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Abstract 
Expectations of how well the European Union (EU) performs in multilateral negotiations 
have often been premised upon the EU’s capabilities as a global actor and its ambition to 
‘lead’.  Considerable attention has subsequently been paid to the EU as an actor, and 
leader, within multilateral negotiations; with focus particularly given to multilateral trade 
and environmental negotiations where expectations of EU performance are highest.  
Within this discourse, highly disparate understandings of how well the EU performs have 
however emerged, with the EU lauded on the one hand for its improving actorness and 
leadership, yet lamented for its ineffectiveness and lack of influence on the other.  Few 
efforts have however sought to move beyond questions of what the EU is, and what it 
wants as a negotiator, to engage instead with what the EU says, what it does, and what it 
achieves in a negotiation environment.  Addressing these issues, the aim of this study is to 
evaluate EU performance in multilateral negotiations as a measure of both its negotiation 
behaviour and effectiveness.  Conducting analysis over-time (from 1995 to 2011) and 
across policy-fields, including case studies covering the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT); this study tests expectations of EU performance and offers 
explanation for why it varies. 
 
Challenging expectations in several ways, the study finds that EU performance in 
multilateral negotiations does not follow a pattern of being good in those fora where it is 
most ‘state-like’ and poor in those forum where it is least integrated, but is instead highly 
variable, not only between negotiation environments, but also within them.  It thus finds 
that the EU performs neither as well as the leadership discourse suggests, nor as poorly as 
the effectiveness literature implies.  Explanation for variation in the EU’s performance is 
moreover found not only in the EU’s institutional complexities and changes in structural 
conditions, but in how these conditions intersect to shape the EU’s level of ambition.  
Where the EU has high ambition, pursuing progressive goals with the EU as a distinctive 
preference outlier compared to its negotiation partners, the EU’s ability to persuade others 
to raise their ambition in support of EU preferences is limited.  Instead, it is where the EU 
moderates its ambition; pursuing progressive objectives but maintaining some zone of 
agreement with negotiation partners that it performs well.  The case is thus made that EU 
negotiation performance may be aided less by the normative distinctiveness of EU 
preferences and its endeavour to ‘lead’ the way, and much more by the EU’s pragmatism 
in finding commonality with the preference structures of its negotiation partners.    
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“In the eyes of domestic political actors as well as negotiating opponents, performance is 
likely to be measured not only by the product you come up with at the end, but also to some 
extent by the way you play the game.”  
(Arild Underdal: 1983: 190) 
 
Since the late 1990s considerable attention has been paid to the European Union (EU) as a 
negotiator, actor, and indeed ‘leader’ in multilateral negotiations.  A burgeoning body of 
debate has concentrated on the EU’s (in)abilities to act, lead, and ultimately to attain its 
goals in multilateral negotiations, with extensive focus particularly given to the EU’s 
leading role in global environmental governance and, specifically, in multilateral climate 
negotiations.  The 2003 European Security Strategy further emphasised this debate, as the 
EU’s strategic objective of ‘effective multilateralism’ narrowed focus onto the EU’s 
abilities not only to build an effective rules-based multilateral system to tackle today’s 
global challenges but importantly, upon the EU’s own effectiveness within it.  
Understanding of the EU’s performance in such fora has therefore been a topic of keen 
interest for EU scholars as the academic community has sought to explain how this unique 
polity functions and achieves its ever more ambitious goals in an international system still 
dominated by the nation-state.   Central to this has been debate of the EU’s capabilities-
expectations gap (Hill: 1993) with the EU seen to be ambitious to take on a greater role but 
often falling short of those aspirations; resorting instead to building its international 
presence if not always its effectiveness.  However, despite being a critical issue of debate 
and a term frequently utilised in EU discourse, ‘performance’ as a concept of analysis has 
rarely been elucidated or explicitly evaluated in the study of the EU.  With a considerable 
volume of literature focusing upon EU leadership and actorness in multilateral 
negotiations, scholars have until very recently tended instead to offer an appraisal of the 
EU’s capacity to act or lead within such forum but with relatively little attention then given 
to the EU’s performance as a measure of its actual negotiation behaviour and overall 
effectiveness.   
 
Increasingly divergent perspectives of EU performance both within, and across, policy 
fields have also developed with the EU seen as a leader, or ‘leading actor’ on the one hand 
and yet inconsistent and often lacking in influence on the other.  This divergence is 
reinforced by a growing disparity between expectations of what the EU ought to do, and 
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what it actually does do in multilateral negotiations.  Understandings of EU performance in 
multilateral negotiations have therefore developed along disparate lines, assessed either on 
the EU’s capacity to ‘act’ or ‘lead’ and thus in part on the “way it plays the game” , or on 
its ability to influence outcome and thus on the “product it comes up with” (Underdal: 
1983: 190), but with limited connectivity between the two.  This study seeks to tackle these 
differences and to test those expectations by explicitly evaluating how well the EU has 
performed – as a measure of both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness - in 
multilateral negotiations spanning time and across policy fields, in order to generate a 
fuller picture of EU performance in multilateral negotiations and to offer some explanation 
for why that performance may vary.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the wider study and is broken down into five 
main sections.  In the first section the concept of performance is introduced with a brief 
overview of how the study of performance has evolved within EU studies and why it 
matters.  In section two discussion is then given to alternative concepts of analysis through 
a review of the existing literature.  Specifically this section considers the discourse on the 
EU as an actor, a leader, and its effectiveness within multilateral negotiations and how 
these debates contribute to expectations of the EU’s performance.   In section three the 
aims of the study are detailed, including its main research questions and the contribution it 
seeks to make, along with an overview and justification of the case studies selected for the 
following empirical analysis.  In section four attention is given to the research and data 
collection methods utilised in the remainder of the study.  The fifth and final section of the 
chapter then offers a breakdown of the thesis structure along with an introduction of the 
main findings from each of the subsequent chapters.   
 
1.1 The evolution of a research agenda 
The performance of the EU in international affairs has, albeit implicitly, drawn the 
attention of scholars since the early 1970s when the first studies into the European 
Communities’ power (Duchêne: 1972) and ‘actorness’ (Sjöstedt: 1977) were introduced.  
As studies sought to describe what the EU was, they further developed to try to explain 
what it did.  Evolving over the 1980s and 1990s as the EU undertook greater widening and 
deepening, a new focus was given to the EU’s ‘presence’ in the world – a concept aimed at 
evaluating the EU’s international role but which moved beyond more state-centric 
approaches to take into consideration the EU’s unique polity (Allen & Smith: 1990: 47).  
The passing of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1992 and the resultant creation of a 
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new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) further developed interest in the EU’s 
performance, particularly in international institutions, as Member States committed to 
“coordinate their action in international organizations and at international conferences” 
and to “uphold [EU] common positions in such fora” (Treaty on European Union: 1992: 
Art. J.2(3)).  Coinciding with increasing public awareness of the need to tackle global 
problems multilaterally, and of the work being conducted in international institutions, 
debate over the late 1990s and early 2000s increasingly re-focused upon the EU’s capacity 
to ‘act’ within such institutions. The EU’s ambition to take on a greater global role, 
especially evident within global environmental governance, further focused the attention of 
scholars, with case studies aimed at analysing EU actorness and leadership in global 
climate negotiations in particular (e.g. Jupille & Caporaso: 1998, Jupille: 1999, Gupta & 
Grubb: 2000, Vogler: 2005, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006).   
 
With this focus on EU leadership in multilateral negotiations – a concept that particularly 
emphasised the EU’s ‘positive influence’ (Underdal: 1994) and its ability to attract 
followers - renewed attention was also given to the type of power that the EU was, with the 
EU’s uniqueness as an international actor ensuing debate of its distinctiveness as a 
‘normative’ (Manners: 2002, 2006), ‘transformative’ (Börzel & Risse: 2009), and even 
‘ethical’ (Aggestam: 2008) power: one who chose to act multilaterally, and who sought to 
be a ‘force for good’; furthering its normative and ethical values, and strengthening a rules-
based multilateral system.  Within this discourse the EU’s ‘normative’ power has 
particularly been popularised as a means of assessing not only the EU’s distinctive 
international identity courtesy of ‘what it is’, but also its methods of wielding influence in 
international affairs (Manners: 2002: 242).  Stressing the EU’s, “different existence, the 
different norms, and the different policies that the EU pursues”, the Normative Power 
Europe (NPE) debate has been notable in stressing the distinctive performance of the EU in 
“redefining what can be ‘normal’ in international relations.” (Manners & Whitman: 2003: 
389-390); especially identified in what is seen as the EU’s ‘ideational impact’ and ‘power 
over opinion’ within the international system (Manners: 2002: 238-9). 
 
Focus on the EU as a ‘type’ of power has invariably led, over the course of the 2000s, to 
scholars becoming ever more interested in the EU’s “power over outcomes” (A.R Young: 
2010: 4), and the debate has further evolved to address the EU’s effectiveness within 
international organisations, in particular within the United Nations (Ortega: 2005, 
Laaitakinen & Smith: 2006), but with case studies concentrating on a growing array of 
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international organisations (Kissack: 2010, Jørgensen: 2009a, 2009b).  The EU’s influence 
within multilateral negotiations has also started to draw attention (Van Schaik & Schunz: 
2012, Schunz: 2010a, 2010b), again reflecting a growing interest towards the EU as more 
than just an international presence but on its ability to shape international outcome and 
achieve its desired results.  
 
Throughout this evolving research agenda, attention has notably shifted across several 
different concepts of analysis aimed at addressing questions of what the EU is and says (as 
a presence, actor, leader, or a distinctive type of power?), what it does (what capacity does 
the EU have to act, what instruments does it use?), and what it achieves (is the EU 
effective and does it exert influence?) in its external relations. Until very recently however, 
very few attempts have been given to addressing the connectivity between these questions 
on what the EU is, says and does and how they relate to each other (see also Damro: 2012: 
697).  Since the start of the 2010s a new research agenda has however started to emerge 
which addresses these linkages by focusing explicitly on EU performance in its external 
relations.  Within this new field of study EU performance in foreign policy (ECFR: 2010) 
and international institutions (JEI Special Issue 2011) have become of increasing interest 
with the emergence also of a new academic network - EUPERFORM
1
 - being established 
for the dedicated study of EU performance in international institutions.   Within those 
performance studies, performance is conceptualised and “unpacked” (Jørgensen et al. 
2011: 599) into a number of criteria or indicators to evaluate not only the EU’s capabilities 
as an actor, but its behaviour within its foreign policy relations and in other institutions and 
its effectiveness or ‘goal achievement’.  Policy-makers have also increasingly started to 
focus upon performance, not least since the global recession in 2008 where on-going 
concerns over the EU’s economic performance have raised the need for more accurate 
means of assessing what the EU is doing to achieve its goals and how successful it is in 
achieving them.  Several studies have been conducted by the European Commission (2008, 
2011) and the European Commission Joint Research Initiative (2010) into EU and Member 
State performance in areas of trade, innovation and enterprise.  Moreover, within 
international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the United 
Nations (UN) the EU and its Member States are themselves subject to performance 
assessments as institutions seek to generate a picture of progress made towards specific 
international goals (i.e. WTO: 2011).   
 
                                                   
1
 For more information see http://www.ies.be/euperform  
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Performance studies are thus increasingly providing the means by which EU behaviour and 
success in its external relations are being assessed and quantified.  As a comparative 
concept, performance studies are highly adept at providing comparison of what the EU 
does, and how successful it has been, either over-time, across products/policies or relative 
to other actors. Performance studies contribute therefore, to the growing competitiveness 
debate within the EU which, since the launch of the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, although 
being primarily concerned with the EU’s economic performance, has nevertheless 
showcased the competitiveness of the EU and its ability to perform well across external 
policy fields.  Performance, as a concept of analysis, offers therefore a highly useful 
analytical tool to further the research agenda, begun in the 1970s, in better understanding 
not only what the EU is doing in its external relations but also, importantly, how well it 
then does.  It is to this small, yet growing field of research that this study thus seeks to 
contribute.  By evaluating EU performance within the specific context of multilateral 
negotiations – a context, it is argued, that is the very crux of global governance and 
fundamental to modern international relations – it aims to generate a fuller understanding 
of EU performance, as a measure of its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness, in order to 
address both consistency and change in EU performance: whether it has improved or 
diminished, and what this can reveal about the EU as an international actor and negotiator.  
 
1.2 Divergent understandings and disparate expectations - EU ‘performance’ 
in multilateral negotiations 
In order to set the scene for the study and to begin to conceptualise performance, a review 
of the existing literature focusing upon the EU within international institutions, and 
multilateral negotiations, is now given.  Focus in this review is particularly given to the 
discourse of what might be seen as competing concepts of analysis, including the EU’s 
actorness, leadership and effectiveness within multilateral negotiations.  Specifically, this 
review addresses how the existing literature has generated divergent understandings of 
what constitutes performance as well as how the EU’s capabilities as an actor have shaped 
expectations of its performance in multilateral negotiations.  By way of clarification, a 
multilateral negotiation is here understood as a process of interaction between three or 
more States (Ruggie: 1992: 571, Keohane: 1999: 731) in order to reach agreement or find 
common interest where conflicting interests are present (Iklé: 1964: 3-4).  More 
specifically, multilateral negotiations addressed in this study may be understood as a 
process of ‘Global Conference Diplomacy’ involving, “meetings of governmental 
representatives serviced by a secretariat and, in some cases, attended by non-governmental 
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observers” (Rittberger: 1983: 170). Multilateral negotiations focused upon therefore 
include those conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). 
 
The ‘Capability-Expectations Gap’ 
Before turning to other concepts of analysis and how they relate to understandings of EU 
performance in multilateral negotiations, it is first necessary to consider the EU’s 
capabilities as an international actor and the expectations that these create in understanding 
how well the EU might perform in any given negotiation environment.  As a polity the EU 
is widely recognised as sui generis.  Increasingly active in the international community the 
EU has evolved since its creation in 1957 to develop capabilities beyond that of a regional 
economic community to also include a wide variety of competences in its external 
relations.  In its efforts towards ‘ever closer  union’2, on-going integration between EU 
Member States in policy fields such as trade, the environment, and security, has meant that 
the EU now frequently ‘acts’ alongside other State Parties within multilateral negotiations.  
However, as a complex polity with varying degrees of authority delegated to it by its still 
sovereign Member States, the EU is widely acknowledged for inconsistencies in its 
capability to act internationally; often referenced using the popularised phrase of being an, 
‘economic giant, political dwarf but military worm’ (New York Times: 1991).  Thus, 
despite its considerable size, population, and economic, military and diplomatic 
capabilities, the EU does not always have the internal decision-making infrastructure that 
would allow it to use them (Whitman: 2010: 26).  Expectations of how well the EU can 
subsequently perform in multilateral negotiations are thus highly disparate depending upon 
the policy field under negotiation and the EU’s capabilities within that field. 
 
As one of the world’s economic superpowers (McCormick: 2007) and with a supranational 
Common Commercial Policy (CCP) directing the collective decisions of EU economic and 
trading interests, the EU is generally expected to have a greater international influence in 
its external trade and commercial relations than it would in policy areas where its 
institutional capabilities are less integrated (i.e. Meunier & Nicolaïdis: 2011).  With trade 
policy under the exclusive competence of the European Community, the European 
Commission is responsible for initiating and implementing EU trade policy and also 
                                                   
2
 Under the preamble of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community signatories, 
“determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (Treaty of Rome: 
1957 emphasis added) 
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formally speaks for the EU in all of its external trade relations.  The EU subsequently 
‘speaks with one voice’ when it comes to multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) and is, in 
this forum, seen to be at its most ‘state-like’ (Whitman: 2010: 27, Bretherton & Vogler: 
2006: 88); raising expectations of the EU being better able to monopolise on its not 
inconsiderable market size and economic resources to gain bargaining power and influence 
within the multilateral trading system (MTS) (Meunier: 2000).    
 
On the other side of the spectrum, despite the creation of the CFSP intended to create 
capability for the EU to take on a greater international role in areas of foreign and security 
policy, scholars have been at pains to comment on the EU’s continued limitations in this 
field (see Ginsberg & Smith: 2007: 273).  Christopher Hill’s (1993) seminal paper 
lamenting the EU’s ‘Capabilities-Expectations Gap’ particularly highlighted this 
disconnect between what had been ‘talked up’ about the EU’s foreign and security policy 
capabilities and what the reality of its situation as a global actor in fact was.  Hill (2004: 
154) later argued that despite the EU’s will to act collectively in international security 
negotiations it still lacked the capacity to be considered a “serious player”.  Comparative to 
the high expectations of EU performance in its external trade relations, expectations of EU 
performance in the security field - where EU Member States maintain national authority 
and where the EU is subsequently less integrated – thus continue to lag behind (Jørgensen: 
2009b: 196).  Low expectations of the EU’s performance in multilateral negotiations have 
moreover been further corroborated by the conventional wisdom that it is only when the 
EU stands together and united that it can perform well in multilateral negotiations (Wessel: 
2011, Jørgensen & Wessel: 2011).  Where the EU has more limited capability to maintain 
its unity, particularly where there are internal divisions amongst its Member States, 
criticisms have followed that EU performance has been weakened by its lowest common 
denominator positioning (Müller: 2010, Elgström & Stromvik: 2005: 117, House of Lords: 
2004: 56), inflexibility (Meunier: 2000: 106, Paeman & Bensch: 1995:  94), or due to 
‘navel gazing’ (Van Schaik & Egenhofer: 2003) and ‘bunker mentality’ (Oberthür & 
Pallemaerts: 2010), whereby the EU spends more time negotiating with itself and 
presenting ambiguous statements than negotiating with others and shaping negotiation 
outcomes.     
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Interestingly however, expectations have also been high (at least until the later 2000s
3
) of 
the EU performing particularly well in multilateral environmental negotiations: this despite 
the fact that the EU has a more limited capability in its common environmental policy 
relative to its CCP.  On environmental issues such as climate policy the EU in fact shares 
competence with its Member States.  The EU must therefore go through a careful process 
of internal negotiation between often divergent policy preferences of the EU’s 27 Member 
States (Van Schaik: 2010) in order to derive its external policy and negotiation objectives.  
Unlike the field of trade however, within multilateral environmental negotiations the 
Commission and the Council Presidency may speak for the EU whilst Member States also 
retain their right to speak in a national capacity; creating potential sources of division for 
the EU as well as confusion for its negotiation partners (Yamin: 2000).  Despite this, the 
EU’s own ambitions in tackling global environmental issues since as early as 1990 
(Council: 1990), and the forging of its international identity as a ‘green’ leader (Kilian & 
Elgström: 2010, Elgström: 2007, Chaban et al.: 2006), have also significantly raised 
expectations of EU performance within multilateral environmental negotiations (see 
Vogler: 2011).   
 
Consequently, scholarly interest has tended to focus much more on those negotiations 
where expectations of the EU’s role are higher and, over the course of the 1990s and 2000s 
volumes of literature have been produced focusing specifically on EU leadership, actorness 
and effectiveness within multilateral trade and environmental negotiations.   What is still 
more interesting is that whilst expectations of the EU’s negotiation performance vary in 
accordance with the EU’s capabilities across its different external relations, analyses of EU 
performance within those negotiations where it has been expected to perform well have 
nevertheless diverged considerably.  Within this literature the EU has thus been seen as 
both a ‘leading’ and highly significant player (i.e. Vogler: 2011, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 
2007, Falkner: 2007, Van Den Hoven: 2004, Woolcock & Smith: 1999), but one that also 
lacks influence and is ineffective (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012, Lacasta et al.: 2007, Hovi 
et al.: 2003, Paeman & Bensch: 1995).  Much of this discrepancy may however be 
explained in the concepts used to make those assessments.  It is to these concepts that this 
review now turns. 
 
                                                   
3
 The EU was widely criticised for its failures at the UNFCCC’s Copenhagen Summit in 2009 which has 
raised questions amongst academics and policy-makers of the EU’s continued prominence in global 
environmental governance (see Afionis: 2011, Roberts: 2010, Santarius et al. 2009).  This is developed upon 
in Chapter Three. 
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Raising expectations: An improved EU ‘leadership’ within multilateral negotiations?  
Leadership, as a concept of analysis, has grown in particular prominence in EU studies 
since the late 1990s.  Seminal works by O. Young (1991), Underdal (1994), and Malnes 
(1995) in re-conceptualising leadership as a necessary form of behaviour to ensure the 
effectiveness of international regimes have increasingly been drawn upon to identify and 
specify the actions and behaviour of the EU as a ‘leader’ within multilateral negotiations  
(see Wurzel & Connelly: 2011, Parker & Karlsson: 2010, Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007, 
Zito: 2005, Andresen & Agrawala: 2002, Oberthür: 2000).  Understood as a form of 
negotiation behaviour in which an actor could exert “positive influence” over others in the 
pursuit of common and shared objectives (Underdal: 1994); from as early as 1990 the EU 
was itself using leadership rhetoric in statements regarding multilateral environmental 
negotiations whereby the EU, “as one of the foremost regional groupings in the world, 
[would] play a leading role in promoting concerted and effective action at a global level” 
(European Council: 1990, emphasis added).  Much has subsequently been written which 
focuses upon the evaluation, and explanation, of EU ‘green’ leadership (i.e. Wurzel & 
Connelly: 2011, Oberthür: 2011b, Kilian & Elgström: 2010, Parker & Karlsson: 2010, 
Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008, Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007, Vogler & Stephan: 2007, 
Zito: 2005), with the case study of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) negotiations and the Kyoto Protocol to cut global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions popularly employed as providing, “the EU’s most paramount claim to 
leadership” (Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 105).   
 
Early works into EU leadership in the 1990s were however, highly sceptical of the EU’s 
self-proclaimed leadership in multilateral negotiations; especially evident in the UN 
climate change negotiations (e.g. Oberthür: 1999, Gupta & Grubb: 2000, Gupta & Ringius: 
2001, Hovi et al. 2003), as well as to some extent within the Uruguay Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations (Paeman & Bensch: 1995, Smith & Woolcock: 1999, 
Devyust: 1995, Woolcock & Hodges: 1996).  Within that discourse the EU was 
particularly criticised for its ‘high ambition but low performance’ (Hovi et al. 2003) due to 
its internal conflicts and divisions (Gupta & Ringius: 2001), for spending too much time 
having to negotiate with itself (Andresen & Agrawala: 2002: 48) and of lacking the 
capacity to lead (Hovi et al.: 2003: 16).  In the 2000s however academic attention shifted 
away from critiquing the EU’s leadership role, to engage instead with the question of why 
the EU was a leader (Zito: 2005, Harris: 2007, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010, Wurzel & 
Connelly: 2011) and the forms of leadership the EU exhibited (Parker & Karlsson: 2010, 
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Oberthur & Roche Kelly: 2008, Vogler & Stephan: 2007).  Within that discourse, studies 
have widely acknowledged what is believed to be the EU’s “improved” leadership record, 
in which the EU has been argued to have “traded places” with the United States as the 
leading actor on global environmental governance (Keleman & Vogel: 2010, Keleman: 
2010, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007, Schreurs & 
Tiberghien: 2007).  Drawing close synergies with the Normative Power Europe debate (i.e. 
Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012, Falkner: 2007, Schiepers & Sicurelli: 2007), arguments 
followed that the EU particularly demonstrates “directional leadership” (Oberthur & Roche 
Kelly: 2008: 36, Skodvin & Andresen: 2006: 21, Andresen & Agrawala: 2002: 49) that is, 
one who, “demonstrates through domestic implementation that a goal is achievable” 
(Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 82) and by the, “setting of a good example or showing the way on 
how to deal with an issue” (Andresen & Agrawala: 2002: 41).  In the multilateral trading 
system similar assessments have also being made of EU leadership within the WTO, with 
the EU’s role in the creation of the WTO and acting as demandeur for a new round of trade 
negotiations, reflecting its improved performance within the MTS (Paeman & Bensch: 
1995, Woolcock & Smith: 1999, Van Den Hoven: 2004).    
 
Such assessments have particularly emphasised the EU’s willingness and ambition to ‘lead 
the way’ for others to follow as reason for its improved leadership record (Parker & 
Karlsson: 2010, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007, Van Den 
Hoven: 2004), along with its distinctively ‘normative’ position within negotiations (Van 
Schaik & Schunz: 2012, Van Den Hoven: 2004).  The EUs ambitions are further seen to be 
reinforced by developments in the EU’s institution with flagship policy developments such 
as the creation of the Single European Market (SEM), reforms of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) (A.R Young: 2011, Jørgensen: 2009a, M. Baldwin: 2006), the establishment 
of the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the evolution of the EU’s ambitious 
climate and energy package (Oberthür: 2011a, Keleman & Vogel: 2009, Oberthür & Roche 
Kelly: 2008: 44, Oberthür: 2000: 649) believed to have encouraged the EU to develop 
more progressive policy objectives at the international level.  The EU’s own high 
ambitions as a domestic actor in tackling climate change, i.e. by taking autonomous action 
to set high unilateral targets for the cutting of greenhouse gas emissions have thus been 
frequently cited as reason for the EU’s improved leadership record (Parker & Karlsson: 
2010: 930, Gowan & Brantner: 2008: 45, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36, Schreurs & 
Tiberghien: 2007: 19, Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 288).   
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However, in what may be described as, “decadal variation” (Oberthür: 2011a), discourse in 
the later 2000s and early 2010s has increasingly started to question the EU’s leadership of 
multilateral negotiations; identifying the rise of the emerging economies (Brazil, China and 
India) as possible explanation for the EU’s ‘fall’ or diminishing performance (Oberthür: 
2011a, A.R Young: 2011, Roberts: 2010, M. Baldwin: 2006).  Within the leadership 
discourse therefore there is some broad agreement that the EU has demonstrated an 
“improved” (Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008, Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2004, Van Den 
Hoven: 2004) leadership record within multilateral environmental and trade negotiations 
over the 2000s but that this may now be diminishing due to competition from new actors 
within the international system.  From a performance perspective however these 
assessments are problematic.  For one thing, whilst there is a general consensus of an 
improving EU leadership over the 2000s, this has been premised primarily on “directional 
leadership” and thus can reveal little of the EU’s actual negotiation performance during 
this time.  The EU has thus been defined as a ‘leader’ premised on its ‘setting an example’  
for others to follow (Vogler: 2011: 30-31, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 28, Schreurs & 
Tiberghien: 2007), or in pushing for ambitious objectives or targets (Parker & Karlsson: 
2010, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008, Van Den Hoven: 2004), but with very little attention 
then paid to the EU’s relationship with those it has supposedly ‘led’, or of its actions in 
persuading them to follow.    
 
Others further argue that the EU is also less successful in exerting more ‘structural’ forms 
of leadership – defined as the use of ‘carrots over sticks’ (O. Young: 1991) and the 
utilisation of power resources to influence and exert a pull on followers (A.R. Young: 
2011, Wurzel & Connelly: 2011: 272, Torney: 2011, Hovi et al.: 2003: 17).  Moreover, it 
has been suggested that despite setting an example in its own domestic policies, and 
pushing for ambitious objectives within multilateral climate negotiations, the EU has had, 
“comparatively limited impact” (Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36, see also Van Schaik 
& Schunz: 2012).  In the EU trade policy literature a similar picture has also started to 
emerge, with the EU frequently identified as one of the MTS’s leading and most powerful 
actors, but then one whose ability to influence the course and outcome of multilateral trade 
negotiations and to attain its goals has shown increasing limitations (see A.R. Young: 
2011: 727).  
 
EU ‘leadership’ analyses thus shed only limited light onto how well the EU has actually 
performed in multilateral negotiations.  Rather than addressing the EU’s negotiation 
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behaviour and its outreach to negotiation partners, the leadership discourse over the 2000s 
has instead significantly raised expectations of EU performance in multilateral negotiations 
whilst setting the bar relatively low for its actual assessment.  By premising assessment on 
the EU’s “directional leadership” - a concept which emphasises the EU’s setting an 
example through its domestic policies and showing the way for others to follow – 
expectations have followed that the EU can be a leader in multilateral negotiations 
courtesy of the distinctiveness of its policy preferences, its domestic performance and 
because it has the ambition to ‘lead the way’.  Arguments of an ‘improved’ EU leadership 
record have thus been an appraisal of the EU’s internal capabilities and ambitions to lead 
rather than offering explicit analysis of its negotiation behaviour, particularly towards 
those whom it is seeking to ‘lead’, and its subsequent effectiveness.  
 
An approach is therefore required which readdresses this imbalance between the rhetoric of 
EU leadership and its actual performance in multilateral negotiations.  By focusing more 
specifically on what the EU does in its negotiation behaviour – particularly addressing its 
outreach to negotiation partners – and its effectiveness in attaining its negotiation 
objectives, it is possible to better address the relationship between EU ambitions within 
multilateral negotiations, and its performance in actually achieving them.  In so doing it is 
possible to move beyond the leadership rhetoric to engage instead with what the EU wants 
within multilateral negotiations relative to its negotiation partners, how it behaves in order 
to secure their support, and whether it is able to attain its goals.    
 
EU ‘actorness’ within multilateral negotiations: establishing EU ‘capacity to act’  
Another interrelated approach in understanding the EU in multilateral negotiations has 
been to focus upon the EU’s capacities and behaviour as an ‘actor’ (Kilian & Elgström: 
2010: 257, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007: 991, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 89, Damro: 
2006: 175).  Within this EU as a Global Actor (EUGA) literature, the concept of analysis 
commonly utilised is that of ‘actorness’ – defined as “the capacity to behave actively and 
deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” (Sjöstedt: 1977: 16).  
Sjöstedt (1977: 15) in his founding work on EU actorness argued that, at its most basic 
level, the EU was an actor when it had autonomy to act (thus demonstrating internal 
cohesion and separateness); where it showed basic indicators of actor capability (the 
structural prerequisites for the EU to perform actions) and demonstrated some actor 
behaviour (i.e. where Member States conformed with the EU position, or more external 
behavioural activities such as diplomatic interaction).  Jupille & Caporaso (1998: 214-220) 
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developed on this by detailing four components of actor capacity including recognition 
(the acceptance of and interaction with the EU by others), authority (relating particularly to 
the EU’s legal competence to act), autonomy (the distinctiveness and independence of the 
EU from other actors), and cohesion (the degree to which the EU is able to formulate and 
articulate internally consistent policy preferences).  Bretherton & Vogler (2006) further 
posited three interrelated conditions required for the EU to act internationally, including: 
opportunity (in the structural context), presence (the ability of the EU, by virtue of its 
existence, to exert influence beyond its own borders) and capability (concerning the 
availability of policy instruments and their use).   
 
Studies assessing EU ‘actorness’ in multilateral negotiations have developed exponentially 
since the early works of Sjöstedt (1977, 1998) and Jupille & Caporaso (1998) with several 
comparative studies (Bretherton & Vogler: 2006, Ginsberg: 2001) as well as numerous 
individual case studies demonstrating a similar tendency to that found in the EU leadership 
discourse; that of focusing upon multilateral environmental negotiations (Vogler: 1999, 
2005, 2011, Vogler & Stephan: 2007, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007).  Typically 
employing a diagnostician approach (Sjöstedt: 1977: 11), these studies have been aimed at 
assessing the extent to which the EU demonstrates ‘actorness’ and thus has the ‘capacity to 
act deliberately and actively’ within multilateral negotiations.  Related to this, increasing 
volumes of literature have also focused on specific aspects of EU actorness including in 
reference to the EU’s delegation authority and autonomy (Laatikainen: 2010, Da 
Conceição: 2010, Delreux & Kerremans: 2010, Delreux: 2006) or on its modes of 
representation within multilateral negotiations (Gstöhl: 2009, Pisani-Ferry: 2009, Van 
Schaik & Egenhofer: 2005, 2003).   
 
Within this discourse several important assessments are to be identified.  First, and most 
prominently, EU actorness is widely understood within the existing literature to be at its 
highest in the field of trade policy where the EU’s capabilities as an actor are most 
advanced.  Bretherton & Vogler (2006: 87) in their analysis of the EU as a Global Actor 
for example, argue that, because the EU can negotiate as “one bloc” within multilateral 
trade negotiations it can be “effective, coherent and frequently innovative”.  They go on to 
suggest that the EU’s trade policy thus “provides a yardstick for the assessment of 
actorness in other domains” (Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 88). Jupille & Caporaso (1998: 
216-218) moreover highlight the EU’s CCP in their breakdown of actorness conditions, 
emphasising the EU’s exclusive competence in trade as, “the greatest external authority” 
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granted to the European Community under the Treaty of Rome.  Second, broadly 
analogous with the EU’s leadership discourse, actorness studies have also assessed the 
EU’s, “high degree of actorness” within multilateral climate negotiations (Groenleer & 
Van Schaik: 2007: 989, Vogler: 2011, 2005, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 89).  
Interestingly, in these assessments emphasis is particularly given to the EU’s improved 
cohesion as an actor within the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol negotiations despite its 
mixed competence in this field (see Oberthur & Pallemaerts: 2010: 47, Groenleer & Van 
Schaik: 2007, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 107, 110).  Thus, despite the challenges of 
capacity and coordination the EU has nevertheless been found to ‘act’ and even ‘lead’ 
within multilateral climate negotiations (Vogler: 2011, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008).   
 
Drawing similar comparisons with the EU leadership discourse, explanation of the EU’s 
“high degree of actorness” as well as its “improved” leadership within multilateral 
environmental negotiations place particular emphasis on the EU’s ambitions to lead and 
its, “global policy aspirations” (Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007: 990, Bretherton & Vogler: 
2006: 110).  Focus therefore has been given to the convergence of Member States interests 
and their willingness for the EU to take on a greater international role (Van Schaik: 2010, 
Van Den Hoven: 2004), its growing capacity to lead as a result of institutional 
developments (Van Schaik: 2010, Parker & Karlsson: 2010, Oberthur & Pallemaerts; 2010, 
Schreurs & Tiberghein: 2007, Falkner: 2007, Zito: 2005, Van Schaik & Egenhofer: 2005), 
or its domestic policies as explanation for the EU proposing ever more ambitious 
international objectives (Keleman: 2010, Keleman & Vogel: 2009).  Another common 
argument has been to claim that EU leadership and actorness within multilateral 
negotiations has come as a result of ‘opportunity’ within the structural conditions of the 
negotiation environment; particularly evident where the United States has itself failed to 
provide such a leadership role (Vogler: 2011: 31-34, Vogler & Stephan: 2007, Hovi et. al.: 
2003:14).   
 
From a performance perspective this discourse does therefore offer some interesting 
insights.  As a concept aimed at establishing the EU’s ‘capacity to act’, actorness provides 
a helpful starting block for the evaluation of EU performance.  The EU’s uniqueness as a 
polity within the international system and its variable capability to ‘act’ within multilateral 
negotiations makes it essential to first establish that the EU – as opposed to its individual 
Member States – is an ‘actor’ and thus a subject capable of performance analysis.   
However, from an evaluation perspective, actorness studies have only been able to reveal 
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so much of the EU’s actual performance in multilateral negotiations.  As a process-oriented 
concept of analysis, actorness studies have been limited to an EU qua the EU focus which 
dwells much on the EU’s cohesion, modes of representation, recognition and presence 
within multilateral negotiations, but which then overlooks its negotiation behaviour 
relative to negotiation partners and its effectiveness.  Instead, causality is often implied 
within the literature that where the EU demonstrates high degrees of actorness it will more 
likely demonstrate effectiveness (see Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 87).  This same link is 
also found in discussion of the EU ‘speaking with one voice’; with expectations following 
that where the EU demonstrates cohesion and unity as an actor it will be more effective 
within multilateral negotiations (i.e. Jørgensen & Wessel: 2011, Van Schaik: 2010, Gstöhl: 
2009, Elgström & Jönsson: 2005).  This assumed link has however, rarely been developed 
upon or tested (see Thomas: 2012).   Important for consideration therefore, is not only 
whether the EU has the ‘capacity to act’ within multilateral negotiations and how this 
might vary across policy fields, but also how the EU subsequently performs.   In this way 
focus can move beyond expectations of how the EU ought to act, and diagnosing that the 
EU is an actor, to start to engage with how the EU then behaves and the results it comes up 
with.   
 
Performance as goal-attainment?: EU ‘effectiveness’ in multilateral negotiations 
In addition to the process-oriented concepts of leadership and actorness which have been 
concerned with the assessment of EU capabilities and its ‘leading’ role within multilateral 
negotiations, another concept increasingly used in evaluating the EU’s performance in 
multilateral negotiations has been its ‘effectiveness’.  Early studies by Jupille (1999) and 
Meunier (2000) instigated this more outcome-oriented focus by addressing how the EU’s 
institutional complexities enable the EU to strengthen its bargaining power and 
subsequently achieve international outcomes.  Since 2003, when the EU introduced its first 
European Security Strategy stating its strategic objective to pursue ‘effective 
multilateralism’ through the, “development of a stronger international society, well-
functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order” (Council: 2003c: 
9), a number of studies have been generated which centre upon the EU’s effectiveness 
within international institutions (Laatikainen & Smith: 2006, Jørgensen: 2009a, Kissack: 
2010).   
 
Within existing EU performance studies, effectiveness – defined as ‘goal achievement’ 
(Jørgensen et al. 2011: 603), or associated with ‘outcome’ (ECFR: 2010: 140) - are 
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particularly prioritised when ‘unpacking’ the concept into specific performance indicators.  
A.R Young (2011: 720) for example associates the analysis of EU ‘performance’ within 
the multilateral trading system with EU ‘external effectiveness’.  Within other case studies 
conducted in the JEI Special Issue on EU performance in international institutions, it is the 
EU’s effectiveness that is of primary interest to the authors, followed by its ‘relevance’ to 
EU Member States where focus turns to EU representation, cohesion and capability (i.e. 
Oberthur: 2011a, Kissack: 2011, Van Schaik: 2011).  The EUPERFORM academic 
network further equates performance with ‘impact on decision-making’4. Similarly 
performance studies conducted by the European Commission are also predominantly 
outcome-driven.  The performance study ‘Global Europe: EU performance in the global 
economy’ (Commission: 2008), for example, assesses EU trade performance through the 
measurement of indicators ranging from EU market share, imports, exports and areas of 
trade specialism.  In its report the Commission judges the EU’s trading performance as 
‘good’ or ‘disappointing’ where the EU’s statistics are higher or lower than those of other 
major economies.  The tendency therefore has been to associate how well the EU performs 
with the extent to which it can attain its goals and demonstrate competitiveness with its 
partners in the international system.   
 
Within the effectiveness discourse however there is also some ambiguity over how 
‘effectiveness’ itself should be defined.  Jørgensen et al. (2011: 604) for example identify 
effectiveness as ‘goal achievement’ and add the caveat that assessment may also need to 
take into account, “how easy or difficult the achievement of the goals has been, given their 
level of ambition, the characteristics of the problem and the preferences of other actors”.  
The ECFR (2010: 140) focuses on assessment of ‘outcome’ as the EU ‘getting what it 
wants’ in its foreign policy.  It goes on to state however, that the EU getting what it wants 
may be assessed regardless of whether other actors were in fact responsible for that 
objective being obtained.  Others associate effectiveness with both effective ‘behaviour’ 
and effective ‘goal-attainment’.  The regime effectiveness discourse for example draws 
symmetries between regime ‘effectiveness’ and ‘performance’ (i.e. O. Young: 2001, Miles 
et al. 2002).  Interestingly in this body of literature the effectiveness of a regime is virtually 
synonymous to the regime’s ‘performance’; which is assessed in terms of regime 
behaviour and function.  Miles et al. (2002) for example, measure regime performance as 
an assessment of both the regime’s behavioural effectiveness and its functional 
effectiveness.  Laatikainen & Smith (2006: 16-19), in their study of the EU in the UN, 
                                                   
4
 http://www.ies.be/euperform  
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emphasise a similar relationship between the EU’s internal effectiveness (as an 
international actor demonstrating collective action, cohesion and output) and external 
effectiveness (whether the EU then achieves its objectives); suggesting that the EU has 
been externally effective in the UN insofar as it has been able to overcome the challenges 
of its own multilateral system and become internally effective.   
 
Assessments of the EU’s effectiveness within multilateral negotiations have moreover been 
highly variable.  Laatikainen and Smith (2006: 20) for example argue that EU effectiveness 
has varied considerably across issue-area within the UN, with the EU often found to have, 
“punched below its weight” when it comes to influence over outcome.  Jørgensen et al. 
(2011) suggests a similar picture of fluctuating effectiveness in their longitudinal overview 
of EU performance in international institutions.  In individual case studies EU 
effectiveness within the multilateral trading system (A.R Young: 2011), and in the climate 
negotiations (Oberthür: 2011a) reflect similar findings: of the EU demonstrating improved 
effectiveness over the late 1990s and 2000s but that, with the rise of new players in the 
international system in the late 2000s, that effectiveness has started to fall.  Others have 
stressed the EU’s lack of influence in shaping the outcome of UNFCCC negotiations (Van 
Schaik & Schunz: 2012, Schunz: 2010b) whilst having greater effectiveness in shaping the 
agenda of discussions (Vogler & Stephan: 2007).   
 
Such assessments thus raise a challenging dynamic in understanding EU performance 
within multilateral negotiations.  As has been discussed previously the EU has been widely 
lauded for its improved leadership and high degree of actorness within multilateral climate 
and trade negotiations.  However, when analysed from a more outcome-oriented 
perspective, effectiveness studies have lamented the EU’s far more variable ability to 
achieve its goals and its lack of influence within those same negotiations.  A further 
challenge is that whilst the ‘external effectiveness’ of the EU has become of increasing 
importance to academics and policy-makers – not least in moving beyond the rhetoric of 
what is ‘talked up’ about the EU’s international role in order to establish what the EU 
actually achieves – there is some danger in focusing only on goal achievement as a 
measure of EU performance.  For one thing, focusing solely on effectiveness can 
considerably over- or under-estimate how well the EU in fact performed.  In particular, 
without recourse to the EU’s behaviour during negotiations it is impossible to ascertain the 
extent to which the EU’s goal-attainment signifies a good performance for the EU or not.  
This is especially relevant in the case of multilateral negotiations which tend to be 
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premised on ‘positive sum games’ (Zartman & Berman: 1982: 13), and where compromise 
and consensus decision-making between a large number of negotiation partners is 
increasingly the norm (Kissack: 2010).  The EU’s preferences and objectives and whether 
it has achieved them cannot therefore realistically be treated in a vacuum but must take 
into account the preference structures of its negotiation partners and the EU’s activities in 
negotiating with them.  By neglecting to take into consideration the preferences of other 
actors, the roles that they play, their significance within the negotiation process, and how 
this relates to the EU’s own behaviour in dealing with them, effectiveness on its own offers 
an incomplete picture of how well the EU has actually performed in multilateral 
negotiations. 
 
Important for a performance analysis therefore is to address the EU’s effectiveness in 
multilateral negotiations as an essential, but insufficient, indicator of how well the EU 
performs.  By focusing on both how the EU’s negotiation objectives relate to the 
preference structures of its negotiation partners, and to the EU’s negotiation behaviour 
relative to its goal-attainment, it is possible to evaluate how well the EU performs in 
multilateral negotiations in a way which not only accounts for what the EU achieves, but 
importantly, to how this relates to what it has said and done.  
   
1.3. Aims of the study and case study selection 
In addressing these challenges identified within the existing literature the aims of this study 
are twofold.  First and foremost this study is an investigation into EU performance in 
multilateral negotiations.  Conducted over-time and across policy fields, it seeks to 
generate a fuller understanding of EU performance, as a measure of both the EU’s 
negotiation behaviour and overall effectiveness, in fora which are the very crux of global 
governance and fundamental to modern international relations.  Specifically this study 
addresses consistency and change in EU performance, whether it has improved or 
diminished, and what this can reveal about the EU as an international actor and negotiator.  
Second, the study endeavours to offer explanation for variation in EU performance within 
multilateral negotiations, with particular consideration to the relationship between the EU’s 
ambitions entering negotiations and its subsequent performance.  In particular, the research 
questions this study aims to address include: 
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Research Questions 
(1) How well has the EU performed in multilateral negotiations over-time and across-
policy fields? 
 
(2) What explains variation in EU performance in multilateral negotiations? 
 
Addressing these questions is important for several reasons.  Firstly, whilst studies thus far 
have provided some account of how the EU performs in multilateral negotiations, within 
these studies have been highly divergent understandings of how such assessment is made 
and with conflicting conclusions of how well the EU in fact performs. Assessments thus 
far focused on process or outcome-oriented aspects of EU negotiation performance have 
therefore risked over- or under-estimating how well the EU in fact performs in multilateral 
negotiations.  Focus in particular has been towards particular aspects of the EU’s 
performance – such as what the EU says and what it seeks to achieve, its unity, cohesion 
and methods of coordination, or on its effectiveness more broadly - but with little reference 
to how this relates to the preferences and behaviour of the EU’s negotiation partners , or 
what the EU then does as a negotiator.  How well the EU performs in multilateral 
negotiations – especially in the eyes of its negotiation partners - is however, as Underdal 
(1983) expresses, both an assessment of “how [the EU] plays the game” and “the product 
[it] comes up with”.  It is necessary therefore to address the existing disconnect within EU 
studies to assess how well the EU performs in multilateral negotiations as a measure of 
both its negotiation behaviour – taking into consideration not only its unity as an actor, but 
also its actions towards negotiation partners in tackling the issues under negotiation - and 
its effectiveness in achieving its objectives.  This is important, not only in providing a 
more comprehensive conceptualisation of performance in order to generate a fuller and 
more accurate picture of EU performance in multilateral negotiations, but also to begin to 
address the links between what the EU says, what it does, and what it actually achieves as 
an international actor and negotiator.    
 
Secondly, addressing these research questions is important to begin to broach the question 
of why EU performance in multilateral negotiations varies.  Explanation for variation in the 
EU’s leadership, actorness and effectiveness within multilateral negotiations has been a 
topic of considerable interest within the existing literature.  In the most part however, 
explanation for the successes, failures or general variability of EU behaviour or its 
effectiveness in multilateral negotiations have been premised on expectations of its 
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capabilities as an actor, its ambition to take on a greater international role, or on structural 
conditions seen to shape its capabilities to act.  Within this discourse however very little 
effort has been given to addressing how these variables intersect or how they explicitly 
shape EU negotiation performance.  Focus therefore is given far more to the EU’s own 
capabilities and ambitions but with little reference to how this relates to the preferences 
and role played by other negotiation partners. More than this, efforts in explaining 
variation in the EU’s actorness, leadership or effectiveness have been limited by the 
paucity of data specifically geared towards the specification and measurement of EU 
performance as an assessment of both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness in 
multilateral negotiations.   Important for this study therefore is first to identify how well 
the EU performs as a dependent variable (DV) in order to generate the empirical data 
necessary to then attempt its explanation.   
 
This study further addresses the question of how well the EU performs both over-time and 
across policy fields in order to evaluate how EU performance has evolved, how it varies 
across negotiation environments and why.  Whilst some performance studies (JEI Special 
Issue: 2011) have provided a longitudinal perspective of EU performance and how it has 
evolved over-time, this has been more the exception than the rule with the majority of 
attention being given within the existing literature to ‘current’ negotiations or single policy 
issues.  This can particularly be seen in light of Jørgensen’s (2007: 510) criticism of 
‘presentism bias’ with scholars focusing far more on individual negotiations often leading 
to a neglect of more longitudinal analyses which better enable variation in the EU’s 
performance to be identified.    This is further exaggerated by the vast quantity of data and 
analysis that has focused upon the EU in the case study of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto 
Protocol and which has also arguably created a ‘selection bias’ (see Moravcsik: 1999: 273) 
within the performance debate.   This is especially noteworthy because, as Vogler (2011: 
32) argues: “In a mundane, but important, sense the EU is constructed as an actor in day-
to-day accounts of international climate policies…” The EU’s international identity, 
presence, and distinctiveness as an actor are thus often intertwined with accounts of its 
‘leadership’ within the global climate regime.  As discussed above however such claims 
are often far more relevant to the EU’s high ambitions and domestic activities than to its 
actual negotiation performance.  With extensive focus on the issue of climate change and, 
to some extent trade negotiations, understanding how the EU performs across other 
external-policy fields is fairly limited.  Analysis has also consequently been fairly well 
skewed to addressing those negotiations where expectations of EU performance are high, 
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whilst ‘hard’ cases – such as multilateral security negotiations where EU competence is 
limited and the EU Member States more dominant – have been broadly overlooked.  
 
This study thus adopts three case studies each focused upon one multilateral negotiation – 
covering trade, the environment, and security – where the EU’s performance is then 
evaluated over a period of time from 1995 to 2011.  These policy-fields have been selected 
as areas of prominence for the EU’s external relations but which also represent 
considerable variability in the EU’s capabilities and subsequent expectations of how well it 
should perform.   Specifically, the case studies selected for this study include: in trade, the 
multilateral trade negotiations of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) including the Doha 
Round (1996-2011); on environment, the multilateral climate negotiations of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1995-2011); and in security, the 
multilateral arms control negotiations of the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
review negotiations (1995-2010).  Each of these cases have been selected as high-profile, 
highly politicised, and globally-scaled multilateral negotiations each of which tackle an 
issue of fundamental significance to the national interests of all States.  EU performance is 
thus evaluated in negotiations concerned with the rules dictating trade within the 
Multilateral Trading System, with efforts to tackle the global common of climate change, 
and with the effort to police the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their 
disarmament – all negotiations of high politics and vested interests which matter to States 
of all regions and level of development.   
 
By selecting these specific negotiations this study will test expectations already generated 
within the existing literature and, in so doing, contribute to that discourse by offering new 
knowledge of EU performance in each of those policy fields.  This is important in each 
case for different reasons.  In the case of the WTO, despite the quantity of literature 
focused upon EU trade policy-making and the EU as a trade actor, very little attention has 
been given explicitly to its performance within the WTO multilateral trade negotiations 
(see also A.R Young: 2011, Dür: 2006).  More than this, divergent perspectives have been 
generated within the existing trade and EUGA literature with regards to expectations of EU 
performance in the WTO, with the EUGA discourse stressing the EU’s impressive trade 
capabilities and subsequent potential to shape outcome in the multilateral trading system 
(i.e. Meunier & Nicolaïdis: 2011, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006) but with the EU trade policy 
literature lamenting the EU’s ineffectiveness and underachievement (i.e. Paeman & 
Bensch: 1995, Woolcock & Hodges: 1996).  In the case of the UNFCCC the focus of this 
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study is not to offer another perspective of the EU’s ‘leadership’ – a debate already highly 
popular within the academic community – but rather to test those high expectations by 
offering an explicit analysis of the EU’s performance in this negotiation since its first 
conference in 1995 up to the most recent negotiation held in Durban in December 2011.    
In the case of the NPT conversely the opposite is the case; with this study aiming to 
contribute towards what is currently a very under-analysed policy-field. 
 
The time frame under analysis (1995-2011) in each of these cases has also purposefully 
been selected in order to compare EU performance over-time and thus to identify variation 
in how well it performs.  Firstly, 1995 has been chosen as the starting point for this study 
as that was the year that the WTO was created, the UNFCCC’s 1st Conference of the 
Parties was held, and it was the year that the EU first entered the NPT review negotiations 
with a Joint Action.  2011 has also been selected as the concluding point for this 
longitudinal study for the simple reason that, at time of writing, the most recent 
negotiations had taken place in December 2011.  By focusing on these more recent 
negotiations in each case study moreover, it is hoped to offer new empirical insight into 
those negotiations that have thus far been given less attention within the literature.   The 
time frame offered in this study therefore covers a period of sixteen years of negotiations 
across three negotiation environments.  This was considered a long enough period to 
enable variation in the EU’s performance to be identified both within and between case 
study as well as to identify if any pertinent trends in the EU’s institutional development or 
the wider structural conditions could be seen as shaping that performance.  Whilst a longer 
timeframe would have allowed further variation to be identified, it was however reasoned 
that a historical perspective earlier than 1995 would not in fact contribute considerably 
more to the analysis beyond what secondary sources have already provided.  With the 
inevitable methodological challenges that would come from trying to generate new 
empirical data prior to 1995 - such as the availability of older negotiation documents, and 
being able to locate and interview officials directly involved in negotiations from that 
period – it was considered that 1995 provided an appropriate cut-off and starting point for 
analysis.   
 
Assessing the EU’s performance in each of these cases is moreover important in order to 
capture variance and pertinent trends evident within several independent variables, 
identified from within the existing literature as influencing factors upon how well the EU 
performs, across different policy-fields and over-time.  As the previous section revealed, 
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expectations and subsequent judgements of how well the EU performs in its external 
relations have often been premised upon understandings of the EU’s variable capabilities 
as an international actor across its external policy-fields (Hill & Smith: 2011a, Ginsberg & 
Smith: 2007, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006, Jupille & Caporaso: 1998).  Explanation for the 
EU’s ‘improved’ actorness, leadership or effectiveness within multilateral negotiations 
have also been commonly premised on the EU’s own improved ambition to ‘lead’ and the 
internal conditions which enable it to adopt a more ambitious negotiation position (Parker 
& Karlsson: 2010, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 53, Van Schaik: 2010, Oberthür & 
Roche Kelly: 2008: 36 ). Others have focused upon the EU’s ‘opportunity’ to lead as a 
result of the structural conditions shaping the negotiation environment (Vogler: 2011: 31-
34, Vogler & Stephan: 2007, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 24-27, Hovi et. al.: 2003:140).  
Within this discourse three core explanations for variation in the EU’s performance in 
multilateral negotiations can particularly be identified.  These include: 
 
i. The EU performs well where it is at its most ‘state-like’ and thus where it has 
exclusive legal competence, is most integrated, and where it subsequently is able to 
‘speak with one voice’ within multilateral negotiations (Commission: 2006, see 
also Wessel: 2011, Jørgensen & Wessel: 2011, Gebhard: 2011, Kissack: 2010, 
Gstöhl: 2009, Falkner: 2007: 509, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 107, Meunier: 2000, 
Allen & Smith: 1998: 46).   
 
ii. Taking into consideration the structural conditions of the negotiation environment, 
the EU has demonstrated an ‘improved’ leadership as well as a ‘high degree of 
actorness’ within multilateral negotiations where it has had the opportunity to act – 
thus where the position of other players – most notably the US – creates space for 
the EU to take on a greater international role (Vogler: 2011: 31-34, Vogler & 
Stephan: 2007, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 24-27, Hovi et. al.: 2003:14). The rise 
of the emerging economies over the course of the 2000s has however limited that 
opportunity and created a more complex negotiating environment  in which the EU 
must perform (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012, Torney: 2011, Obethür: 2011a, A.R. 
Young: 2011, Roberts: 2010, Kilian & Elgström: 2010: 268). 
 
iii. The EU will be better able to make ambitious demands within multilateral 
negotiations where its own domestic policy, and/or the policy preferences of its 
Member States, support progressive international policy initiatives (A.R Young: 
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2011, Vogler: 2011: 31, Oberthür: 2011a: 673, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 53, 
Van Schaik: 2010, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36, M. Baldwin: 2006: 934, 
Falkner: 2007, 512, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007, Lamy: 2004, Meunier: 2000).   
 
The case studies here selected, and the time-period chosen from 1995 to 2011, are thus 
important because they reflect policy fields and time in which several critical changes have 
taken place both within the EU and within international structural conditions which may be 
expected to influence how well the EU subsequently performs.  Addressing first the EU’s 
competence and level of integration, case studies have been selected in which the EU’s 
legal competence is variable between exclusive (WTO), shared (UNFCCC) and no 
competence (NPT).  Assessed over-time case studies moreover encompass changes which, 
since the mid-1990s, has also seen the EU undergo numerous institutional developments 
through the Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007) Treaties, with each treaty 
reform aimed at stream-lining the EU’s internal decision-making processes, improving EU 
legal competence and enhancing coherence in order to boost external effectiveness 
(Commission: 2006, Thomas: 2012, Portela & Raube: 2012: 7-10, Gebhard: 2011: 103-
105, Woolcock: 2010).  An important aim for this study therefore is to test the impact that 
the EU’s level of legal competence and its steps towards ‘ever closer union’ have had upon 
its performance in multilateral negotiations.  It addresses therefore questions of whether 
competence matters in explaining variation in EU performance across policy-fields, and 
how EU performance has varied, if at all, as a consequence of its institutional 
development.  
 
Another justification for analysing EU performance within each case selected and over the 
time period 1995 to 2011 is to address how changes within the international system and the 
structural conditions of each negotiation environment can be seen to shape EU 
performance.  Cases have thus been selected which capture changes in the rising influence 
of the emerging economies since the mid-1990s, but also variation in the role that the 
United States has played within each of these negotiation environments over this time 
period.  Within the WTO the rise of the BRICs within the Multilateral Trading System and 
the growing role of India, Brazil and China as major power brokers within the Doha Round 
of trade negotiations has particularly been identified as a structural change influencing how 
well the EU can perform (i.e. A.R. Young: 2011).  The role of the United States within the 
WTO over this period has also witnessed several changes with the US moving from what 
was a position of relative reticence in the formative years of the WTO (Bridges Weekly: 
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1998), to a more proactive role in the early years of the Doha Round (New York Times: 
2001, Blustein: 2009), again returning to a more reticent position in the mid to late 2000s 
where it has since been roundly blamed as one of the main culprits stalling the Round 
(Bridges Weekly: 2012, Bridges Daily Update: 2009, EurActiv: 2006, Financial Times: 
2006).   
 
Within the UNFCCC these same major players have also been identified as shaping the 
EU’s role and effectiveness within the climate regime over the period 1995 to 2011, not 
least since the rise of the emerging economies and the EU’s diminishing share of global 
greenhouse gases over the 2000s (see Roberts: 2010, Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012).  The 
role of the United States is also particularly noteworthy in this case, with the time-period 
from 1995 to 2011 reflecting important changes in US foreign policy preferences towards 
multilateral climate policy; moving from initial support for a Kyoto Protocol in the mid-
1990s, to reticence in the 2000s, to a re-engagement with the regime under the Obama 
Administration since the early 2010s.  Selecting this case study therefore allows variance 
within the structural conditions at play within the UNFCCC negotiations to be compared to 
variance in the EU’s own performance during this time period.  This is also relevant to the 
NPT negotiations which, dominated by the balance of nuclear power and by the nuclear-
weapon states particularly, has also seen some significant shifts in US foreign policy 
towards the negotiations over this time-period (Johnson: 2005, 2010), with the US moving 
from a position of reticence in 2005 to re-engagement in 2010.  Assessed over-time these 
structural changes thus present important dynamics for testing the explanatory power that 
the condition of ‘opportunity’ and the presence or absence of competition has upon the 
EU’s performance within multilateral negotiations.  
 
Finally, justification for selecting these cases over this time-period is in order to capture 
changes within the EU’s own internal policy development and its impact upon the EU’s 
ambition within multilateral negotiations.  This is important because, as EU policy-makers 
themselves stress, there is an ‘inextricable link’ between the EU’s internal policy and its 
external projection (Commission: 2006: 4).  The cases and time-frame thus captured in this 
study encompass several key policy developments which may be expected to have shaped 
the ambition of the EU’s negotiation position and which may, in turn, be seen to affect its 
subsequent performance.  Within the UNFCCC, the EU’s burden-sharing agreement on 
greenhouse gas emission reductions by EU Member States (Vogler: 2005: 848, Andresen 
& Agrawala: 2002: 47), the introduction of the European Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
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in 2004 (Vogler: 2011: 31) and the EU’s 2007 climate and energy package (Van Schaik & 
Schunz: 2012: 169), have all been identified as policies which have raised the EU’s level 
of ambition within the climate negotiations.  Within the WTO changes to the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have also been identified as shaping the EU’s 
ambition within the Doha Round negotiations (A.R. Young: 2011, Baldwin: 2006), whilst 
agreement on the 2003 European Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction has also been expected to impact upon the EU’s negotiation position and the 
role that it plays within the NPT negotiations (Portela: 2003, 2004).  Important therefore 
for this study is to identify how changes to the EU’s internal policy within each of these 
policy-fields can be seen to shape its external projection and overall performance within 
multilateral negotiations.  
 
Making that assessment is moreover important for two reasons.  First, it explicitly 
addresses how the ambition of the EU’s negotiation position can explain changes in the 
EU’s negotiation performance – an issue that has been largely implicit within the 
performance and effectiveness discourse thus far (i.e. Jørgensen et.al.: 2011).  And 
secondly, it is important in addressing the Normative Power Europe (NPE) discourse 
which has stressed the EU’s distinctiveness as an international actor and its ‘different’ 
approach to international relations as a source of power and influence (see Schiepers & 
Sicurelli: 2007).  By assessing EU performance within each of these case studies and over-
time it is therefore possible to address how changes in the EU’s internal policy and its level 
of ambition relative to its negotiation partners has impacted upon its subsequent 
performance.  In particular it allows the question of whether the pursuit of a highly 
ambitious, normative and distinctive negotiation agenda helps or hinders the EU’s 
negotiation performance.  By selecting cases across policy-fields and spanning time this 
study thus not only contributes new knowledge in evaluating the dependent variable of 
how well the EU performs, but will also importantly tests those independent variables 
commonly believed to offer explanation for why EU performance varies. 
 
1.4. Research methods and data collection 
In order to assess EU performance within those multilateral negotiations selected some 
research tools are required that enable the relevant data to be collected and used.  This 
study conducts empirical case studies across three multilateral negotiations – the 
UNFCCC, the WTO, and the NPT - spanning time from 1995 to 2011.  These are 
extensive negotiations to research, covering highly detailed and technical issues and which 
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cover a data-range of sixteen years.  It is necessary therefore to narrow in the research to 
key negotiations periods within these studies in order to assess EU performance at specific 
moments of the negotiation process and which enables a general understanding of how it 
has evolved over-time to be generated.  This is particularly the case in the climate change 
and trade cases where negotiations take place at on-going intervals throughout the year and 
which thus require narrowing in to key periods to make analysis more manageable.  Whilst 
this does risk missing data from less high-profile periods of the negotiations, the cases do 
attempt to reference this in order to give as broad a picture of EU performance over-time as 
possible. Focus in the case studies is therefore paid specifically to the most prominent and 
significant periods of negotiations and which might be considered, in hindsight, as 
‘milestones’ in the process of negotiations.  These most especially concern those periods 
where effort was exerted by negotiators with major pushes to launch negotiations, agree 
their operationalization, or finalise their agreement 
 
In total, twenty individual negotiations are researched in assessing EU performance 
covering eight ‘milestone’ negotiations for both the trade and climate cases and four 
conferences for the NPT case study.  Research methods used in making performance 
evaluations for each negotiation are grounded in analysis of primary documentation, 
triangulated with analytical commentary from third parties participant in the negotiations, 
and with data collected from semi-structured elite interviews conducted by the author with 
officials directly involved in the negotiations.  Primary documentation used in this study 
includes EU council conclusions, common positions, joint actions and statements, as well 
as position papers and statements by other major players and groups within the 
negotiations assessed in order to compare the EU’s negotiation position to others.  EU and 
other major players proposals, offers and working papers submitted to negotiations are also 
analysed as an evaluation of outreach and activity.  Analysis is also made of negotiation 
outcome documents in order to assess EU effectiveness in achieving the objectives of its 
negotiation position within the negotiation outcome.  Supporting this documentary 
analysis, analytical and media commentary provided during and after negotiations are also 
analysed, including EU and non-EU based press reports and affiliated NGOs reports on 
negotiation events and processes, for example, the Earth Negotiations Bulletin in the case 
of climate change, the Bridges Trade Digest in the case of trade, and the NPT NGO News 
in Review bulletin in the case of the NPT.  These accounts are particularly useful in 
providing detailed overviews of the issues being negotiated, the positions of the players, 
the negotiation activities by key players and the processes leading up to the negotiation 
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outcome.  They are also neutral commentaries and give account of the EU as one party 
amongst many, rather than the main focus of analysis.  In this way a more objective 
overview of EU performance is gained.  
 
In addition to documentary research and the commentaries provided by NGO analysts, 41 
semi-structured elite interviews have also been conducted by the author with officials from 
the EU and third countries involved in negotiations over this period of analysis (see 
Appendix I for list of interviews conducted)
5
.  Fieldwork for this study took place between 
March and May 2011 with interviews being conducted in New York, London, Brussels and 
Geneva with officials from the EU institutions, EU Member States, third countries and 
observer Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). In order to obtain as comprehensive 
an over-view of the EU’s performance within those multilateral negotiations analysed, the 
author approached interviewees from a variety of economic and development backgrounds 
and whose political views ranged across the main dividing issues within each negotiation 
environment.   In approaching third countries the author sought to gather data from 
interviewees from both the global north and south, and from developed and developing 
nations, in order to gather a wider knowledge base of third country interactions with the 
EU and thus a balanced overview of how others perceived its performance.  In addition, 
where possible, the author sought to interview officials involved within other major 
negotiation groups in order to generate an understanding of how the EU dealt with other 
blocs within the negotiations.  Within the WTO this included for example States Parties 
from the G90 and LDC groups, the NAMA-11 group, and the Cairns Group (see also 
Appendix III).  Within the NPT negotiations interviews were moreover conducted with 
States Parties involved in the Non-Aligned Movement, New Agenda Coalition, Vienna 
Group of Ten, and the P-5 (see also Appendix V). 
 
Furthermore, in order to gather a comprehensive range of data from within the EU, 
interviews were sought by the author with officials from within the EU institutions 
(Commission, EEAS and Council) as well as from a broad geographical range of EU 
Member States.  Where possible interviews were sought with Member States whose 
political views spanned the political spectrum of positions within the negotiations 
analysed.  In the case of the WTO this included Member States whose economic 
preferences covered both more ‘liberal’ and ‘protectionist’ approaches to trade 
liberalisation (see M. Baldwin: 2006).  In the NPT this also included those Member States 
                                                   
5
 The author would like to thank UACES for financial support of that fieldwork 
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whose political views spanned either side of the political divide on core issues of nuclear 
disarmament and the use of nuclear energy.   In this way data collected from those 
interviews conducted spans a range of political and economic perspectives of the EU’s 
performance in multilateral negotiations. 
 
Of the 41 interviews conducted for this study fifteen were with officials from EU Member 
States, eight from the EU institutions (Commission and EEAS), eleven with officials from 
third countries, and six from affiliated NGO/IOs.  Of the interviews conducted with the EU 
institutions, EU Member States and third countries all participants were at the level of First 
Counsellor, Ambassador or other senior level official and had been directly involved in the 
negotiations under analysis.  Consequently, interviewees were able to provide first-hand 
experience of negotiations that had taken place behind closed doors enabling insight into 
less well documented processes of the negotiations that would otherwise be unavailable.  
All interviewees were asked a number of structured questions relating to the negotiations 
with which they were involved. Interviews were aimed at fact-finding and to garner a 
better understanding of the perceptions of officials both within and without the EU, as to 
the EU’s performance and role.  Core questions focused upon: who officials perceived the 
main players to be in the negotiations; what the key issues under debate were; and what 
roles the EU and other participants played. More specific questions were asked of EU 
officials about the processes of EU coordination, unity and outreach during negotiations 
whilst questions with third country officials concentrated more on the interactions they had 
had with the EU delegation and how well they perceived the EU to have performed.  
Questions were semi-structured to allow flexibility in the interview and to enable 
elaboration on points and issues as they arose.  All interviewees were given the option of 
whether a voice recorder could be used.  The majority of interviewees allowed this with 
interviews being transcribed afterwards, others chose not to be recorded and notes were 
taken by the author instead.  Due to the diplomatic sensitivity of the subject interviewees 
were all given the option of anonymity in the use of any material gained from discussion 
with the author.  Where anonymity was requested those interviews are identified in this 
study by the title of the interviewee i.e. Ambassador, First Counsellor or senior official 
and, to ensure no traceability, by general reference to their State’s geographical location 
and development status i.e. EU Member State A, or northern developed State, southern 
developing State etc.   
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It should be noted that interviews were conducted with diplomats and observers participant 
in the majority, but not all negotiations under analysis in this study. In particular, 
interviews were not conducted with officials involved in the UNFCCC negotiations.  This 
decision was taken for several reasons.  First and foremost, analysis into the UNFCCC 
negotiations was initially intended as a ‘shadow’ case study – aimed at identifying the 
challenges of what has been a predominant ‘leadership’ focus in assessing EU performance 
within this forum.  With the evolution of the study however it became clear that despite the 
quantity of literature on the EU’s role in the UNFCCC, gaps still existed which would 
require empirical research to fill.  Unfortunately, time and financial constraints prevented 
interview data from being collected and thus this gap in data collection must be accounted 
for.  In addition however, the decision was further helped by the fact that, due to the 
volume of literature already available on the EU’s role within the climate negotiations; 
many including interview data, the need for new empirical data from interview sources was 
also less of a necessity than in the trade and NPT cases where interview data is scarcer.  
Nevertheless, a more detailed analysis of newspapers, reports, and primary documentation 
revealing actor positions within the UNFCCC was conducted in order to address identified 
gaps in the empirical data and maintain the evidentiary balance. 
 
A further point of note is with regard to the challenge of conducting interviews for 
negotiations that date back to the mid-1990s, particularly in terms of officials retiring, 
moving on to other posts, or otherwise being unavailable. Subsequently fewer interviews 
have been conducted with officials involved in these earlier negotiations and secondary 
sources are thus used to supplement this.  Moreover, a large portion of the interview data 
for this study is considered most relevant to current negotiations due to the simple fact that 
officials that are in post are easier to identify and contact than those who have moved onto 
new roles.  Another challenge in conducting interviews, particularly with officials who 
were involved in negotiations dating back some years, is that information gathered must be 
recognised as being fallible to human error, human perception and ‘sugar coating’.  The 
events of a negotiation may seem clearer in hindsight but it is equally possible for 
negotiators to put a certain spin on the events and to remember things differently having 
had time for contemplation.  It is for this reason that interview data is triangulated against 
the perceptions of other interviewees, the analytical commentary provided by the media 
and analysts, and the assessment of primary documents submitted by the EU and other 
parties to the negotiation in question.  In this way a full overview of how well the EU 
44 
 
performed has been sought with evidence gathered providing as thorough and accurate an 
account of each negotiation as possible. 
 
1.5. Thesis outline and main findings 
In order to address this study’s research questions and to evaluate and subsequently explain 
variation in EU performance over-time and across policy fields, the study is broken down 
into six further chapters.  In Chapter Two the analytical framework is detailed.  Focus in 
this chapter is given to ‘unpacking’ performance as a concept of analysis and how it can be 
used as a practical and testable analytical tool.  Specifically the framework outlines three 
phases of analysis.  First, what is the EU’s negotiation position and how ambitious are its 
objectives?  Second, how does the EU perform in terms of the performance indicators: (i) 
Unity, (ii) Outreach, (iii) Significance, and (iv) Effectiveness?  Third, how well has the EU 
performed, on a scale of very good, good, fair, poor, or very poor taking into account both 
its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness? Applying that analytical framework 
empirically, Chapters Three, Four and Five then provide the main performance analysis to 
the study.   
 
In Chapter Three the first case study of the EU’s performance in the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change negotiation is assessed from the 1
st
 Conference of the 
Parties (CoP) in 1995 up to CoP-17 held in Durban in December 2011.  Understood to be 
the EU’s “paramount claim to leadership” (Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 105), this case 
centres on EU performance in the negotiations focusing upon the launch and agreement of 
the Kyoto Protocol, and the negotiations since 2005 on a post-Kyoto Protocol agreement.  
It finds that, despite claims of an “improving” EU leadership record and of its “high degree 
of actorness” within this negotiation environment the EU’s performance within the 
UNFCCC has in fact been highly variable.  Demonstrating no clear trend of improvement 
in its negotiation behaviour or effectiveness over the time-period scrutinised, analysis 
shows that the EU has instead shown a mixed record of performances ranging between 
very good, good, fair and poor.  Further challenging expectations, this chapter finds that 
the EU has performed well in this negotiation environment not because of its high 
ambitions and distinctiveness as a ‘leading actor’, but rather where its negotiation position 
has been both progressive and in keeping with the preference structures of its negotiation 
partners.   
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In Chapter Four the case study of the EU’s performance in the WTO’s multilateral trade 
negotiations is assessed from the WTO’s 1st Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 
up to the 8
th
 Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in December 2011.  Offering what is 
arguably an ‘easy’ test for EU performance due to the EU’s market size and ‘state-like’ 
qualities in this forum, this study focuses on those negotiations in which a new round of 
multilateral trade negotiations were first attempted, through to the launch of the Doha 
Round, and the Doha Round’s decade-long efforts to find an outcome agreement.  It finds 
that, whilst the EU has not performed poorly in these negotiations, neither has it had the 
extent of very good performances typically expected of an actor of its size and importance 
within the multilateral trading system.  Varying in fact between primarily fair and good 
levels of overall performance, this chapter shows that whilst the EU has demonstrated a 
consistently high degree of negotiation behaviour within the WTO, its effectiveness has 
been far less impressive.  It subsequently argues that despite the EU being an economic 
superpower, its performance within the MTS has been challenged by an inability to always 
translate its ambitions into actual goal-attainment.  Thus, whilst the EU has been a 
principle, and often ambitious, demandeur within the WTO, it has had only limited success 
in persuading its negotiation partners to support its objectives.  As a result the EU has had 
to significantly lower its ambitions over the course of the Doha Round to more closely 
reflect the preference structures of its negotiation partners.   
 
In Chapter Five the case study of the EU’s performance in the NPT review negotiations 
from 1995 to 2010 is assessed.  In comparison to Chapters Three and Four, this chapter 
deals with the EU’s performance in what is arguably a ‘hard’ test for EU performance.  
Findings suggest that, despite the EU’s institutional limitations as an actor in this forum, its 
performance over this period has to some extent exceeded the low expectations typically 
afforded it in such a high politics security environment.  Demonstrating the same 
variability of performances as is found in the UNFCCC and WTO negotiations, it finds 
that the EU has given good performances on several occasions within the NPT and with 
evidence found of an improving performance over the later 2000s both in terms of 
negotiation behaviour and effectiveness.  This chapter thus challenges expectations of the 
EU’s performance premised on its capacity to act alone.  Whilst the EU does have 
limitations in this negotiation environment due to the more prominent role of its Member 
States, it has nevertheless shown evidence of performing well through harnessing the 
diplomacy of its Member States, working closely with other negotiation groups, and 
achieving its objectives through consensus-building. 
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In Chapter Six focus then turns to explanation of the variation found in EU performances 
over-time and across each of these case studies.  Concerned, therefore, with causal 
inferences between how well the EU performs, and those factors seen to have shaped it, it 
tests those acknowledged explanatory variables identified from the existing literature as 
shaping EU performance, including the EU’s capabilities and opportunity to act, and the 
EU’s level of ambition.  It argues that the EU’s competence and ‘state-like’ qualities, as 
well as the opportunity to act can help explain variation in EU performance, but only to an 
extent.  Rather, the EU’s negotiation position and its level of ambition – both in terms of 
what the EU is trying to achieve and what is wants relative to other major players within 
the international system – has been a major influencing factor on EU’s performance within 
the negotiations analysed.  It suggests that where the EU makes highly ambitious demands 
and acts as a preference outlier within multilateral negotiations, its ability to persuade 
others to support its goals and to achieve its objectives has been significantly limited.  
Instead the EU performs at its best in multilateral negotiations where it has sought 
progressive objectives but where it has also shared some ‘zone of agreement’ with its 
negotiation partners.  The thesis is then concluded in Chapter Seven where a summary of 
key findings is offered.  In this chapter the threads from the previous chapters are pulled 
together in order to directly respond to the studies’ two research questions.  In so doing, it 
shows that EU performance in multilateral negotiations has challenged expectations in 
several ways.  Further offering a stepping stone for the furtherance of the performance 
research agenda, this concluding chapter also provides some suggestions for the potential 
development of the EU performance research agenda. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter the concept of performance was introduced.  Focusing on the evolution of 
performance studies within the EU and how the EU’s performance in multilateral 
negotiations has been assessed within the existing literature; the chapter has detailed a 
number of challenges within the literature which this study seeks to overcome.  In 
particular, the challenge of divergent approaches to how EU performance has been 
understood within the literature to date was identified along with the need to bridge these 
gaps by evaluating performance as a concept of both negotiation behaviour and 
effectiveness.  Introducing the aims of this study, including the core research questions it 
seeks to address, an outline of the thesis was offered including discussion of the case 
studies selected for empirical analysis and the research methods and data collection tools 
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utilised in making a performance assessment.  In the following chapter the concept of 
performance will be developed further through the introduction of an analytical framework 
for evaluating how well the EU performs in multilateral negotiations. 
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Chapter 2: Evaluating EU performance in multilateral 
negotiations: An analytical framework 
In the previous chapter the EU’s performance in multilateral negotiations was discussed in 
light of the existing literature focusing upon the EU as a leader, and actor and its 
effectiveness within multilateral negotiations.  Rarely evaluated explicitly, it has only been 
since the turn of the 2010s that ‘performance’ has itself been developed as a distinctive 
research agenda, and conceptualised as a tool for the analysis of the EU’s activities and 
effectiveness in its foreign policy or in the context of international institutions.  In this 
chapter, in contributing to and developing upon this initial research agenda, an analytical 
framework for the evaluation of EU performance in multilateral negotiations is introduced; 
this will then be applied empirically within the following chapters.  Drawing upon both 
process- and outcome-oriented methods of assessing the EU’s international role, it assesses 
performance as a concept of both EU negotiation behaviour and effectiveness.  In order to 
present the framework the chapter is broken down into five main sections.  In section one, 
focus is paid first to the question of ‘who is EU’ within the context of multilateral 
negotiations; detailing the importance of first establishing the EU’s capacity to act and to 
represent itself ‘as EU’ within the negotiation environment prior to evaluating its 
performance.  In section two a brief introduction is given to the analytical framework with 
particular focus to the question of measurability of how well the EU performs and the 
values subsequently utilised in making that assessment.  In section three attention then 
turns to the EU’s position entering negotiations and how its ambition is to be assessed.  In 
section four focus turns to the elucidation of performance indicators – including the EU’s 
unity, outreach, significance and effectiveness – and how they are evaluated.  In the fifth 
and final section the analytical framework is developed to address how, when taking each 
performance indicator into account, an overall value of how well the EU performed in a 
multilateral negotiation may be assessed. We turn first therefore to the important question 
of ‘who is EU’ when making a performance evaluation. 
 
2.1. Who is EU? 
“Empirically, the EU can be seen as one of the world’s two economic ‘superpowers’, and 
increasingly a significant influence in the realms of international diplomacy... Analytically, 
the Union poses major challenges by virtue of its status as something more than an 
intergovernmental organisation but less than a fully-fledged European ‘state’” 
(Hill & Smith: 2011a: 4) 
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For the EU to be the subject of a performance analysis an initial assessment must first be 
made about who is EU and the EU’s capacity to act in multilateral negotiations.  A 
multilateral negotiation comprises particular processes of interaction between multiple 
parties in order to reach agreement or find common interest (Iklé: 1964: 3-4).  Such 
negotiations involve the submission of formal proposals and the interaction of the majority 
of States within the international system under the auspices of an international institution 
(Rittberger: 1983: 170, Barston: 1983: 131).  The following case studies thus focus on 
formal negotiations occurring at regular intervals, attended by over 100 States Parties, in 
the format of a diplomatic conference, including plenary and committee sessions, and 
where Parties seek an outcome agreement in an effort to find common interest or solve a 
common problem. Assessing ‘who is EU’ within this context is therefore necessary 
because, as Hill and Smith (2011a) suggest, the EU suffers several analytical challenges 
courtesy of the fact that it is neither like any other State Party nor simply an 
intergovernmental organisation.  Rather, as was shown in Chapter One, whilst the EU has 
the size and resources to be considered a major power in the international system its ability 
to always utilise them varies considerably across policy fields.  The EU therefore draws 
significant debate over its capabilities to act within international diplomacy; with its 
variable level of competence, institutional integration and subsequent ability to ‘speak with 
one voice’ across its numerous external relations often the grounds on which expectations 
of its likely performance are premised.   
 
In order to ensure that it is therefore the EU that is the subject of the following 
performance analysis – as opposed to its individual Member States - cases selected for this 
study are chosen where the EU meets several essential ‘actor’ conditions (Sjöstedt: 1977: 
16) as developed upon from the EU actorness discourse.  Firstly, the EU is considered an 
actor within a multilateral negotiation where an EU goal or goals is, “articulated in a 
document so that its formulation, if not its interpretation, is beyond dispute” (Sjöstedt: 
1977: 24), and shared by all Member State governments.  This may be in the form of a 
common position, joint action, strategy, or council conclusions formulating a negotiation 
mandate.  Secondly, the EU is considered an actor where it also has some degree of 
autonomy from its Member States with negotiations thus conducted by an EU 
representative i.e. the European Commission, Council Presidency, High Representative, 
European External Action Service (EEAS), or lead Member State(s) appointed to speak on 
behalf of the EU as a whole.  The third essential condition in establishing EU capacity to 
act within a multilateral negotiation is that the EU is also recognised by the institution 
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within which it is negotiating such that the EU representative is permitted to participate in 
the negotiations on behalf of its Member States including in all plenary and committee 
sessions
6
. 
 
2.2. Evaluation and measurability: EU performance in multilateral 
negotiations 
Having established that the EU is an ‘actor’, an evaluation of its performance may then be 
conducted.  In this study three steps in its analytical framework are adopted, addressing: 
(1) the ambition of the EU’s negotiation position, (2) the EU’s performance as an 
assessment of its negotiation process and outcome, and (3), making an assessment of the 
EU’s overall performance. It is noted that this study adopts a measurement focus in its 
performance evaluation in order to reinforce its comparative analysis and enable findings 
to be more clearly reflected.  The measurability of performance is useful in demonstrating 
progress or change in particular aspects of an actor’s behaviour and effectiveness and can 
be especially useful in cross-policy and longitudinal studies.  However, analysing 
performance through more quantitative means can prove challenging where indicators are 
more difficult to measure, as may be expected in behavioural analyses.   How, for example, 
is good negotiation performance to be measured relative to poor performance?  
Conceptualisations of EU performance in international institutions and foreign policy 
analysis draw different conclusions in this respect.  Jørgensen et al.’s (2011: 607) 
conceptualisation of EU performance in international institutions resolutely avoids drawing 
any such measurability of its performance criteria, despite proffering an historical 
perspective to better account for “identifying changes over time and pertinent trends”.  
Subsequently, their overall conclusions draw more normative and impressionistic 
judgements of the EU’s ‘increasing’ (Jørgensen et al.: 2011: 607) performance in certain 
performance indicators but which otherwise refrain from trying to grapple with the 
problem of how indications of EU ‘relevance’ or ‘effectiveness’ should be measured.  
 
Conversely, measurability is a primary focus for the European Council on Foreign 
Relation’s EU performance scorecard on foreign policy (ECFR: 2010).  The ECFR’s 
methodology - premised on a scorecard marked out of 20 - measures EU performance 
                                                   
6
 See also Delreux (2006: 233) who argues that the EU must meet three conditions before it can act in 
multilateral environmental negotiations including: (i) it must have international legal personality, (ii) it must 
have external recognition, and (iii) it must hold competences in the policy field of the negotiated issue.  It is 
here argued that the issue of competence is not specifically necessary for the EU to ‘act’ and thus to 
‘perform’ in multilateral negotiations where it has none.  Rather that it is an ‘actor’ as long as it has a 
common position to pursue within the negotiations with representation by an EU representative.  
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across each of its three performance criteria (with ‘unity’ and ‘resources’ each marked out 
of 5 and ‘outcome’ marked out of 10) and correlates that measurement to an A-F grading, 
where an A+ reflects ‘outstanding’ performance and F a ‘failed’ performance.  In so doing 
the ECFR’s assessments of EU performance across policy fields and from year to year are 
easily comparable by scoring.  A difficulty with the ECFR approach however, is that it 
requires a highly generalised, and generic, system of measurement in order to be applicable 
across all foreign policy fields.  In the endeavour to index EU performance as an easily 
quantifiable variable much of the more qualitative detail that also shapes judgement on 
how well the EU has performed is at risk of being lost.  This is also a challenge identified 
by O. Young (2001) in the regime effectiveness literature whereby efforts to index ‘actual 
performance’ of a regime using quantifiable – and thus easily tractable – indexes, may 
also, “undervalue the overall effectiveness of regimes” (O. Young: 2001: 112). 
 
There is a balance to be wrought therefore in performance analysis that encapsulates the 
benefits of measurability but does not neglect important information and shaping factors 
that come from a more qualitative assessment.  In his analysis of the EU in multilateral 
diplomacy Jørgensen (2009b) offers one such balance by detailing a low-medium-high 
scale in assessing particular aspects of EU diplomatic activity – for example identifying 
variation in the EU’s domestic dimension, outreach and impact.  Whilst Jørgensen does not 
specify how these terms are explicitly assessed - and thus how a low rating differs from 
medium or high - there is some benefit in taking such an approach: enabling consistency 
and change in aspects of performance to be clearly identified (and thus compared) but 
maintaining the flexibility of a more qualitative judgement.    
 
This framework thus adopts a simple three point scale, developed from Jørgensen (2009b) 
in making a general qualitative assessment of the EU’s negotiation performance and in 
each performance indicator, ranging from low, moderate to high
7
.  It should be noted that 
a nil assessment is not made in this framework due to the stipulations of assessing ‘EU’ 
performance as meeting the basic criteria of an actor.  Where a common position exists, 
with representation by an EU representative, and with the EU permitted to speak within the 
negotiations, it is assumed that the EU has already demonstrated some basic level of 
negotiation behaviour which rules out the possibility of nil assessments in these indicators.  
A nil assessment of effectiveness – whereby the EU achieves none of its objectives – is 
also ruled out on the basis that each negotiation focused upon in the following case studies 
                                                   
7
 The term ‘moderate’ is here used in place of ‘medium’. 
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are premised on consensus decision-making (see also Kissack: 2010).  Any outcome 
agreement should therefore have something within which all parties can agree otherwise 
any party could block consensus.  More than this, whilst a nil assessment might be 
expected in cases where no formal agreement is decided by negotiators this does not 
necessarily relate to nil effectiveness.  For example, where the EU blocks an outcome 
agreement that it cannot support this is itself an indication of EU effectiveness.  In 
addition, where no formal agreement is adopted the negotiation process does still continue 
suggesting that some level of goal-attainment is still present.  It is also noted that a nil 
assessment of EU ambition in its negotiation position is not made in this framework on the 
grounds that, where the EU has derived a negotiation mandate – necessary for establishing 
the EU as an actor – it has already demonstrated a basic level of ambition. It is to this 
negotiation position that we now turn. 
 
2.3. The negotiation position 
“A good negotiator should be realistic… flexible… patient… Above all he must maintain 
the will to win”  
Iklé (1964: 254-5) 
 
Evaluating EU performance in the context of a multilateral negotiation first requires an 
assessment of its negotiation position and the extent to which it is ambitious.  This is 
important as its performance will depend in large part upon the EU’s initial objectives and 
the extent to which it has a ‘will to win’ (Iklé: 1964) in achieving something within the 
negotiation
8
.  To what extent is EU performance therefore driven by its ambition to 
actually achieve something?  An EU negotiation position will vary in format across policy 
fields but is typically detailed in the form of a Joint Action, Common Position and/or 
Council Conclusions with which a negotiation mandate is stipulated.  A negotiation 
position, usually derived prior to a negotiation and fine-tuned to the specifics of that 
negotiation context, includes the EU’s key objectives as well as guidelines for how they 
will be pursued.  It offers therefore, the blueprint by which the EU’s negotiation behaviour 
and effectiveness will be judged.  Assessing the ambition of that position must then take 
into account several important factors relating to the negotiation environment itself, as well 
as the extent to which the EU is progressive – that is, change-seeking - in its objectives.  
Two questions are of particular note when making that assessment: 
 
                                                   
8
 See also Jørgensen et al. (2011) who argue that the ambitiousness of the EU’s objectives in an international 
institution should be taken into consideration when assessing EU goal attainment 
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i. Does the EU pursue a progressive or conservative agenda – that is, does the EU 
seek progress or change in the current situation under negotiation – or is it 
seeking the maintenance of the status quo?
9
    
ii.  Do the EU’s objectives meet some zone of agreement with the preference 
structures of its negotiation partners? Is the EU therefore acting as a preference 
outlier or demandeur or does it share some common ground with the preferences 
of others?   
 
The level of EU ambition may then be understood on a scale of high, moderate and low.  
High ambition is here assessed where the EU’s negotiation objectives are mostly 
progressive and which go much further than the preference structures of its negotiation 
partners.  Highly ambitious negotiation positions are change-seeking and position the EU 
as a preference outlier relative to its negotiation partner.   Moderate ambition is assessed 
where the EU’s negotiation objectives are mostly progressive but which meet, in part, with 
the preference structures of its negotiation partners.  A moderately ambitious position 
seeks change but meets some zone of agreement with negotiation partners.  Low ambition 
conversely is assessed where the EU has mostly conservative objectives and/or its 
objectives are ambiguous.  A low ambition negotiation position seeks the preservation of 
the status quo and/or has no clearly defined objectives. 
 
The ambition of the EU’s negotiation position is important for several reasons.  First, 
according to the Normative Power Europe (NPE) discourse the more progressive and 
different the EU is as an actor in international relations, the more influential an actor it is 
(Manners: 2002, Manners & Whitman: 2003, Schiepers & Sicurelli: 2007).  In order 
therefore to test those expectations it is necessary to explicitly assess the level of EU 
ambition entering a negotiation relative to its subsequent performance.  Secondly, it can 
also be expected that the EU would have to work harder where its ambitions are higher, as 
any EU gain would be at the expense of its more conservative negotiation partners (see 
also Keohane & Nye: 1977: 10). The EU would be required therefore to utilise all of its 
                                                   
9
 See also Meunier (2000) who distinguishes between reformist and conservative contexts in bilateral 
negotiations whereby a reformist context sees the EU trying to make demands on its opponent who prefers 
the status quo, and a conservative context is where the EU seeks to preserve the status quo and is resistant to 
its opponents demands for reform.  Meunier further makes the case that the EU has greater bargaining 
capability where its agenda is conservative as its can effectively resist the demands of its negotiation 
opponent.  It is further noted that, as is commonly found in the trade literature, ‘offensive’ interests are here 
related to a progressive agenda – namely, that the EU must pursue reform, in the form of change by others, if 
it is to achieve its offensive objectives – and ‘defensive’ interests relate to a conservative agenda – as the EU 
would be expected to seek the maintenance of the status quo if it does not want to give anymore away. 
54 
 
diplomatic skill where its objectives are highly ambitious and which would thus influence 
analysis of its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness.  How realistic the EU’s objectives 
are, relative to the preference structures of other negotiation partners, is also important in 
ascertaining whether the EU has over- or under-estimated the ‘anticipated minimum’ (Iklé: 
1964: 192) or red-lines of its negotiation partners, and thus whether some ‘zone of 
agreement’ is possible (see also Afionis: 2011, Underdal: 1983). As Iklé (1964: 2) states: 
 
“Two elements must normally be present for negotiation to take place: there must 
be both common interests and issues of conflict. Without common interest there is 
nothing to negotiate for, without conflict nothing to negotiate about”.   
 
Having some zone of agreement between the EU’s negotiation position and the preference 
structures of its negotiation partners may therefore be expected to help the EU negotiate 
and achieve its goals.  Highly ambitious preferences that go much further than the 
preference structures of less ambitious negotiation partners may thus create difficulties for 
the EU’s performance by placing greater impetus on the EU’s ability to persuade others to 
raise their ambition to meet its objectives.  The ambition of the EU’s negotiation position 
may therefore be expected to have some influence upon the EU’s performance; shaping not 
only its negotiation behaviour but also its overall effectiveness.  It is in evaluating this 
performance that we now turn. 
 
2.4. Assessing individual performance indicators 
Performance in this study is conceptualised as an evaluation of both the EU’s behaviour 
and its overall effectiveness within multilateral negotiations.  Taking into account the 
performance studies developed by Jørgensen et al. (2011) and the ECFR (2010) it unpacks 
performance into specific performance indicators inspired by conceptualisations currently 
found in the literature on EU actorness, leadership, and effectiveness, thus including both 
process- and outcome-oriented concepts.  The indicators selected further draw upon the 
discourse of actor behaviour and negotiation process within the broader negotiations and 
regime effectiveness literatures.  This has been important in order to accurately evaluate 
EU performance within the specific context of multilateral negotiations which is the central 
forum of consideration in this study.  It is necessary therefore for performance indicators to 
be relevant to that context. More than this, by utilising these different strands of debate the 
indicators here included offer not only a more comprehensive method of analysing EU 
performance, but importantly address the connectivity between what the EU says, what it 
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does, and what it achieves in multilateral negotiations further stipulated in Chapter One.  
The performance indicators therefore analysed in this study include: 
 
Process-oriented indicators: 
(i) Unity (Is the EU represented by ‘one voice’ and how well does it maintain its 
cohesion?) 
(ii) Outreach (Is the EU utilising a particular negotiation style or employing tactics in order 
to outreach to its negotiation partners?) 
(iii) Significance (Is the EU significant to the decisions being made such that it is 
participant in processes of endgame bargaining?) 
 
Outcome-oriented indicator: 
(iv) Effectiveness (Does the EU attain its goals?)  
 
A point to raise prior to discussion of each of these indicators in turn is that there is an 
inevitable leaning in this indicator selection in favour of process-oriented concepts with 
unity, outreach and significance each concerned with the EU’s negotiation behaviour, 
comparative to effectiveness which is the only outcome-oriented indicator.  Treated 
individually each performance indicator is important to understanding EU performance.  
However, when it comes to making an overall assessment (discussed in the following 
section), what the EU does in a negotiation is treated as of equal importance to what it then 
achieves.  As the only indicator concerned with outcome, effectiveness is therefore to be 
understood as an essential (but insufficient) indicator in making an overall performance 
assessment. 
   
Unity 
The EU’s unity as an actor has been of fundamental importance to scholars of EU external 
relations (Sjöstedt, 1977; Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; Jupille, 1999; Meunier, 2000; 
Bretherton and Vogler, 2006).  Often taken as an indicator of how ‘state-like’ the EU can 
be; the EU’s (in)ability to ‘speak with one voice’ has been commonly cited as reason for its 
success or failure in multilateral negotiations (Jørgensen & Wessel: 2011, Parker & 
Karlsson: 2010, Gstöhl: 2009, Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007, Falkner: 2007).  Assessing the 
EU’s unity in multilateral negotiation is thus an important indicator of any performance 
analysis.  For one thing the EU’s unique institutional structure, specifically in terms of its 
‘functional fragmentation’ (Gebhard: 2011: 102), makes the EU’s unity of action a distinct 
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challenge.  Unlike States Parties which can present a unitary appearance within multilateral 
negotiations, the EU’s appearance within multilateral negotiations much more closely 
reflects a ‘network’ (Manners & Whitman: 2003: 384) thanks to its numerous constituent 
parts.  Assessing its unity is thus central to assessment of the EU’s capacity to manage its 
institutional complexities and still negotiate with others.  There is also a common 
assumption that, where the EU is united, it will be more effective (i.e. Gebhard: 2011: 110, 
Van Schaik: 2010: 255).  It is important, therefore, for performance analyses concerned 
with the connection between behaviour and effectiveness, to test this assumed link between 
EU unity and effectiveness.  Third, the concept of unity is often used synonymously with 
concepts such as coherence (De Jong & Schunz: 2012, Gebhard: 2011, Nuttall: 2005, 
Missiroli: 2001), cohesion (Thomas: 2012) and the frequently cited phrase ‘speaking with 
one voice’ which creates some ambiguity around the concept.  This ambiguity is evident 
also in performance studies where unity has been defined both as the extent to which the 
Member States and EU institutions agree (ECFR: 2010: 136), and whether the EU speaks 
with ‘one official voice’ (Jørgensen et al. 2011: 605).  Assessing unity as a performance 
indicator does therefore require some important clarification.  It is here argued that unity, 
as an indicator of performance in the context of multilateral negotiations, is explicitly 
concerned with matters of EU representation and cohesion.   
 
Representation is of particular importance because the EU, as a multifaceted polity, may 
present itself within multilateral negotiations fronted by any number of figureheads, 
institutions, or indeed Member States which may affect its unity as an actor.   
Representation initially raises questions of the EU’s legal competence and thus to its 
authority to act within different policy fields.  Does the EU therefore have exclusive 
competence (as is found typically in commercial policy), mixed competence (i.e. 
environmental policy) or no legal competence (i.e. security)?  Pisani-Ferry (2009) takes up 
this point in identifying three modes of governance that the EU may utilise in its 
representation in multilateral negotiations.  The EU may, for example, have an 
unconditional delegation model whereby the Member States give delegation authority to 
the EU institutions.  This is found in the case of competition policy which is delegated 
unconditionally to the European Commission (Jørgensen: 2009b: 197).  Alternatively the 
EU member states may delegate conditionally their authority to the EU institutions to 
negotiate on their behalf; retaining their own formal representation and providing the 
institutions with on-going guidelines and negotiation mandates.  This mode of governance 
may be seen particularly in the case of multilateral trade negotiations where the European 
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Commission represents the EU Member States within the WTO and acts as the EU’s 
formal voice.  A third, and most widely used, mode of governance (Jørgensen: 2009b: 198) 
– is the coordination model whereby the EU member states agree to act in coordination and 
in a concerted manner, typically represented by the rotating Council Presidency but where 
the Member States themselves may also act in a national capacity.  The unity of the EU in 
this latter model of representation is challenging as the EU has many voices interjecting on 
its formal representation and where coordination between the Member States must be 
frequent in maintaining that unity.   
 
Interrelated to this, assessment of unity as a performance indicator in multilateral 
negotiations must also take into consideration the EU’s political cohesion, defined by 
Thomas (2012) as, “reflect[ing] how fully EU actors support whatever common policy has 
been agreed”.  This may also be described as the demonstration of vertical coherence (De 
Jong & Schunz: 2012, Nuttall: 2005), concerned with, “the concertation of Member State 
positions and policies with and in respect of the overall consensus or common position at 
the Community or Union level...It thus concerns issues of solidarity...and a readiness to 
comply with the acquis” (Gebhard: 2011: 107).  A common tendency in assessing EU 
unity however has been to focus predominantly on the degree of convergence or 
divergence in the Member States and EU institutions interests and thus on their ability to 
agree (i.e. Van Schaik: 2010).  Whilst recognising that this may shape the EU’s common 
negotiation positioning- as the ECFR (2010) particularly distinguishes in its definition – 
what this analysis is concerned with, is the extent to which the EU maintains its unity 
within negotiations, and thus to the cohesiveness of the Member States in maintaining that 
position within the negotiation environment.   
 
This is important because a divided EU is an easy target for negotiation partners seeking to 
‘divide and conquer’.  As Zartman & Berman (1982: 213-214) identify, “A delegation with 
a number of components can use them for flexibility but it is also vulnerable to their being 
used to the same end by…[an]other party.”  A cohesive EU may be expected to be a much 
stronger negotiator – using its combined weight and expertise to pursue its objectives and 
capable of using divergent interests within its membership as a tactic rather than being 
subject to its divisions (Zartman & Berman: 1982: 213).  For one thing, a cohesive and 
united EU enhances the value of the EU common position, much aided by the fact that an 
EU common position is respected as one that has already undergone significant 
negotiation, as being thoughtfully conceived, and with its objectives approved by 27 
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Member States.  It is as such more likely to be accepted by other parties due to the internal 
process and debate that it has undergone (Kissack: 2010: 61).  Measuring EU unity within 
multilateral negotiations therefore takes these factors into account by identifying three 
levels of unity: 
 
High unity =  The EU has a common position entering the negotiation with one 
official EU voice representing the interests of the EU in negotiations 
with third countries. 
Moderate unity =  The EU has a common position entering the negotiation with 
representation by an EU figurehead but with Member States also 
speaking in a national capacity in a way which does not challenge 
the EU common position.  
Low unity = The EU has a common position entering the negotiations with 
representation by an EU figurehead but with Member States also 
speaking in a national capacity in a way that challenges the common 
position. 
 
From this approach however some challenges must be addressed.  In particular there is the 
question of to what extent the EU is measured as united where its Member States are 
themselves divided in their interests and where this may, for example, impact on the EU’s 
negotiation mandate.  A common criticism facing the EU in multilateral negotiations is the 
EU’s ‘lowest common denominator’ position and behind-the-scenes differences between 
Member States preventing the EU from being a more proactive player in the negotiations.  
Here a line must however be drawn between divergences in Member States interests and 
the EU’s actual negotiation performance.  Interests are here considered as a variable to be 
taken into account but which cannot, of themselves, be used to assess EU unity within the 
negotiation environment.  Instead, where the EU has a lowest common denominator 
position this is addressed in assessing the ambition of the EU’s negotiation position.  
Where the Member States are divided this only affects assessment where it affects the 
representation and cohesion of the EU within the negotiation itself.  Public or private 
statements of discontent by Member States against the EU representation in negotiations 
may for example weaken the EU’s position and provide a challenge to the EU delegation, 
but a mark of good performance is where those issues do not affect the EU’s representation 
and cohesion within the negotiation.  Unity becomes, therefore, an assessment of the EU’s 
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capability to overcome its internal difficulties and to present itself as a united front during 
negotiations.      
 
Outreach 
The next process-oriented indicator is outreach which focuses explicitly on the EU’s 
negotiation activities, encompassing elements of what the ECFR (2010) identifies as the 
criterion ‘resources’ and how hard the EU tries in its pursuit of its objectives.  More 
explicitly it is concerned with what Jørgensen (2009b: 203) defines as, “interaction with 
third-party diplomats – that is, non-EU diplomats”.  Outreach importantly refers therefore 
to the activity or behaviour of the EU towards others in the pursuit of its negotiation 
objectives; and thus to what the leadership discourse specifies as the ‘leader-follower 
relationship’ (Schirm: 2010, Underdal: 1994).  Due to the nature of multilateral 
negotiations where consensus is often a requirement for agreeing an outcome, this implies 
a necessity for EU performance to demonstrate outreach to others in order to find a ‘zone 
of agreement’ (Underdal: 1983, Afionis: 2011).  In order to assess EU outreach this 
analysis is thus specifically concerned with three considerations.  First, how active is the 
EU in pursuit of its objectives – does the EU have a proactive or reactive negotiation 
style?
10
  Second, is there evidence of the EU utilising formal mechanisms or tactics to 
reach out to negotiation partners?  Finally, how successful is the EU in the employment of 
particular negotiation tactics in its efforts to find agreement?   
 
How the EU pursues its negotiation objectives depends to a great extent on its negotiation 
style and, subsequently, on the ambition of the EU’s negotiation objectives.  The EU’s 
negotiation style may be, as Jørgensen (2009b) highlights, proactive or reactive. Although 
offering no explicit definition of these different styles, his empirical overview implies that 
the EU has a proactive negotiation style where it purposely pushes for its negotiation 
objectives, often going first or making particular demands which can set the tone for 
negotiations.  In terms of negotiation behaviour a proactive negotiation style might be 
                                                   
10
 In his framework for the assessment of the EU in multilateral diplomacy Jørgensen (2009b: 195) 
distinguishes between ‘outreach’ and ‘negotiation style’ as two different dimensions of analysis arguing that 
negotiation style relates to “issues such as reactive or proactive, general performance, communicative action 
or hard-nosed approaches” whilst outreach relates to “diplomacy vis-à-vis third parties during negotiation 
processes”. He argues that the reason for including outreach as its own dimension is due to the criticism that 
EU diplomats often spend more time on EU internal coordination than on outreach to third parties “in terms 
of persuasion, coercion or communicative action”. Whilst making a valid point that analysing outreach is 
important I suggest that these dimensions are in fact synonymous with each other and should be treated as 
one performance indicator rather than separately and with the EU’s negotiation style treated as a sub-
indicator of its overall outreach.   
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associated with the role of ‘leader’ or ‘pusher’11.  Conversely a reactive negotiation style is 
recognised where the EU’s outreach tends to be in reaction to the activities of other 
negotiation partners.  Where the EU is reactive this may be for a number of reasons.  It 
may be a specific negotiation tactic – purposely dragging its feet in order to prevent 
agreement on an issue it disagrees with (commonly associated with the role of ‘blocker’ or 
‘laggard’12).  It may however also have to do with difficulties with capacity and, as 
Jørgensen (2009b) highlights, the EU’s challenge of maintaining internal unity and 
coordination whilst proactively pursuing its objectives with third parties.   
 
How the EU then undertakes outreach to negotiation partners may depend on a number of 
formalised methods including the submission of proposals and working papers, making an 
offer or concession, hosting side-events at international conferences, and conducting 
demarchés to third countries i.e. tour des mondes (interview, Lord Brittan of Spennithorne, 
former EU Trade Commissioner, London, 19
th
 April 2011), all with the intention of 
ensuring EU objectives are publicised with third countries.  In negotiations, a party’s 
ability to come up with proposals that overcome differences is often an important method 
by which agreement is reached - “More than repetition or rebuttal, new arguments have 
been shown to be the key to persuasion, and new proposals will be seen as crucial in 
forging parts of an agreement” (Zartman & Berman: 1982: 20).  Returning again to Iklé 
(1964: 193), the submission of proposals is considered a, “key role in the process through 
which the parties come to terms.  Indeed, the confrontation, revisions, and final acceptance 
of proposals at the conference table is sometimes all that is meant by ‘negotiation’...If there 
is to be an explicit agreement, there must first be at least one explicit proposal”.  The EU 
may therefore demonstrate outreach in a negotiation through the submission of proposals 
that seek to overcome differences or propose solutions to problems.   Proposals are a form 
of outreach aimed at influencing negotiation partners, to serve as path-breakers, or to 
encourage favourable terms (Iklé: 1964: 193-194).  Another similar form of outreach is the 
submission of working papers which are intended to provide information, technical detail, 
and broadly outline your position to help inform discussions.  Another related formal tactic 
                                                   
11
 A distinction should be highlighted between these two roles as whilst a pusher actively pushes for its own 
particular goals, a leader actively leads others towards a common or shared objective (see Andresen & 
Agrawala: 2002).  It should be noted that it goes beyond the scope of this study to make any explicit 
assessment of the EU’s negotiation ‘role’ only to take into consideration the forms of negotiation behaviour 
which the EU might follow in the pursuit of its objectives. 
12
 A blocker is one who purposely blocks agreement by failing to join the consensus whilst a laggard is one 
who drags its feet and causes delay in a more passive method of blocking agreement.  See also Levy et al. 
(2001: 399) for discussion on laggards as those states who show low concern for the effectiveness of the 
institution itself 
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that the EU might employ is that of making an offer or concession and which will typically 
be required in negotiations where, “the stakes can be considered as increments of the same 
item” (Zartman & Berman: 2982: 166).  How much the EU will itself concede in a 
negotiation in order to achieve agreement, when it makes that concession, and the extent to 
which that concession is conditional on others making similar commitments, are important 
considerations in assessing EU outreach.  The success of such a concession is moreover 
highly dependent on its acceptability to negotiation partners and thus to their reciprocating 
with similar or better offers.   
 
The EU may also demonstrate outreach by using methods prior to the negotiations 
themselves including hosting side-events or meetings at international conferences in an 
effort to draw parties together to discuss particular EU-driven policies which may lead to 
the persuasion of negotiation partners to support EU preferences (interview, Former 
Disarmament Ambassador Miguel Aguirre de Carcer, Spanish Permanent Mission to the 
EU, Brussels, 5
th
 May 2011). These side-events are also useful socialisation methods 
enabling negotiators to meet in less formalised conditions away from the bargaining table.  
The EU may also seek to persuade third countries of its preferences by conducting 
diplomatic meetings through demarchés direct to capitals.  Demarchés may be conducted 
through regularly scheduled meetings or summits with third countries with the negotiation 
included as a particular agenda item (interview, senior official, Department of Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs, EEAS, Brussels, 10
th
 May 2011), or they may be 
conducted with the specific aim of drumming up support in anticipation of an upcoming 
negotiation. 
 
Assessing outreach may further be identified where the EU employs certain negotiation 
and diplomatic tactics in its dealings with its negotiation partners. Specific tactics that may 
be employed as part of the EU’s outreach include for example, framing, argument, issue-
linkage, and coalition-building.  The way the EU frames its negotiation objectives can aid 
its outreach.  For example it may aim to depoliticise its preferences, focusing more on 
technical details to avoid political challenge, or it may frame more controversial 
preferences in wording that will make it more acceptable to opponents
13
.   The EU may 
also employ particular tactics of argumentation whereby it frames its statements and choice 
of language in negotiations to make its preferences more attractive to negotiation partners 
                                                   
13
 Carbone (2007:24-29) identifies framing as a particular tactic used by the European Commission in dealing 
with the Member States when seeking to initiate and formulate policy.  It is argued here that a similar tactic 
may also be employed by the EU in its external relations.   
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or to emphasise the firmness of the EU’s stance. Iklé (1964: 197-203) argues that a 
negotiator may employ particular types of argument to make its preferences more 
agreeable to negotiation partners, such as stressing that objectives are motivated by 
friendly intentions or binding amplifications that spell out particularly positive details of an 
offer.  The EU may also use argument to stress the firmness of its stance by impressing 
upon its negotiation partners that no further concessions will be forthcoming, or that 
domestic constraints prevent it from going any further in its offer.  Iklé (1964: 202) also 
suggests that firmness of position may further be argued by linking objectives with legal or 
scientific principles.  Such a tactic is also identified within the regime effectiveness 
literature as useful to raising the level of concern by more conservative negotiation 
partners in support of more progressive objectives (Levy et al.: 2001: 399) 
 
Another tactic indicating outreach may be seen in the use of issue-linkage.  Issue-linkage 
refers to the tactic of linking agreement on one issue to concessions or sanctions in another.  
Thus the EU might use its economic weight to persuade or coerce others to support its 
negotiation preferences in exchange for economic concessions or the threat of withdrawing 
economic benefits.  As Keohane &  Nye (1977: 31) identify: “Dominant states may try to 
secure much the same result by using overall economic power to affect results on other 
issues...Linkage of unrelated issues is often a means of extracting concessions or side 
payments from rich and powerful states.”.  Similarly Iklé (1964: 69) identifies tie-ins and 
package deals in negotiations as relating to promises of compensation whereby a negotiator 
might promise a package of concessions across a broader range of issues in return for 
agreement on its negotiation preferences.   
 
Another outreach tactic that the EU might employ is coalition-building in an effort to 
gather support from a larger number of negotiation partners to more effectively push 
forward shared objectives.  In multilateral negotiations coalitions are an important means 
by which to bring the number of actors down to a more manageable number so that 
consensus can be achieved (Elgström & Jönsson: 2005: 2, Rittberger: 1983: 177).  
Coalition-building may involve the building of like-minded coalitions which seek to pool 
their resources and knowledge in the common pursuit of shared goals.  It may also involve 
coalition with highly divergent States or groups of States in an alliance to overcome a 
common opponent.  Coalition-building, particularly in this latter example, can be time-
consuming as efforts must be spent on building up areas of agreement and liaising with 
partners with whom you may have little else in common.   Coalition-building may also 
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require that a Party relinquish some of its objectives deemed unsatisfactory to its coalition 
partners in order to pursue a wider shared objective.  Coalition-building, where achieved, is 
however seen to move the negotiation forward or bring it to a successful end (Sjöstedt: 
1999: 242) and is therefore a highly useful tactic to employ.   
 
Making an assessment of EU outreach must therefore take into consideration the EU’s 
negotiation strategy, but also the extent to which it successfully employs negotiation 
tactics.  A low outreach might therefore be expected where the EU has a reactive 
negotiation style and where it employs little to no tactics in its relations with third 
countries to persuade them to support its goals.  Where the EU is proactive, as may be 
expected where its negotiation position is more progressive, it must employ some outreach 
to persuade negotiation partners that its objectives should be supported.  Tactics employed 
that directly bring about that effect indicate a successful, and thus a high, outreach.  Tactics 
attempted but which ultimately fail i.e. through a failed effort at coalition-building or 
where potential allies move their support to an opponent would be reflected in a more 
moderate level of outreach. These outreach measurements are thus summarised as follows: 
 
High outreach =  The EU institutions and Member States are proactive in the 
concerted pursuit of the EU’s objectives with evidence also of the 
successful employment of negotiation tactics to persuade negotiation 
partners to support EU objectives. 
Moderate outreach =  The EU institutions and Member States demonstrate concerted 
pursuit of the EU’s objectives with evidence also of attempting to 
employ negotiation tactics in an effort to persuade others but failing 
to do so. 
Low outreach = The EU institutions and Member States are reactive in their 
negotiation style with little to no evidence of negotiation tactics 
being employed to pursue EU objectives. 
 
Some challenges should be addressed in assessing outreach as a performance indicator.  
Firstly there is the challenge of assessing when certain negotiation tactics are deemed 
successful or not.  This is especially relevant when comparing tactics which require greater 
effort than others – a successful demarché to one country may, for example, take less effort 
on the part of the EU than successful coalition-building with a variety of different States.  
To some extent therefore, the efficiency of EU performance (see also Jørgensen et al. 
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2011) and the cost/benefit ratio of its negotiation outreach must be taken into 
consideration.  Whilst a loaded term (S. Baldwin: 2000), the ‘success’ of EU negotiating 
tactics is ultimately focused upon whether the EU was capable of utilising its diplomatic 
skill enough to be able to work alongside other partners and persuade them of its 
objectives.  Whilst this may be difficult to assess (the sheer scale of EU diplomatic activity 
would make it impossible to know how much effort it has given to persuading negotiation 
partners to support its objectives; in much the same way as is it may be difficult to pinpoint 
when changes in other actor’s positions may be linked to persuasion by the EU), 
understanding where the EU has tried – and succeeded – in persuading others is an 
important consideration in any performance assessment.  It is noted therefore, that success 
is not in this case related explicitly to the negotiation outcome.  Instead, success relates to 
whether the EU has been able to utilise tactics which then result in some shift in 
positioning by the negotiation partners it is targeting.  In this way, this assessment is 
concerned with “the transition of other actors to different values” (Vogler & Stephan: 
2007: 412) or, at the very least, to an acceptance by other actors that working with the EU 
may be a necessity in order to achieve an outcome that is acceptable to them both.    
 
Related to this, a challenge in measuring outreach is that some tactics may not always be 
easily identifiable.  Who the EU is trying to persuade or coerce, as well as the methods that 
it uses in terms of argumentation and framing may not always be publicised and, without 
first-hand knowledge of what the EU’s real intentions are for the negotiations, its outreach 
may be difficult to pinpoint.  Additionally, many of these tactics may be expected to be 
conducted behind closed doors, unadvertised by officials.  Officials may not publicise the 
fact that the EU has sought to persuade or coerce third countries.  However, formal 
methods of outreach – for example where the EU has submitted proposals or made 
concessions - are more easily identified, utilising the extensive document tools available 
through negotiation websites and the EU itself.  Interview data and analysis of negotiation 
commentary by analysts and the media further enables a general understanding of the EU’s 
negotiation style; whilst comparison of EU activities compared to other negotiation 
partners also contributes towards understanding whether the EU was a first-mover or more 
reactive in its approach.   
 
Significance 
Another important indicator of the EU’s performance in multilateral negotiations concerns 
its significance as a player and importance at the negotiating table.  This indicator relates in 
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part therefore to discourse on the EU as a ‘power’ and ‘presence’.  In EU studies there is 
an, often implicit, expectation that the EU will be most effective in multilateral 
negotiations where it is judged to be a significant player and thus essential to decision-
making processes.  This assessment is often based on an assumption that because the EU 
has power – typically identified in its material resources i.e. as a trading power (Dür & 
Zimmerman: 2007), its global share of greenhouse gas emissions (Oberthür: 2011a, 
Vogler: 2011) or in its ‘normative’ distinctiveness (Schiepers & Sicurelli: 2007, Manners: 
2002, 2006) – it will better influence the negotiations, shape the views of others, and thus 
be more capable of attaining its goals.  Dür & Zimmerman (2007: 772) for example, make 
the case that the EU’s market size, “makes it unthinkable that a multilateral trade 
agreement could be concluded in the WTO without EU participation”.  Building upon this, 
this analytical framework focuses on more direct evidence of EU significance, by focusing 
on the EU’s actual participation (or exclusion) from key negotiation processes, and 
particularly its participation in decision-making and endgame bargaining. 
 
According to Sjöstedt (1999: 233) there are three main processes of multilateral 
negotiation including: (i) agenda-setting (ii) negotiation for formula and (iii) endgame 
bargaining.  Interestingly it is the EU’s involvement in the first-phase ‘agenda-setting’ that 
has generated the most interest in the literature thus far, particularly in relation to the EU 
environmental leadership literature (Parker & Karlsson: 2010, Vogler & Stephan: 2007: 
407, Schreurs & Tiberghein: 2007: 19, Zito: 2005: 370, Gupta & van der Grijp: 2000: 79).  
The same is also seen in the trade literature where the EU’s role as demandeur is a 
commonly cited example of the EU’s influence, leadership, and ‘driving force’ in the 
Multilateral Trading System (Jørgensen: 2009: 204, Dür & Zimmerman: 2007: 771, 
Meunier & Nicoläidis: 2006: 916, M. Baldwin: 2006: 913, De Bièvre: 2006: 852, Van den 
Hoven: 2004: 258).  Whilst the EU’s participation in agenda-setting processes, as well as 
in the negotiation of formulae, provides useful insights into the EU’s performance, 
methodological challenges prevent any accurate assessment due to the difficulty of trying 
to identify every single negotiating encounter that the EU may or may not have been 
participant in.  With negotiations in the UNFCCC typically lasting up to a fortnight, up to a 
month in the NPT, and, in the case of the WTO’s Doha Round, running continuously for a 
period of over 10 years, coupled with the challenges of accessing often undisclosed 
information of ‘who met whom’ due to the diplomatic sensitivities of a negotiation 
environment, such a task is far beyond the scope of this study.   
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Instead, it is the EU’s participation in the final process ‘endgame bargaining’ - focused 
explicitly on the details of any outcome agreement, involving brokering between the major 
interests, and where decisions are ultimately made (Zartman & Berman: 1982) – that is the 
primary focus of this assessment. Moving beyond the methodological challenges of 
assessing all three negotiation stages, there is also a more logical rationale for focusing on 
EU participation in endgame bargaining as an indicator of its significance.  In multilateral 
negotiations it is common practice to manage complexity by condensing negotiations down 
to a select group of key players who are influential in terms of their strategic importance, 
positioning, or status.  Multilateral negotiations conducted under the auspices of the UN 
for example, commonly resort to what have become termed ‘Friends of the Chair’ 
(interview: Ambassador to the UN, southern developing country, New York, 10
th
 March 
2011, interview, UNODA official, New York, 10
th
 March 2011), whereby a selected group 
of key players are invited by the negotiation chair to discuss areas of agreement and 
disagreement with an effort to finding consensus for an outcome agreement. A similar 
arrangement takes place within the WTO where a system of concentric circles is employed 
in an effort to find agreement on formula and endgame bargaining and which typically 
starts with a core circle of the major trading powers (Interview, WTO spokesperson, 
Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011).  It is then within these groups that endgame bargaining takes 
place and where core decisions affecting the negotiation outcome are typically taken.  The 
EU’s participation or exclusion from these core negotiations thus provides a plausible 
indication of EU significance as an actor in that process. 
 
Where the EU is then participant in all processes of endgame bargaining it may be seen to 
have a voice at a very important table and may, subsequently, be expected to have some 
influence over the final outcome agreement.  Measuring significance may then be assessed 
as follows: 
 
High significance = EU representative/lead negotiator(s) participates in all 
processes of endgame bargaining.   
Moderate significance = EU representative/lead negotiator(s) participates in some but 
not all processes of endgame bargaining. 
Low significance = EU representative/lead negotiator(s) excluded from 
processes of endgame bargaining. 
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Effectiveness 
The final performance indicator assessed in this framework is effectiveness.  As was 
demonstrated in Chapter One, the concept of effectiveness is a burgeoning area of analysis 
in EU external relations.  EU performance studies have also increasingly drawn upon the 
concept in, “using goals and objectives as a central performance standard” (Jørgensen et 
al.: 2011: 603).  As was discussed in Chapter One, effectiveness has however, often been 
an ambiguous concept, and commonly used synonymously with ‘performance’ itself.  It 
requires therefore some clarification as a specific and important performance indicator.  
Specifically, effectiveness in this context is concerned with EU goal-attainment.  It 
therefore draws upon definitions of effectiveness as the ‘deliverance of concrete results’ 
(A.R Young: 2006), on the EU’s “(in)ability to achieve desired effects” (Elgström & 
Smith: 2006), or as, “the degree to which the EU has achieved its goals and objectives in 
the decision-making process within that institution (not their implementation).” (Jørgensen 
et al.: 2011: 603). As a performance indicator, effectiveness – or goal-attainment – is 
therefore fundamentally a concept of outcome concerned with whether or not the EU 
achieved what it set out to achieve within multilateral negotiations. 
 
Evaluating the EU’s effectiveness in multilateral negotiations is premised therefore on a 
comparison between the EU’s negotiation objectives and preferences relative to the 
negotiation outcome.   In order to make that assessment a simple quantitative exercise is 
therefore conducted as follows: 
 
High effectiveness = Most EU objectives, as specified in its negotiation position, 
have been met within the negotiation outcome 
Moderate effectiveness = Some EU objectives, as specified in its negotiation position, 
have been met within the negotiation outcome 
Low effectiveness = Few EU objectives, as specified in its negotiation position, 
have been met within the negotiation outcome 
 
This approach does however raise several challenges which must be taken into account.  
First, taken by itself, assessing EU effectiveness by focusing on similarities between what 
the EU wanted to achieve and the negotiation outcome does raise questions of causality.  In 
other words, did the EU do anything to achieve these objectives or were other negotiators 
responsible?  According to the ECFR methodology the EU performs well in a foreign 
policy if it achieves the outcome it wanted.  This is however regardless of whether other 
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actors helped to make that outcome possible (ECFR: 2010: 131) and which raises 
questions or whether others may then have been more responsible.  Others have tried to 
overcome the issue of causality by associating EU ‘external effectiveness’ with its 
‘internal’ effectiveness (Laatikainen & Smith: 2006) and subsequently drawing causal 
links between what the EU does and what it then achieves.  The problem with this 
approach however, is that it concentrates more on the EU’s own internal functioning rather 
than it does on its actual negotiation behaviour, particularly in relation to its negotiation 
partners.  Thus whilst its unity is widely discussed, its significance and outreach are 
neglected.  It is for this reason that this framework focuses upon EU performance as a 
measure of both its effectiveness and negotiation behaviour; adopting performance 
indicators to assess EU unity, outreach and significance.  These may, in turn, shed greater 
light upon the relationship between EU negotiation activity and its goal-attainment, better 
enabling claims of EU ‘effectiveness’ to be credited (or not) to its actual negotiation 
behaviour.       
 
Second, there is a question of how assessment can be made where the EU’s goals are 
themselves vague or difficult to identify.   Goals may not for example be clearly defined or 
can be so broad as to be meaningless (see Jørgensen et al. 2011: 604).  They may also 
coincide with the goals of the institution within which negotiations are being conducted, or 
with the goals of other negotiation partners, which makes assessment of EU effectiveness 
challenging as these same goals may be shared by many others.  In such a scenario, whilst 
these factors may shape assessment of the EU’s ambition, they do not alter the assessment 
of EU effectiveness.  The utility of performance as a concept of analysis is that it 
encompasses analysis of the EU’s negotiation position (level of ambition); its functioning 
as a negotiator (unity, outreach, significance) and its effectiveness.  Assessing 
effectiveness is therefore concerned solely with EU goal-attainment. Where the EU’s 
objectives are ambiguous and there is little or no evidence of their inclusion in a 
negotiation outcome then this would be assessed as low effectiveness by the EU.  Equally, 
if the EU shares many of the same negotiation objectives as its negotiation partners and 
which are then reflected in the outcome, the EU will have demonstrated moderate or high 
effectiveness.  In such cases however, assessment of the EU’s own negotiation behaviour 
is all the more important when making an overall performance assessment, in order to 
draw conclusions as to the EU’s involvement in contributing towards that outcome.   
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Another challenge when assessing EU effectiveness is how to make a measurement where 
there is no outcome agreement.   Having no agreement can be a common occurrence in 
multilateral negotiations as the attempt to find settlement between so many different 
interests ends in failure and which may result in the EU, and others, being branded 
ineffective.  However, as discussed earlier in this chapter, having no outcome agreement 
does not necessarily correspond to nil effectiveness.  Instead, a return to the EU’s 
negotiation position is necessary in order to make a judgement as to goal-attainment 
regardless of their being no formal outcome.  For example, if the EU had a conservative 
agenda and was seeking to block agreement on a matter it was unhappy with, no agreement 
would qualify as high effectiveness by the EU.  Equally the EU might have sought a 
successful outcome but, despite their being no formal agreement, progress may still have 
been made with negotiations still moving in the direction the EU wants.  In cases where the 
EU sought a successful outcome for the negotiation as a whole, but no formal outcome was 
agreed, an assessment of low effectiveness would therefore be made as it must be assumed 
that, with no agreement, few of the EU’s objectives would have been attained.  This 
example further demonstrates the benefit of a longitudinal study as goals which may not be 
attained in the short-term may still be assessed over a longer period of time. 
 
A final challenge relates to whether the importance or priority of an EU objective being 
attained affects assessment of low, moderate or high effectiveness.  Due to the quantitative 
nature of this effectiveness assessment, this analysis does not make a priority of EU 
objectives; concentrating instead on the quantity of goals attained over the quality.  
However, it is noted that choice of language distinguishing values of effectiveness as 
‘most’, ‘some’ and ‘few’ goals attained, has been intended to allow a more qualitative 
assessment which takes into consideration both the number and importance of goals 
attained.  ‘Most’ for example, suggests that the EU’s key objectives may have been 
obtained as well as the majority of its smaller objectives.  ‘Some’ indicates that the EU has 
been unable to attain the majority of its key objectives but that it has nevertheless managed 
to attain a number of key objectives and some lower priority objectives also.  ‘Few’ then 
indicates low effectiveness with the EU attaining little of its key or lower priority 
objectives.  
 
2.5 Making an overall performance assessment 
Having unpacked performance into these measurable indicators how do they then 
contribute to a broader assessment of the EU’s performance within multilateral 
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negotiations?  More specifically, how well did the EU perform?  Previous attempts to 
address this question have focused primarily on the EU’s negotiation behaviour to make an 
assessment; with the EU as a global actor and leadership literatures particularly 
emphasising what the EU says or does within a negotiations (process) over what it then 
gets (outcome).  The difficulty with this approach however is that it sets the bar for 
measuring how well the EU performed rather low - with the EU’s performance judged to 
be good where it either meets or exceeds expectations of how it ‘should’ perform relative 
to its capabilities.   
 
A smaller, but burgeoning, field of debate has conversely concentrated on the EU’s 
‘external effectiveness’ and ‘influence’ within multilateral negotiations, focusing therefore 
on the EU’s ability to shape the negotiation outcome and attain its goals.  More recent 
performance studies have also, whether implicitly (Jørgensen et al. 2011) or explicitly 
(ECFR: 2010), placed greater emphasis on outcome as a measure of how well the EU has 
performed; with how the EU went about attaining its goals being less significant than the 
fact that it has actually achieved them.  It is here argued however that focusing on process 
or outcome-orientated concepts to analyse EU performance can risk over- or under-
estimating how well the EU in fact performed.  Necessary therefore to making that 
judgement is consideration of process and outcome thus, “not only the product you come 
up with” but also, “the way you play the game” (Underdal: 1983: 190).  Subsequently, how 
well the EU performs in multilateral negotiations is assessed on the following equation:   
 
Behaviour (B) + Effectiveness (E) = Performance (P) 
 
This equation does however require some clarification.  Firstly, there is the question of 
why each of the four performance indicators outlined above are not treated separately 
within this equation.  Justification for this is that, with four performance indicators - each 
measured on a scale of low, moderate or high - to assess the EU’s overall performance 
based on the equal aggregation of all indicators would place too much emphasis on the 
EU’s negotiation behaviour.  With three process-oriented indicators (unity, outreach and 
significance) and only one outcome-oriented indicator (effectiveness), this would defeat 
the purpose of trying to readdress the balance between predominantly process and 
outcome-oriented approaches.   In order to evaluate EU performance as an equal measure 
of both its negotiation behaviour and its effectiveness requires an aggregate value for the 
EU’s unity, outreach and significance.  Deriving that aggregate value is achieved using a 
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simple average equation. Where each process indicator is assessed on a scale of low, 
moderate or high this is associated with the quantitative measurement where 1 = low, 2 = 
moderate and 3 = high.   The value associated to the EU’s negotiation behaviour is 
therefore premised on the equation: 
 
 
 
For example, where the EU has high unity (3), moderate outreach (2) but low significance 
(1) this is aggregated into an overall moderate level of negotiation behaviour
14
.  Similarly, 
where the EU has high unity (3), moderate outreach (2) and high significance (3) this is 
aggregated into an overall high level of negotiation behaviour
15
.   
 
This approach does however raise a methodological challenge that must be addressed.  
Specifically, it raises the question of whether all process indicators should be given equal 
weight in deriving an overall value for negotiation behaviour – should the EU’s level of 
unity, for example, be given greater weight than its level of significance or outreach?  The 
EU’s unity as an actor is an issue that has continued to fascinate scholars and has 
subsequently been flagged as an issue of some importance when assessing its performance 
in multilateral negotiations.  This is addressed through its inclusion in this analytical 
framework; however, it is not judged to be a more important indicator than the EU’s level 
of outreach or significance as these indicators are also essential in making an overall 
performance assessment.  Similarly, the EU’s level of outreach might be considered to be 
more important to its overall performance than its level of significance.  How the EU 
negotiates with others must, after all, matter more than whether or not it is a participant in 
endgame bargaining?  In fact this is not the case.  The EU’s significance, as a measure of 
its participation in key bargaining processes and decision-making, is an essential indicator 
for its performance to be assessed.  The EU may have high unity, a high level of outreach 
with a proactive negotiation strategy and a highly successful raft of demarchés, coalition-
                                                   
14
 Where 3+2+1 / 3 = 2 and where 2= moderate.   
15
 Where 3+2+3 / 3 = 2.66, rounded up = 3 and where 3 = high 
Behaviour (B) = ư + ơ + ƨ 
            3 
Where: 
ư = unity 
ơ = outreach 
ƨ = significance 
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building, and other tactics but, if is not then in the room to push those shared objectives so 
that they are included in the negotiation outcome, its ability to push its objectives forward 
into the negotiation outcome will be affected.  Each process-indicator is therefore essential 
to understanding how well the EU has performed in its negotiation behaviour, and are 
accordingly treated with equal weight in deriving an aggregate value for the EU’s 
behaviour as a whole.  
 
Values for the EU’s overall performance are then assessed using a simple scale of: (i) very 
good, (ii) good, (iii) fair, (iv) poor, and (v) very poor.  This scale has been adapted from 
the often-used scale used in behavioural science and market research and which typically 
ranges from excellent – very good – good – fair – poor (i.e. Reynolds: 1966).  An 
‘excellent’ assessment is not made in this study for the primary reason that an ‘excellent’ 
performance did not add much beyond what ‘very good’ already provided in making an 
overall performance assessment.  A ‘very poor’ category has also been added in order to 
reflect balance across the scale in contrast to a ‘very good’ performance.  These values 
have furthermore been chosen as they allow the question of how well the EU performs to 
be clearly answered.  They are also clearly distinguishable according to the low, moderate 
and high values assessed in the EU’s negotiation behaviour and effectiveness.  Overall 
performance assessments are therefore made as follows: 
(i) Very good performance  
A ‘very good’ performance would be expected where an actor not only achieves most of 
their objectives within the negotiation outcome, but can claim credit for this by having 
behaved very well within the negotiations themselves.  In such cases the actor has 
presented a high level of negotiation behaviour, showing itself a united force, engaged in 
all processes of the negotiations, and been proactive in pushing forward their preferences 
and which coincides further with a high level of effectiveness.  In this case the EU has 
shown that it has both performed well in terms of its unity, outreach and significance, and 
translated this into most of its goals being attained.  A very good performance may 
therefore be assessed where the EU achieves high levels in both its negotiation behaviour 
and effectiveness. 
(ii) Good performance  
A ‘good’ performance in contrast may be expected in two different scenarios.  Firstly it is 
assessed where an actor has performed well in terms of its negotiation behaviour; 
maintaining its united front, being proactive in pushing forward its objectives and engaged 
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in endgame bargaining, but which may then be less successful in attaining all of its 
objectives in the negotiation outcome.  Secondly, a good performance may also be 
expected where the actor has managed to achieve most of its objectives in the negotiation 
outcome but has perhaps performed less well in terms of its negotiation behaviour.  For 
example, where it has had some challenges in terms of its unity, its participation in 
endgame bargaining, or in its ability to persuade others to support its objectives.  A good 
performance may be valued therefore where the EU has shown either a high level of 
negotiation behaviour and moderate effectiveness or vice versa.   
(iii) Fair performance  
An actor may then be expected to have had a ‘fair’ performance where it faces particular 
challenges to its negotiation behaviour, effectiveness, or both.  Such a performance is 
better than poor as the actor has performed well in some aspect, but it has not performed 
well in all factors thus preventing it from being assessed as good.  A fair performance may 
therefore be assessed in a number of different scenarios.  For example, where the actor has 
faced challenges in its negotiation behaviour in addition to only some of its goals being 
attained this would equate to a fair performance.  A fair performance may also be assessed 
however where the actor has behaved very well in its negotiation behaviour, doing all that 
it could to achieve its goals within the negotiation environment, but then achieved very few 
of its objectives within the negotiation outcome.  A further scenario where a fair 
assessment may be made is where the actor performs poorly with regards its negotiation 
behaviour but also managed to attain most of its objectives within the negotiation outcome.  
A fair performance for the EU may therefore be assessed where it has had moderate levels 
in both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness, or either a low level of negotiation 
behaviour but high effectiveness or vice versa.   
(iv) Poor performance  
A ‘poor’ performance may be understood in those cases where an actor has had a low level 
of either its negotiation behaviour or effectiveness and no more than a moderate level in 
the other.  It is thus assessed where an actor either behaves poorly - whether as a result of 
internal divisions, or of under-estimating the preferences of negotiation partners and failing 
to attract their support – and achieves some of its objectives; or where it behaves relatively 
well but achieves few of its negotiation objectives, most particularly where the outcome 
reflects the opposite of pursued preference structures.  For the EU therefore a poor 
performance may be assessed in two scenarios. First, a poor performance may be assessed 
where the EU’s negotiation behaviour has been low but where its effectiveness is 
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moderate.  Second, a poor performance may be assessed where the EU’s negotiation 
behaviour has been more moderate but where its effectiveness has then been low.  A poor 
performance is distinguished therefore from a ‘fair’ performance in that the most that is 
achieved is a moderate level of either negotiation behaviour or effectiveness. 
 (v) Very poor performance 
Finally, a ‘very poor’ performance is assessed where an actor has performed poorly in 
every aspect of its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness.  A very poor performance is 
distinguished from a poor or fair performance as the actor achieves low levels across all 
indicators.  It has thus not only shown divisions amongst its delegation, a reactive 
negotiation strategy with limited to no outreach to negotiation partners, but has also been 
essentially ignored within the negotiation process and which further results in few of its 
objectives being obtained.  For the EU therefore a ‘very poor’ performance is a worst case 
scenario whereby it achieves low values in both its negotiation behaviour and 
effectiveness.  These values are summarised in Table 2.1 below: 
 
Table 2.1: Values of overall performance equation 
 
 
In this way, EU performance within each negotiation analysed may be assessed as a 
measure of both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness, and valued in a way as to 
clearly demonstrate how well it has performed.  In the following chapters this framework 
will be employed across a range of multilateral negotiations to generate a fuller picture of 
how well the EU performs both over-time and across policy fields.   
Behaviour High Moderate Low
High Very Good Good Fair
Moderate Good Fair Poor
Low Fair Poor Very Poor
Where Behaviour = (Unity + Outreach + Significance)/3
Source: Author's own compilation
Effectiveness
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Conclusion 
In this chapter an analytical framework for evaluating EU performance across multilateral 
negotiations and over-time was introduced.  Positioning performance as a bridging concept 
that encompasses elements of both process- and outcome-oriented analysis, this framework 
assesses both EU negotiation behaviour and its effectiveness in making a performance 
evaluation.  Considering first the ambition of the EU’s negotiation position, assessment 
then focuses upon four performance indicators including the EU’s unity, its outreach, 
significance, and effectiveness.  Measuring each indicator on a low, moderate and high 
scale these assessments are then combined into an overall performance assessment ranging 
from very poor, poor, fair, good to very good.  In the following case studies this framework 
will be utilised in evaluating EU performance within climate change (UNFCCC), trade 
(WTO) and security (NPT) multilateral negotiations.   
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Chapter 3: EU performance in the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change negotiations (1995-2011) 
 
In no other case study is the disparity in assessing EU negotiation performance best 
identified than in the case of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).  Recognised as a ‘critical study’ (Schunz: 2010a: 15) in understanding 
the EU’s influence in the world, the UNFCCC negotiations and the EU’s involvement in 
the making of the Kyoto Protocol is perhaps the most widely cited case study employed in 
evaluating EU behaviour in multilateral negotiations.  Since the 1990s, a burgeoning body 
of literature has concentrated its efforts on seeking to assess and explain the EU’s 
presence, actorness, leadership and overall effectiveness in this forum, which has produced 
a plethora of divergent perspectives.  Of those that offer a longitudinal viewpoint, scholars 
have been seen to lament the EU’s ‘suboptimal’ (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012: 170) 
‘(under)’performance (Afionis: 2011: 347) on the one hand, to praise its ‘significantly 
improved’ (Oberthür: 2011a, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 35)) and ‘sustained’ 
(Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007: 21) leadership on the other, or to reflect upon its ‘mixed’ 
and ‘uneven’ negotiation behaviour (Van Schaik & Egenhofer: 2005, 2003).  With 
extensive focus given to analysis of the EU’s ‘green leadership’, debate has further been 
coloured by high ambitions, and even higher expectations; with the EU itself contributing 
to that rhetoric by proclaiming from as early as 1990, that it would take on, “a leading role 
in promoting concerted and effective action at the global level” in tackling the global 
common of climate change (Council: 1990).   
 
One particular source of confusion in assessing EU performance in this forum has been the 
cocktail of, often implicit, criteria used in making those judgements.  Assessments are, for 
example, made courtesy of the EU’s ‘pushing for action’ during the negotiations (Parker & 
Karlsson: 2010: 924, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36), of acting as an ‘agenda-setter’ 
(Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007: 24, Vogler & Stephan: 2007: 398) or of its ability to act as 
‘one bloc’ (Kilian & Elgström: 2010: 262).  Others focus on the EU’s representation and 
coordination during negotiations (Van Schaik & Egenhofer: 2003, 2005).  Another method 
has been to focus on the EU’s own internal performance on climate issues in ‘setting an 
example’ for others to then follow (Vogler: 2011: 30-31, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 
28, Sjöstedt: 1998).  Others base their assessments on the EU’s (in)ability to export its 
normative preferences and domestic policies to the global level (Van Schaik & Schunz: 
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2012, Afionis: 2011), or on an effectiveness gap between EU ambition and actual goal-
attainment (Lacasta et al. 2007, Hovi et al. 2003).  Since the failed UNFCCC Copenhagen 
Summit in 2009, a further approach has been to focus upon the EU’s ability to achieve its 
goals relative to other rising powers (Oberthür: 2011a, Vogler: 2011), and on its 
diminishing influence in shaping others climate policy (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012, 
Torney: 2011).  Very few efforts have however, been made towards explicitly assessing 
EU performance within the UNFCCC negotiations, and even fewer that take into account 
that performance as a measure of both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness
16
.  As 
such, an incomplete picture of the EU’s negotiation performance within the UNFCCC has 
developed with assessments either over- or under-estimating how well the EU has 
performed dependent upon primarily process- or outcome-oriented approaches.  The 
picture that has started to emerge within the EU environmental literature therefore is of an 
EU, perceived by some to have performed well if it demonstrates some semblance of 
‘leadership’ behaviour, but, by others, to have performed poorly if it then fails in achieving 
ambitious objectives.   
 
The aim of this chapter is to make a clarifying contribution to this debate on EU 
performance within the UNFCCC negotiations.  Specifically it evaluates EU performance, 
premised on the framework developed in the previous chapter, as a measure of both its 
negotiation behaviour and effectiveness, within the UNFCCC negotiations from 1995 to 
2011.  Focusing its assessment on periods of negotiation within the UNFCCC Conferences 
of the Parties (CoP) where major efforts were made towards either launching or 
operationalizing an international climate agreement, it seeks to address the question of how 
well the EU has performed in this negotiation when it has mattered most.  Endeavouring to 
fill in some of the blanks in the picture described above, it finds that EU performance in 
the UNFCCCC negotiations from 1995 to 2011 has been highly variable, neither meeting 
the high expectations associated with a ‘leader’, nor the low expectations associated with 
critiques of the EU’s limited effectiveness and influence.  Rather, it finds that the EU has 
had a mixed record, performing particularly well during negotiations aimed at initiating 
negotiations towards a Kyoto and post-Kyoto Protocol agreement, but with more limited 
                                                   
16
 Exceptions to this may be seen by Damro (2006) who, whilst focusing upon the EU’s external 
effectiveness within the UNFCCC, does also address its internal effectiveness which draws some 
comparisons with its negotiation behaviour.  Oberthür (2011a) moreover, by focusing on the EU’s relevance 
to its Member States and its effectiveness does give some consideration to both process and outcome-
oriented indicators.  In both of these cases however, whilst attention is given to the EU’s unity within the 
UNFCCC, no attention is given explicitly to the EU’s negotiation actions in terms of its outreach and 
significance. 
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success at times of operationalizing and finalising their details.  In addition, it finds that 
despite its widely lamented failure to ‘lead’ and its overall poor performance at 
Copenhagen in 2009 there is no clear sign of a diminution in the EU’s performance within 
the UNFCCC as indicated within the existing literature.  Rather it will show that, having 
moderated its ambitions following the Copenhagen failure, the EU bounced-backed to give 
a good performance at the Durban CoP in December 2011.  It suggests moreover that, 
despite the EU’s ambitious leadership rhetoric in this forum, its negotiation objectives do 
not always place it as a preference outlier within the UNFCCC.  It can therefore often 
achieve its goals in this forum through successfully outreaching to its negotiation partners 
with whom it shares some zone of agreement. 
 
In order to present itself the chapter is broken down into the following four main sections.  
In the first section discussion is given to the EU as an actor within the UNFCCC.  Setting 
the scene for the following performance evaluation this section focuses on the evolution of 
the EUs institutional framework on climate action; how its external policy is derived and 
on developments in its competence and negotiating capabilities.  In section two discussion 
moves onto the UNFCCC negotiations themselves, with a brief overview of the major 
players and key negotiation issues at play.  Sections three and four then provide the main 
performance evaluation, assessing the EU’s performance within the UNFCCC over two 
key periods of negotiations.  Section three focuses first on EU performance over the course 
of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations and ratification (1995-2004); concentrating on four 
specific conferences in which the Kyoto Protocol negotiations were first launched (CoP-1), 
agreed (CoP-3), and operationalized (CoP-6-CoP-6bis-CoP-7).  Section four then turns to 
more recent developments, evaluating EU performance in negotiations focused upon a 
successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol (2005-2011), and concentrating on four specific 
conferences in which the post-2012 negotiations were first intended to be discussed (CoP-
11), where negotiations were launched (CoP-13), where an agreement was meant to be 
reached (CoP-15) and subsequently where negotiations were again re-launched (CoP-17).  
The chapter is then summarised in a concluding section.   
 
3.1. The EU as an actor in the UNFCCC 
An important consideration in making a performance evaluation is first to address the 
question of ‘who is EU’.  This is especially necessary in the case of the UNFCCC where 
the EU’s institutional arrangements on climate issues make it a particularly complex actor.  
As a multi-faceted issue in which the EU and Member States share competence, 
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understanding the EU’s capacity to act, and negotiate, in multilateral climate negotiations 
has generated some consternation, not least for the EU’s negotiation partners (Damro: 
2006: 175).  Whilst the Union has the legal authority to act for its Member States on 
matters pertaining to ‘environmental protection’ and particularly on issues including air 
pollution and waste treatment (TFEU: 2007: Art. 191-192), Member States nevertheless 
retain exclusive competence when it comes to issues of taxation and energy policy.  
Although changes under the Lisbon Treaty raised the profile of climate change as a more 
explicit strategic concern for the EU (TFEU: 2007: Art. 4(2), this has not translated into 
any changes in the existing distribution of competences (Vogler: 2011: 23).  Within 
multilateral climate negotiations, and the UNFCCC more specifically, both the European 
Community (EC) and Member States therefore have legal competence to act.  Within the 
UNFCCC moreover, the European Community (EC) is also recognised as a Regional 
Economic Integration Organisation (REIO).  Subsequently the European Commission, on 
behalf of the EC (and now the EU
17
), can formally participate and sign agreements 
alongside State Parties to the Convention on condition that it does not acquire additional 
voting rights.  Within the UNFCCC the Commission thus has the formal status to negotiate 
for its Member States and vote on their behalf, but it cannot vote in addition to its Member 
States.  Although changes from the Lisbon Treaty have raised debate within the EU 
regarding the Commission formally representing the Member States within the UNFCCC 
(see Oberthür: 2011a, Afionis: 2009), in practice this is not used.  Instead, it is the Council 
Presidency, not the Commission, who typically takes the lead in negotiating on behalf of 
the Member States within the UNFCCC negotiations. 
 
Upon entering UNFCCC negotiations the Council Presidency represents the position of all 
Member States with the Commission providing support
18
.  However, with the EU Council 
Presidency rotating to a different Member State every six months and the UNFCCC 
Conference of the Parties (CoP) negotiations taking place annually, the EU has been 
criticised for inconsistencies in its approach towards the negotiations and for not 
generating enough of a long-term perspective (Van Schaik & Egenhofer: 2005).  It has also 
been open to criticism over the level of negotiating skill and capacity each of the Member 
States can provide as the EU’s lead negotiator, with the smaller Member States particularly 
put under pressure during their terms of office (Lacasta et al. 2007: 217).   
                                                   
17
 Under the Lisbon Treaty the legal personality of the European Community formally became the European 
Union.  In these discussion EU is therefore most widely used. 
18
 Prior to the Amsterdam Treaty EU representation in the UNFCCC was led by the ‘Troika’ including the 
current, previous and incoming Council Presidencies.  The Amsterdam Treaty amended this so that the 
Troika was formed of the current Council Presidency, incoming Presidency and the Commission. 
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Subsequently, in 2004 the Irish Council Presidency initiated a reform of the EU’s 
representation within the UNFCCC negotiations (Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010, Oberthür 
& Roche Kelly: 2008, Damro: 2006, Van Schaik & Egenhofer: 2005). These reforms 
focused on moving delegation authority from the Council to the expert level and creating a 
flexible system of coordination and representation (Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 38).  
This has created a system of ‘lead negotiators’ and ‘issue leaders’ whereby Member States 
– other than the Presidency – can represent the EU within specified negotiation groups.  
This reform is seen to have resulted in, “a significant increase in the negotiating capacity of 
the EU in the 2000s” (Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 41).  Further changes in February 
2010 within the European Commission have also generated a shift in the EU’s 
representation within the UNFCCC negotiations, notably with the creation of a new 
dedicated Directorate General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA)
19
.  Whilst this change has 
not altered the key role played by the Council Presidency within climate negotiations, the 
creation of DG CLIMA was seen to establish the Director General for Climate Action as a 
lead negotiator for the EU during the Durban CoP in 2011.  As the following analysis will 
suggest, this participation by DG CLIMA was highly contributory to the EU’s good 
performance at Durban and may, along with changes under the Lisbon Treaty, indicate a 
general shift in EU representation within the UNFCCC for future negotiations.   
 
The process of deriving the EU’s negotiation position, upon which the Presidency and 
other issue leaders are then delegated to act (Lacasta et al. 2007: 214), must go through 
numerous stages.  Whilst officially falling under the purview of the Environment Council – 
and thus national environmental ministers – in reality, due to the high political salience and 
popular awareness of the issue, the final decision on the EU’s negotiation position is given 
to the European Council and agreed by unanimity vote
20
 (Van Schaik: 2010).  Early 
preparation on building a common position begins within expert groups including the 
Working Party on International Environment Issues: Climate Change (WPIEI-CC)
21
, 
before moving to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER-I).  The 
Commission also feeds in to this preparatory stage with strategy documents or advice 
before it goes first, to the Environment Council, and then the full European Council.  The 
                                                   
19
 Formed out of the previous DG Environment 
20
 It should be noted that subsequent Treaty Reforms have extended the right of qualified majority voting 
within the Council, including on issues of environmental policy.  However, in practice the Council maintains 
a unanimity rule in deciding its negotiation position entering the UNFCCC negotiations 
21
 Prior to 2000 named the Ad Hoc Working Group on Climate Change.  With the 2004 reform greater 
authority was given to the Council working group to develop negotiating positions 
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process can be laborious as efforts to find consensus between often divergent national 
energy policies and preferences can be difficult.   
 
As a result, the EU has often been criticised for having too much of a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ position upon entering multilateral climate negotiations (Yamin: 2000: 65, 
Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 286, Lacasta et al.: 2007: 214-5), which in turn can prevent the 
Council Presidency from acting with flexibility, from having any clear fall-back positions 
(Grubb & Yamin: 2001: 271, 288, Gupta & van der Grijp: 2000b: 267, Lacasta et al. 2007: 
227) or an efficient negotiation strategy (Afionis: 2011).  Due to the need for on-going 
coordination during the negotiations themselves, with the Council Presidency requiring 
frequent in-put and, at times, approval by the other Member states, the EU has also been 
criticised for being too slow to react (Yamin: 2000) and of being beset by problems of 
‘bunker mentality’ and ‘navel gazing’ (Van Schaik & Egenhofer: 2003: 1, see also 
Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 41, Lacasta et al. 2007, Yamin: 2000) whereby the EU 
must spend much of its time during negotiations, “in coordination meetings [rather] than 
actually negotiating with and listening to their negotiating partners” (Van Schaik & 
Egenhofer: 2005: 4, Andresen & Agrawala: 2002: 48).  Running in tangent to this, a 
further perceived difficulty for the EU as an actor in this environment is that of ‘speaking 
with one voice’; with any obvious divergences amongst the Member States seen to create 
challenges for its cohesiveness and overall unity (i.e. Tangen: 1999, Oberthür: 2011a: 671, 
Lancasta et al. 2007, Vogler & Stephan: 2007: 408). 
 
Despite these challenges for the EU’s actorness within multilateral climate negotiations, 
the EU continues to be recognised as a major, and oftentimes influential, player by its 
negotiation partners within the UNFCCC (Kilian & Elgström: 2010, Torney: 2011).  The 
EU’s own policy development on climate issues has established it as a world leader on 
climate action.  With the EU’s negotiation objectives within the climate change 
negotiations developing in tandem with its internal climate policy there is a clear 
relationship between both its internal and external approaches towards tackling the issue of 
climate change
22
.  In particular,  the EU is often seen to be attempting to ‘export’ EU 
policy solutions for tackling climate change to the global level (Van Schaik & Schunz: 
2012), often in an effort to prevent free-riding by other less-ambitious States (Lacasta et al. 
                                                   
22
 The EU’s June 1990 Council conclusions also outlined that its credibility and effectiveness as a leader at 
the global level would be premised on its own adoption of, “progressive environmental measures for 
implementation and enforcement by Member States” (Council: 1990) and thus to the “inextricably linked” 
internal and external dimensions of its environmental policy (see also Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010) 
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2007), but also in embodying its rhetoric of ‘leadership’ through setting an example which 
others might follow.  The EU’s make-up as a polity of industrialised nations, and with a 
global share in CO
2
 emissions of 15% at 1990 levels
23
; does also ensure that the EU is an 
important actor to  have at the table within UNFCCC negotiations.  The EU is also seen to 
have a considerable influence over the negotiation preferences of nations in its own 
neighbourhood, looking to the EU to guide their external policies – not least for those who 
hold EU association and accession agreement – but also over other regions including for 
example the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries (Vogler & Stephan: 2007, 
Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007: 991).  The EU is therefore widely recognised as an actor 
of some note within multilateral climate negotiations. Turning to the negotiations 
themselves, in the next section an overview of the UNFCCC’s history, its key negotiating 
issues and the major players is provided.   
 
 
3.2. The UNFCCC negotiations: Major players and key issues 
The UNFCCC was launched with 165 signatory parties at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992.  
Now with 194 states parties plus the EU, the UNFCCC is the foremost international 
multilateral negotiation for tackling the ‘global common’ of climate change.  Intended as a 
framework to build international cooperation towards the goal of stabilising greenhouse 
gas (GHG) concentrations, “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system” (UNFCCC: 1992: Art.2), UNFCCC negotiations are 
both highly politicised and technical proceedings.  Guided by the scientific findings of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC: 1990), the UNFCCC’s primary 
objective has been the prevention of a global temperature rise of 2º Celsius with efforts 
towards the stabilisation, and subsequent reduction, of GHG emissions beyond 1990 levels.   
 
Negotiations within the UNFCCC take place across numerous fora including Subsidiary 
Bodies and Ad hoc Working Groups which meet at regular intervals to negotiate more 
technical aspects of the Convention including on implementation (SBI), scientific and 
technological advice (SBSTA) and differing tracks focusing on long-term cooperation
24
.  
                                                   
23
 Figure from the World Resources Institute, http://cait.wri.org 
24
 Over the life-span of the UNFCCC numerous Ad hoc Working Groups have been established to 
concentrate specifically on the next steps for negotiations. These include the Ad hoc Working Group on the 
Berlin Mandate (AGBM – 1995-1997), the Ad hoc Working Group on Article 13 (AG13 1995-1998), the Ad 
Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex-I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 
2006-), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 
2008-)  and the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2012-). 
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However, the most high-profile and politicised negotiations of the UNFCCC take place 
during an annual Conference of the Parties (CoP), intended to review the implementation 
of the Convention and make formal decisions of the Convention as a whole.  CoPs take 
place over a period of a fortnight in the format of a global diplomatic conference, 
supported by a dedicated Secretariat, with formal plenary sessions, ministerial segments 
and committees as well as the submission of proposals and working papers by Parties to 
the Convention upon which negotiations are based.  Despite an early effort at CoP-2 in 
Geneva in 1996, the UNFCCC has however, never agreed its rules of procedure for  CoP 
negotiations (Vhima: 2011).  Instead negotiations are conducted under UN General 
Assembly rules and with all agreements requiring a consensus of all Parties to the 
Convention.  Thus voting does not typically take place in the UNFCCC, although the 
option is included under the draft rules of procedure outlined at Geneva (UNFCCC: 1996). 
 
Detailing the timeline of UNFCCC negotiations, Table 3.1 below summarises negotiations 
undertaken by Parties to the Convention since the first meeting in Berlin in 1995 and 
which have been focused specifically upon strengthening the global response to climate 
change through legally binding emissions reduction targets by industrialised, or ‘Annex-I’, 
countries
25
.  In 1997 the Kyoto Protocol for the legally binding reduction of GHG 
emissions by Annex-I countries of up to 5% by 1990 levels for the period 2008-2012 was 
agreed (UNFCCC: 1997), with the years up to its eventual ratification in 2004 focused on 
negotiating the Protocol’s operation and implementation.   Since then negotiations have 
focused more specifically on a post-2012 successor agreement to be introduced following 
the conclusion of Kyoto’s first commitment period at the end of 2012.  The post-2012 
agreement has been intended to push targets further and include new commitments by all 
Parties to the Convention to reduce their GHG emissions – thus, for the first time, 
including obligations for developing countries (DCs) as well, particularly the more 
advanced emerging economies.   With negotiations still on-going and, at time of writing, 
with the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period coming to a conclusion, it is noted that 
concerns continue to be voiced, most especially amongst the most vulnerable states 
affected by climate change
26
 that not enough has been done by Parties to the Convention to 
                                                   
25
 Annex 1 countries include all original OECD countries, members of the EU, and the Economies in 
Transition (many of which originally included central and east European states but who have now joined the 
EU).  Non-Annex 1 countries include all developing countries including the major developing countries such 
as China, India, Brazil and South Africa.  Under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol only Annex-I 
countries have to make legally binding commitments to reduce the level of GHG emissions 
26
 On signing the Kyoto Protocol a number of small island States in fact added additional remarks that the 
Protocol was inadequate (UNFCCC: 2006) 
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adequately address the problem of climate change, specifically criticising industrialised 
countries (ICs) for a lack of ambition and political will to address the problem (Navoti
27
: 
2012).  These concerns are further reiterated within the academic community as 
comparisons continue to be drawn between the relative effectiveness of environmental 
regimes such as the Montreal Protocol in tackling ozone depletion and the relative 
ineffectiveness of the UNFCCC to tackle global warming (i.e. Sunstein: 2007, O. Young: 
2001: 99-100, Oberthür: 2000). 
  
                                                   
27
 Sai Navoti is the lead negotiator for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
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Table 3.1: Timeline of UNFCCC negotiations (1995-2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Year CoP Decision Adopted Negotiation Focus
1995 CoP-1 Berlin Mandate
Launching negotiations for a climate agreement to be in place by CoP-
3
1996 CoP-2 Geneva Declaration
Mid-point in the Berlin Mandate schedule, focusing on scientific 
findings of the IPCC Second Assessment Report and the legally 
binding nature of future commitments
1997 CoP-3 Kyoto Protocol
Agreement of a Protocol for the legally binding emissions reductions by 
Annex I countries for the period 2008-2012 and the mechanisms by 
which reductions should be met
1998 CoP-4 Buenos Aires Action Plan
Agreement of a two-year plan of action for the implementation of the 
Kyoto Protocol
1999 CoP-5 n/a
Mid-point of the Buenos Aires Action Plan.  Technical meeting 
focusing mainly on guidelines for national communications 
2000 CoP-6 Failure to find consensus
Intended to agree the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol but focus 
primarily on disagreement over land-use, land-use change and forestry 
(LULUCF) and carbon 'sinks' 
2001
CoP-6bis
CoP-7
Bonn Agreement
Marrakesh Accords
Negotiations geared towards finding political agreement for the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.  Bonn negotiations facilitated 
agreement at Marrakesh with a focus on operational details of the 
Protocol including on flexiblity mechanisms, compliance, and reviewing 
the adequacy of commitments
2002 CoP-8
New Delhi Declaration on Climate 
Change and Sustainability
Focus upon developing world issues in relation to climate change.  
Negotiations address transfer technology and sustainable development.  
Some discontention over efforts to initiate dialogue over new 
commitments
2003 CoP-9 n/a
Negotiations focus upon LULUCF definitions and modalities in 
particular with regards afforestation and reforestation activities and 
good practice guidelines
2004 CoP-10
Buenos Aires Programme of Work on 
Adaptation and Response Measures
Focus upon agreement of an Adaptation Package to facilitate the 
implementation of adaptation measures.  Negotiations also concentrate 
on future commitments with seminars agreed to for discussions on a 
post-2012 agreement
2005 CoP-11 Kyoto Protocol launched
Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol with the first Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.  Negotiations focused upon further 
commitments by Annex I parties for the post-2012 period with a 
dialogue for future negotiations
2006 CoP-12
Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, 
Vulnerability, and Adaptation to Climate 
Change
Little movement on post-2012 discussions with negotiations instead 
focusing on developing country issues including the Adaptation Fund 
and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
2007 CoP-13 Bali Road-Map
Launching negotiations for a post-2012 agreement to be in place by 
CoP-15
2008 CoP-14
Poznan Strategic Programme on 
Technology Transfer
Mid-point of the Bali Road-Map but limited progress on the post-2012 
agreement.  Negotiations focus on issues including technology transfer, 
national communications, financial and other administrative matters
2009 CoP-15 Copenhagen Accord
Negotiations intended to finalise agreement for a post-2012 
commitment period but with negotiations focusing instead on the legal 
bindingness of national commitments and the drafting of a weaker 
accord continuing the dialogue.  Negotiators also agree the launch of 
the Green Climate Fund 
2010 CoP-16 Cancún Agreements
Negotiations focus upon adaptation, mitigation and finance, emissions 
reductions through deforestration and forestry degradation in 
developing countries but little progress towards a post-2012 agreement
2011 CoP-17 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 
Launch of negotiations for a new climate agreement to be concluded 
by 2015 to be ratified by 2020.  Negotiations focus also on a second 
commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol to bridge the gap between 
2012 and 2020
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As the timeline in Table 3.1 attests, a major difficulty in bringing about effective and 
lasting action to tackle climate change within the UNFCCC has been a number of 
fundamental differences polarising opinions amongst key negotiations groups – 
particularly the ‘major alliances’ (Tangen: 1999: 176) within the UNFCCC, of which the 
EU may be counted.  Whilst the number of negotiation groups within the UNFCCC has 
risen since the 1st CoP in 1995 (Roberts: 2011) the major players remain much the same
28
.  
Of the Annex-I countries the EU is one prominent player, acting as one bloc and regularly 
with the support of its own neighbourhood states (Vogler & Stephan: 2007).  The EU has 
consistently sought to position itself as an advocate for ambitious reductions targets, and 
has been a leading voice for maintaining the environmental integrity of any international 
agreement to ensure the prevention of a global temperature rise of 2°C.  In particular, the 
EU has called for the highest emissions cuts as well as broadening the scope of the 
UNFCCC to include GHG emitted by aviation and maritime transportation (Council: 
2011a, 2009, 2007).  Supporting the EU’s calls for environmental integrity of any 
international agreement are Switzerland, Korea and Mexico who, as the Environmental 
Integrity Group (EIG) have also been vocal on the need for more ambitious reduction 
targets (Lethuard: 2010).  The United States is another key player in the negotiations but, 
unlike the EU, the US is typically reticent towards ambitious reductions, and allies itself 
with other low ambition Annex-I countries including Japan, New Zealand, Australia, 
Canada, Russia, and Norway (prior to 1997 called the JUSCANNZ group, since 1997 the 
group has evolved to become the Umbrella Group
29
) to ensure that national interests are 
served.   The Umbrella Group as an alliance is generally supportive of an international 
agreement to tackle climate change but favours nationally set and flexible targets over 
internationally-set reductions (Umbrella Group: 2011, Schunz: 2010a:189, Ott: 2001b: 
470). 
   
Another prominent alliance within the UNFCCC is the G77 who, along with China, has 
been a vocal advocate of developing world issues within the negotiations since their 
inception.  The G77, as a grouping of over 100 DCs, has been vocal in its opposition to any 
imposition of new commitments by the developing world to reduce GHG emissions and 
has pushed stringently for financial support by ICs to enable sustainable development 
through adaptation to new green energies and technology transfers (G77: 2010).  Within 
their grouping however, are a number of highly divergent interests with the Alliance of 
                                                   
28
 See Appendix II for overview of all major negotiation groups in the UNFCCC 
29
 At the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Summit the US, Japan, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada joined forces with 
Russia, Ukraine, Khazakstan, Norway and Iceland to forge the Umbrella Group (Ott: 2001a: 278) 
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Small Island States (AOSIS), and other vulnerable LDCs most affected by adverse climate 
change, notable especially for raising the level of ambition in calling for immediate and 
direct action in tackling climate change (AOSIS: 2011)  The Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) are also members of the G77 but diverge considerably from 
AOSIS, due to their vested interest in the supply and demand of petroleum and other fossil 
fuels which are key targets for lowering GHG emissions.  In particular OPEC’s key 
demand in the negotiations has been for compensation by Annex-I countries should an 
international agreement result in a drop in petroleum demand (Wittneben et al.: 2006: 96).  
Since the latter half of the 2000s moreover the emerging economies, including Brazil, 
India, China, and South Africa (BASIC) have formed a loose alliance in the pursuit of 
shared interests.  BASIC have been particularly prominent within the UNFCCC since 2009 
and whose key concerns lie in the level of new commitments expected of DCs in a post-
2012 agreement (ENB: 2009, see also Appendix II).   
 
Within this network of interests a fundamental negotiating division exists between 
developed and developing countries; typically summarising the north vs. south dichotomy 
of many international multilateral negotiations.  Within the UNFCCC, Parties to the 
Convention are categorised by level of development as a necessary measurement of their 
commitments to reduce GHG.  Due to their industrialisation, ICs have a greater 
responsibility to make emissions cuts than developing countries whose production of GHG 
is far more limited.  Annex-I countries are therefore the sole bearers of reduction targets 
under the Kyoto Protocol and also provide financial support to DCs to enable their 
adaptation to greener sources of energy in order that they might develop without damaging 
the climate.   A key issue for the EU and Umbrella Group, representing core interests of 
the developed world, has therefore been the need for the more advanced DCs to also make 
binding commitments to reduce their GHG emissions.  The G77, representing the 
developing world, however have consistently emphasised the historic responsibility of ICs 
to make emissions reductions and have resisted efforts to make any binding cuts 
themselves.  This division has been further compounded over the 2000s as the rise of the 
emerging economies, and China particularly who has become the world’s largest emitter, 
has dramatically altered global shares of GHG emissions, demonstrated in Figure 3.1 
below. 
88 
 
Figure 3.1: Percentage growth in National CO2 emissions (1990-2008) 
 
 
Source: World Resources Institute, Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) http://wri.cait.org 
   
As Figure 3.1 represents, the percentage growth of GHG emissions of China, India and 
Brazil (reflected respectively along the top three lines) has dramatically increased since 
1990.  Comparatively the US’ percentage growth has increased only marginally whilst the 
EU (represented in the bottom line) has in fact reduced its emissions. In 1990 the US and 
EU were however the world’s largest GHG emitters with shares of 16% and 15% of global 
CO
2
 emissions respectively.  Upon the creation of the UNFCCC industrialised Annex-I 
countries produced the vast majority share of CO
2
 emissions (67.35% of global CO
2
 
emissions compared to 31.53% for non-Annex-I countries)
30
.  However, latest figures 
produced in 2008 demonstrate that the share in global emissions has shifted with Annex-I 
countries now accounting for less than half of global CO2 emissions, at 47.40% compared 
to non-Annex-I countries who now account for 51.08%.  Most notable in these statistics is 
the increase in China’s share of emissions; leaping from 10% in 1990 to 24% in 2008 (the 
US’ global share has also increased but is now second to China, accounting for 19%)31.  
Consequently a key issue underlying UNFCCC negotiations has been the need to find 
compromise between the defensive interests of the G77/BASIC over new commitments, 
                                                   
30
 Figures from the World Resources Institute, http://cait.wri.org  
31
 Figures from the World Resources Institute, http://cait.wri.org 
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and the offensive interests of the Umbrella Group and EU over the need for equity in 
commitments to legally binding reduction targets. 
 
In addition to this north/south division in the UNFCCC negotiations, a second division is 
also apparent between economic and environmental concerns.  Notably this is seen 
between those groups whose defensive interests are to protect their economic growth and 
development with minimal interference (the Umbrella Group, OPEC, BASIC and, to some 
extent, the G77) and those who pursue more offensive interests in pursuit of the 
environmental integrity of the international agreement (the EU, EIG, AOSIS).  This 
division is most evident when comparing the levels of emissions reduction targets and 
timetables proposed by these groups as reflected in Table 3.2 below: 
 
Table 3.2: Proposed emission reductions by UNFCCC negotiation group 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation. Documents pertaining to proposals available at http://unfccc.int 
Negotiation Group Emissions Reductions proposed
-7.5% at 1990 levels by 2005
-15% at 1990 levels by 2010
(No binding commitments by DCs)
-3% to +10% of 1990 levels by 2012
(Binding commitments by DCs)
G77/China No binding commitments on DCs
AOSIS -20% by 2005
Global GHG to fall to 50% compared to 1990 levels by 2050 with collective 
reduction by developed countries of 25-40% by 2020 and 80-95% by 2050
Own commitment to reduce -20% (going up to -30% if others make concrete 
commitments) at 1990 levels by 2020
 Developing countries should commit to reduction targets of 15-30% from 
‘business as usual’ by 2020
Umbrella Group Support a 50% reduction in global emissions by 2050 with all Umbrella Group 
members prepared to propose individual reduction targets that will substantially 
reduce their emissions by 2020 - but no specified commitments given
BASIC Commitment under the Copenhagen Accord to ‘implement mitigation actions’ – 
but no specified commitments given
G77 Commitment under the Copenhagen Accord to ‘implement mitigation actions’ – 
no specified commitments
AOSIS Big emitters to agree to produce enough clean energy to attain the targets of 
limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degree Celsius and 350 parts per million of 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.
EIG Individual commitments to reduce GHG emissions.  Switzerland, in line with the 
EU, has committed to -20% by 2020 and up to -30% with other commitments by 
industrialised countries
Kyoto Protocol Proposals
EU
JUSSCANNZ
Post-Kyoto Protocol Proposals
EU
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A careful balance has therefore been required in the UNFCCC negotiation process to find 
an acceptable level of progress in emissions targets that finds compromise between the 
economic and environmental interests of its Parties.  As Table 3.2 also demonstrates 
however, calls for more ambitious emissions reduction targets have progressed 
considerably since the Kyoto Protocol with the EU, amongst others, particularly prominent 
in pushing for the deepest emission cuts.  Having set the bar high in its progressive 
objectives for the UNFCCC, expectations for the EU’s performance during negotiations 
has subsequently also risen.  With this in mind we therefore turn to evaluate the EU’s 
performance within the UNFCCC negotiations.   
 
3.3. EU performance in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations 
EU performance in this and the following section is evaluated during what are identified as 
eight milestone conferences of the UNFCCC’s negotiation history, included in bold type in 
Table 3.1 above.  In this section EU performance in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations is 
assessed during four specific CoPs.  These include the first Conference of the Parties to the 
UNFCCC, CoP-1 in Berlin 1995 where negotiations for an international agreement were 
first launched, CoP-3 in Kyoto 1997 where the Kyoto Protocol was formally agreed; CoP-6 
in 2000 at The Hague where the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol was to be agreed 
but failed, and CoP-6bis and CoP-7, both in 2001 in Bonn and Marrakesh, where the Kyoto 
Protocol’s operational rules and procedures were finally adopted.  Whilst this focus does 
result in other moments of negotiation being overlooked
32
, it is considered that due to 
space constraints requiring some selectivity, only those CoPs which have made a 
significant impact on the progress of the UNFCCC’s negotiations may be focused upon in 
these discussions.  For this reason also the 2004 ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is also 
not explicitly assessed as this was not centred upon a specific CoP.  
 
The performance evaluations in these sections are premised on the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter Two.  In the following discussions the EU’s overall performance 
assessment is thus detailed, as shown in each section header, and elaborated upon with 
focus on its negotiation positioning relative to others and its performance across each of 
the four performance indicators. 
 
                                                   
32
 For example CoP-8 in New Delhi in 2002 where the EU’s performance has in fact been criticised for 
internal divisions and disunity (Van Schaik: 2003, Vogler: 2005) 
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A very good performance and a mandate for negotiations (Berlin CoP-1) 
The first Conference of the Parties to the newly established UNFCCC took place in Berlin 
from 28
th
 March to the 7
th
 April 1995 and chaired by then German Federal Minister for the 
Environment, Angela Merkel.  Within the existing literature relatively little has been 
written on the EU’s performance in this negotiation.  Yamin (2000: 50) has suggested that 
the EU used, “structural and instrumental leadership….to forge consensus at COP-1” 
whilst Andresen & Agrawala (2002: 47) intimate that the EU “played a key role” during 
the negotiations, but analysis of its actual performance is otherwise limited.  As the first 
CoP a core aim at Berlin was to address the adequacy of commitments made under the 
Conventions original text agreed at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 (ENB: 1995).  
Addressing this issue, EU Council conclusions agreed on 9
th
 March 1995 (Council: 1995), 
detailing the EU’s negotiation position for Berlin, were notably progressive.  Outlining its 
belief that the Convention’s stipulation that ICs should implement national policies (see 
UNFCCC: 1992: Art. 4(a)&(b)) for the reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) was 
“inadequate” (Council: 1995), the EU set its objective for Berlin to establish a mandate for 
negotiations towards creating, “a protocol on policies and measures as well as targets and 
timetables in order to limit and progressively reduce greenhouse gas emissions” (Council: 
1995 (4)).  In particular the EU sought a mandate for negotiations on a Protocol, to be 
agreed by 1997 and implemented by 2000, that would establish coordinated, 
internationally-set policies and measures with which ICs would be bound to reduce their 
CO
2
 and other GHG emissions within set time-frames – the first of which it sought for 
2005.  The EU further stated its position that ICs should take the lead in committing to 
emission reductions through the principle of common and differentiated responsibility 
(Council: 1995: 6(e)(i)).   
 
Comparative to the EU however, the JUSCANNZ states entering the Berlin negotiations 
were highly reluctant to take on responsibility for emissions reductions, particularly where 
the science of climate change was uncertain and where DCs were then exempt (Yamin: 
2000: 50, Hovi et al.: 2003: 15).  Instead, they preferred the goal of stabilising CO
2
 
emissions at 1990 levels and through the use of national – as opposed to international – 
policies and measures (Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 33, Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012: 
179).  With little zone of agreement at Berlin, the EU’s negotiation position was thus 
highly ambitious (see also Gupta & van der Grijp: 2000b: 264, Oberthür: 2011a: 669, 
Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36) leaving the EU with much to do to bring about the 
necessary support for a progressive negotiation mandate.  In rising to this challenge, the 
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EU gave a very good performance at Berlin – demonstrating not only high effectiveness, 
but, with moderate unity, high outreach and a high level of significance, overall high 
negotiation behaviour also. 
 
Entering the negotiations, the EU delegation was led by the French Council Presidency 
who spoke formally for the EU during the negotiations.  Supplementing this, Member 
States were also active during negotiations with regular contributions made, both orally 
and through the submission of national proposals, with Germany especially evident as the 
host country and next Council Presidency (ENB: 1995).  During Ministerial Segments all 
Member States plus the European Commission also spoke in a national capacity although, 
with statements all broadly adherent with the EU common position portrayed by France 
(ENB: 1995), the EU’s unity at Berlin was moderate.   
 
Complementing its high ambitions for Berlin, the EU’s outreach to its negotiation partners 
was also high.  Adopting a proactive strategy which sought the pursuit of followers to its 
ambitious objective of securing a negotiation mandate for the Kyoto Protocol, the EU’s 
strategy was geared towards securing support particularly from the G77.  In particular the 
EU was successful in its efforts of coalition-building, forming – alongside the G77 (minus 
the OPEC states) – what became known as the ‘Green Group’ (ENB: 1995, Yamin: 2000: 
50, Lacasta et al.: 2007: 222).  The formation of this new coalition, allied in their support 
for a negotiation mandate for a Kyoto Protocol in which the developing countries would be 
exempt from emissions reductions, enabled the EU to challenge JUSCANNZ reticence 
and, in so doing, “outnumbered and outmanoeuvred those who had come to be perceived 
as ‘regime laggards’” (Yamin: 2000: 50).  Further submitting a joint working paper the 
Green Group were also active in shaping the agenda and direction of a new negotiation 
mandate (ENB: 1995).  As a prominent and proactive player within the negotiations, the 
EU, alongside members of the G77 and JUSCANNZ, was also participant in all core 
negotiation sessions at Berlin, including the final week ‘Group of Friends’ negotiations 
which focused solely on the core issue of adequacy of commitments (ENB: 1995).   
  
Reinforcing a very good performance in terms of its negotiation behaviour, with moderate 
unity and high levels of outreach and significance, the EU was also highly effective at 
Berlin.  Ending on 7
th
 April 1995 the Berlin CoP brought about a consensual decision by 
all Parties to the Convention to adopt the Berlin Mandate – a mandate setting out the 
negotiation process for the Kyoto Protocol to be in place by CoP-3 two years later.  
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Comparison of the EU’s negotiation position – as outlined in its council conclusions of 9th 
March – and the language of the Berlin Mandate (UNFCCC: 1995) reveals striking 
similarities, with the EU effective in securing most, if not all, of its objectives for the body 
of the negotiation mandate.  In fact, of the EU’s seven specified elements for a negotiation 
mandate, and incorporating areas of priority focus (Council: 1995 (6)), all are included 
within the text of the Berlin Mandate.  This does moreover reflect findings by others who 
have cited the EU’s “key role” in bringing about and shaping the Berlin Mandate 
(Andresen & Agrawala: 2002: 47, Yamin: 2000: 50) and particularly, of the important part 
played by EU coalition-building efforts in persuading ICs to commit to negotiations for 
legally-binding emissions reductions (Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 287).   
  
‘Principle’ player and a fair performance (Kyoto CoP-3) 
Two years later on 1
st
 December 1997 Parties to the Convention met at Kyoto to agree the 
Protocol detailed in the Berlin Mandate.  Entering those negotiations the EU’s negotiation 
position demonstrated the same progressiveness evident at Berlin, calling for the adoption 
of a Protocol to include legally binding targets and timetables covering three GHGs and to 
include legally binding policies and measures (Council: 1997).  On the issue of setting 
international policies and measures however, the EU was to be “fairly isolated” (Gupta & 
Ringius: 2001: 288) with the majority of Parties not yet ready to discuss how they would 
implement any reduction targets, and the US in fact refusing to submit any proposals at all 
on the premise that it should be up to each individual State to decide their own policies and 
measures (Yamin: 2000: 52).  However, the previous year at CoP-2 in Geneva, the United 
States had switched its stance from reticence to support for a Protocol with internationally 
set emissions targets (ENB: 1996) and, in so doing, had created a closer zone of agreement 
between negotiation partners.  Despite claims of the EU’s high ambition at Kyoto (i.e. 
Hovi et al. 2003), by acting as less of a preference outlier entering the Kyoto negotiations, 
and with some consensus between Parties that a Protocol was needed, the EU’s negotiation 
position was moderately ambitious comparative to Berlin.  It is further argued that the 
EU’s performance at CoP-3 was fair, demonstrating a moderate level of both negotiation 
behaviour and effectiveness. 
 
Similarly to its performance at Berlin, the EU’s unity at Kyoto remained moderate, with its 
official voice, represented by the Luxembourg Council Presidency, further supplemented 
by other Member States voices.  The UK was particularly evident in negotiation 
discussions, particularly on the issue of emissions trading – utilising market-based 
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mechanisms to off-set emissions reductions (ENB: 1997) although, with the EU’s position 
being fairly ambiguous on this issue at Kyoto, this activity did not challenge the EU’s 
stance and maintained its cohesion.  Unlike at Berlin however, the EU’s outreach to 
negotiation partners at Kyoto was more moderate.  Particularly notable in the EU’s 
negotiation strategy at Kyoto was the proactive pursuit of an ambitious proposal (Van 
Schaik & Schunz: 2012: 179) calling for a 15% reduction of GHG by ICs by the year 2010, 
with commitment to do so itself with similar commitments by others (see Table 3.2 above, 
Council: 1997, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 33), particularly underpinned by its own 
internal burden-sharing
33
 agreement (Wettestad: 2000: 36).  This strategy was in part 
successful; seen to have put other ICs on the defensive and enabling the EU to push them 
further than they were initially willing to go on targets (Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007: 20). 
However, on the issue of policies and measures, despite submitting nearly thirty pages of 
proposals (Yamin: 2000: 52), the EU was criticised for not articulating its position or 
defending the ambitiousness of its proposal adequately in the face of opposition (Gupta & 
Ringius: 2001: 288, Yamin: 2000: 52).   
 
In addition, due to the level of attention given by the EU to the matter of targets and 
timetables – specifically aimed at persuading the US and other JUSSCANNZ members – it 
then neglected other important negotiation issues.  This was evident in its lack of 
preparedness over negotiations on flexible mechanisms (Yamin: 2000: 56-58) where its 
common position remained ambiguous and focused instead on matters of domestic policies 
and measures only.  For the JUSCANNZ members however, flexible mechanisms to meet 
their emissions reduction targets were a favoured option; seen to be more cost-effective, 
and including emissions trading, joint implementation (JI)
34
, and supporting green energy 
projects in developing countries
35
; and with the promotion of carbon ‘sinks’, off-setting 
emissions reductions through land-use, land change and forestry (LULUCF)
36
.  With no 
concrete proposals on flexible mechanisms, and further struggling to justify its stance in 
                                                   
33
 This agreement particularly benefitted from the Member States having already stabilised their emissions 
due to unrelated factors including the modernisation of the energy sector in East Germany after German 
reunification as well as the privatization of the energy sector in the UK (Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 283) 
34
 Joint Implementation allows industrialised countries (Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol) to earn 
emission reduction units (ERUs) from an emission-reduction or emission removal project in another Annex 
B Party which can be counted towards meeting its Kyoto target.  
35
 Known as the Clean Development Mechanism or CDM.  The CDM allows Annex B Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries. Such projects can earn saleable 
certified emission reduction (CER) credits which can be counted towards meeting Kyoto targets.   
36
 LULUCF activities are seen to provide a cost-effective way of offsetting emissions, either by increasing 
the removals of GHG from the atmosphere (e.g. by planting trees or managing forests), or by reducing 
emissions (e.g. by limiting deforestation). The drawback of this approach however is that it is difficult to 
accurately measure GHG emission reductions this way 
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favour of domestic policies and measures (Yamin: 2000: 52), the EU failed to persuade its 
negotiation partners of the benefits to its approach and thus to garner their support.   
 
The EU’s significance was also more moderate at Kyoto with it playing a role in most, but 
not all, key processes of the negotiations.  Notably, it was not participant in the 
negotiations on the Joint Implementation and CDM which were dominated instead by the 
JUSCANNZ members.  In particular, on the fast moving CDM negotiations it was the US 
and Brazil who undertook mostly bilateral endgame bargaining to the exclusion of the EU 
(ENB: 1997).  The EU was also reportedly still in internal coordination meetings on the 
final night of the Kyoto negotiations and missed the gavel closing the negotiations (Yamin: 
2000: 61, Afionis: 2011: 346), thus preventing the EU from influencing the final decision 
over flexible mechanisms which it continued to resist.  With moderate levels across all 
three process-oriented indicators therefore, the EU’s negotiation behaviour as a whole may 
be judged as moderate.    
 
The EU’s more moderate effectiveness at Kyoto has been particularly well-documented 
within the literature (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012: 179, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36, 
Harris: 2007: 12, Lacasta et al.: 2007: 223-4, Hovi et al.: 2003: 17, Andresen & Agrawala: 
2002: 47, Grubb & Yamin: 2001: 274, Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 288, Yamin: 2000, Gupta 
& van der Grijp: 2000a: 80).  Prominent in these accounts has been a focus on the EU’s 
failure at Kyoto to obtain its legally binding policies and measures, failing to persuade the 
JUSCANNZ states of their necessity and subsequently being required to accept a Protocol 
that placed considerable emphasis on flexible mechanisms at US and JUSCANNZ 
insistence.  Compared to the US – who has been widely accredited with the overall 
structure of the Kyoto Protocol (Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36, Grubb & Yamin: 
2001: 274, Lacasta et al.2007: 224, Hovi et al.: 2003: 1) – the EU’s effectiveness has been 
seen to be far more limited.  However, the EU in fact achieved some of its objectives at 
Kyoto – successfully pushing other Annex-I countries, and notably the US, to set legally-
binding, emissions reduction targets with a timetable (e.g. Afionis: 2011: 342, Gupta & 
Ringius: 2001: 288).  This principle was a core element of the Kyoto Protocol – and all the 
more of an achievement for the EU in light of the resistance by the JUSCANNZ states to 
its inclusion.  Consequently, the EU gave a fair performance at Kyoto and was a key player 
in shaping the principle of the Kyoto Protocol to come.   
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A poor performance and a stalled conference (The Hague CoP-6) 
Following the agreement of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 the UNFCCC negotiations moved 
into a new phase focusing on the operational details of the agreement.  At CoP-4 in Buenos 
Aires in 1998 a two year action plan had been approved for agreeing the operationalisation 
of the Kyoto Protocol by 2000 at The Hague (CoP-6) (UNFCCC: 1998).  Despite this, little 
development had been made in 1998 and 1999 and The Hague Summit began “politically 
charged” and with disagreements between countries over what the Kyoto Protocol’s rules 
and operational details should look like (ENB: 2000).  Particularly controversial at The 
Hague was the issue of whether carbon ‘sinks’ projects – known also as Land-Use, Land 
Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) - should be allowed to count against emissions 
reductions or not.  For the EU its common position approaching The Hague was firm that 
carbon sinks be excluded from the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period (Council: 
2000c: (7)) and further calling for a ceiling on the use of other flexible mechanisms in 
order to focus on, “significant, real, domestic emissions abatements” and thus maintain the 
environmental integrity of the Protocol (Council: 2000b: (2)). Still favouring domestic 
policies and measures to tackle the reduction of GHG emissions, the EU’s position on the 
flexible mechanisms agreed at Kyoto was for a necessary ceiling to be put in place, using a 
principle of ‘supplementarity’37 (Council: 2000c: (5)), that would prevent their over-use in 
off-setting emissions reductions at the expense of real domestic abatement.   
 
Comparative to the US and its allies in the re-named ‘Umbrella Group’38 however, the 
EU’s stance on this issue was not only progressive but highly ambitious.  By 2000 the US 
had become increasingly reticent towards the UNFCCC negotiations, expressing concerns 
that emerging economies, such as China, would be exempt from making any GHG 
reduction commitments and would thus be able to free-ride at the expense of the ICs.  
Opposing the EU’s stance on the exclusion of sinks, the Umbrella Group – with backing 
from many DCs – strongly pushed for ‘sinks’ to be included at The Hague (ENB: 2000).  
The EU was thus positioned as a preference outlier approaching CoP-6 (Afionis: 2011: 
353-4) which, as at Berlin, would require an impressive performance in order to bring 
about its preferred objectives. 
 
                                                   
37
 The supplementarity principle would require that the use of flexible mechanisms, including LULUCF, to 
reduce emissions would be used supplementary to other domestic policies and measures in order to ensure 
that the environmental integrity of the Protocol would remain intact.  
38
 Previously JUSCANNZ 
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Unlike Berlin, the EU’s performance at The Hague was however, far from impressive. 
Widely criticised in the literature, it has been argued that the EU gave a “flawed” (Afionis: 
2011: 326) and “weak” performance at CoP-6 with assessment focusing particularly on 
challenges to its negotiation behaviour including its, “crippling shortcomings in EU 
internal processes for such negotiations” (Grubb & Yamin: 2001: 274), the “Herculean 
task” of trying to coordinate its diverse Member States (Ott: 2001a: 285) and by its lack of 
flexibility in responding to United States’ demands (Vogler: 2005: 840).  Corroborating 
these findings, this analysis argues that the EU gave a poor performance at The Hague, 
courtesy not only of its moderate negotiation behaviour but also due to its low level of 
effectiveness. 
 
Again represented formally by the French Council Presidency, the EU’s official voice 
during CoP-6 was this time not only supplemented, but also openly contradicted by other 
Member States (ENB: 2000).  This was perhaps most notable on the core issue of ‘sinks’ 
where the EU’s unity was not only challenged by Finland going against the EU common 
line by presenting a paper demanding that forest management be eligible for credit (Jung et 
al. 2007: 247), but with the UK bypassing the French Presidency by attempting to broker a 
deal with the US that would allow sinks to be included (ENB: 2000, Grubb & Yamin: 
2000: 275, Van Schaik: 2010: 226-7, Alfionis: 2011: 353-4).  The EU’s low unity during 
the negotiations was further emphasised in its more moderate outreach, its proactive 
strategy largely hindered by Member States working at cross-purposes (Vogler: 2011: 27, 
Jung et al.: 2007: 251).  Whilst the EU had a high level of significance at The Hague 
(ENB: 2000), it was then widely criticised for being inflexible to Umbrella Group demands 
(Van Schaik: 2003: 1, Vogler: 2005: 27) due, in large part, to the EU’s inability to 
consider, and then counter, US compromise proposals (Ott: 2001a: 285, Grubb & Yamin: 
2001: 275).  The EU’s moderate outreach thus weakened the EU and, by the conference’s 
conclusion consensus between the Parties had still failed to be reached.  The Hague CoP 
thus ended with no agreement and with negotiations stalled until the Bonn conference in 
June 2001.  With no outcome agreement the EU’s effectiveness was low - achieving few of 
its objectives, not least its primary goal of finalising the operational details of the Kyoto 
Protocol.  However, it is noted that in failing to find consensus the EU did succeed in 
blocking, at least temporarily, US demands for ‘sinks’ to be included under the Protocol’s 
operational guidelines (see also Ott: 2001a: 285-6).  The Hague had however, ended in 
failure both for the UNFCCC and, by and large, for the EU as well. 
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Saving the day and a good performance (Bonn CoP-6bis – Marrakesh CoP-7) 
Six months later UNFCCC negotiations recommenced at the re-kindled CoP-6bis in June 
2001 at Bonn, and followed on six months later in Marrakesh for CoP-7.  Negotiations in 
2001 remained focused on finalising the operational details of the Kyoto Protocol and on 
promoting its overall ratification.  In March of that year however, the Bush Administration 
had formally withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol negotiations when the US Senate refused 
its ratification.  The Kyoto Protocol faced imminent failure with the agreement requiring 
ratification by at least 55 countries including Annex-I countries responsible for 55% of 
global CO
2
 emissions at 1990 levels (UNFCCC: 1997: Art.25).  With the US accounting 
for 36% of global CO
2
 emissions its withdrawal from the process was a significant blow; 
repositioning the burden on other Annex-I countries to ratify including the ‘Gang of Four’ 
- encompassing Russia (accounting for 17%), Japan (8%), Canada (3%) and Australia (2%) 
- alongside the EU’s 24% share.  The EU’s decision in June 200139 to continue to push 
forward with the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was therefore highly ambitious and 
marked out the EU as the one to ‘save’ the Kyoto Protocol (Hovi et al. 2003: 2).   
 
Approaching the Bonn negotiations the EU’s common position continued to demonstrate 
progressiveness in its objectives to maintain the environmental integrity of the Protocol 
and to secure its ratification by 2002 (European Council: 2001).  More particularly the EU 
was firm on its commitment to ensure rules on compliance to the Kyoto Protocol were 
agreed (Ott: 2001b: 470).  With the United States now removed from the process the EU’s 
continued push to secure the Protocol and its environmental integrity was significant.  With 
the Gang of Four also reluctant to make costly commitments to reduce emissions 
reductions, and preferring compliance issues to remain off the table (Council: 2001a, Ott: 
2001b: 470) the EU would require an impressive performance to secure their support and 
secure its objectives, not least in light of its failures at The Hague.  Accounts within the 
existing literature of EU performance in rising to meet this challenge have been limited; 
concentrating instead on the EU’s ‘opportunity to lead’ rather than on its actual negotiation 
performance (i.e. Ott: 2001b).   As an example, this period has been particularly pinpointed 
as the time in which the EU first took on a leadership role in the UNFCCC (Ott: 2001a: 
476, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 47, Oberthür: 2011a: 676).  In terms of its negotiation 
performance, it is argued that the EU did demonstrate improvements in both its negotiation 
behaviour and effectiveness, and thus gave a good performance at CoP-6bis and CoP-7. 
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 Presidency Conclusions from the 2001 Council stated that the EU would, “work to ensure the widest 
possible participation of industrialised countries in an effort to ensure the entry into force of the Protocol by 
2002” (Council: 2001a) 
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Re-establishing its cohesion following its failures at The Hague, EU representation within 
the UNFCCC during 2001 was formally led by the Belgian Council Presidency with 
support also from Troika member Sweden and the Commission (ENB: 2001a). EU unity 
during both CoP-6bis and CoP-7 was therefore moderate.  During the previous Swedish 
Council Presidency the EU had also adapted its negotiation strategy (Christiansen: 2004: 
31), moving away from trying to find its own internal agreement, and instead focusing on a 
major diplomatic campaign to persuade the Gang of Four to ratify (Oberthür & 
Pallemaerts: 2010: 35, Oberthür: 2011a: 669, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007: 985 footnote 
43).  This the EU pursued “relentlessly and successfully” (Vogler: 2011: 26).   
 
Particularly noteworthy in this campaign was the use of issue-linkage by the EU, linking 
its considerable weight as a global trading power and influence within the WTO, to its 
diplomatic effort to persuade Russia to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Damro: 2006, Bretherton 
& Vogler: 2006); promising support for Russia’s application to the WTO.  Coinciding with 
the EU’s diplomatic efforts outside of the conference room, the EU was also more 
proactive in its tactics in the negotiations.  This included a much more flexible approach to 
the inclusion of flexible mechanisms to the Kyoto Protocol, consequently coinciding with 
the EU’s own switch in favour of emissions trading within the Community (Christiansen: 
2004).  The EU’s outreach, again utilising its diplomatic ties within the ‘Green Group’, 
was also successfully employed with the EU and G77, again working in coalition to 
persuade the remaining Umbrella Group members to ratify the Kyoto Protocol
40
; outreach 
which has been judged as making a major contribution to moving the negotiations forward 
(Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 281).  In addition, with the United States now out of the picture, 
the EU’s significance as a negotiator was to further increase, with the EU being recognised 
as, “the only actor that could be expected to have the will and the ability [to save the Kyoto 
Protocol]” (Hovi et al.: 2003: 23).  From 2001 therefore, the EU was seen to become the , 
“most important player in the climate negotiations” (Ott: 2001a: 290) and an essential 
participant in all processes of the negotiations (ENB: 2001a, 2001b).   
 
With a markedly improved performance in terms of its negotiation behaviour, the EU was 
however thwarted in attaining all of its high ambition objectives at Bonn and Marrakesh.   
Whilst the EU is accredited with playing a pivotal role in securing a finalised agreement 
                                                   
40
 As Afionis & Chatzopoulos (2010: 48-49) highlight, the G77 stood to lose out on sustainable development 
funds under the Kyoto Protocol if ratification was not achieved.  Consequently aligning with the EU was in 
both their interests. 
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for the Kyoto Protocol’s operational and implementation rules – detailed in the 2001 
Marrakesh Accords (Oberthür: 2011a: 669, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 36, Oberthür & 
Roche Kelly: 2008: 36), it was less effective in maintaining its environmental integrity.  
EU attempts to ‘save’ the Kyoto Protocol by persuading the Gang of Four to ratify in fact 
required considerable lowering of ambition by the EU, resulting in the environmental 
integrity of the agreement being diminished – an objective the EU had initially sought to 
avoid (Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 36, Oberthür: 2011a: 669).  This was seen by some 
as the EU essentially “giving in to the requirements of the Gang of Four” (Hovi et al. 2003: 
19), especially notable in its concession over the inclusion of ‘sinks’ (Hovi et al. 2003: 19).  
In other elements the EU’s effectiveness was also limited - particularly with regards to the 
EU’s preferences for a legally binding compliance system under the Kyoto Protocol (Hovi 
et al. 2003: 1). Prior to 2001 the US had supported the EU in a legally-binding system but 
its silence on Kyoto issues after 2001 resulted in the remaining Umbrella Group members 
using the opportunity to push their preference for a softer legal option.  At Bonn the EU 
had to concede by pushing the decision to a later date (Ott: 2001b: 474).  With the US out 
of the picture the EU also had to concede to the Umbrella Group in removing any cap on 
the use of flexible mechanisms; although it is noted that the text of agreement reached at 
Bonn still emphasises the supplementarity of the flexible mechanisms to domestic action.  
The Bonn Agreement does also stipulate that nuclear energy is to be excluded from CDM 
and JI activities – a policy objective particularly pushed by the EU (UNFCCC: 2001, Ott: 
2001b: 471).  Subsequently, whilst this good performance did enable the EU to ‘save the 
day’ in 2001, it did so at the expense of its own high ambitions and the environmental 
integrity of the Kyoto Protocol.   
 
3.4. EU performance in the Post-Kyoto Agreement negotiations  
In September 2004 the EU’s diplomatic effort to persuade Russia to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol and bring it into force was finally successful (BBC News: 2004, Parker & 
Karlsson: 2010: 930, Damro: 2006: 189).  On the 16
th
 of February 2005 the Kyoto Protocol 
entered into effect – three years later than initially intended - and, on 28th November 2005 
Parties met for the first Conference of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(CMP-1) alongside CoP-11 at Montreal in Canada.  Montreal was a milestone conference 
for several reasons.  As the first major summit following the launch of the Kyoto Protocol 
it was highly symbolic.  In addition however, Montreal was significant as the year where 
negotiations for a post-2012 agreement were to be initiated, as stipulated under the Kyoto 
Protocol (UNFCCC: 1997).  Under the Kyoto Protocol, emissions reduction targets had 
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been set for participating Annex-I countries for a first commitment period from 2008 to 
2012.  With the Kyoto Protocol now formally launched, negotiations turned to the 
unenviable task of deciding what would come next.  Subsequently, negotiations since 2005 
have been dominated by the issue of what a post-2012 successor agreement will look like, 
with particular attention to the participation of the emerging economies and other 
developing countries whose global share of GHG had risen considerably since 2002 (see 
Figure 3.1).   
 
In this section focus thus turns to these more recent developments in the UNFCCC 
negotiations, again concentrating on what are identified as four key conferences in relation 
to a post-2012 agreement.  These include CoP-11 at Montreal in 2005, where the issue of 
future commitments was first initiated, CoP-13 at Bali in 2007, where the Bali Road-Map, 
launching a mandate for new negotiations towards agreement, was then agreed, CoP-15 at 
Copenhagen in 2009 where negotiators failed to agree an outcome, and finally CoP-17 at 
Durban in 2011 where negotiations were re-launched under the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action.  We turn now to the EU’s performance in the Montreal CoP-11. 
 
Lowered ambition but a good performance (Montreal CoP-11) 
Prior to CoP-11/CMP-1, held in Montreal in December 2005, the topic of long-term action 
and a potential post-2012 successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol had been considered 
something of a “taboo” issue within the UNFCCC (Depledge: 2006: 16).  Early soundings 
by the EU – first at CoP-8 in New Delhi in 2002 (Ott: 2002: 2), and again at CoP-10 in 
Buenos Aires in 2004 (Ott et al. 2005: 85) – to initiate discussions on a post-2012 
agreement had been met with considerable reluctance by both the Umbrella Group and 
G77.  It was not therefore until 2005, with the successful implementation of the Kyoto 
Protocol, that the EU’s progressive strategy of pursuing a post-2012 agreement was to 
begin to meet with the preference structures of the other major alliances (C2ES: 2005).  
Despite this, the EU’s negotiation position entering the Montreal CoP was more 
ambiguous than in previous years.   Stipulating its determination to, “reinvigorate the 
international negotiations” it then employed vague terminology looking to, “explore 
options for a post-2012 arrangement”, stressing that the CoP should “initiate 
considerations” towards future commitments, and looking forward to initiating a, “process 
among all Parties…to explore how further to implement the Convention to achieve its 
ultimate objective by developing a post-2012 arrangement” (Council: 2005b, emphasis 
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added).  As a result the EU’s negotiation position entering Montreal was low in ambition 
due to the vagueness of its outlook and lack of any clearly-stated objectives.    
 
Accounts within the existing literature as to the EU’s performance at Montreal have, as 
with previous negotiations, also been limited.  The EU has, for example, been criticised for 
being too reactive in the Montreal CoP (Vogler: 2011: 26) and of not offering concrete 
proposals to help push forward negotiations (Wittneben: 2006: 91).  Little however has 
been said on its performance overall.  It is here argued however that EU performance at 
Montreal was good with the EU demonstrating moderate negotiation behaviour – reflective 
of high unity and significance but also low outreach – and a high level of effectiveness.   
Particularly noteworthy at Montreal was the EU’s reformed method of representation 
following reforms initiated by the Irish Presidency in 2004.  The EU’s representation was 
thus formally led in the negotiations by the UK Council Presidency and with representation 
also by several ‘lead’ negotiations – including officials from the Commission who also 
spoke for the EU (ENB: 2005).  Whilst spreading its voice, the EU did also maintain its 
cohesion at Montreal, with the EU delegation supported by Member States’ own national 
statements given during a high-level ministerial segment and which were widely adherent 
to the EU Common Position (ENB: 2005).  That the EU managed to maintain cohesion 
(see also Parker & Karlsson: 2010: 936) was all the more notable in light of the 
divergences and disputes emerging amongst the Member States over the EU’s new ‘20-20-
20 targets’41 at this time, as well as the influx of ten new Member States following the 
latest round of enlargements in 2004 (Volger: 2011: 24, Santarius et al. 2009: 77, Van 
Schaik: 2010: 266).   
 
In contrast to its previously proactive efforts, at Montreal the EU’s outreach was notably 
low.  Criticised for being too ‘reactive’ in the run up to CoP-11 (Vogler: 2011: 26) and of 
offering very little in the way of real solutions for what a post-2012 agreement should look 
like (Wittneben et al. 2006: 91)
42
, the EU was not  ready to offer a more ambitious 
negotiation position at Montreal.  Thus the extent of EU outreach during the CMP-1 
negotiations was simply to invite parties to make submissions for further consideration to a 
later subsidiary body meeting (ENB: 2005, Wittneben et al. 2006: 91).  To all other intents 
and purposes the EU was participant in, but not an active pursuant, of negotiations for a 
                                                   
41
 The term for the EU’s planned Climate and Energy Package due to the commitment to reduce emissions by 
20%, for 20% of EU energy consumption to come from renewable sources, and for a 20% reduction in 
primary energy use to be achieved through improved energy efficiency 
42
 Although interestingly others have also claimed that the EU was “very active”, particularly in pushing for 
new commitments (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012: 181) 
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post-2012 successor agreement.  Despite its continued high significance at Montreal (ENB: 
2005) therefore, the EU’s negotiation behaviour was moderated by its low level of 
outreach.  Despite this the EU was able to attain most of its goals – as set out in its council 
conclusions (Council: 2005b) in the decisions adopted at CoP-11.  Concluding on 9
th
 
December 2005, the Montreal conference ended with the formal adoption of the 
Marrakesh Accords – fully operationalizing the Kyoto Protocol, the launch of a Dialogue 
on Future Cooperative Action supported by consensus from all Parties, and with decisions 
taken on non-compliance, streamlining the CDM, and with further commitments made by 
the ICs towards making future reduction cuts in GHG emissions (UNFCCC: 2005, Harris: 
2007: 15).  Subsequently the EU can claim to have had a good performance at Montreal.  
Most notable is that this good performance was fundamentally a result of the EU’s low 
ambition at Montreal.  By detailing ambiguous objectives of support for a post-2012 
successor agreement but providing little direction as to what form it should take or how 
negotiations should proceed, the EU was able to achieve agreement on the vague principle 
of new negotiations without exerting much effort.  It would not be until 2007 that any real 
progress towards such an agreement would be achieved.   
 
A very good performance plus a Road-Map (Bali CoP-13) 
The UNFCCC negotiations again reached a milestone in 2007 at the Bali CoP-13 where 
Parties to the Convention and Kyoto Protocol formally agreed to launch negotiations for a 
post-2012 successor agreement.  Two core issues were prominent at Bali.  The first was a 
core issue for DCs with the launch of the Adaptation Fund in helping the developing world 
adapt to the negative effects of climate change.  The second – of core interest to the EU - 
was the implementation of a framework for negotiations on long-term cooperative action, 
specifically aimed at putting in place an international agreement for the period following 
2012 (ENB: 2007, Müller: 2008: 1).  Approaching Bali the EU’s negotiation position had 
made some steps forward; detailing, this time in clear and decisive language, the EU’s 
renewed concerns over rising global temperatures and the, “urgent need for a global and 
comprehensive post-2012 agreement to bring the necessary emissions reductions” 
(Council: 2007: (5) emphasis added).   
 
Specifically, the EU detailed its intent, premised on the scientific findings of the IPCC, that 
an agreement would require a global emissions reduction of 30 per cent by 2020 and 60-80 
per cent by 2050 compared to 1990 levels (Council: 2007: (8), see also Table 3.2 above), 
requiring the facilitation of a framework that would entail, “deeper absolute emission 
104 
 
reduction targets” by the developed world, and including “further fair and effective 
contributions by other countries” (Council: 2007: (7) emphasis added); further stressing 
that any unilateral EU commitments to reduce GHG should be accompanied by similar 
commitments by other developed and, “more advanced developed countries” (Council: 
2007: (9)).  The EU’s position would therefore directly challenge one of the fundamental 
dividing issues within the UNFCCC by tackling commitments to reduce GHG emissions 
by the developing world.   
 
On more detailed objectives the EU’s position entering Bali was also progressive, calling 
for the extension of the carbon market (in a role reversal to its stance in the early Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations where it opposed market-based mechanisms, aided further by the 
introduction of the EU’s own Emissions Trading System in 2004); addressing emissions 
from aviation and shipping; promoting sustainable development policies and measures, and 
calling for all Parties to support an ambitious and comprehensive agreement to be in place 
by no later than 2009.  With increasing evidence provided by the IPCC in its fourth 
assessment report (IPCC: 2007) of climate change being man-made, there was further 
incentive for all Parties to the Convention to take decisive action (Ott et al. 2008: 92).  
With the G77 particularly indicating their commitment for action in tackling climate 
change (G77: 2007) the EU’s progressive position did moreover meet in part with the 
preference structures of other major players in support for a post-2012 agreement, 
reflecting therefore a moderate level of ambition.  It has been the EU’s reported ambitious 
proposals approaching the Bali negotiations that have been cited within the existing 
literature as contributing to the EU’s ‘major driving role’ during CoP-13 (i.e. Oberthür & 
Roche Kelly: 2008: 36).  This is in part corroborated in this analysis, although it is argued 
that in fact the EU had a very good performance at Bali courtesy not only of its high level 
of negotiation behaviour but also of its effectiveness.   
 
Entering the Bali negotiations EU representation was led by the Portuguese Council 
Presidency with support from the Commission.  Continuing to demonstrate cohesion with 
its Member States stepping back to allow the Presidency to take the lead, the EU again 
reflected a moderate level of unity during the negotiations.  Its outreach was then high at 
CoP-13, reflected particularly in the successful employment of several negotiation tactics 
to persuade others to support its objectives for a Road-Map for negotiations.  Firstly, the 
EU’s major playing card entering Bali was a proposal, agreed by the Council in March 
2007 (Council: 2007) for a post-2012 agreement to encompass ambitious reduction targets 
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of up to 80% by developed countries by the year 2050, further reinforced by its own 
unilateral commitment to lower EU emissions by 20% by the year 2020, and going up to 
30% if other developed countries committed to similar targets; positioning the EU as a  
“major driving force” (Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36).  Secondly, having brokered 
with the G77 a deal of support for the Adaptation Fund (Müller: 2008: 2) thus successfully 
using the tactic of issue-linkage, the EU and G77 (minus OPEC) again re-forged the 
former ‘Green Group’ in pushing forward a Road-Map for negotiations (Bals: 2008: 9, 
Watanabe et al. 2008: 156, Ott et al. 2008: 94).  With wider support for a Road-Map from 
the G77, the EU was also active in trying to re-engage the United States who, after its 
withdrawal from the Kyoto negotiations in 2001 remained on the outskirts of discussions 
on a future agreement (Ott et al. 2008: 93).   
 
Again demonstrating its high significance as a player at Bali, the EU was further 
participant in all decision-making processes at CoP-13 (ENB: 2007). The outcome of the 
negotiations, agreeing the Bali Road-Map as well as a decision on the finalisation of the 
Adaptation Fund also reflected the EU’s high effectiveness.  Under the Road-Map the EU 
was seen to attain most of its goals, most evident in formation of a post-2012 negotiation 
mandate being launched under a newly formed Ad hoc Working Group on Long-Term 
Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) (UNFCCC: 2007).  More than this, the EU’s objectives 
were largely adopted under the Road-Map’s agenda with negotiations set for a deadline of 
2009, encompassing mitigation commitments by both developed and developing countries, 
focusing on sectoral-approaches (as a particular nod to EU demands to include aviation 
and shipping sectors within a post-2012 successor agreement), and stipulating policy 
approaches to reduce emissions from deforestation – all objectives detailed by the EU in its 
Council Conclusions entering the negotiations.   
 
It is noted however, that despite these successes for the EU, the Bali Road-Map was also 
notably ambiguous in its wording.  The EU did not, for example, attain its objective of 
stipulating that Parties to the post-2012 agreement would be legally-bound to emissions 
reductions which was instead papered over in the Road-Map document (UNFCCC: 2007, 
Oberthür: 2011a: 669).  As a negotiation mandate, rather than an outcome agreement itself, 
the Road-Map therefore left out this more contentious point to be picked up at a later date.  
More than this, unlike the 1995 Berlin Mandate which was highly detailed over the 
direction for negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol, the Bali Road-Map did not include any 
clear guidance or direction on what the negotiations for a post-2012 agreement should 
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explicitly entail beyond the basic principles supported by the EU (UNFCCC: 2007, Bals: 
2008: 22-23).  Whilst the EU gave a very good performance at Bali, the outcome of the 
CoP was to create significant challenges for the EU and other negotiators in the 
negotiations to come. 
 
A poor performance and another stalled conference (Copenhagen CoP-15) 
The ambiguity of the Bali Road-Map was most notably manifested two years later at the 
Copenhagen CoP-15 in 2009.  Intended to be the conference in which a post-2012 
successor agreement to the Kyoto Protocol would be agreed, the Conference has instead 
been widely criticised for its failure to do so (ENB: 2009, BBC News: 2010, EUobserver: 
2009).  For the EU, the Copenhagen CoP was to prove a major backlash.  Continuing to 
demonstrate the same progressiveness of position as was evident in Bali, the EU’s 
ambitions at Copenhagen were however much increased in calling for developed countries 
to reduce their emissions now by upwards of 40% by 2020 and up to 95% by 2050 
(Council: 2009: (8)).  Relative to the United States and increasingly prominent BASIC 
countries however, the EU’s position was a considerable outlier (see Table 3.2 above), 
with the US and BASIC countries showing increasing reticence towards any agreement 
that was legally binding.  With the EU doggedly pursuing a legally-binding agreement that 
would set even higher emissions targets, its position was notably higher in ambition 
relative to Bali that would require a considerable performance to persuade its negotiation 
partners to change their preferences.  
 
Much attention has been given within the literature to the EU’s failures at Copenhagen; 
being widely lamented for its ‘unconvincing’ performance (Afionis: 2011: 342) and lack of 
influence (Wurzel & Connelly: 2011: 8) with a particular emphasis being given to the EU 
showing a, “sobering demonstration of disarray” (Vogler: 2011: 27), and of being an 
“incoherent, internally divided, actor without a strong spokesperson” (Kilian & Elgström: 
2010: 267).  In part this analysis corroborates these findings.  It is argued that the EU’s 
performance at Copenhagen was poor, however, findings do also challenge the more 
calamitous accounts offered of the EU’s performance at Copenhagen, suggesting that 
whilst it had low effectiveness and was divided, its outreach was moderate, and its 
significance was not as low as has been suggested.   
 
A major challenge to the EU’s performance at Copenhagen was its unity.  Represented 
within the negotiations by the Swedish Council Presidency, the EU’s official voice was not 
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only supplemented but also at times challenged by its Member States.  This has been most 
widely reported in the remarks by Connie Hedegaard, President and then Special 
Representative of the Copenhagen Summit
43, who commented that the EU “spoke with 
many different voices” during the final hours of the Conference (EUobserver: 2010).  Less 
focused upon within the literature, but nevertheless important in a performance assessment, 
was the EU’s then failure in its, previously successful, coalition-building efforts at 
Copenhagen (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012: 182, Oberthür: 2011a: 678-9).  Despite 
stipulating its intention to, “strengthen its alliances and partnerships with developing 
countries” (Council: 2009: (3)), it then failed to build on this within the negotiations.  
Efforts at issue-linkage, with the EU offering €7.2bn in financial support to developing 
countries, were also unsuccessful in then persuading the G77 to support EU objectives of 
launching a new agreement (Vogler: 2011: 29, Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012: 182), with 
developing countries instead countering that the EU’s funding was “insignificant” (Curtin: 
2010: 4).  Being seemingly caught by surprise by the new prominence of the BASIC 
countries within the negotiations, the EU’s outreach at Copenhagen was thus an unusual 
mixture of being highly proactive in its calls for raising emissions targets and launching an 
agreement, yet reactive and on the back-foot in trying to deal with the more reticent 
preferences of the major players.  Failing moreover to judge the extent to which the US 
and emerging economies wanted to go in establishing a post-2012 agreement, the EU’s 
highly ambitious proposals were then essentially ignored (Afionis: 2011: 351).   
 
More prominent critiques offered within the literature was the EU’s apparent 
insignificance at Copenhagen (Van Schaik & Schnuz: 2012: 182, Oberthür: 2011a: 670, 
Vogler: 2011: 29, Kilian & Elgström: 2010: 256, Spencer et al. 2010, Curtin: 2010: 7).  
With proceedings dominated by the US and BASIC countries’ preferences for a 
significantly watered-down agreement, focusing upon national pledges rather than the 
EU’s favoured approach of internationally imposed emissions reduction targets (Curtin: 
2010), the EU was then partially excluded from endgame bargaining on this core issue.  
With the US and BASIC as the key players formulating the decisions on what was 
essentially to become the Copenhagen Accord, the EU was “side-lined” (Van Schaik & 
Schunz: 2012: 182, Oberthür: 2011a: 670, Spencer et al. 2010).  The EU was thus obliged 
to accept the Copenhagen Accord despite having little participation in the decisions which 
created it (Kilian & Elgström: 2010: 256).  Despite this, it is also noted that the EU’s 
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 Connie Hedegaard stepped down as Conference President in order that the Danish Premier could take on 
the role.  She remained involved in all negotiations however as a Special Representative for the President 
(Guardian: 2009) 
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significance at Copenhagen was not as irrelevant as some have indicated.  The EU was in 
fact participant in some endgame bargaining negotiations –reflecting moderate significance 
– including the group of 30 key players who met to discuss the draft of the Copenhagen 
Accord prior to it going to the full Convention (ENB: 2009).  It was therefore presented 
with the opportunity to shape – and even block – the decision had it chosen to adopt that 
approach.  However, with its low unity the EU’s capacity to present a cohesive line was 
significantly reduced which hindered it from making the most of its participation in this 
group. 
 
The EU’s subsequent failure to attain its goals during Copenhagen has also been widely 
reported (Curtin: 2010, Spencer et al. 2010, Afionis: 2011: 342, Parker & Karlsson: 2010: 
940, Oberthür: 2011a: 670) with the most prominent failure evident in the mostly voluntary 
nature of the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC: 2009); an agreement which in no way 
reflected the EU’s preference for legally binding commitments by all countries (Council: 
2009, see also Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012: 181).  Instead the Copenhagen Accord, 
“merely recited existing offers” rather than extending commitments (Vogler: 2011: 26), 
removing any mention to mitigation targets (Curtin: 2010: 4).  The EU’s effectiveness was 
consequently also low. Taken altogether, this analysis does therefore support those 
critiques of EU performance at Copenhagen.   
 
It is emphasised however, that this evaluation does not corroborate the more calamitous 
accounts stating that the EU’s failings at Copenhagen indicates the EU’s demise within the 
UNFCCC.   Whilst the EU performed poorly at Copenhagen, not least in the eyes of those 
expecting it to take on a particular ‘leadership’ role (Parker & Karlsson: 2010, Wurzel & 
Connelly: 2011: 8), much of the hype surrounding this has likely stemmed from the 
dramatic variation between the results of Copenhagen compared to the EU’s good or very 
good performances throughout much of the 2000s.  That this has coincided with the rise of 
the emerging economies within the UNFCCC has further dramatized claims of the EU 
“abdicating its leadership role” (Santarius et al. 2009: 95), and of diminishing in 
importance under a new “multi-polar world order where large developing countries and the 
US dominate any future post-Kyoto negotiations” (Kilian & Elgström: 2010: 268).  As the 
following final evaluation of EU performance in the Durban CoP-17 in 2011 shall reflect 
however, such claims may be premature. 
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The Bounce-back: A good performance but still no agreement (Durban CoP-17) 
Following the failure at Copenhagen, negotiations in the UNFCCC have moved forward 
only gradually.  At the Cancún CoP-16 in 2010 the Cancún Agreements were established 
which vaguely detailed the international community’s intent to address the challenge of 
climate change through steps towards long-term cooperative action (UNFCCC: 2010).  At 
Durban some momentum towards resuscitating the negotiation process for a post-2012 
agreement had begun (ENB: 2011).  For the EU, coming back from its seeming fall from 
grace in Copenhagen, the Cancún conference in 2010 had seen it “downsize” its objectives 
(Oberthür: 2011b: 10) in an effort to adapt to the changing negotiation environment, and 
positioning itself as a broker or ‘bridge-builder’44 between the US and emerging powers in 
an effort to shift the discussions towards a more ambitious post-2012 agreement.  At 
Cancún moreover, the EU had been seen to have performed better following Copenhagen 
(Oberthür: 2011b: 10).  By the time of Durban, the EU had regained its more progressive 
stance and was again decisively pushing for a ‘road-map’ (Council: 2011a: (6)) for a new 
legally binding agreement with commitments by all Parties. 
 
Nevertheless moderating its ambitions after Copenhagen – thus showing a more realistic 
perspective of the preference structures of its negotiation partners – the EU also indicated 
in its negotiation position approaching Durban a willingness to accept a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, on the proviso that the environmental 
integrity of the Protocol was preserved and its architecture enhanced (Council: 2011a: (6)).  
Thus, the EU made a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol conditional on 
others having to commit to negotiate a new agreement by the year 2015 (Economist: 
2011).  The EU’s performance in then taking those objectives forward at Durban further 
showed a considerable bounce-back following the dramatic events of Copenhagen.   
Giving a good performance the EU demonstrated both a high level of overall negotiation 
behaviour and a moderate level of effectiveness. 
 
Continuing the practice of representation conducted in previous CoPs the EU’s 
representation was formally led at CoP-11 by the Polish Council Presidency.  However, the 
creation of DG CLIMA in 2010 had also resulted in the DG Climate Commissioner – 
previous Conference President at Copenhagen - Connie Hedegaard acting as one of the 
EU’s lead negotiators.  Throughout the two weeks of negotiations from 28 th November to 
                                                   
44
 The Council’s conclusions entering Cancun emphasised the EU’s “willingness to strengthen bilateral and 
regional alliances with a view to building bridges between Parties which reinvigorate and feed into the 
UNFCCC” (Council: 2010c: (28)) 
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9
th
 December 2011 it was the DG Climate Commissioner who was to grab the headlines 
for the EU (Guardian: 2011a) and who, by the final week of negotiations was the EU’s 
leading negotiator.  Reports from Durban further suggest a marked improvement for the 
EU’s unity following the Copenhagen failure (ENB: 2011), with the EU seen to be 
maintaining its cohesion and with Member States remaining mostly silent to allow their 
lead negotiators to represent their views.   One further small, if symbolic, boost for the 
EU’s unity at Durban, courtesy of changes from the Lisbon Treaty, was that the EU’s 
negotiators spoke from behind the EU flag rather than the previous practice of speaking 
from behind the flag of whichever Member State was holding the Council Presidency at 
that time (Oberthür: 2011a: 672).  
 
In terms of its outreach following Copenhagen, the EU’s strategy in Durban was also much 
improved with a high outreach reflecting not only a proactive strategy but also successful 
efforts  at coalition-building with the EU forging a coalition with other ‘high ambition’ 
countries (Guardian: 2011b) including AOSIS and the LDCs (ENB: 2011, Harmeling: 
2011).  With the G77 divided between the interests of BASIC, AOSIS and OPEC, the EU 
instead focused on the G77’s more ambitious factions and successfully established an 
alliance of Parties who each sought concrete and comprehensive action from the 
negotiations.  In addition to this, the EU has also been praised at Durban for the 
‘brinkmanship’ strategy adopted by the EU Climate Commissioner over the legality of a 
new agreement in the face of Indian and Chinese objections to mandatory cuts (ENB: 
2011, Guardian: 2011c, New York Times: 2011).  With India and China continuing to 
show reticence towards a new agreement in which they would be legally-bound to make 
emissions cuts, the EU was successful in standing against demands for what the EU 
perceived as the weakening of any future agreement.   
 
Similarly, in an improvement to Copenhagen, the EU again demonstrated a high level of 
significance at Durban by being participant in all end-game negotiation sessions, and 
notably within the “huddle” initiated by the Conference Chair to reach agreement on the 
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (Guardian: 2011a).  With the EU a core player in 
standing up to Indian and Chinese demands, it was moreover the EU (rather than the US) 
that was involved in final day endgame bargaining negotiations with these emerging 
economies over the wording of a post-Kyoto agreement and its ‘legal force’ (ENB: 2011).   
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The outcome of the Durban CoP could moreover be counted a success for the EU with a 
moderate level of effectiveness evident in agreement on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action.  This agreement, much like the Bali Road-Map agreed in 2007, draws a 
number of similarities with the EU’s proposal for a further ‘Road-Map’ towards 
negotiations on a future legally-binding agreement for all Parties.  In particular, the Durban 
Platform stipulates that negotiations are to be concluded by 2015 and put in place by 2020 
(UNFCCC: 2011).  The EU was also effective in ensuring language that made reference to 
the legally binding agreement for all emitters – something that had been all too elusive in 
the Copenhagen Accord – with the decision stating that the Parties to the Convention, 
“decide to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed 
outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties, through a 
subsidiary body under the Convention hereby established and to be known as the Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action” (UNFCCC: 2011: 2 
emphasis added).  As an agreement therefore, the Durban Platform sets out the goal of 
initiating negotiations for an agreement to be in place, and enforceable, by 2020 with 
participation from all Parties.  Implicit in the agreement was a further goal-attainment for 
the EU – that of the emerging economies also being required to participate under legally 
binding commitments.   
 
It is noted however, that the Durban outcome did also require the EU to give an assurance 
to a second commitment period, under the Kyoto Protocol to commence from 2012 thus 
ensuring continuity after the Protocol’s first commitment ceases at the end of 2012 
(Council: 2011a, UNFCCC: 2011, see also Guardian: 2011c, ENB: 2011).  Whilst this was 
not the EU’s first preference – preferring an outright agreement for a successor Protocol to 
Kyoto (Council: 2011a) – its offer to accept this as a condition for negotiations on a new 
agreement was then taken up by negotiation partners.  In addition, the agreement made no 
mention of specific commitments to be made by negotiation partners, nor did it specify 
mitigation targets, or the inclusion of new sections (including aviation and shipping which 
the EU has continued to push for) under future negotiations, all of which the EU had 
specified in its negotiation position (Council: 2011a).  Consequently, with moderate 
effectiveness, coupled with its high negotiation behaviour, the EU’s overall performance at 
Durban was good, thus challenging those critiques of the EU’s role post-Copenhagen. 
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Conclusion 
As this analysis has revealed, the EU’s performance within the UNFCCC negotiations over 
the period 1995 to 2011, whilst variable, has, with occasional exceptions, been good or 
very good – as demonstrated in Figure 3.2 below.   
 
Figure 3.2: EU performance in the UNFCCC negotiations (1995-2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
As this figure reflects, EU performance within the negotiations selected for this study has 
ranged across the scale including very good, good, fair and poor performances.  Starting 
off well with a very good performance at CoP-1 in Berlin, the EU’s performance has 
subsequently gone through peaks and troughs, dropping away at Kyoto and again during 
The Hague negotiations in 2000, but rising after 2001 as the US withdrawal from the 
Kyoto process gave a renewed incentive for the EU  to ‘save the day’.  Demonstrating 
good and very good performances over the early launch of negotiations for a post-Kyoto 
agreement after 2005 the EU did then suffer a decline at the Copenhagen CoP in 2009.  
Despite claims that this could lead to the demise of the EU’s role within the UNFCCC, and 
of its ‘abdicated leadership role’ (Santarius et al.: 2009); this study has however shown that 
EU performance bounced-back following Copenhagen.  Demonstrating a good 
performance at Durban in 2011, the EU has shown that claims of its demise in this forum 
are premature and that it continues to perform well both in terms of negotiation behaviour 
and goal-attainment. 
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In contributing to those more disparate accounts of EU performance detailed at the 
beginning of this chapter, the picture this analysis therefore reveals is of an EU 
performance that has challenged expectations in several ways.  Firstly, its performance has 
been neither ‘suboptimal’ nor ‘significantly improved’ but of somewhere in the middle-
ground.  As such, this analysis corroborates findings that EU performance within the 
UNFCCC has been mixed, demonstrating as it has peaks and troughs over both the Kyoto 
and post-Kyoto negotiations.  As such, by evaluating EU performance as a measure of both 
its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness, a more realistic, clarifying view of how the EU 
has performed in this forum can be seen – all the more essential to a case which is coloured 
by high ambitions and even higher expectations and thus to often unrealistic bench-marks 
for performance to be measured against. 
 
Closer analysis of the EU’s performance across each indicator - as detailed in Table 3.3 
below - moreover sheds some interesting findings which further challenge expectation. 
   
Table 3.3: Breakdown of EU performance in the UNFCCC negotiations (1995-2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Of particular note, EU unity has remained broadly consistent within the UNFCCC 
especially in terms of maintained cohesion.  This is despite the fact that the EU does not 
‘speak with one voice’ in this forum but rather with numerous voices.  Challenging 
expectations that with shared competence EU unity would be harder to maintain, this 
analysis has shown that, in practice, the EU Member States have – with the exceptions of 
The Hague and Copenhagen Summits in 2000 and 2009 – remained broadly adherent to 
EU positions and have increasingly allowed the EU’s ‘lead’ negotiators to speak for them.  
Findings do thus also challenge those claims that the EU has increasingly ‘spoken with one 
voice’ in the UNFCCC (see Oberthür: 2011a: 676), suggesting instead that it has 
performed well in this forum in part because it has spoken with several voices.  Findings 
Negotiation Ambition Unity Outreach Significance Behaviour Effectiveness
Performance 
assessment
1995 CoP-1 High Moderate High High High High Very good
1997 CoP-3 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Fair
2000 CoP-6 High Low Moderate High Moderate Low Poor
2001 CoP-6bis/CoP-7 High Moderate High High High Moderate Good
2005 CoP-11 Low Moderate Low High Moderate High Good
2007 CoP-13 Moderate Moderate High High High High Very good
2009 CoP-15 High Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Poor
2011 CoP-17 Moderate Moderate High High High Moderate Good
114 
 
further suggest that the EU has had some success in the pursuit of proactive strategies and 
negotiation tactics within this environment.  This has been particularly evident in the use of 
coalition-building and issue-linkage, thus demonstrating that whilst its ambitions have 
generally been moderate to high in this forum, its ability to persuade others of those 
preferences has also been relatively successful.   
 
The EU has also been seen to have maintained a high level of significance within the 
UNFCCC negotiations which, despite its exclusion from some processes of endgame 
bargaining at Copenhagen in 2009, has remained consistent despite concerns raised of 
diminutions in the EU’s weight and significance at the negotiating table (i.e. Oberthür: 
2011a: 676).  In terms of the EU’s goal-attainment in this forum, this analysis has also 
revealed that, whilst variable, the EU has on the whole attained some or most of its 
objectives within CoPs with moderate or high levels of effectiveness.  This would seem to 
challenge those who, in focusing on EU effectiveness and influence within the UNFCCC, 
have broadly criticised the EU for often failing to live up to its high ambitions in this 
forum (i.e. Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012, Afionis: 2011, Lacasta et al. 2007, Hovi et al. 
2003).  Rather, it is argued that whilst the EU’s rhetoric is often that of high ambition, its 
negotiation positioning does not in fact always reflect this.  Instead, it has been shown that 
the EU’s negotiation objectives in this case – whilst primarily progressive – have still also 
at times maintained some zone of agreement with its negotiations partners and thus 
enabled it to find some consensus with other Parties.   
  
A final point of note from this analysis has been that the EU has been seen to perform very 
well in the UNFCCC negotiations where the negotiations are themselves at a stage of 
initiation rather than where it comes to finalising agreement.  This was evident not only at 
Berlin in 1995, but again in Bali in 2007 and Durban in 2011 where the EU had good and 
very good performances.  Where negotiations have been aimed at finalising operational 
details and making binding commitments the EU’s performance has however, been more 
variable, particularly seen at Kyoto where its performance was fair and in The Hague and 
Copenhagen where its performances were poor.  This would in turn support those who 
have argued that the EU’s strengths in this negotiation are more in setting the direction for 
negotiations than in their agreement (i.e. Vogler & Stephan: 2007, Andresen & Agrawala: 
2002). It would subsequently suggest the need to moderate expectations of EU 
performance in the UNFCCC negotiations leading up to 2015 where agreement for a post-
Kyoto successor will need to be finalised.  This in turn does imply that expectations of EU 
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‘leadership’ in this forum may also require some fine-tuning.  Whilst findings from this 
analysis do indicate a relatively positive performance record for the EU in the UNFCCC, 
they in no way support claims of a ‘sustained’ and ‘significantly improved’ leadership 
record found within the wider leadership discourse (see also Chapter One).  To such claims 
it is therefore recommended that focus move beyond the EU’s leadership rhetoric to 
instead engage with how the EU’s objectives meet with the preference structures of others, 
and hence on its actual negotiation performance in subsequently pursuing and meeting 
them. 
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Chapter 4: EU performance in the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) multilateral trade negotiations 
(1996-2011) 
 
Within the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) the EU is unquestionably a major player.  
The EU is both the world’s largest trade importer and exporter and accounts for just under 
a fifth of world trade (Eurostat: 2011: 11).  It has one of the world’s largest internal 
markets with a population of 502 million people
45
 and, with trade competence exclusively 
delegated to the European Community, the EU does formally speak with one voice in its 
external trade relations. Since 1995 and the establishment of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), the EU has moreover positioned itself as a leading advocate of the MTS (Smith & 
Woolcock: 1999, Van Den Hoven: 2007, Ahnild: 2005, M. Baldwin: 2006, Pisani-Ferry: 
2009, Mortensen: 2009, Jørgensen: 2009b, A.R Young: 2011), prioritising the WTO as the 
regulatory forum for establishing multilateral trading rules and disciplines (De Bièvre: 
2006), and being widely acclaimed both for its role in the WTO’s creation and in pushing 
forward the creation of its new, and strengthened, dispute settlement mechanism 
(Mortensen: 2009: 87, Jørgensen: 2009b: 204, M. Baldwin: 2006: 933, Ahnild: 2005: 131).  
Assessing EU performance in the WTO’s multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) could then 
be seen as something of an easy test.  Comparative to other policy fields expectations of 
the EU’s performance within this negotiation are high.  The EU is widely understood as an 
economic superpower and subsequently an important voice in global trade governance 
(Schnabel: 2005, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006, McCormick: 2007).  More than this the EU 
is expected to use its not inconsiderable market size as bargaining leverage or coercion 
over other smaller states in order to obtain its objectives within negotiations (Meunier: 
2000, Steinberg: 2002: 347-9).  
 
Unsurprisingly therefore, trade policy and the EU’s ability to pursue its trading interests 
and attain its goals within the MTS, is of considerable interest to EU scholars.  
Interestingly however, very little has in fact been written about EU performance and how 
well it performs within multilateral trade negotiations (see also Dür: 2006: 363).   Closer 
analysis of the literature not only highlights a lack of analytical rigor when discussing the 
                                                   
45
 Provisional statistics for 2011 provided by Eurostat, available online at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&
footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1 (last accessed 19 March 2012) 
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EU’s performance within the WTO but also highly disparate perceptions of how well it 
either has performed, or is likely to perform within this forum.  The EU is, for example, 
perceived as performing at its best within MTN by scholars focusing on the EU’s 
actorness, but then challenged for its institutional weaknesses, internal divisions, and 
cumbersome negotiation behaviour by scholars of EU trade policy more specifically.  
Within the EUGA literature particularly the tendency is to highlight trade, and trade 
negotiations, as demonstrating the EU’s “raison d’étre” (Meunier & Nicolaïdis: 2011: 276) 
or, at the very least, as a best case scenario for EU performance and global influence 
thanks to the EU’s exclusive competence, single voice, and ‘presence’ due to its market 
size and overall economic power (Whitman: 2010: 27, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 86-7, 
Smith: 2001: 798).  The EU trade policy literature however, offers a far more critical 
picture; highlighting the EU’s “underperformance” (A.R Young: 2011: 723, Paemen and 
Bensch: 1995: 45–46; Smith: 1994: 291–92) and especially emphasising challenges faced 
by the EU in terms of its actual effectiveness within the MTS.  Within this debate divisions 
between the Member States and the Council and Commission, have been highlighted 
(Mortensen: 2009: 86, Pisani-Ferry: 2009: 26, Damro: 2007, Paeman & Bensch: 1995, 45-
46), in addition to the EU’s, at times, reactive and inflexible negotiating style (Ahnild: 
2005: 131, Jørgensen: 2009b: 201) – most especially over the controversial issue of 
agricultural trade – as cause for what are seen as the EU’s performance failings.   
 
Similar to that seen in the previous chapter in the climate change literature, there is also a 
penchant within the EU trade policy literature of focusing, often implicitly, on individual 
performance indicators but which then overlooks the EU’s overall performance taking into 
consideration both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness. Much attention is given, for 
example, to the (in)ability of the EU to maintain its unity during MTN (Da Conceição: 
2010, Grant: 2007, A.R Young: 2007: 131-2, Kerremans: 2004: 364) with divergent 
opinions over the impact that often publicised disputes between the Commission and 
Council have upon the EU’s negotiation position and, implicitly, then upon its 
performance
46. Others focus instead on the EU’s internal developments i.e. reform of the 
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or the creation of the Single European Market 
(SEM) and the likely impact this might have on its negotiation position, but with little 
explicit reference then to its actual negotiation performance (M. Baldwin: 2006, 
                                                   
46
 This literature is predominantly concerned with the Principle-Agent (PA) relationship between the Council 
and Commission in MTN.  For a useful overview see Dür & Zimmernan (2007) 
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Hofreither: 2008: 341). Relatively few (A.R Young: 2011, 2007) give consideration to the 
EU’s outreach and subsequent effectiveness.   
 
This inconsistent picture of EU performance within the WTO’s MTN has been further 
contributed to by the selectivity of negotiations and periods of negotiation that are 
discussed within the literature.  Typically, the EU’s role and performance has been 
discussed at length with regard to its dealings with the WTO’s predecessor, the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
from 1986 to 1994 (e.g. Devuyst: 1995, Paeman & Bensch: 1995, Hyett: 1996, Woolock & 
Hodges: 1996, Meunier: 2000).  No such efforts have however yet been made in providing 
a similar overview of the EU’s performance over the course of the WTO’s negotiation 
history.  Whilst individual WTO Ministerial meetings (e.g. Scholte: 2000, Schott: 2000, 
Kerremans: 2004, Cho: 2005, Lee & Wilkinson: 2007, Ismail: 2008, O’Sullivan: 2008), or 
specific aspects of the negotiations such as, for example, development (e.g. Van Ven 
Hoven: 2004, Duponteil: 2008) or agriculture (e.g. Hofreither: 2008) have been given 
attention, the broader case of how well the EU has performed within WTO MTN over-time 
has been much more neglected
47
. 
 
The aim of this chapter therefore is to contribute to this debate by evaluating the EU’s 
performance; specifically over the course of the WTO’s trade negotiations from its first 
Ministerial Conference in Singapore in 1996 up to the eighth Ministerial Conference held 
in Geneva in December 2011.  This period has been chosen for several reasons.  First, it 
encompasses the WTO’s formative years where, following the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round in which the EU’s performance was seen to take a notable ‘rise’ (A.R 
Young: 2011, Paeman & Bensch: 1995), and where the EU has been widely accredited for 
the WTO’s subsequent creation, expectations of its performance are invariably high. 
Testing those expectations therefore provides an important incentive for covering this early 
period.  Second, it also addresses the EU’s performance over the course of the Doha Round 
negotiations (2001-2011) which, despite the Round’s significance to the MTS and to the 
EU’s own role within it, few assessments have yet been made of the EU’s performance and 
how it might have changed over its now decade long history
48
.  This is particularly notable 
in more recent negotiations where little to no academic attention has been given to EU 
                                                   
47
 Exception may however be found in A.R Young (forthcoming) 
48
 The Doha Round has, at time of writing, still to be concluded which may offer some explanation for this 
lack of longitudinal perspective within the literature.  Whilst a completed Round would help to build a better 
performance overview, particularly from an effectiveness perspective, much can still be learned of EU 
performance in MTN over the course of the Doha Round’s history to date. 
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performance since the failed effort to bring the Doha Round to a conclusion in July 2008 – 
this despite developments that have taken place over 2011.  
 
Utilising the performance framework developed in Chapter Two, the EU’s performance – 
as a measure of both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness - is assessed over this 
period.  Focusing particularly on WTO Ministerial Conferences and General Council 
meetings during critical periods of both the launch and subsequent process of the Doha 
Round negotiations, it finds that whilst the EU has not performed poorly in these 
negotiations, neither has it had the extent of very good performances typically expected of 
an actor of its size and importance to the MTS.  In so arguing, this chapter challenges some 
of the diverse expectations within the literature, whilst generating a clearer overview of 
how well the EU has actually performed in the WTO since its creation.   To make its case, 
the chapter is broken down into five main sections.  In the first section, the EU will be 
introduced as a trade actor within the WTO trade negotiations.  In section two a brief 
overview of the WTO negotiations is provided with particular regard to the major players 
as well as the key negotiating issues within the current Doha Round.  Sections three, four 
and five will then concentrate on the performance evaluation itself.  The chapter is then 
summarised in a concluding section. 
 
4.1 The EU as an actor in the WTO  
As one of the world’s trade ‘superpowers’ it might be considered counter-intuitive to ask if 
the EU is then also a trade ‘actor’.  The question of who is ‘EU’ within the context of the 
WTO does however remain an important one.  For EU performance to be evaluated it is 
important to first establish the EU’s ability to act, and negotiate, within this forum.  In this 
section brief discussion is therefore given to the EU’s competence, common position and 
representation within the WTO, as well as to some of its core challenges.   
 
Under the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP) the European Community (EC) has 
exclusive competence over trade policy (Treaty of Rome: 1957 Art 113).  On international 
trade matters the EU is therefore at its most ‘state-like’ with the Commission granted the 
authority to initiate the EU’s negotiation position and to subsequently speak for its 
Member States in all MTN.  Despite this, which trade issues fall under the EC’s exclusive 
competence has nevertheless remained a cause of particular contention (A.R Young: 2002, 
2011: 719), opening questions of EU authority in speaking for its Member States across all 
MTN issues.  Since the formation of the GATT in 1948, the MTS has seen a significant 
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widening and ‘deepening’ of its agenda (Young & Peterson: 2006).  New issues on the 
MTN agenda such as trade in services, intellectual property, investment, environmental 
and labour standards, and other ‘behind-the-border’ issues which fall under the purview of 
national governments, have subsequently resulted in the EC sharing competence with its 
Member States within the GATT, and later the WTO.  Various efforts, both within the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ: 1994) and later EU treaty reforms (Treaty of Amsterdam: 
1997, Treaty of Nice: 2001, TFEU: 2007), have sought to bring new trade-related issues 
under the exclusive competence of the EC and, under the Lisbon Treaty (TEFU: 2007) this 
was essentially solidified with the remaining issues of shared competence transferred to the 
EC (TFEU: 2007, A.R Young: 2011: 719, Meunier & Nicolaïdis: 2011, Woolcock: 2010: 
385) 
 
Within the GATT/WTO the EC has however, long acted ‘as if’ it had exclusive 
competence (A.R Young: 2002: Ch.2) during MTN.  Represented by the European 
Commission, itself a formal Member of the WTO, neither the EU Member States nor 
Council Presidency negotiate in MTN but the Commission speaks on their behalf
49
.  
During negotiations it is the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) that forms the 
mainstay of the EU delegation – led in political negotiations by the European Trade 
Commissioner
50
, and in technical negotiations by the DG Trade Director-General.  
Member States nevertheless maintain their presence and oversee the Commission in all 
open negotiating sessions and through on-going coordination meetings (interview, senior 
official, EU delegation to the WTO, Geneva, 20
th
 May 2012).  This is important as, whilst 
the Commission has negotiation authority within the WTO, the Member States must still 
ratify any outcome agreement.  It is thus in the Commission’s interests to ensure that 
Member States remain fully involved and will accept the outcome it negotiates within the 
WTO. 
 
                                                   
49
 It is noted that the EU Member States are members of the WTO but they do not negotiate in a national 
capacity except in rare circumstances – for example in WTO budgetary discussions (interview, Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State B, Geneva, 20
th
 May 2011).  EU Member States 
do also give statements in their national capacity during plenary sessions of Ministerial Conferences whilst 
the Member State holding the rotating Council Presidency will give a statement on behalf of the Council. 
Otherwise all negotiating sessions are conducted by the Commission. 
50
 Sir Leon Brittan (UK), 1995-1999, Pascal Lamy (France), 1999-2004, Peter Mandelson (UK), 2004-2008, 
Lady Catherine Ashton (UK), 2008-2009, Benita Ferrero-Waldner (Austria), 2009-2010, Karel de Gucht 
(Belgium), 2010- 
121 
 
Furthermore, the Commission’s negotiation mandate within WTO MTN must be approved 
by the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC)
51
 with involvement also by the Agriculture & 
Fisheries Council (A.R Young: 2011: 720, Woolcock & Hodges: 1996: 303).  Under the 
Treaty of Rome (Art 311(3)), “the Commission shall make recommendations to the 
Council, which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations”.  
Initiated therefore by the Commission, the EU’s draft negotiation mandate then undergoes 
extensive deliberation before being adopted by the FAC.  The main consultative and 
advisory body dealing with trade matters within the EU is the Trade Policy Committee 
(TPC)
52
 which meets every Friday, formed of senior trade policy officials from each 
Member State
53
.  The TPC then reports to COREPER-I who in turn reports to the FAC 
where the mandate is formally approved. 
 
Much has been written on the complexities of the EU’s decision-making processes in trade 
policy, and the, often fraught, relationship between the Commission and Council in 
deriving the EU’s negotiation position entering trade negotiations (e.g. Meunier & 
Nicolaïdis: 2011, Da Conceicão: 2010, Dür: 2008, Damro: 2007, Kerremans: 2004, A.R 
Young: 2002).  The EU is not a homogeneous block when it comes to building its trade 
objectives in multilateral negotiations. Member States have different priorities in their 
trading interests as well as different general approaches to trading practices and rule-
making.  At its most fundamental this is seen as a north vs. south divide with Member 
States in the north of Europe, including for example the UK, and the Scandinavian 
countries, typically seen to be more free trade and liberal in their trade preferences, whilst 
Member States in the south, for example France, Greece and Italy, are widely understood 
to be more protectionist.  Although this portrayal is simplistic (see M. Baldwin: 2006), the 
argument nevertheless holds that Member States do have differing approaches to 
international trade and must therefore find compromise in deriving a common negotiation 
directive in the Council.   
 
One method which demonstrates how Member States work together to find compromise 
may be seen in the TPC where a ‘like-minded group’54 of liberal Member States meet for 
                                                   
51
 Formally the General Affairs & External Relations Council.  The Council’s title was changed following the 
passing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
52
 Formally the ‘133 Committee’ and ‘113 Committee’.  These titles refer to the relevant articles under the 
Treaty of Nice and Treaty of Amsterdam respectively 
53
 The TPC also meets once monthly at Ambassadorial level (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to 
the WTO, EU Member State E, Geneva, 20
th
  May 2011) 
54
 The like-minded group consists of the UK, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Ireland, 
Czech Rep, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia and Malta 
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coordination meetings prior to full member meetings in order to form consensus amongst 
themselves before negotiating with more protectionist members (interview, senior trade 
official, EU Member State E, Brussels, 17
th
 May 2011).  Other practices for finding 
consensus are also evident.  Within the Council for example, whilst qualified majority 
voting (QMV) is the rule for the majority of decisions taken on international trade matters, 
decisions have typically been adopted by unanimity (Meunier: 2000: 108, A.R Young: 
2011, 720).  This has continued since the passing of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty where, despite 
introducing further extension of QMV rules in the Council, international trade decisions 
have been largely consensual and agreed by unanimity (VoteWatch: 2012: 9).   
 
This same practice has however also opened the EU up to criticism for having a lowest 
common denominator position within MTN reflecting only what the most conservative of 
its Member States will agree to (Paeman & Bensch: 1995, Meunier: 2005).  This is most 
clearly evident in the EU’s stance on trade liberalisation in agriculture where the defensive 
interests of those Member States most supportive of the domestic support provided by the 
CAP has resulted in the EU having a highly defensive negotiation stance which has 
translated into perceptions of a “fortress Europe” (Hanson: 1998).  Commission efforts to 
remain faithful to the mandate set by the Council in upholding this defensive stance has 
also often resulted in the EU being criticised for being too inflexible with its negotiation 
partners (Smith & Woolcock: 1999: 444, A.R Young: 2007), and, similarly to that found in 
the EU environmental discourse, of spending too much time negotiating with itself rather 
than with its negotiation partners (Paemen and Bensch, 1995; M. Baldwin, 2006).  
Although, with negotiating partners having to accept that the EU can only move so far and 
so quickly, this apparent inflexibility has also been seen by some as a bargaining asset for 
the EU, with others having to shift their position in order to accommodate the EU’s 
demands (interview, senior trade official, northern developed third country, Geneva, 24th 
May 2011, Meunier: 2000, 2005, Meunier & Nicolaïdis: 2006, Elgström & Stromvik: 
2005).  Where the Commission has however sought to move beyond the red-lines set by 
the Council this has also resulted in criticism of weakening the EU’s negotiating position 
in the eyes of its negotiation partners (Da Conceição: 2010: 1123, Meunier & Nicolaïdis: 
1999).  The EU’s ability to negotiate within MTN is therefore highly dependent upon its 
negotiation mandate and the majority support of its Member States.   
 
However, as the world’s largest single market in purchasing power parity terms, the EU is 
doubtless a significant presence within the WTO, and widely recognised as an actor of 
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some importance with trading interests spanning across all major elements of trade 
negotiations (interview, First Secretary to the WTO, southern developing country, Geneva,  
19
th
 May 2011, interview, Commercial Secretary, southern developing country, Geneva, 
19
th
 May 2011, interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, southern 
developing country, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011, Elgström: 2007).  With both defensive and 
offensive interests spanning every sector within the WTO’s extensive trade negotiation 
agenda the EU is also represented within all negotiation fora (interview, Deputy Permanent 
Representative to the WTO, EU Member State B, Geneva, 20
th
 May 2011) and therefore 
has a voice at every negotiation table.  The EU’s not inconsiderable trading power – and 
subsequent presence within the WTO - has moreover enhanced since the 1990s with 
enlargement gradually increasing its size from six to twenty-seven member states, 
substantially enhancing the size of the EU’s market and GDP (Smith & Woolcock: 1999: 
444, A.R Young: 2011: 718-19) and broadening further the EU’s trade interests.  It is to 
the pursuit of these interests within the WTO that we now turn.     
 
4.2 WTO trade round negotiations: Major players and key issues 
The WTO was launched in 1995 following the conclusion of the GATT’s Uruguay Round 
in December 1994.  Born out of the GATT, the WTO was created to establish, and 
monitor, the rules of trade between nations at the global level.  Above all, the WTO is a 
negotiation forum which, now with 157 members
55
, is responsible for facilitating 
multilateral trade negotiations or trade ‘rounds’.  Negotiators within the former GATT had 
already seen a marked increase in the MTN agenda during the Uruguay Round, with a 
focus not only on traditional issues including agriculture, textiles and clothing but, for the 
first time, seeing negotiations extended to include trade in services, intellectual property, 
and investment measures.  Negotiations also focused upon strengthening the MTS more 
broadly through the establishment of new rules, a mechanism for dispute settlement, and 
the creation of the WTO.  The result of the Uruguay Round was, “the largest liberalisation 
of trade in the world” (interview, Lord Brittan of Spennithorne, former EU Trade 
Commissioner, London, 19
th
 April 2011), cutting tariffs across the board with a 
commitment by contracting parties not to raise them again on 95% of world visible trade 
(Hyett: 1996: 91), and the establishment of the WTO, widely accredited to the role played 
                                                   
55
 Vanuatu joined the WTO as its 157
th
 member on 24
th
 August 2012.  It joins recently acceded members 
Russia (acceded on 12
th
 August 2012), Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga and Samoa 
(acceded on 10 May 2012).  Laos has also been accepted to join the WTO and is expected to become the 
organisations 158
th
 member in early 2013. 
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by the EU (Mortensen: 2009: 87, Jørgensen: 2009b: 204, M. Baldwin: 2006: 933, Ahnild: 
2005: 131). 
 
Entering the WTO as a founding member and its “de facto leader – or at least, cheerleader” 
(M. Baldwin: 2006: 933) the EU was amongst those most prominent in calling for further 
broadening of the multilateral trade agenda within the new WTO (Bridges Weekly: 1998, 
Van Den Hoven: 2004: 259).  From as early as the 1994 GATT Marrakesh Ministerial 
where the Uruguay Round Final Act was formally signed, EU Trade Commissioner, Sir 
Leon Brittan had called for a new trade agenda to include the interface between trade and 
the environment, labour standards, and competition law (GATT: 1994) and, by 1996, went 
on to promote a new ‘Millennium Round’ (De Bièvre: 2006: 585, interview, Lord Brittan 
of Spennithorne, London, 19
th
 April 2011).  Shaping that objective was the Uruguay 
Round’s Final Act itself; including a ‘built in agenda’ detailing negotiations and agreement 
to be reached on several different topics by set dates in the future, and which included 
amongst them the further liberalisation of trade in agriculture (Kerremans: 2005).   
 
The WTO’s formative years were thus dominated by negotiations focused primarily on the 
WTO’s Work Programme and efforts to launch a new round of trade negotiations56.  With 
a failed first attempt at the WTO’s 3rd Ministerial Conference in Seattle in 1999, the Doha 
Development Agenda was launched in Doha in November 2001.  Covering twenty-one 
subjects ranging from trade in agriculture, industrial goods, services, intellectual property, 
investment, procurement, competition, and addressing issues including the relationship 
between the WTO and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) as well as the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Doha Round is the largest Round of trade 
negotiations in history.  What has followed has been over a decade of negotiations in what 
has also been the longest multilateral trade negotiation in history and which, at time of 
writing, still shows no clear end in sight. 
 
A major challenge facing the Doha Round - and a principle challenge in bringing the 
Round to its subsequent conclusion - has been the shift in global balance of power – see 
Figure 4.1 below -within the MTS since the WTO was established and the Doha Round 
launched in 2001 (A.R Young: 2011, Pisani-Ferry: 2009: 26, M. Baldwin: 2006: 939).  
                                                   
56
 The period from 1996-2000 was also notable within the WTO for negotiations on basic 
telecommunications and financial services of which the EU was a key player.  Space constraints prevent 
these negotiations from being addressed in this chapter however, for a detailed overview see A.R Young 
(2002). 
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Initially dominated by the ‘Quad’, formed of the EU, US, Canada and Japan as the core 
circle of negotiators, the Doha Round was launched when the emerging economies 
including India, Brazil and China, had still to establish themselves as major power brokers 
and were still considered, “essentially bit players” in the late 1990s-early 2000s (M. 
Baldwin: 2006: 939).   Since the Round’s launch however, decision-making and core 
negotiations within the WTO have been undertaken through a plethora of ‘concentric 
circles’ (interview, WTO spokesperson, Geneva, 19th May 2011, Kissack: 2010: 71) with 
the ‘G4’ at their centre – including the EU, US, India and Brazil – but with other countries 
also heavily involved such as South Africa, China, Singapore, Japan, Mexico, Kenya, 
Costa Rica, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Canada, Chile, New Zealand and Australia (Lamy: 
2004: 7).  Since 2008 the core circle of negotiators has increased to a G5 to include China 
whose considerable growth over the 2000s has resulted in it becoming a major power 
broker within the WTO. 
 
Figure 4.1: Shares of world GDP since 1985 (based on purchasing power parity) 
 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Data, April 2012, image from Google Public Data Explorer (estimated data for 
2010-2017) 
 
The Doha Round was however, also set up as a development agenda – aimed at integrating 
developing countries into the MTS through the reduction or elimination of trade barriers 
and lowering tariffs to enable them access to markets in the developed world.  Specifically, 
the Doha Round was launched under the principles of ‘special and differential treatment’ 
and of ‘less than full reciprocity’ (LTFR) whereby developed countries would lower their 
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import duties and other trade barriers and allow special treatment to developing countries, 
but without the expectance of reciprocal concessions in return.   
 
As Figure 4.1 above represents, shares of global GDP have seen a general decline by the 
EU, US, Canada and Japan since the 1980s, but an increase for the emerging economies 
and China especially, particularly since the early 2000s.  This rise – and potential for 
further rise – by the emerging economies does therefore present the Doha Round 
negotiations with a major challenge with regard to its development dimension.  This 
challenge is most clearly demonstrated in negotiations on industrial goods – or non-
agricultural market access (NAMA).   In these negotiations the EU and US have offensive 
interests in trying to gain access for their goods to other markets – not least in China, 
Brazil and India whose population growth and development creates considerable 
opportunities for American and European industries but where, at present, there is 
considerable ‘water’ between developing country’s bound tariff rates and the rates actually 
applied (HLTEG: 2011: 39)
57
.  In these negotiations the LTFR principle requires that the 
EU and US lower their own tariffs for industrial goods but without the requirement of 
reciprocal access to others markets. For the emerging economies, and particularly those 
with large exporting interests, the LTFR principle is an important means by which they 
gain access for their goods in the developed world.  For the EU and US however it creates 
a potent avenue of increased competition to which there are few gains to be found through 
reciprocity, and which has led to increased demands for reciprocal concessions to be made 
by the emerging economies in order to give the EU and US, “something in return” 
(Mandelson: 2008a). 
 
This same stalemate translates into other sectors of the Doha negotiations (see Appendix 
III for a summary overview of the positions of the major players across key negotiation 
issues).  With the Doha Round premised on a single undertaking – whereby nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed – negotiators use the concessions they must make in 
some sectors of the negotiations as leverage to gain ground in others. Thus, for the EU, its 
position in the Doha Round may be best understood as a dual strategy of aiming to 
                                                   
57
 Applied tariffs are the duties actually charged on imports. Bound tariffs are the commitment not to increase 
a rate of duty beyond an agreed level.  Following the Uruguay Round agreement bound rates were applied to 
100% of agricultural tariffs and 99% on NAMA tariffs for DCs.  Due to liberalisation amongst many DCs 
since the Uruguay Round however they have voluntarily chosen to levy ‘applied tariffs’ at much lower rates.  
The scope – or ‘water’ – nevertheless remains for these countries to significantly increase their applied tariffs 
if they became more protectionist and which would still be legal under the WTO.  Bound tariffs on industrial 
products in the EU are between 4-5% and  are 30% for the emerging economies (House of Lords: 2008: 
pt.42)   
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concede as little as possible in the agricultural negotiations, where it is most defensive, 
whilst trying to gain as much as it can in market access for its industrial goods and 
services in other markets (see also A.R Young: 2007: 123, Paeman: 2000: 54-57).  Offers 
made by the EU, as well as others, within the Doha Round tend therefore to be conditional 
on progress made in other areas of the negotiations and in gains it can make in the 
package as a whole.   
 
In agriculture this is a cause of particular contention for the EU who, as the world’s largest 
agricultural market, is the main focus of demands for ‘fairer’ trade.  Thus across each of 
the three pillars of the agricultural negotiations – market access, export subsidies, and 
domestic support – it is the EU that sees itself as, “the major net loser in any deal” 
(Mandelson: 2008a). The EU’s conservative stance and preferred objectives of 
maintaining the status quo by keeping the ‘multi-functionality’ of the agricultural sector 
intact – and thus of maintaining in some way its protected status from trade liberalising 
rules – has met considerable resistance by the US as well as the emerging economies.  
This has been most obvious in the emergence of the G20 – a negotiation group forged of 
all three emerging economies plus other developing nations in the common pursuit of 
agricultural liberalisation by the developed world.  The agriculture negotiations during the 
Doha Round are therefore best understood as a tripartite of divergent interests between the 
EU, US and G20.   
 
In balancing against the concessions it has been called on to make in agriculture, the EU 
has been the most ambitious amongst the G4/5 in demands for liberalisation across other 
sectors of the negotiations.  On NAMA and in services the EU has, along with the US, 
been at the forefront of demands for more ambition by the emerging economies in opening 
up new sectors and of lowering applied tariffs.  In these sectors however, the emerging 
economies have been highly resistant, preferring instead to cut bound rates in areas of 
existing liberalisation only.  In addition, divisions are apparent in the level of progress 
sought by the EU and the emerging economies over ‘new’ trade issues tackled under the 
Doha Round.  First debated at the WTO’s 1st Ministerial Conference in 1996 at Singapore, 
the ‘Singapore Issues’ – including trade in investment, competition, procurement and 
trade facilitation – have been particularly pushed as an agenda item by the EU and were 
originally included under the Doha Declaration.  For the EU, whose approach was a 
“global negotiation without limits” (Paeman: 2000: 53), these new issues represented 
sectors for economic gain.  For the emerging economies however, these issues have been 
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less of a priority – preferring instead liberalisation of the ‘built-in agenda’ issues and, not 
least, in the crux issue of agriculture.   
 
MTN within the WTO thus involve highly divergent positions between what are now the 
three major power blocks within the MTS – the EU, the US, and the emerging economies.  
Whilst this brief overview misses the more nuanced positions of each of the major players, 
it has highlighted the significant challenges at play within the WTO and the difficult task 
facing negotiators in bringing the Doha Round to a satisfactory conclusion.  Over the 
course of the WTO’s negotiations – detailed in the timeline provided in Table 4.1 below - 
these divisions have been most notably manifest in delays focused less upon negotiating a 
consensus deal, and more on the framework, rules and formulae (known as ‘modalities’) 
by which such a deal might start to take shape.  Initially intended under the Doha 
Declaration to be concluded by 2004, modalities have continued to elude negotiators 
throughout the Doha Round’s now decade-long history.  For the EU, as the principle 
demandeur for a new Round of trade negotiations, this impasse has been a major cause of 
consternation and a significant challenge for its own performance.  In the following 
sections that performance is evaluated over the period of WTO negotiations from 1996 to 
2011. 
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Table 4.1: Timeline of WTO negotiations (1996-2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Year
Ministerial/
Council
Major decisions adopted (where 
applicable) Negotiation Focus
1996
MinCon1: 
Singapore Singapore Ministerial Declaration
Focus upon the WTO's Work Programme, the implementation of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement and broadening the agenda with the initiation of 
negotiations addressing new issues including core labour and environmental 
standards, trade in competition, investment, trade facilitation and government 
procurement. Focus also on the integration of the developing world, and 
LDCs particularly, into the MTS.
1998
MinCon2: 
Geneva Geneva Ministerial Declaration
Symbolic Conference in honour of the 50th anniversary of the GATT.  
Negotiations focus on plans to launch a 'Millennium Round' of trade 
negotiations incorporating new issues on the trade agenda.  No substantive 
developments or agreements made.
1999
MinCon3: 
Seattle n/a
Intended to launch a new round of trade negotiations that would cover the 
'built-in agenda' as well as the Singapore Issues and other new agenda items. 
Ends with failure to find consensus.
2001
MinCon 4: 
Doha Doha Ministerial Declaration
Launching a new round of trade negotiations.  Focus particularly on 
developing-world issues as well as new trade agenda items.  Results in the 
launching of the Doha Round
2003
MinCon 5: 
Cancun n/a
Intended as a stock-taking conference for the Doha Round's mid-term 
review.  Focus particularly on the core issues of modalities for the 
Agriculture negotiations and the inclusion of the Singapore Issues on the 
agenda. Conference ends with no consensus
2004
Gen Council: 
Geneva The 'July 2004 Package'
Negotiations aimed at the agreement of a package of framework agreements 
for negotiation modalities.  Produces a framework of modalities on agriculture 
and industrial goods
2005
MinCon 6: 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration
Conference aimed at breaking deadlock and narrowing consensus towards 
modalities.  Focus particularly on agriculture and the elimination of export 
subsidies as well as LDC issues including Aid for Trade and Duty-Free 
Quota Free access. Some narrowing of positions but no major breakthroughs.
2006
Gen Council: 
Geneva n/a
Meeting for the agreement on modalities for negotiations in agriculture and 
industrial goods to be agreed.  Ends in the suspension of the Doha Round on 
23rd July 2006
2008
Gen Council: 
Geneva The 'July 2008 Package'
Aimed at agreeing modalities in agriculture and non-agricultural market 
access (NAMA) and to look at the next steps towards concluding the Doha 
Round. Negotiators come close to consensus for the Round's completion but 
are stalled at the last over disagreement on the Special Safeguard Mechanism 
(SSM). Some narrowing of positions leads to a further framework for 
negotiations agreed in December but no substantive breakthroughs.
2009
MinCon 7: 
Geneva n/a
Negotiations concentrate on the theme of "The WTO, the Multilateral 
Trading System and the Current Global Economic Environment" in light of the 
global recession.  No significant breakthroughs for the Doha Round
2011
MinCon 8: 
Geneva
 'Elements for political guidance' 
Chairman's Summary 
Negotiations on the Doha Round focus upon finding ways through impasse by 
considering alternatives to the single undertaking and recommit efforts to 
bring the Round to a conclusion. No substantive breakthroughs but agreement 
to explore 'early harvest' approach for some aspects of the Doha negotiations
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4.3. EU performance in the WTO’s formative years: From a ‘Millennium’ to 
Doha Round (1996-2001) 
EU performance in this, and the following two sections, is evaluated during three phases of 
the WTO’s negotiating history, covering eight key negotiating events as highlighted in 
Table 4.1 above.  In this section EU performance is evaluated during the WTO’s formative 
years from 1996 to 2001 and covers three key Ministerial Conferences
58
 including: the 
WTO’s 1st Ministerial in Singapore (1996) at which time the WTO’s Work Programme 
was first formally deliberated, the 3
rd
 Ministerial in Seattle (1999) where a new 
‘Millennium Round’ of trade negotiations was attempted but failed to be launched, and the 
4
th
 Ministerial in Doha (2001) where the Doha Round was formally launched.  As with the 
performance evaluations conducted in Chapter Three, each negotiation focused upon in 
this chapter represents a period of significance to the progress of the WTO’s MTN and 
may be considered ‘milestone’ conferences.  Performance evaluations are premised on the 
analytical framework developed in Chapter Two.  As such, in each negotiation the EU is 
discussed first in light of its negotiation positioning and its ambitions relative to what it is 
trying to achieve and to the preferences of the other major actors.  An overall performance 
evaluation is then made based upon the EU’s negotiation behaviour (assessed on the 
performance indicators unity, outreach and significance) and effectiveness, and assessed on 
a scale of very good, good, fair, poor or very poor performance. 
 
A good performance and the makings of a Work Programme (Singapore, 1996) 
For the EU, the launch of the WTO in 1995 came during what may be seen as a ‘Golden 
Era’ for EU trade politics (M. Baldwin: 2006: 932).  In 1992 the EU had established the 
Single European Market, reformed the CAP and in 1995 gained three new members
59
. The 
EU was not only a leading advocate of the MTS but, as the largest single market within the 
WTO, also brought a great deal to the negotiation table.  This had not however, always 
been the case.  During the early years of the Uruguay Round the EU has been widely 
criticised for its “underperformance” (A.R Young: 2011), with assessments focusing upon 
its lack of unity (Paeman & Bensch: 1995: 55-56), challenges over its negotiation mandate 
(A.R Young: 2002, 2011, Devuyst: 1995), its reactive strategy (Paeman & Bensch: 1995: 
                                                   
58
 Ministerial Conferences are the highest decision-making body of the WTO.  Whilst it is recognised that 
many decisions take place within the WTO’s on-going negotiation environment in the context of smaller 
committee and working party groups, the main decisions concerning the course and outcome of MTNs are 
nevertheless deliberated and adopted at the Ministerial level.  WTO Ministerial Conferences typically take 
place biennially and only for two to four days in total.   
59
 Austria, Finland and Sweden 
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94, Jørgensen: 2009b, A.R Young: 2011), lack of substantive proposals (Meunier: 2005: 
106), and an overall reticence towards the GATT due to its defensive posture over the CAP 
(Paeman & Bensch: 1995: 98, Devuyst: 1995, Woolcock & Hodges: 1996, M. Baldwin: 
2006: 932).  Following two failed GATT Ministerial Conferences in Montreal in 1988 and 
Brussels in 1990 – for which the EU was itself roundly blamed (Woolcock & Hodges: 
1996: 315, Paeman & Bensch: 1995: 187, Hofreither: 2008: 340) – the EU’s performance 
within the GATT was however then seen to have a marked ‘rise’ (A.R Young: 2011).  
Most notably the EU’s approach towards MTNs shifted, moving away from its stance as 
reluctant partner to instead taking the role of leading advocate through the proactive 
pursuit of a strengthened rules-based system, the creation of a ‘Multilateral Trade 
Organisation’ (GATT: 1990), and a strengthened dispute settlement mechanism (Paeman 
& Bensch: 1995, Devuyst; 1995, Woolcock & Hodges: 1996, A.R Young: 2011).  The EU 
thus entered the WTO as its major driving force (interview, Hugo Paeman, former 
Uruguay Round lead negotiator for the EU, Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011). 
 
From the WTO’s inception the EU was foremost in pushing for further broadening of the 
MTN agenda.  Entering the Singapore Ministerial Conference in 1996 the EU’s negotiating 
position was progressive in not only calling on the WTO's future work programme to 
encompass and expand upon the built-in agenda set out in the Uruguay Round Final Text, 
but also to address new trade issues including the priority issues of trade in investment and 
competition, and calling for a renewed focus on the links between environmental and 
labour standards and trade.  It was also progressive in calling for, “the definition of 
concrete actions in order to underpin the involvement in and commitment to the WTO 
system of developing countries, in particular the least developed countries” (Council: 
1996: (3)). During his statement to the Singapore plenary session European Trade 
Commissioner, Leon Brittan, moreover emphasised his hope that it would be possible “to 
launch in due course the further broad-based round of talks, which could probably be 
called the Millennium Round’ (WTO: 1996a)60.   Relative to its negotiation partners the 
EU’s calls for a broader trade agenda for the WTO was to meet in some part with their own 
preference structures.  Most importantly the US had shown openness to a broader range of 
topics being included under the WTO’s agenda, notably highlighting government 
procurement, trade and environment and examining the “nexus between trade and labour 
                                                   
60
 Although it is noted that calls for a new Round of MTN were not formally endorsed by the European 
Council until its meeting in Cologne in June 1999 (European Council: 1999).  These early calls by Sir Leon 
Brittan were intended to launch the concept of a new Round as a starting off point (interview, Lord Brittan of 
Spennithorne, former EU Trade Commissioner, London, 19
th
 April 2011) 
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standards with a modest work programme in the WTO” (WTO: 1996b).  The US moreover 
indicated a willingness, “to go along with others who wish to begin a modest programme 
in the areas of investment and competition, as part of a balanced overall agenda for the 
WTO” (WTO: 1996b).  Brazil also, of the newly emerging economies, was also open to 
negotiations on competition, investment and procurement (WTO: 1996c) although was 
resolutely opposed, along with India, to any new negotiations focusing upon labour 
standards (WTO: 1996c, 1996d).  Whilst less progressive in their preferences for the 
WTO’s work programme comparative to the EU and with a general negotiation fatigue 
affecting negotiators following the Uruguay Round (interview, Hugo Paeman, Brussels, 
16
th
 May 2011, Europolitics: 1996), US and Brazilian openness to new issues being 
included nevertheless created some common ground for the EU to build upon.   
 
In pursuing its moderately ambitious negotiation objectives at Singapore the EU was then 
to give what may be assessed as a good performance reflecting both a high level of 
negotiation behaviour and a moderate effectiveness.   Focusing first on its negotiation 
behaviour, the EU entered the Singapore Ministerial united behind the Trade 
Commissioner.  During the Ministerial the Commission was at the forefront of the 
negotiations representing the EU Member States with third countries and it was only 
during the plenary session that Member States spoke in their national capacity with many 
openly endorsing the statement already made by the EU Trade Commissioner (i.e. WTO: 
1996e, 1996f).  In addition to its high level of unity, as one of the Quad the EU was 
moreover highly significant in this period of negotiations, participant in all negotiation fora 
including over the drafting of the Singapore Declaration text.  EU outreach during 
Singapore was moreover high – adopting a proactive strategy that sought to persuade third 
country officials that their lack of appetite for new negotiations for further liberalisation 
was unwarranted, the Commissioner was active in seeking to persuade negotiation partners 
of the need to at least open discussions for a future Work Programme and further in 
persuading others of the need for a Plan of Action in tackling LDC issues (Bridges 
Sustainable Development Update: 1996).   
 
Concluding the Singapore Ministerial on 13
th
 December 1996 with agreement on the 
Singapore Ministerial Declaration (WTO: 1996e) and the adoption of a Comprehensive 
and Integrated WTO Plan of Action for LDCs (WTO: 1996f) the EU could moreover, 
claim some goal-attainment from the WTO’s 1st Ministerial Conference.  Comparison of 
the Ministerial outcome documents with the EU’s Council Conclusions reflects several 
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achieved objectives, including not only the adoption of a Plan of Action for LDCs (1996f) 
– a key priority for the EU – but also an agreement for work on future negotiations, on 
what were to become termed the ‘Singapore Issues’ (trade and investment, competition, 
public procurement and trade facilitation), to be taken forward through the establishment 
of new committees under the WTO’s framework (WTO: 1996e: pt. 16, 20-22).  On other 
issues the EU also achieved recognition of the need for a swift conclusion of several of the 
outstanding services negotiations from the Uruguay Round, including on financial services 
and basic telecommunications (WTO: 1996e: pt.17).  The EU was however unsuccessful in 
securing commitment for negotiations focusing upon trade and core labour standards.  
Here the objections of many developing countries (DCs) were prominent and the 
Declaration reflected instead a, “renewed commitment to the observance of internationally 
recognised core labour standards” (WTO: 1996e: pt. 4), but stressed that the ILO was the 
competent body to deal with this issue rather than the WTO itself.  Whilst the outcome 
from Singapore did also create new committees for focusing attention onto the new trade 
issues sought by the EU, it was not as ambitious an achievement as the EU would have 
preferred, with no firm commitment for negotiations to actually take place, or any mention 
of a new trade round being launched at any future date.  Consequently, the EU could claim 
only moderate effectiveness in the outcome of the Singapore meeting.  Combined however 
with its high level of negotiation behaviour the EU demonstrated a good overall 
performance at Singapore with the makings of a new Work Programme for the WTO set in 
motion. 
 
A fair performance amid a failed ‘Millennium Round’ launch (Seattle, 1999) 
Progressing from its initial efforts in Singapore, in June 1999 the European Council 
formally endorsed the Commission’s mandate to pursue a comprehensive new Round of 
trade negotiations within the WTO (European Council: 1999).  In October 1999 the 
Council further approved the full breadth of the Commission’s negotiating directives in 
which all of the EU’s objectives for new trade negotiations, covering topics from 
agriculture, services, trade and investment, competition, trade facilitation, NAMA, trade 
and environment, trade-related aspects of intellectual property (TRIPs), government 
procurement and technical barriers to trade were included in detail (Council: 1999).  
Continuing to be progressive for the launch of a ‘Millennium Round’, the EU entered the 
WTO’s third Ministerial Conference in Seattle with what was, relative to Singapore, a high 
ambition negotiation position.  Following the WTO’s 1st Ministerial in 1996, efforts to 
energise WTO members to support further liberalisation had met with only limited success.  
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The US especially had shown increasing reluctance about a new trade Round following 
Singapore, with former USTR and Seattle Ministerial Conference Chairperson, Charlene 
Barshefsky notably sceptical (Blustein: 2009: 66) and the US instead supporting a ‘mini-
round’ that was narrow in scope and focused solely on issues including agriculture, 
services, intellectual property, and a commitment to ban tariffs on e-commerce (Steinberg: 
2002: 353).  The developing world was also unhappy with the prospect of a new round, 
due in large part to what was seen as a failure by the developed world to so far implement 
their commitments under the Uruguay Round agreement (WTO: 1999a).  Discontented 
with what was seen as “critical gaps” (WTO: 1999b) in the balance of benefits obtained by 
the developed compared to the developing world within the MTS thus far, developing 
countries firmly opposed negotiations on the Singapore Issues, and on the environment or 
labour standards as distracting from core issues including agricultural market access, 
capacity building for DCs and the definition of TRIPs during public health crises 
(Steinberg: 2002: 353).  For the developing world therefore the EU position was of little 
interest and even in cases an “anathema” (A.R Young: 2007: 126).   
 
Already therefore a preference outlier in pushing for a Millennium Round to be launched at 
Seattle, the EU’s performance has subsequently been criticised for its overly-ambitious 
objectives (Bhagwati: 2001: 23-24) and inability to adapt to the conditions presented by 
the Seattle negotiation environment (Smith: 2001).  It is here argued that the EU gave a fair 
performance at Seattle, continuing to demonstrate a high level of negotiation behaviour, 
but with a low level of effectiveness.  Continuing to represent itself as a highly united actor 
and maintaining its significance as one of the core circle of negotiators the EU had also, in 
the year leading up to the Seattle meeting, been highly active in trying to persuade third 
countries of its goals.  From 1998 onwards the EU promoted heavily the concept of a 
Millennium Round (Bridges Weekly: 1998) and in April 1999 the European Trade 
Commissioner conducted a tour des capitales of those WTO members
61
 most reluctant to 
agree to a new Round to try to garner support (Bridges Weekly: 1999a, interview, Lord 
Brittan of Spennithorne, London, 19
th
 April 2011).  On agriculture the EU had also, in the 
week prior to the Seattle Conference begun to cut its budget supports for agricultural 
export subsidies in a move aimed at, “building good faith with its trading partners” 
(Bridges Weekly: 1999b).   Such moves were however to prove of  limited success as the 
developing countries, led predominantly by India, continued to resist pressure from the EU 
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and who criticised the EU instead for its avoidance of making any real commitment to 
agricultural liberalisation (Bridges Weekly: 1999c).   
 
The outcome and ultimate failure of the Seattle Ministerial to find agreement has been 
widely reported (Scholte: 2000, Schott: 2000).  No consensus was reached, no Ministerial 
Declaration was adopted, and no new trade round launched.  For the EU, the failure at 
Seattle was a major set-back, argued by some to have even challenged its power in 
international relations (Van Den Hoven: 2004: 258).  Such claims are however highly 
exaggerated.  Whilst the failure at Seattle resulted in the EU having low effectiveness, it 
nevertheless performed well in terms of its negotiation behaviour.  The extent of its 
outreach particularly, although in many respects fighting a losing battle, was nevertheless 
impressive and emphasised the EU’s proactive and determined strategy towards the WTO 
MTN.  It also firmly sowed the seeds for launching a new round of MTN which continued 
to grow in the lead up to the next WTO Ministerial. 
A good performance and the launch of the Doha Round (Doha, 2001) 
Two years later delegates met again at the WTO’s 4th Ministerial Conference hosted in 
Doha, Qatar in November 2001.  Entering the negotiations the EU had maintained its same 
progressive positioning, with its mandate based on the October 1999 Council Conclusions 
agreed prior to Seattle (Council: 2001b)
62
.   In a change from Seattle however the US 
stance, amongst others, was significantly altered approaching Doha.  The events of the 
New York and Washington terrorist attacks two months previously had caused a 
significant shift in the US position (Blustein: 2009), moving it from a reticent partner to 
supporter for a new trade round.  As Pascal Lamy (2004), then European Trade 
Commissioner, later commented, it was “the global shock of 9/11 [that] persuaded world 
leaders, including those sceptical of multilateralism, to look for an international 
governance success”.  With the EU shifting its focus following Seattle onto the 
development dimension of a new trade Round (Van Den Hoven: 2004), many other 
developing countries had also altered their stance approaching Doha (Steinberg: 2002: 
353), further closing the gap in preference structures between the major interest groups.  
Thus for the EU, whose core goal remained the launch of a new comprehensive trade 
round, its positioning entering Doha was moderately ambitious compared to Seattle. 
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 Efforts to modify the EU’s position after Seattle to allow for greater flexibility failed to find agreement 
amongst EU Member States (Young: 2007: 126) and, from 2000 onwards the Council maintained its focus on 
the October 1999 conclusions as the premise for its negotiation mandate.   
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As the principle demandeur for a new trade round, the Doha Ministerial is a negotiation of 
special importance to the EU and has received some attention already by scholars.  Focus 
particularly has been given, for example, to the EU’s outreach and tactics in bringing about 
the launch of the Doha Round (Van Den Hoven: 2004, Kerremans: 2004) as well as upon 
its effectiveness in attaining its goals within the Doha agenda (A.R Young: 2007: 127, 
Kerremans: 2005).  Within these accounts some disparity exists however, as to how well 
the EU was seen to perform at Doha.  For those focusing on the EU’s outreach and strategy 
the picture that emerges of the EU’s performance at Doha are highly positive with the EU 
seen to show itself in a leading and pivotal role both to the course of negotiations and their 
outcome (see Van Den Hoven: 2004).  More outcome-oriented studies however highlight a 
more balanced perspective with the EU securing some successes from Doha but failing to 
achieve all of its objectives for the Round (see A.R Young: 2007: 127).  Contributing to 
that debate by assessing the EU’s overall performance as a measure of both its negotiation 
behaviour (high) and effectiveness (moderate), it is here argued that the EU had a good 
overall performance at Doha. 
 
Entering the negotiations represented by European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy the 
EU’s unity at Doha was initially challenged by Irish and French public defences of the 
CAP as reflecting the EU’s main priority (New York Times: 2001, Van Den Hoven: 2004: 
273).  Despite this, the Commission remained the EU’s official voice during the Doha 
negotiations.  Whilst Member States continued to detail national areas of priority during 
the plenary session, they nevertheless maintained EU cohesion with EU Council 
Conclusions and with many Member States endorsing the statement made by the 
Commissioner (WTO: 2001c) in their statements (see for example WTO: 2001a, 2001b).  
The EU’s behaviour within the negotiations was further enhanced by the EU’s continued 
significance in the Doha agenda’s drafting exercises and as an important participant of the 
‘green room’63 negotiations, including endgame bargaining on the final night (Bridges 
Weekly: 2001).  As demandeur for a new Round it was moreover a key participant and 
essential to the decisions being taken during the Conference.  Supplementing its high unity 
and significance, the EU also demonstrated a high level of outreach both in the run up to 
and during the Doha meeting.  Continuing to pursue the same proactive strategy adopted 
by his predecessor, Pascal Lamy had conducted a further tour des capitales of developing 
countries prior to Doha in an effort to bring more countries on board and build up the 
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 The green room is a meeting room at the WTO in Geneva where the WTO President chairs meetings with a 
core of 20-25 Members.  Closed room negotiations that take place during Ministerial Conferences amongst a 
similar size group are also typically referred as to ‘green rooms’.  
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necessary support to launch a new Round (interview, Hugo Paeman, former EU lead 
negotiator in the WTO, Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011).  One demarché in particular was to 
Brazil four months prior to Doha where Pascal Lamy worked hard to gain the support of 
the Mercosur members (Van Den Hoven: 2004: 262-3).  Recognising that its negotiation 
position was still at odds with the developing world the EU’s strategy had further shifted to 
address the development issues of a new trade round.  Altering its tactics to focus on what 
the MTS could do for the developing world the EU promoted its own internal policies such 
as the Everything But Arms Initiative, providing duty-free and quota-free (DFQF) access 
for LDC products to the EU (Kerremans: 2004: 373); fought for a WTO waiver for its 
preferential trade agreement with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, and 
further accepted implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments on textiles in 
exchange for DC support in other issues (Van Den Hoven: 2004: 264).  Further 
demonstrating flexibility over DC demands for clarification of the TRIPs language relative 
to the Access of Medicines and also modifying its own language over core labour 
standards (WTO: 2001e), the EU was then successful in persuading many DCs to support a 
new Round. 
 
The Doha Ministerial Statement and subsequent Declarations signed at Doha moreover 
reflected a number of symmetries with the EU’s objectives set out in the Commissions’ 
negotiation mandate.  Most notably the EU attained its core goal of securing a broad-
ranging and comprehensive new Round, encompassing not only trade in agriculture but 
also, importantly, in other issues including services, NAMA, TRIPS, the relationship 
between multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) and trade, and, significantly, in the 
Singapore Issues, all of which were to be achieved in a Round that would be agreed as a 
single undertaking (WTO: 2001f).  Much aided by US support and by the supportive role 
played particularly by USTR Bob Zoellick (interview, WTO spokesperson, Geneva, 19
th
 
May 2011, New York Times: 2001, Blustein: 2009), the EU was able to secure the 
necessary support in launching the largest MTN in history.   
 
In a further success for the EU’s development approach for the Round (van den Hoven: 
2004, Council: 2001b, pt. 4), negotiations were to be launched as a Doha Development 
Agenda, with principles aimed at providing DCs with special and differential treatment 
(WTO: 2001b: pt.44) and less than full reciprocity (WTO: 2001d: pt. 16), and with 
negotiations specifically geared towards trade facilitation through enhanced technical 
assistance and capacity building for DCs (WTO: 2001d: pt. 27).   On top of this, in 
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response to the EU’s high outreach in pushing development issues to secure developing 
world support for the Round, the EU attained its goals of receiving a waiver to its 
preferential trade agreement with the ACP countries (WTO: 2001e), recognition by others 
for duty-free quota-free market access for LDCs, as well as clarification over TRIPs access 
to medicine and public health crises (WTO: 2001f)
. 
 Whilst the EU did have to ‘accept the 
unacceptable’ (Bridges Weekly: 2001) in agreeing to a comprehensive agriculture mandate 
which would include the phasing out of export subsidies, it did so with confirmation that 
‘non-trade concerns’ would also be taken into account within the negotiation remit (WTO: 
2001d: pt. 13) thus achieving its objective in recognising the ‘multifunctional’ role of 
agriculture (Council: 1999: pt. (a))    
 
Despite this, the EU was only to achieve moderate effectiveness at Doha. Notably, on its 
more ambitious objectives the EU failed to achieve all that it sought from the new Round.  
This was clearly evident on many of the new issues included under the Doha Declaration, 
for example with EU efforts to secure negotiations recognising the environmental 
‘precautionary principle’64 and clarification of the rules between WTO regulations and 
eco-labelling systems (Council: 1999: (g)), reduced to negotiations examining the link 
between WTO rules and trade measures taken under MEAs only.  On core labour 
standards, which the EU maintained as a negotiation objective, the topic was entirely 
dropped from the negotiation agenda and included only in reference to the need for greater 
communication between the ILO and WTO (WTO: 2001d:pt. 8).  Importantly, on the 
Singapore Issues moreover, whilst being their principle advocate and achieving recognition 
for negotiations to take place, the EU had to accept that they would not be negotiated 
formally until after the WTO’s fifth Ministerial Conference at the end of 2003 and, even 
then, only with full consensus from all WTO members.  As a major sticking point for many 
DCs still, especially India, this postponement was aimed as a concession between EU and 
DC interests.  Subsequently the scope of the Doha Round was far less than the EU initially 
sought for it such that it was, “not ideal from a European perspective… But everyone made 
the concessions necessary to achieve a balanced result.” (Lamy: 2004).   
 
4.4. EU performance in the Doha Round (2003-2005) 
Following the Doha Round’s launch in November 2001 negotiations within the WTO were 
to move into a new phase focusing more explicitly on ‘modalities’ (the timeframes, rules 
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 The ‘precautionary principle’ is premised on the  understanding that, in order to protect the environment, 
“where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as 
a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” (UNEP: 1992) 
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and formula) to be employed in negotiating the necessary trade liberalisation in order to 
bring the Round to a conclusion by the deadline, set in the Doha Declaration, of 2004.  A 
deadline of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in 2003 to be held in Cancún, Mexico 
was stipulated in finalising modalities in order to move the negotiations into their final 
determining phase.  What was to follow however was a period of much consternation 
amongst WTO delegates, several missed deadlines, and the eventual suspension of the 
Round in July 2006.  In this section, EU performance will be evaluated during this first 
half of the Doha Round negotiations, with particular attention to its performance during 
three key negotiating events including: the Cancún Ministerial in 2003 where efforts to 
finalising modalities faltered over agriculture and the Singapore Issues, the July 2004 
General Council meeting where a framework for negotiation modalities was agreed, and 
the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial where agriculture modalities persisted to cause discontent 
between the major players and resulted in an extension of the Round’s conclusion to 2006. 
 
A fair performance amid a changing negotiation environment (Cancún, 2003) 
According to former European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy (2004: 6), “The 22 
months between Doha and Cancún were a study in frustration”.  Aiming to finalise 
negotiations on modalities and to launch negotiations on the Singapore Issues, the Cancún 
Ministerial was designed to act as the Doha Round’s Mid-Term Review.  Following the 
Doha launch however negotiations had made little head-way.  Agriculture in particular had 
shown itself to be an early crux issue for the Round with the EU particularly targeted as the 
main defensive force preventing what was seen by much of the developing world, and to 
some extent the US, genuine liberalisation in agricultural trade.  With disagreement within 
the Council over the EU’s proposal to the agriculture negotiations in early 2003 (Bridges 
Weekly: 2003a), progress towards modalities was notably slow with the EU blamed by the 
US, Australia and many DCs for its failure to act flexibly in the spirit of the Doha Round 
and for preventing any real progress towards market opening (Bridges Weekly: 2003b).  
The Singapore Issues also presented a major issue for negotiators with the EU, along with 
Japan and South Korea, continuing to push for their inclusion on the Doha Round agenda 
but which continued to be resisted by the majority of DCs.  Whilst the US remained open 
to negotiations on government procurement and trade facilitation (Blustein: 2009: 154) the 
EU was increasingly finding itself in a minority over broadening the Doha agenda to 
include all four Singapore Issues. 
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Entering Cancún the EU was thus presenting another high ambition negotiation stance.  
Whilst finding some zone of agreement with the US over agriculture following the EU’s 
own CAP reform in 2003, and with backing from some countries
65
 over the Singapore 
Issues, the EU nevertheless found itself as a preference outlier.  With developing countries 
continuing to show resistance both to the extent of EU commitment towards market 
liberalisation in agriculture (Blustein: 2009: 139), and its preference for negotiations over 
the Singapore Issues, the EU would have a fight on its hands in achieving its primary 
objective of securing modalities for the comprehensive, balanced and ambitious MTN it 
was seeking (Council: 2003a). 
 
Much attention has been given to the dissection and overview of the WTO’s ‘failed 
Ministerial’ (Kerremans: 2005: 33) at Cancún and the EU’s role within it (Jørgensen: 
2009b, Mortensen: 2009, Hofreither: 2008, A.R Young: 2007, M. Baldwin: 2006, 
Kerremans: 2004).  Within this literature a general perception is of a failed EU 
performance, with criticisms focusing particularly upon its outreach or unity.  The EU has, 
for example, been criticised for failing to fully take into consideration the level of DC 
discontent towards its agricultural positioning at Cancún (Mortensen: 2009: 86, M. 
Baldwin: 2006: 939).  Others suggest that on the Singapore Issues the EU was either not 
flexible soon enough in meeting the demands of the DCs (A.R Young: 2007: 129) or too 
flexible by giving into their demands prematurely (interview, senior official, WTO unit, 
DG Trade, 12
th
 May 2011, see also Kerremans: 2004: 392).  Furthermore, the EU has been 
accused for failing in terms of its unity, with divisions between its Members over the 
Commissions’ offer in the agriculture negotiations perceived to have weakened its 
negotiation stance (Kerremans: 2004).  In fact it is here argued that the EU’s performance 
at Cancún was less of the failure than has thus far been portrayed but that it given a fair 
performance overall. 
 
Entering the negotiations represented by the European Trade Commissioner the EU 
maintained its cohesion and united front during the whole of the Cancún negotiations with 
Member States and the Presidency maintaining the practice of allowing the Commission to 
speak on their behalf.  This demonstration of high unity was all the more noteworthy in 
light of the internal disputes that had taken place within the EU in the run up to Cancún 
with several member states – notably France and Ireland – challenging the Commission’s 
negotiation mandate (Kerremans: 2004: 374).  Despite the increased representation of the 
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EU Agriculture Council within the EU delegation at Cancún (Council: 2003b), and the 
need for the Commission to maintain close communication with the 133 Committee during 
negotiations (Bridges Weekly: 2003c) the EU nevertheless managed to preserve its one 
official voice within the negotiations themselves.  Continuing to be a key player within the 
negotiations the EU also maintained its high level of significance, remaining as a core 
player of the critical ‘green room’ negotiations that sought to find the necessary consensus 
between the major interest groups in bringing about a successful conclusion (Bridges 
Weekly: 2003c, Blustein: 2009: ch. 7) 
 
The EU’s strategy towards Cancún was also proactive, even with regard to its more 
defensive stance on agriculture.  In January 2003 the Commission had submitted its offer 
for agricultural concessions: cuts to EU trade-distorting domestic support by 55%, average 
tariffs by 36%, and a substantial cut in the volume of export subsidies (Hofreither: 2008: 
351).  In July 2003 at a mini-ministerial held prior to Cancún in Montreal, European Trade 
Commissioner Pascal Lamy further initiated an EC-US joint working paper that would 
seek to move negotiations forward through establishing broad proposals across all three 
pillars of the agriculture negotiations which would act as a compromise between EU and 
US agriculture stances (Blustein: 2009: 140).  The text that was agreed was subsequently 
adopted as part of the Draft Declaration for discussion at Cancún (Hofreither: 2008: 356).  
In addition, in a call made by the EU’s Agriculture and Fisheries Council in July 2003 
(Council: 2003b), the Commission had also conducted an information campaign with the 
EU’s trading partners to inform them of changes brought about through the CAP reform 
and thus of its renewed flexibility over the agriculture negotiations.   
 
Despite its efforts, the EU’s outreach was moderated by its failure to generate sufficient 
support from DCs in favour of its proposed draft modalities.  Many DCs, including the 
African Union and broader G90, found the proposal to be too short on specifics, with no 
clear timeframes or figures included and which was seen to be, “retreating from the Doha 
spirit insofar as domestic support is concerned” (WTO: 2003a).  For the emerging 
economies moreover, the EC-US joint paper on agriculture was seen to antagonize 
DCs, being an indication of efforts by the ‘Big Two’ not only to dominate the agenda 
but also to retract on their commitment under the Doha Declaration to reduce export 
subsidies (House of Lords: 2003: pt. 39, Blustein: 2009).  Responding swiftly and 
concertedly the emerging economies agreed to an alliance – the G20 – in which they 
would, together, seek market opening in agriculture from the developed world.   
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EU outreach in other areas, particularly on the Singapore Issues also failed to garner 
the necessary support and despite offering flexibility by unbundling the four Singapore 
Issues to be treated separately, many DCs, and particularly India, remained resolutely 
opposed to their inclusion on the agenda, threatening to block any deal that included 
them (Bridges Weekly: 2003, WTO: 2003b).  The result at Cancún was a failure to find 
the necessary consensus with the meeting ending with no outcome document, no 
modalities agreed, and which subsequently resulted in the EU having low effectiveness.  
 
The failure at Cancún has resulted in a blame game being played out in which the EU, 
as a major player, has invariably been highlighted.  The EU has been blamed 
particularly for failing to take into account the force of feeling amongst DCs or of 
recognizing that a new topography had emerged within the MTS (Mortensen: 2009: 
86).  Certainly Cancún represented a major shock for the EU (Lamy: 2004: 7), with one 
DG Trade official present at the negotiations commenting that, “People were coming 
back from the conference trying to realize what happened.  The G20 formation with 
India who is defensive and Brazil who is offensive in their interests finding common 
ground to oppose the EC-US joint paper was something we had never seen before and 
we were taken by surprise” (interview, senior official, WTO Unit, DG Trade, Brussels, 
12
th
 May 2011).  Despite the challenges of Cancún the EU’s negotiation behaviour was 
nevertheless high; performing well in maintaining its unity and striving to find the 
necessary consensus to attain its objectives.  Its low effectiveness however, resulted in 
an overall fair performance at Cancún. 
 
A very good performance and a framework for negotiations (Geneva, 2004) 
Following the failure at Cancún in September 2003 a renewed effort was made towards 
finding agreement on modalities.  In December 2003 negotiators had re-launched 
negotiations with a view to making maximum progress in 2004 (Commission: 2004a).  In 
July 2004 negotiators met again for a General Council
66
 meeting at the WTO in Geneva to 
finalise a deal on the negotiations modalities.  In November 2003 the European 
Commission had, in light of the Cancún failure, revisited the EU’s negotiation objectives 
and concluded that the EU should be ready, “to explore alternative approaches to 
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negotiating the Singapore Issues…possibly through removing them from the single 
undertaking of the negotiations.” (Commission: 2003).   It further argued that, on 
agriculture the EU would show, “continued readiness to make significant commitments 
provided that our trading partners also show real movement.” (Commission: 2003).  The 
Commission’s approach was formally endorsed by the Council in December 2003 and, 
approaching the General Council in July 2004 the EU’s position was solidified on its 
objective of securing a, “satisfactory agreement” that would cover negotiation frameworks 
across all four main pillars under negotiations including Agriculture, NAMA, development 
and the Singapore Issues (Council: 2004a).   
 
Relative to the negative environment of Cancún, the effort to revitalise talks within the 
WTO during 2004 had met with increasing positivity amongst negotiators (Bridges 
Weekly: 2004, Commission: 2004b).  With the EU softening its stance on the Singapore 
Issues it had also narrowed the gap between EU and DC positions on this issue.  
Subsequently the EU’s position entering the July meeting was of moderate ambition 
compared to Cancún.  The EU’s subsequent performance can also be assessed as very good 
with high measures across all performance indicators.  It is interesting therefore that 
attention paid to the EU’s role during this period of negotiations is mostly preoccupied 
with discussion of disputes within the EU itself (Da Conceição: 2010: 1118, Kerremans: 
2005: 33, Grant: 173-4, A.R Young: 2007: 130).  This in particular concerns divisions 
within the EU Agricultural Council over the Commission’s mandate to make further 
concessions on agriculture.  Within this discourse, how divisions within the Council 
impacted upon the EU’s performance at Geneva have been overlooked.  It is argued here 
however that internal disunity within the EU did not adversely affect EU performance in 
2004 but that the EU’s negotiation behaviour was to remain high. 
 
This was particularly evident in the EU’s unity at Geneva which was to remain at a high 
level with the EU represented, in his final year as Trade Commissioner, by Pascal Lamy.  
Whilst disputes were taking place behind closed doors - with France notably calling for the 
Commissioner’s mandate to be revisited over concessions on agriculture - these issues 
were kept behind closed doors by a qualified majority vote taken by the General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC) in support of the Commission’s negotiating 
mandate.  Council Conclusions produced in a Special Council meeting on 30
th
 July 2004 
moreover expressed the Council’s, “trust in the Commission in the final effort during the 
WTO General Council [and] no Member State had expressed the wish to give further 
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negotiating directives” (Council: 2004b).  Furthermore, with enlargement taking place 
earlier that year bringing the EU’s number from 15 to 25 Member States, rather than 
allowing the extra voices around the table to challenge its unity at Geneva, the EU was 
seen to “hold together well” (Lamy: 2004: 8).  Continuing to also demonstrate its 
importance as a key player within the Doha Round, the EU was highly significant at 
Geneva in both the build up to and during the July meeting.  In particular at this time the 
EU formed part of a group called the Five Interested Parties (FIPs) along with the US, 
Brazil, Australia and India as the core circle of negotiations and who effectively agreed 
and drafted the text on the agricultural negotiation framework (Grant: 2007: 174). 
 
The EU’s outreach at Geneva was also seen to improve following Cancún with its 
continuing proactive strategy towards building the necessary consensus, this time meeting 
with more success.  Core in this approach was a letter sent by Pascal Lamy and EU 
Agriculture Commission, Franz Fischler to all WTO Members in May 2004 (Commission: 
2004b).  The letter detailed the EU’s revised approach to the Round and which outlined, 
for the first time, the EU’s willingness to bind cuts in its domestic support of agriculture 
and eliminate export subsidies on the condition that others made cuts in their export 
promotion schemes.  In addition the Commissioners called for further ambition to be 
shown by others on NAMA and services, but which detailed the EU’s willingness to join 
the majority consensus and to drop its calls for investment and competition to be included 
under the single undertaking.   Importantly, the EU also specified its proposal that, on 
agriculture and NAMA, LDCs and the most vulnerable DCs, should not have to open their 
markets beyond their existing commitments – in effect offering the G90 a ‘Round for Free’ 
(Commission: 2004b: 3).  This offer was a major motivator for reviving the negotiations 
(Grant: 2007: 173-4) and was importantly successful in convincing LDCs that the round 
did not represent a threat to them (Lamy: 2004: 7).  On top of this, the EU, along with the 
US, conducted extensive diplomatic demarchés worldwide in an effort to generate the 
necessary momentum and secure a deal (New York Times: 2004). 
 
On top of its high degree of negotiation behaviour the EU was also highly effective in 
Geneva.  Seen as a pivotal motivator in bringing about the July meeting, the EU was then 
effective in securing the July 2004 Framework agreement (WTO: 2004) which reflected 
much of what the EU outlined in its letter to WTO Members in May (A.R Young: 2007: 
130, Grant: 2007: 173-4).  In particular, a deal was struck on agricultural modalities which, 
thanks to the EU’s own CAP reforms, required very little additional concession by the EU 
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beyond that which it had already achieved internally but which instead required others to 
make similar commitments.  The EU had also succeeded in keeping the exact date by 
which the elimination of export subsidies should be made on the negotiating table 
(Kerremans: 2005: 33).   The EU was also successful in defending a non-linear formula for 
the NAMA negotiations (Lamy: 2004: 8, WTO: 2004: Annex B)), securing negotiations on 
trade facilitation (Dür: 2008: 34), detailing a date for May 2005 for revised offers to be 
submitted for the services negotiations (WTO: 2004: (e)) and with a strong recommitment 
of the Round’s development dimension included a reaffirmation of the principle of special 
and differential treatment and a special emphasis on LDCs (WTO: 2004: (d)).  On the 
Singapore Issues investment and competition were however dropped from the single 
undertaking – as conceded by the EU – whilst government procurement would be taken 
forward in plurilateral negotiations within the WTO.  The EU had nevertheless succeeded 
in getting the Doha negotiations back on track and, in so doing, had demonstrated a much 
improved performance following Cancún. 
 
A fair performance but little progress (Hong Kong, 2005) 
The WTO’s 6th Ministerial Conference took place in Hong Kong in December 2005.  Seen 
as a, “crucial opportunity for WTO members to reinvigorate the Doha Round” (House of 
Lords: 2005: 5), the Hong Kong Ministerial was intended to reach agreement on 
agriculture, NAMA and services modalities, and to set the stage for intensive negotiations 
that would bring the Round to a conclusion during 2006 (CRS: 2005).  Following the 
Geneva Framework agreed in 2004 the G20 and US continued to put pressure on the EU to 
set a date for the elimination of agriculture export subsidies and to make further offers on 
the reduction of its agricultural tariffs.  Continuing to take forward its strategy of 
conceding only as far as the 2003 CAP reform would allow; and whilst pursuing greater 
market opening in NAMA (particularly pushing for agreement on the formula for 
modalities that would include coefficients) and services, the EU’s negotiation position 
entering Hong Kong retained the objective of achieving a, “comprehensive, balanced and 
ambitious agreement within and across all the main elements of the Doha Agenda” 
(Council: 2005c).  In addition, the EU was prominent in calling for an ambitious 
development package on Aid for Trade as well as for all developed countries to commit to 
follow the EU example of providing Duty-Free, Quota-Free (DFQF) access to all products 
from LDCs (WTO: 2005a).  Consecutive concessions made by the EU in the agriculture 
negotiations over the course of July and October 2005 had also gradually narrowed the gap 
in positions between the EU, G20 and US (more on this below) and, with some zone of 
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agreement over the necessity to find agreement in order to bring the Round to a conclusion 
in the pushed back deadline of 2006, the EU’s negotiation position was again to reflect 
moderate ambition.   
 
The EU’s performance at Hong Kong was however, to see a decline following Geneva.  
Managing to maintain a high level of negotiation behaviour - although with more moderate 
outreach - EU performance was then to be diminished at Hong Kong by its low 
effectiveness.  As with Geneva, the focus within the literature on the EU’s performance at 
Hong Kong has however concentrated much more on the divisions going on internally 
within the EU (Da Conceição: 2010: 1123, Grant: 2007: 176) rather than on its negotiation 
behaviour or effectiveness
67.  The EU’s unity was certainly challenged in the run up to 
Hong Kong.  Challenges by the French government, supported by 12 other protectionist 
Member States, to the Commission’s offers in July and October over agriculture had been 
highly publicised (EU Observer: 2005, New York Times: 2005), with new European Trade 
Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, denouncing French obstructionism as, “creating room for 
big agricultural players such as Brazil, Australia, Canada and the US to intensify pressure 
on the EU ahead of the December Ministerial” (EUobserver: 2005).   Convening an 
extraordinary meeting of the GAERC on 18 October France further attempted to water 
down the Commission’s agricultural offer to the WTO with French President Chirac 
threatening to block any Doha deal (Grant: 2007: 176, Da Conceição: 2010: 1119).  
Following a vote however, the Commission maintained its negotiation mandate with a 
majority support in the Council.  It thus entered negotiations at Hong Kong with business 
as usual with the EU represented by the single voice of the Trade Commissioner, and the 
Member States maintaining their silence. 
 
Maintaining also its high level of significance at Hong Kong, the EU nevertheless 
demonstrated a more moderate outreach in the run up to and also during Conference 
negotiations.  In the lead up to Hong Kong the EU demonstrated some progressiveness 
over agriculture, committing to several concessions in July and then again in October 
which, upon entering the Ministerial in December, had been raised to a commitment to cut 
its highest tariffs by 60%; its average tariffs by 46%; the reduction in the number of 
sensitive products to 8% of tariff lines; the reduction of overall trade-distorting domestic 
support, and the elimination of all agricultural export subsidies (CRS: 2005: 17).  The 
offer, made on 27 October 2005, whilst conditional on agreement being reached at Hong 
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 Exception to this is found in Young (2007: 132) 
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Kong towards a progressive formula that cut applied tariffs on manufactured products in 
the NAMA negotiations; the establishment of mandatory country targets for services trade 
liberalisation; and the agreement of its development package including Aid for Trade and 
DFQF commitments for all LDCs (CRS: 2005: 18), was seen to be the most detailed offer 
the EU had put onto the table up till that point (Grant: 2007: 175).  Despite this the EU 
continued to meet with pressure from negotiation partners. The G20 and US had each 
submitted proposals which called on the EU to reduce its highest tariffs further by up to 
70% and 90% respectively (CRS: 2005), and at Hong Kong demanded that the EU 
eliminate all export subsidies by the year 2013.   Responding to these demands the EU 
insisted that it would not eliminate export subsidies by 2013 unless the US accepted a ban 
on sending free American-grown food to poor countries
68
 (New York Times: 2005).  By 
the final few days of the Conference the US had accepted the EU’s demands for a ban and, 
with the EU budget agreed the day before, the EU agreed to set 2013 as the deadline for its 
export subsidy elimination (New York Times: 2005, Wilkinson & Lee: 2007: 9).  In 
making this concession the EU also framed its language to show its negotiation partners 
that its, “threshold of pain had been reached” (WTO: 2005b) and that it would concede no 
more on agriculture (Grant: 2007: 176). 
 
Elsewhere in the negotiations the EU was considerably more proactive in pursuit of its 
offensive interests.  This was most notable over the development package which the EU 
pushed hard with negotiation partners, using its own Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative 
as an example for others to follow (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
WTO, EU Member State B, 19
th
 May 2011, Geneva).  The EU also pursued efforts to 
persuade negotiation partners of the need for more ambition within the services 
negotiations, and in NAMA, although this was to meet with considerable resistance from 
the emerging economies (interview, senior official, WTO Unit, DG Trade, 12
th
 May 2011).  
In pushing for a development package moreover the EU’s outreach to DCs at Hong Kong, 
whilst aimed at building support from the developing world, was instead viewed with 
suspicion, seeing the EU’s development rhetoric as a tactic to divert attention from its 
hesitancy towards agricultural concessions (Ismail: 2008: 101).   
 
As a result, Hong Kong has been widely reported as a disappointing negotiation (i.e. 
Wilkinson & Lee: 2007).  Intended as the meeting that would push the Doha negotiations 
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 Seen to push up food prices and prevent local producers from selling their product (New York Times: 
2005) 
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into their final stage, the meeting ended instead with little progress (Interview, senior 
official, DG Trade, Brussels, 11
th
 May 2011) and, for the EU at least, with few of its 
objectives attained.  The main breakthrough came in the agriculture negotiations where the 
EU had, thanks to its deal with the US over a ban on sending free American-grown food to 
poor countries, agreed to eliminate its export subsidies by 2013.  Agreement had also been 
reached on the adoption of the Swiss Formula
69
 for the NAMA negotiations.  Despite this 
the EU failed to get agreement on the Swiss Formula coefficients which were instead 
postponed till a later date (A.R Young: 2007: 132).  Progress was also slow in services 
and, on the EU’s other core objective, little substantive commitments had been made for a 
development package.  DQFQ for LDCs, whilst seen by many DCs as the “big thing” to 
have come out of Hong Kong (interview, Commercial Secretary, southern developing 
country, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011) was only detailed as a voluntary measure which 
developed and emerging economies should be encouraged to offer (WTO: 2005c).  An Aid 
for Trade agreement was also not reached (Ismail: 2008).  Subsequently, with a high 
negotiation behaviour but low effectiveness, the EU’s performance at Hong Kong dropped 
considerably from Geneva the year previously. With little progress in the Doha Round as a 
whole the scene was further set for a difficult year of negotiations ahead. 
 
4.5. EU performance in the Doha Round (2006-2011) 
After Hong Kong a new phase of negotiations was to begin as efforts focused upon 
bringing the Round to its conclusion.  In July 2006, at a meeting of the WTO General 
Council the Doha Round was however suspended (WTO: 2006).  Efforts by the US to push 
for larger cuts in agricultural tariffs met with considerable resistance from the EU, Japan 
and India (Financial Times: 2006) and, further resisting proposals to put a cap on the US’s 
own agricultural subsidises, the US was then widely blamed for the Round’s collapse 
(Economist: 2006, EurActiv: 2006).  Negotiations began again in 2007 and, by 2008 
progress had been made towards agreement on the modalities for agriculture and NAMA 
that would enable a deal to be reached.  In this section EU performance is evaluated during 
two key events; namely the July 2008 meeting of the General Council where negotiators, 
believing themselves to be in the endgame, then failed to bring about a successful 
conclusion, and the WTO’s 8th Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in December 2011 
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 A non-linear approach to tariff reduction, the Swiss Formula tends to cut higher duties more than lower 
ones and is favoured by the EU (and US) because it cuts tariffs proportionally to the initial tariff rate.  It is 
referred to as the Swiss Formula because it was first proposed by Switzerland during the GATT Tokyo 
Round.  
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where, following three years of negotiation impasse, agreement was reached that 
negotiators should look for alternative approaches to conclude the Round.  
Tears as the gavel falls: another fair performance and still no conclusion (Geneva, 
2008) 
The July 2008 meeting of the WTO General Council was a further milestone in the Doha 
Round negotiations.  Intended to finalise agreement on the crux issues of agriculture and 
NAMA which had so far eluded negotiators in 2006, the ‘mini-ministerial’ was seen as a 
“window of opportunity” for bringing the Round to its successful conclusion (Ahnild: 
2012: 68).  For the EU, its negotiation position entering the meeting remained consistent 
with its striving for progress within the negotiations with more ambition in areas of NAMA 
and services and with modalities to be agreed in agriculture based only on what the reform 
of the CAP would already allow.  More ambitious relative to Hong Kong however, the EU 
was much more of the preference outlier in 2008; pushing hard for the Round’s conclusion 
at a time when many of its negotiation partners thought this was premature.  With elections 
to take place in the US and EU later in the year, many delegates were reported to have seen 
the prospect of concluding Doha at the July General Council as highly unlikely (interview, 
Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State D, Geneva, 20
th
 May 
2011, EurActiv: 2008).  For EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson however, the 
chance of concluding the Round before his term ended was a major incentive for raising 
ambitions (Blustein: 2009).  In Council Conclusions prior to Geneva the EU’s negotiating 
position was also explicit in calling on its negotiation partners to make, “meaningful 
contributions commensurate with their level of development.  For emerging economies, in 
industrial tariffs in particular, this requires granting additional market access” (Council: 
2008a: (2)).  This was highly ambitious in light of the emerging economies reluctance to 
make reciprocal commitments in NAMA and, in a repeat of its performance at Hong Kong, 
and despite consistency in its high level of negotiation behaviour EU performance was 
again challenged by another period of low effectiveness, attaining few of its objectives and 
with the Geneva meeting closing in ‘tears’70. 
 
As in Hong Kong the EU again experienced unity challenges in the lead up to the Geneva 
mini-ministerial.  Proposals submitted by the European Commission in May 2008 to 
revitalise talks had been met by public criticism by the French Government particularly 
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 It is reported that as the gavel fell at Geneva in 2008 EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, who was 
distraught that no agreement had been reached, was close to tears (interview, Deputy Permanent 
Representative to the WTO, EU Member State E, Geneva, 20
th
 May 2011) 
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(EurActiv: 2008, EUobserver: 2008, New York Times: 2008). Nevertheless Commissioner 
Mandelson maintained that he had the support of an, “overwhelming majority” of EU 
nations (EurActiv 2008).  At an extraordinary session of the GAERC in Brussels on 18
th
 
July 2008 the Council further affirmed its support to the Commission’s efforts to 
improving the Doha texts under negotiation and stated that, “for the sake of unity and 
cohesion” its negotiation position remained that of securing a ‘comprehensive, ambitious 
and balanced’ Round (Council: 2008b).  Subsequently, the EU entered the Geneva mini-
ministerial again demonstrating a high level of unity, represented by the Trade 
Commissioner and with the Member States maintaining their silence in support of the 
common EU negotiating position. 
 
At Geneva moreover, despite the EU finding itself, “in the unusual position of being on the 
edge of a Doha argument rather than in the middle” (Mandelson: 2008b) in relation to what 
was to become the main sticking point preventing progress – the Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM)
71
 - it nevertheless maintained its high level of significance during 
negotiations as a participant in all green room meetings and as part of what was now the 
‘G5’ with China also part of the core circle of negotiators (Ahnild: 2012: 73, Mandelson: 
2008b, Blustein: 2009).  The EU’s outreach at Geneva was however to be moderate.  
Demonstrating a highly proactive strategy to persuade others to find the necessary 
consensus by offering to further concede a cut in average agricultural tariffs by 60%; 
cutting its tariff lines on industrial goods to 2% (House of Lords: 2008) and submitting an 
ambitious offer on services, the EU was nevertheless unsuccessful in generating enough 
support – particularly amongst the emerging economies – for its objectives.  Further efforts 
by the EU in trying to unblock the negotiations over the SSM in chairing a group of 
technical experts to try to find a compromise solution between divergent Indian, Chinese 
and American interests, moreover failed to find any breakthrough (Mandelson: 2008b, 
interview, senior official, EU delegation to the WTO, Geneva, 20
th
 May 2011).  More than 
this, under the impression that the Round was now in its endgame and close to finding 
agreement across all sectors of the negotiations (interview, senior trade official, EU 
Member State A, Brussels, 18
th
 May 2011, interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, 
16
th
 May 2011) the EU was then one of the first to formally accept the total package then 
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 The Special Safeguard Mechanism is based on the concept that countries threatened by a flood of imports 
could temporarily raise their tariff barriers to protect local industry.  In the Doha Round India has called for a 
SSM for DCs to protect against an influx of agricultural goods from the developed world.  At the 2008 
meeting disagreement over the types of constraints that would limit the use of the SSM resulted in India 
blocking agreement (Blustein: 2009: 266) 
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on the table
72
 (Blustein: 2009).  This tactic was a bold step in leading the way in the hope 
that others would follow suit.  Such a tactic was however to prove premature.  With 
divisions over the SSM proving ‘irreconcilable’ (Bridges Weekly: 2008) and with India 
threatening to walk out of discussions (Blustein: 2009) the meeting at Geneva was to close 
with no outcome agreement and with the Round left languishing in a state of impasse.   
 
With no outcome agreement the EU subsequently achieved few of its ambitious objectives.  
Failing to achieve its primary goal of securing agreement on modalities for agriculture and 
NAMA, the EU had moreover played the last of its cards in offering a further concession 
on agriculture, as well as in NAMA and services, whilst receiving no reciprocal 
commitments from its negotiation partners.  Subsequently the EU was to demonstrate 
another fair performance in 2008. More than this, by revealing its cards by showing 
willingness to accept the deal on the table at Geneva, the EU was to substantially change 
its role in the negotiations to follow. 
 
A good performance through blame avoidance (Geneva, 2011) 
Since 2008 the Doha Round has been in a situation of stalemate between the United States 
and emerging economies over NAMA and the formula to use for modalities (interview, 
First Secretary to the WTO, southern developing country, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011, 
interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, 11
th
 May 2011).   For the EU, its acceptance 
of the package deal in July 2008 has essentially been seen as the EU ‘playing its hand’ 
(interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011, 
interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State D, 19
th
 May 
2011, interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State B, 20
th
 
May 2011).  Subsequently, since 2008 the EU has been removed from the crux issues of 
the negotiations which have been focused instead on the divergent interests of the US and 
China.  Several attempts over 2009 and 2010 within the G20
73
 - often initiated by the EU - 
to intensify negotiations and bring the Doha Round to a successful conclusion (i.e. Bridges 
Weekly: 2011b) have produced little progress and, by the time of the WTO’s 8 th 
Ministerial Conference held in Geneva in December 2011, negotiators had begun to 
question the ability to conclude under a single undertaking (interview, Ambassador to the 
WTO, northern developed country, 19
th
 August 2011).   
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 Brazil also agreed that the package agreed across agriculture, NAMA and services was acceptable in 2008 
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 The Group of 20 Finance Ministers from the 20 major economies – not to be confused with the WTO G20 
which is formed of approximately 20 developing countries who work together in the agriculture negotiations. 
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Approaching the Ministerial still demonstrating progressiveness in trying to see the Round 
successfully concluded, the EU had however, considerably lowered its ambitions in what it 
believed it could achieve from the Round (Council: 2011b).  In particular it has dropped its 
insistence on the fact that the Round should be agreed under a single undertaking; 
supporting instead an ‘early harvest’ approach that would allow areas of negotiation where 
agreement had been reached to be finalised without recourse to other sectors (WTO: 
2011a).   Subsequently the EU’s strategy of tying concessions made in agriculture to gains 
made across other areas of negotiation will prove far more difficult to achieve in the longer 
term.  More than this, the EU’s position towards the Doha Round was much less geared 
towards finding an ambitious outcome, and much more about avoiding being asked to 
concede any more on market access itself (interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, 
16
th
 May 2012, interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member 
State D, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011).  As one DG Trade official claimed, “'we were frightened 
that if we followed the path of more ambition we would be asked to pay more on market 
access” (interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, 16 th May 2011).  Comparative 
therefore to the US who had considerably raised its level of ambition for the Round by 
calling for more significant market access by the emerging economies
74, the EU’s position 
in 2011 was much more low ambition than it had previously been within the Doha 
negotiations.    
 
The EU’s performance at the 2011 Ministerial was then good; with the EU performing well 
in terms of its negotiation behaviour, but also achieving a moderate level of effectiveness.  
Entering the 2011 Ministerial with representation by new Trade Commissioner Karel de 
Gucht, the EU continued to reflect a high level of unity and a cohesive front within the 
MTNs.  Moreover, despite concerns that EU significance within the Doha Round had 
diminished following its early acceptance of the 2008 deal, and with the EU less involved 
over the core blocking issue of NAMA (Interview, senior trade official, EU Member State 
C, Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011, Interview, senior trade official, EU Member State A, Brussels, 
18
th
 May 2011, Interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country, Geneva, 
19
th
 May 2011), the EU’s significance within the Doha negotiations has nevertheless 
remained high.  This has been seen not only in the EU’s continued participation in all 
meetings of the G5 (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU 
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 Some officials see the US stance as being deliberately over-ambitious as a tactic to stop them from having 
to compromise and thus accept a deal it would find difficult to get through Congress (interview, senior 
official, DG Trade, Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011). 
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Member State E, Geneva, 29
th
 May 2011) and other negotiation processes of the WTO, but 
also in the recognition that no agreement shall be reached within the Doha Round without 
the involvement of the EU at the top table (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative, 
EU Member State B, Geneva, 20th May 2011, interview, WTO spokesperson, Geneva, 19
th
 
May 2011).   
 
EU outreach in the run up to and during the 2011 Ministerial was however moderate. 
Maintaining its proactive strategy toward negotiation partners, the EU’s approach to the 
negotiations since 2008 have nevertheless primarily been geared towards facilitating 
agreement between the US and emerging economies over the NAMA impasse in an effort 
to break deadlock but, critically, to also avoid being blamed should the Round then fail 
(interview, senior trade official, EU Member State A, 18
th
 May 2011, interview, Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State B, 20
th
 May 2011, interview, 
senior trade official, EU Member State E, Brussels, 17
th
 May 2011).  One prominent 
example of this was seen in April 2011 where the EU agreed to issue a proposal on the 
critical issue of NAMA-sectorals
75
 (interview, senior official, DG Trade, 16
th
 May 2011).  
In May 2011 this technical proposal was issued informally to WTO members.  Pitched by 
the EU as offering a middle-ground or ‘compromise deal’ between the US and emerging 
economies’ positions on a sector by sector formula to tariff reductions in NAMA, this 
proposal was judged from within the EU as being an important step to kick-starting 
negotiations (interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, 11
th
 May 2011) as well as a 
necessary effort by the EU to show it, “still has something it could throw into the mix” 
(interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State D, Geneva, 
19
th
 May 2011).  With limited movement elsewhere in the Doha negotiations and with 
continued reticence shown on the part of the US and emerging economies in early 2011, 
the EU compromise proposal on NAMA was however, timed to be, “the only show in 
town” (interview, senior official, DG Trade, Brussels, 11th May 2011) which was to 
contribute to its impact. 
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 The US (and to some extent also the EU) have called for the emerging economies to agree to sectoral 
initiatives in market access under the NAMA negotiations.  The US has particularly promoted a sectoral 
approach to the negotiations with tariff cuts across entire sectors of industry. i.e. chemicals, electronics and 
machinery rather than focusing wholly on  the overall tariff-cutting formula.  Currently sectoral initiatives are 
voluntary and the emerging economies have made the case that without further agricultural liberalisation by 
the developed world they have no incentive to sign up to sectoral initiatives under the NAMA negotiations.  
The EU compromise solution proposes that developed countries eliminate tariffs in specific sectors in return 
for the developing world eliminating tariffs on some products covered by sectoral initiatives. For others, they 
would have to establish future tariff ceilings using the Swiss Formula plus x reductions (Bridges Weekly: 
2011a) 
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Despite its efforts, the EU’s NAMA proposal has nevertheless received very mixed 
reviews.  Judged by some to be a helpful proposal for moving negotiations forward 
(interview, senior trade official, northern developed third country, Geneva, May 2011) and 
an intelligent attempt to build bridges between the US and China particularly (interview, 
WTO spokesperson, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011), others have criticised the EU for 
contributing nothing more than ‘business as usual’ (interview, Deputy Permanent 
Representative, EU Member State C, Geneva, 23
rd
 May 2011), of only helping the US 
meet its sectoral objectives (interview, senior trade official, southern developing third 
country, Geneva, May 2011, Interview, Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed third 
country, Geneva, May 2011), and of ultimately failing to bridge the gap (Bridges Weekly: 
2011a).  However, the EU’s NAMA proposal did also reinforce the view amongst its 
negotiation partners that the EU has proactively sought a solution (Interview, senior trade 
official, northern developed third country, Geneva, May 2011, Interview, senior trade 
official, southern developing country, Geneva, May 2011).  Consequently, whilst its 
outreach in facilitating a deal over NAMA has thus far proven unsuccessful in bridging the 
gap, it was successful as a reminder to negotiation partners that the EU was still an active 
and important participant within the negotiations. 
 
Maintaining therefore a high degree of negotiation behaviour in 2011, the EU was also to 
achieve a more moderate level of effectiveness in Geneva.  The 2011 Ministerial ended 
with several Declarations adopted
76
 and a Chairman’s paper including ‘Elements for 
Political Guidance’ (WTO: 2011b).  Most notably the EU was successful in attaining a 
Declaration agreeing the waiver of preferential treatment to services for LDCs (WTO: 
2011c).  Within the political guidance paper the EU also achieved its goal of securing 
recognition by WTO Members of their commitment to resist protectionist measures, as 
well as for the strengthening and improvement of the WTO’s bodies in order to oversee the 
implementation of WTO agreements, to manage disputes, and importantly to ensure 
transparency through monitoring and reporting (WTO: 2011b: 1).  The paper further 
reaffirmed the link between trade and development as supported by the EU including an 
agreement to maintain Aid for Trade beyond 2011 (in a further nod to the EU’s objective 
notably pushed at Hong Kong) (WTO: 2011b: 2).  Finally the paper did also include the 
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 Not all declarations adopted at the 2011 Ministerial were directly relevant to the Doha MTNs.  For 
example a declaration was adopted approving Russia’s membership of the WTO – a long held EU objective, 
as well as an Agreement in the plurilateral Government Procurement negotiations which the EU could also 
claim as goal attainment in light of its original push for negotiations on procurement as a Singapore Issue 
155 
 
consensus that Ministers would remain active and explore new ways of brining the Doha 
Round to its successful conclusion (WTO: 2011c: 3).  
 
However, the ambiguity of the 2011 Ministerial outcome did also mean that the EU failed 
to achieve any recognition of the need to prioritise negotiations on trade facilitation and 
non-trade barriers as areas for possible early-harvest.  It did moreover neglect to provide 
any clear direction by which the deadlock in the NAMA negotiations could be moved 
forward instead, citing the need for Ministers to “intensify efforts…to overcome the most 
critical and fundamental stalemates” (WTO: 2011b: 3).  Subsequently, whilst there was 
some symmetry between the 2011 outcome and the EU’s objectives, this moderate 
effectiveness did not reveal any substantive breakthroughs for the Doha Round itself.   
This in turn highlights a much more significant challenge for EU performance within the 
WTO MTN.  With EU efforts in achieving a, “comprehensive, balanced and ambitious 
agreement within and across all the main elements of the Doha Agenda” (Council: 2005c) 
now essentially deadlocked, and with claims being made that the Round is now dead 
(Economist: 2012), a longitudinal perspective of EU effectiveness in the Doha Round 
would appear less than impressive.  Whilst achieving smaller victories over the course of 
the Doha negotiations through shaping the course, direction and modalities for the Round, 
the EU’s principle objective of securing a Round that would lead to greater trade 
liberalisation has remained all too elusive.  Despite this, European Trade Commissioner de 
Gucht has stated that, “Doha will not be declared dead, because we are one of the 
physicians and we are not ready to do so” (Financial Times: 2011).  The question 
nevertheless remains as to whether EU doctoring will be sufficient to resuscitate the 
Round.   
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter EU performance within the WTO multilateral trade negotiations has been 
evaluated across a number of major negotiating periods during the WTO’s formative years 
and the decade-long Doha Round negotiations.  Evaluating EU performance as a measure 
of its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness it has shown that the EU has, on the whole, 
had predominantly fair to good performances within this forum.  Summarised in Figure 4.2 
below, it is further shown that the EU has consistently demonstrated high levels of 
negotiation behaviour within the WTO but low to moderate levels of overall effectiveness. 
156 
 
Figure 4.2: EU performance in the WTO multilateral trade negotiations (1996-2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
What these findings contribute is an assessment of how well the EU has performed within 
a negotiation environment in which expectations have been notably high.  As a major 
player within the MTS and with the exclusive competence to ‘speak with one voice’, the 
EU is expected to perform well in this forum.  As was demonstrated at the start of this 
chapter however, disparate views have then been seen within the existing literatures which 
have either assumed these expectations to be accurate, or critiqued them by focusing solely 
on individual performance indicators such as its unity or effectiveness, whilst shedding 
little light on the broader performance picture.  What this analysis has revealed is that the 
EU’s performances within the WTO multilateral trade negotiations since 1996 have in fact 
challenged those expectations by neither wholly meeting the high expectations typically 
afforded it within the EUGA literature, nor the low expectations suggested by the trade 
policy literature.  Rather it has suggested that the EU’s performance within this forum has 
occupied a relatively consistent middle-ground whereby it has demonstrated an impressive 
level of negotiation behaviour but a more limited effectiveness, reflected also in Table 4.2 
below. 
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Table 4.2 Breakdown of EU performance in the WTO multilateral trade negotiations 
(1996-2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
As Table 4.2 further suggests, the EU’s impressive negotiation behaviour has been 
achieved thanks to the EU’s consistently high levels of both unity and significance.  Whilst 
these indicators might be assumed in light of the EU’s exclusive competence and its 
trading power and importance within the MTS, what this study reveals is that the EU has 
managed to  maintain these levels in spite of considerable internal challenges to its unity 
(especially seen over the period 2004 to 2008 where Commission’s negotiation mandate 
was regularly called into question by discontented Member States) and, since 2008, despite 
challenges over its relevance at the negotiation table due to the increasing significance of 
the emerging economies.  Where the EU has shown limitations in its performance within 
the MTN however, has been in its variable ability to persuade negotiation partners to 
support its preferences and subsequently to attain all of its ambitious objectives.   Whilst 
consistently maintaining a proactive style towards the negotiations, its outreach to 
negotiation partners has not always been successful but has met with difficulties 
particularly in persuading the emerging economies to raise their own level of ambition 
towards further market liberalisation.  Whilst the EU has consistently pushed for progress 
within the negotiations; demonstrating mostly moderate to high levels of ambition 
approaching each negotiation, its ability to then persuade others to match those ambitions 
(particularly with regards to services, NAMA and the Singapore issues), has been hindered 
by a growing reluctance by negotiation partners to concede to EU demands without 
reciprocal concessions by the EU over agriculture.  This has in turn made it much harder 
for the EU to attain its goals within the WTO MTN, with the EU achieving mostly 
moderate or low levels of effectiveness in the launching, and subsequent course, of 
negotiations; but with no clear end in sight for the EU attaining its ultimate goal of the 
‘comprehensive, balanced and ambitious’ round initially sought.    
 
Negotiation Ambition Unity Outreach Signficance Behaviour Effectiveness
Performance 
assessment
1996 Singapore Moderate High High High High Moderate Good
1998 Seattle High High Moderate High High Low Fair
2001 Doha Moderate High High High High Moderate Good
2003 Cancun High High Moderate High High Low Fair
2004 Geneva Moderate High High High High High Very good
2005 Hong Kong Moderate High Moderate High High Low Fair
2008 Geneva High High Moderate High High Low Fair
2011 Geneva Low High Moderate High High Moderate Good
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A further interesting finding from this study seen from a longitudinal perspective is that the 
EU has demonstrated some moderation of its ambitions approaching negotiations where, 
previously, it had met with failure.  This was evident particularly in 2004 where, following 
the EU’s high ambitions and correspondingly fair performance at the failed Cancún 
Ministerial in 2003, the EU approached the Geneva General Council with a moderately 
ambitious negotiation position and which resulted in a very good overall performance, 
further credited for helping make a real difference to moving the negotiations beyond a 
state of impasse.  The moderation of EU ambition has also been evident in more recent 
negotiations with findings showing that, after the failed 2008 General Council meeting 
where the EU had high ambitions but which resulted in a major disappointment and 
another fair performance, the EU approached the 2011 Ministerial Conference with much 
lower ambitions.  Its performance was subsequently much better, although it is noted that it 
still did not achieve is primary objective of concluding the Doha Round.   
 
What these findings suggest is that, where the EU’s ambitions have been too high within 
the WTO MTN, the EU has been unable to persuade its negotiation partners to concede to 
its demands, resulting in relatively unimpressive performances.  Instead of others therefore 
raising their level of ambition to meet the preference structures of the EU, it has been the 
EU who has had to moderate its ambition to find a zone of agreement with its negotiation 
partners.  Under current deadlocked conditions in which the preference structures of the 
US, India and China continue to be at odds, the EU’s ability to bring the Doha Round to a 
successful conclusion – such that it achieves the ambitious objectives for trade 
liberalisation it initially set out as demandeur – has therefore become increasingly 
questionable.    
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Chapter 5: EU performance in the case of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review negotiations (1995-2010) 
 
As was seen in the previous chapter, there is a widely held belief in academic and policy-
making circles that when the EU stands together and united that it is at its most influential 
as an international actor (Laatiakainen & Smith: 2006, Elgström & Smith: 2006, Haseler: 
2004, Allen: 1998, Taylor: 1979).  Expectations follow that the EU performs at its best in 
multilateral negotiations where the EU Member States are most integrated, where that 
integration is reflected in the level of EU competence, and consequently where the 
Member States then ‘speak with one voice’ (Jørgensen & Wessel: 2011, Kissack: 2010, 
Meunier: 2000).  As a security environ, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty 
on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon) therefore presents what 
would appear to be a particularly hard test for EU performance. As an area of high politics 
where the security and energy interests of its Member States are highly prominent, the 
NPT is not an issue where the EU is particularly integrated, or where there is EU 
competence and, despite entering NPT negotiations with a common position since 1995, 
Member States continue to be active – and highly vocal – participants within the 
negotiations.  As a negotiation where the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) are of critical 
importance, the EU is further at risk of being over-shadowed by its own Member States 
within the NPT; not least the UK and France as two of the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council (UNSC).  Subsequently when it comes to tackling nuclear issues, 
“few would expect the EU to be a serious player” (Hill: 2004: 154). 
 
With such low expectations of any ‘EU’ performance within the NPT, attention to the NPT 
and its quinquennial review negotiations has been a much under-analysed field in the 
context of EU studies, with what little literature there is stemming from think-tanks and 
dedicated disarmament and non-proliferation analysts (see Fischer & Müller: 1995, Müller 
& van Dassen: 1997, Johnson: 1999, 2000, 2005, Portela: 2003, Meier & Quille: 2005). 
Journal coverage of the EU in the NPT remains far more limited (Müller: 2010, 2005), 
with greater attention given to the EU’s bilateral non-proliferation relations, particularly 
with Iran (Bergenäs: 2010, Denza: 2005, Leonard: 2005); the institutionalisation of the 
EU’s own 2003 strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(Zwolski: 2011, Tertrais: 2005), or to the EU’s role within other related institutions such as 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Lundin: 2012).  However, a more 
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explicit focus upon EU performance and its ‘impact’ in multilateral diplomacy utilising the 
case of the NPT, has started to develop within EU Studies (i.e. Dee: 2012a, 2012b, 
Jørgensen: 2009a, 2009b) reflecting a growing appreciation of the rich empirical findings 
that this case can contribute.  
 
Despite its limited coverage, reflections of the EU’s role and performance within the NPT 
negotiations have nevertheless produced something of a puzzle.  Whilst few would expect 
the EU to perform well in this forum, accounts and analysis thus far have in fact 
emphasised the EU’s “potential” leadership within the NPT (Müller: 2005: 43).  
Discussion of the EU during individual NPT RevCons further emphasise this dynamic with 
the EU seen to have played, “a crucial role” (Meier & Quille: 2005) in shaping the 
negotiation outcome on several occasions (Dee: 2012a, Portela: 2004, 2003, Van Dassen & 
Müller: 1997, Fischer & Müller: 1995).  The EU’s unique make-up as a polity of both 
nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) is also seen to be a negotiation advantage; 
positioning the EU as a “microcosm” of the wider NPT community (Fischer & Müller: 
1995: 46, Jørgensen: 2009b: 201) and where its own common position is believed to, 
“provide a useful benchmark for the international community as a whole” (Fischer & 
Müller: 1995: 46).  The picture that has emerged from the existing literature therefore, is of 
an EU who, on the one hand, is expected to perform poorly due to its institutional 
weaknesses in this forum, but on the other, discussed as a ‘potential leader’ and one that 
has made a ‘crucial’ difference within the NPT negotiations.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to address this puzzle by explicitly evaluating EU performance 
within the NPT’s quinquennial review negotiations.  Evaluating EU performance over-
time, from the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference – where the EU first entered 
the negotiations with a Joint Action – up to the most recent NPT RevCon held in New 
York in May 2010; it seeks to assess how well the EU has in fact performed in this forum.  
In so doing it finds that the EU’s performance, whilst variable, has in large part exceeded 
the low expectations typically afforded it.  With the exception of the 2005 failed NPT 
Review Conference where EU performance was very poor, this chapter will show that the 
EU has in fact managed to show both improving negotiation behaviour and an ability to 
attain its goals within the NPT.  It further suggests however, that much of the EU’s 
performance in this forum has been premised on moderate to low ambitions – greatly 
contributed to by divergences within the EU’s own membership over nuclear issues – and 
which has positioned the EU as an ‘NPT Champion’ and supporter of the system rather 
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than a driver of it.  This has enabled the EU to play a role within the negotiations without 
challenging its Member States own sensitivities and which has allowed it to claim some 
effectiveness in the attainment of more generalised principles and objectives.    
 
To present its case, the chapter is broken down into three main sections.  First addressing 
the EU’s capacity to act, section one discusses the EU as an actor in the NPT negotiations.  
This is of particular necessity in this case where, with the EU’s institutional limitations on 
non-proliferation issues, and where the EU Member States are themselves heavily 
involved, has resulted in the NPT being considered by some as an, ‘inappropriate situation’ 
for the EU to attempt to unify and act together at all (Johnson: 1999: 9).  Establishing ‘who 
is EU’ is thus important if we are to be able to evaluate the EU’s negotiation performance.  
In section two the NPT review negotiations are briefly introduced with discussion given to 
the major issues under negotiation, as well as the key players’ involved.  In section three 
the EU’s performance is then evaluated.  Using the framework developed in Chapter Two, 
EU performance is evaluated during four negotiating events including the 1995, 2000, 
2005 and 2010 NPT RevCons.  The chapter is then summarised in a concluding section. 
 
5.1. The EU as an actor in the NPT  
In 1957 the European Atomic Energy Agency was established.  Often overlooked by the 
more prominent success of the EEC, the Euratom Treaty was nevertheless ground-breaking 
for its time: establishing cooperation between EU Member States' research programmes for 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  Despite this initial leap toward cooperation in nuclear 
energy, EU Member States have staunchly defended their sovereign rights in nuclear 
issues.  Unlike the evolution of the EEC therefore, which has seen ‘ever closer union’ 
between the EU Member States and an increasing competence being afforded the European 
Community to act on their behalf, on nuclear matters the EU has no legal competence to 
act for its Member States.   Within the NPT itself it has only been since 1995 that the EU 
has presented itself ‘as EU’ within review negotiations.  Whilst early coordination efforts 
in the 1980s and early 1990s did meet with some success (Fischer & Müller: 1995: 7-12), 
such efforts were to have limited impact due to France’s refusal to accede to the NPT.  It 
was not until after the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU), establishing the EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), that the instruments to encourage 
cooperation and enable the EU to act in concert within the NPT were established, and 
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which further resulted in French accession to the NPT
77
.  Formulating its first Joint Action 
at a meeting of the European Council in July 1994 (Council: 1994) in preparation for the 
1995 NPT RevCon and with statements then given on behalf of the EU by the French 
Council Presidency, the 1995 RevCon was the first time that the EU was formally to act 
within the NPT negotiations. Since that first Joint Action the EU has consistently acted in 
concert in NPT RevCons with a common position in place prior to negotiations and with 
representation by the rotating Council Presidency.   
 
The process of deriving the EU common position for the NPT is a laborious process which 
begins the year before the RevCon itself, if not earlier, and which requires extensive 
coordination between the Member States, typically led by the rotating Council Presidency 
who will hold the position during the negotiation itself (interview, senior official, 
Department of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs, Brussels, 10
th
 May 2011).  On-
going discussions take place with non-proliferation experts from each of the Member 
States within the CONOP
78
 working group, who meet in Brussels once monthly, but EU 
and EU Member State delegations in Geneva
79
 and the capitals are also heavily involved 
with proposed language for the common position considered, debated and fine-tuned.  The 
Foreign Affairs Council
80
 then has formal responsibility for adopting the position which is 
approved by unanimity. Whilst not an uncommon time-frame in producing a position 
under the CFSP, the NPT is a highly sensitive issue where Member States themselves have 
significantly divergent positions on both nuclear security and energy interests.  
 
Within the EU fundamental differences exist between Member States over at least two of 
the NPT’s three pillars. The NPT addresses three main pillars including: the principle of 
nuclear disarmament by the NWS (Pillar I), the principle of non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and weapons technology by NNWS (Pillar II), and the principle of cooperation in 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Pillar III).  Whilst there are broadly consistent 
interests between the Members over Pillar II and non-proliferation, on nuclear 
                                                   
77
 As a NWS France had refused to sign the NPT on the grounds that nuclear disarmament could not 
guarantee French security.  It laid aside these objections at the same time as the TEU was established and 
acceded to the NPT as a NWS in 1992. 
78
 CONOP is the Council working group on non-proliferation.  There is some overlap between the role of 
CONOP and the CODUN Working Group that focuses more specifically on disarmament. CONOP however 
is responsible for the NPT whilst CODUN focuses more on the CTBT, the Chemical Weapons Convention 
and the Biological Weapons Convention. 
79
 Geneva is home to the Conference on Disarmament.  Many Member State officials working in the CD also 
work on NPT issues.  Their input to drafting the EU’s common position is therefore necessary  
80
 Formally the General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC).  The Council’s name was amended 
following the Lisbon Treaty 
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disarmament and nuclear energy there are highly divergent positions.  The most 
fundamental divergence is over nuclear disarmament.  The EU is today comprised not only 
of eleven NATO-members, two of which are NWS and with four Member States hosting 
NATO strategic weapons, but it also has neutral Member States, several of which are 
strongly and consistently opposed to nuclear weapons.  The EU is divided therefore 
between Member States that occupy two sides of a spectrum: the UK and France on the 
one hand – who as NWS are themselves committed to the principle of disarmament but 
seek gradual disarmament when it is practical to do so - and pro-disarmament states most 
notably including Ireland
81
, Sweden and Austria - who have been forthright in their 
opposition to nuclear weapons and seek immediate disarmament - on the other.  On Pillar 
III and the issue of nuclear energy the EU is also highly divided.  France is highly in 
favour of nuclear energy and has the second largest number of nuclear power plants in the 
world after the United States
82
.   On the other side of the spectrum the EU also has several 
nuclear prohibition countries including Austria, Ireland and Denmark.  In between these 
strongly pro and anti-nuclear energy positions are moreover a wealth of diverging and 
more moderate views.  For example, Germany and Belgium are considered by the IAEA to 
be in condition of nuclear ‘phase-out’ whilst Finland, France and Bulgaria are ‘expansion’ 
countries that are constructing new nuclear power plants (IAEA: 2008).   
 
In 2003 efforts to create a coherent EU Action Plan on non-proliferation led to the 
European Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Council: 
2003d) which  has gone some way to solidifying Member States more convergent interests 
over non-proliferation.  It has however had limited impact upon the EU’s negotiation 
position entering the NPT (Dee: 2012b, Portela: 2004).  The 2007 Lisbon Treaty has 
however, sought to further streamline the EU’s non-proliferation policy through the 
establishment of the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy as well as the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS).  
Whilst the effects of the Lisbon Treaty will not be fully realised under the next NPT 
RevCon in 2015, some changes have already been brought about.  In particular the Lisbon 
Treaty has resulted in responsibility for the coordination of the EU’s non-proliferation and 
disarmament policy passing from the General Council Secretariat to the EEAS (Council: 
2010b: (11)) along with the creation of a dedicated EEAS Non-Proliferation and 
                                                   
81
 Ireland was in fact responsible for introducing the UN resolution that led to the introduction of the NPT in 
1968. 
82
 IAEA statistics from March 2008 show that of the 439 nuclear power plants in the world, the US has 104 
and France has 59.  It further shows that 78% of all of France’s electricity comes from nuclear reactors  
(IAEA: 2008) 
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Disarmament office.  Within the NPT negotiations moreover, EU representation has begun 
to move away from the rotating Council Presidency to the EEAS (interview, senior 
official, Department of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs, EEAS, Brussels, 10
th
 
May 2011) - a move further enabled by the passing of the UN General Assembly 
resolution on 3 May 2011 allowing EU representatives - and not just Member State 
officials - “the right to make interventions, as well as the right of reply and the ability to 
present oral proposals and amendments” (UN: 2011).  In the NPT 2010 RevCon this 
change was most clearly evident in the EU being represented within negotiations by both 
the Spanish Council Presidency and the Director of the EEAS’s Department for Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs. 
 
Despite the idiosyncrasies of EU nuclear policy and the considerable divergences that exist 
amongst its Member States over nuclear security and energy interests, the EU’s common 
position entering the NPT negotiations has been particularly highlighted as presenting a 
benchmark for the NPT community as a whole (Fischer & Müller: 1995: 46, Jørgensen: 
2009b: 201).  As a polity of both NWS and NNWS each with divergent positions on the 
security and energy concerns of the NPT negotiations, the EU has been viewed as a, 
“laboratory for consensus” (Anthony et al. 2010: 24, Grand: 2000) with the fact that the 
EU can find a common position at all generally seen to provide its added value within the 
NPT (interview, Ambassador to the Political & Security Council, EU Member State F, 
Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011, interview, First Counsellor, EU Member State E, New York, 11
th
 
March 2011).  As Kissack (2010: 61) has also argued, the EU’s own common position can 
in fact be an asset in negotiations of this kind because third countries are more likely to 
accept a position that has already undergone its own internal compromise and moderation.  
The EU is thus uniquely placed within the NPT by offering an important consensual 
middle-ground that third countries can more easily accept.   
 
It is however, paradoxically for this reason that the EU is also commonly criticised for 
having too much of a lowest common denominator position within the NPT (Müller: 2010: 
11, Interview, Minister Counsellor to the UN, northern developed country, 7
th
 March 2011, 
Interview, Counsellor, southern developing country, 11
th
 March 2011, Interview, Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the CD,  EU Member State C, 19
th
 May 2011)  With a broad 
range of differing interests and strategic perspectives on the issue of nuclear weapons and 
energy the EU’s common position is inevitably one that reflects a watering down of 
stronger national views in order to appeal to all Member States.   As a result, the EU’s 
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common position has further been criticised for being too universal in its policy objectives 
(interview, EU diplomatic source, New York, 7
th
 March 2011), and, due to the interests of 
its more powerful Members, somewhat limp particularly on the matter of nuclear 
disarmament (Interview, Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will, March 2011, Interview, 
Senior Advisor, ICRC, 10
th
 March 2011, Interview, Counsellor, southern developing 
country, 11
th
 March 2011).   
 
This in turn leads to a further peculiarity facing the EU as an actor within the NPT.  With 
no EU competence, EU representation within the NPT has, since 1995, been premised on a 
coordination model whereby the Member States agree to coordinate their positions and act 
in concert as ‘EU’.  EU statements and proposals are then put forward by the rotating 
Council Presidency, but, unlike in the UNFCCC where Member States increasingly sit 
back to allow the EU representatives to speak for them (see Chapter Three), in the NPT, 
Member States continue to speak and negotiate on their own behalf.  With the EU common 
position often based on a lowest common denominator appealing to all of its Members, 
several Member States do also chose to then pursue more specific national interests within 
other negotiation groupings, as reflected in Figure 5.1 below.  
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Figure 5.1: EU Member State negotiation partnerships in the NPT in 2010 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
As this figure shows, the UK and France who, as NWS are highly prominent within the 
NPT in their own right, also work alongside the other Permanent Members of the UNSC 
including the US, Russia and China, to form part of the Permanent-Five or ‘P-5’ group 
within NPT negotiations.  Ireland and Sweden, as pro-disarmament States, are also 
members of the group called the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)
83
 – a coalition of seven 
middle powers who work towards the specific objective of nuclear disarmament.  Ireland, 
Sweden, Austria, Hungary, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands, also form part of the 
Vienna Group of Ten (G-10) along with Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Norway.  
This group pursue common objectives on the ‘Vienna’ issues such as strengthening the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), export controls and nuclear safeguards.  
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 Formed in 2000 with members Ireland, Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Brazil, New Zealand and South Africa 
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Forming the NATO-7, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain and Lithuania also ally 
themselves with Turkey and Norway during the NPT negotiations, working together in 
their shared interests as NATO members.   
 
This cross-alignment has been considered a major flaw of the EU’s negotiation 
performance within the NPT, with the EU broadly criticised for its resultant failure to 
maintain a united front (Kile: 2006, Müller: 2005: 43, Fischer & Müller: 1995: 43-44, 
interview, EU diplomatic source, New York, 7
th
 March 2011).  Whilst cross-alignment 
presents a challenge for EU unity in this forum (discussed in the following performance 
evaluation), it is also noted that EU Member States are committed under the CFSP to, 
“refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair 
its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” (TEU: 1992: J1(4)).  
Subsequently, working within other negotiation groups is deemed by many Member States 
to be “complementary” to the EU common position rather than contradictory to it 
(interview, Former Disarmament Ambassador Miguel Aguirre de Carcer, Spanish 
Permanent Mission to the EU, Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011). 
 
Interesting to note moreover, is that the EU is itself widely recognised to be a highly 
visible group within the NPT by its negotiation partners (interview, Counsellor, southern 
developing country, New York, 11
th
 March 2011) as well as one whose position counts 
(interview, Minister Counsellor to the UN, northern developed country, New York, 10
th
 
March 2011, interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, northern developed 
country, Geneva, 23
rd
 May 2011).  Since 1995 the EU has increasingly attracted the 
support of its own neighbourhood within the NPT, with EU statements and working papers 
within the NPT frequently given on behalf not only of the EU Member States and EU 
candidate, potential candidate and stabilisation and association States, but also including 
States such as the Republic of Moldova, Iceland, Georgia, Armenia, Norway, Ukraine and 
Liechtenstein (i.e. European Union: 2010).  A further more implicit recognition is that the 
EU is permitted the courtesy to speak ‘as EU’ within the NPT negotiations.  Thus the 
Council Presidency can submit working papers and proposals and speak on behalf of the 
EU in all plenary and committee sessions despite the EU having no formal membership 
within the NPT.  A further elaboration of this recognition afforded the EU as an, albeit 
complex, actor was also notably seen in 2010 where the newly selected High 
Representative for the Union, Catherine Ashton, was permitted to speak for the EU during 
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the NPT’s plenary session prior to the Foreign Ministers of many States Parties84 
(interview, EU diplomatic source, New York, 7
th 
March 2011, interview, Ambassador to 
the UN, southern developing country, New York, 10
th
 March 2011).  The EU may 
therefore be identified as an actor within the NPT; although one with several peculiar 
characteristics which must be taken into consideration when evaluating its performance.  In 
the following section this is developed with discussion of the NPT negotiations 
themselves.  
 
5.2. The NPT review negotiations: Major players and key issues 
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) came into effect in 1970 
and was indefinitely extended in 1995.  Considered the ‘cornerstone’ of the global nuclear 
non-proliferation regime; the NPT encompasses a near universal acceptance
85
 by the 
international community of the principles it enshrines including: the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and weapons technology, the sovereign right of all states to the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy, and the agreement by the NWS to disarm their nuclear weapons.  
Within the text of the NPT (UNODA: 1968, VIII(3)) is the proviso that the Treaty be 
reviewed at intervals of every five years by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty in order 
to review its operation.  Beginning in 1970 review conferences have therefore taken place 
quinquennially with their success typically judged by the production of a Final Document 
– agreed by consensus among the states parties – intended to offer a review of the previous 
five years of activity, as well as detailing points of action and provision for States Parties 
to meet their obligations under the Treaty.   
 
Therefore, unlike the WTO and UNFCCC negotiations (see Chapters Three and Four) 
which are continuous with meetings taking place throughout the year, NPT RevCons 
typically take place at the United Nations General Assembly in New York during April to 
May every five years and with negotiations lasting upwards of four weeks.  Since 1995, 
NPT States Parties have also met under the forum of NPT Preparatory Committees or 
PrepComs, which take place in cycles of three annual PrepComs followed by one RevCon 
followed by one year off.  PrepComs are intended to discuss issues as they arise and to set 
the agenda for the upcoming RevCon where decisions are then formally taken.  Whilst 
important, PrepComs have not been included in this analysis for several reasons.  First, as 
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 This was all the more notable for taking place prior to the UNGA resolution on EU representation within 
the UN and was to set an important precedent for the EU as an actor within the NPT. 
85
 The NPT currently has 189 members.  Notable exceptions however include nuclear weapon states Israel, 
India and Pakistan who have refused to accede to the Treaty as well as the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea who withdrew from the Treaty in 2003. 
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primarily procedural events PrepComs are rarely formal negotiating sessions.  The 1
st
 and 
2
nd
 PrepComs in a five-year cycle are intended to discuss issues that have arisen and to 
offer delegates a chance to indicate the direction for negotiations at the upcoming RevCon 
(interview, senior official, UNODA, New York, 10
th
 March 2011).  The 3
rd
 PrepCom is 
more relevant and is intended to set the agenda for the upcoming RevCon.  In practice 
however, no PrepCom has yet resulted in an agenda being finalised entering the RevCon.  
Instead the RevCon agenda is typically set in the first week(s) of the RevCon itself.  
Secondly, as primarily procedural meetings, the EU, whilst regularly giving prepared 
statements by the rotating Council Presidency and occasionally submitting working papers, 
does not enter each PrepCom with a prepared common position (interview, senior official,  
Department of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs, EEAS, Brussels, 10
th
 May 
2011).  Assessing the EU’s capacity to act within the NPT PrepComs is therefore far more 
complex as, without a formal common position, there is not evident an EU goal or goals, 
“articulated in a document so that its formulation, if not its interpretation, is beyond 
dispute” (Sjöstedt: 1977: 24, see also Chapter Two). 
 
Focusing therefore on the RevCon as the principle ‘milestone’ negotiation conducted under 
the NPT, conferences are typically broken down into negotiations concentrating on three 
Main Committees, each tackling one of the NPT’s three main pillars: Main Committee I 
(MCI) dealing with disarmament, Main Committee II (MCII) dealing with non-
proliferation, and Main Committee III (MCIII) dealing with the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy.  In addition, since 1995, the NPT RevCon has also included closed Subsidiary 
Body (SB) negotiations which tackle specific issues including practical measures to 
disarmament (SBI) and regional issues including the Middle East (SBII) (see Appendix IV 
for a detailed breakdown of issues addressed in these committees and the positions of the 
major negotiation groups).  Within each of the four RevCon’s between 1995 and 2010 a 
key aim for negotiators has been to agree, by consensus, a Final Document agreeing a 
review of the Treaty; to put in place a plan of action for future work and steps towards the 
NPT’s core principles. As the NPT constitutes the only multilateral agreement in which the 
P-5 commit to the disarmament of their nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology, 
a major, and on-going, issue under negotiation with the NPT is the obligation by the NWS 
to disarm and by the NNWS not to proliferate.  Table 5.1 below reflects a timeline of the 
major issues under negotiation in each of the RevCons and their subsequent outcomes 
between 1995 and 2010. 
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Table 5.1: Timeline of NPT review negotiations (1995-2010) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Whilst committing to the general principle of disarmament of their nuclear weapons, the 
NWS have demonstrated only limited substantive progress in actually eliminating their 
stockpiles since the Treaty was first enacted in 1970.  Recent statistics published in the 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists suggest that whilst there has been a general decline in the 
number of nuclear weapons by the NWS, inventories of nuclear weapons within the P-5 
remain at just under 18,000 warheads with Russia accounting for 12,000, the US 8,000, 
France 300, China 240, and the UK 225 (Norris & Kristensen: 2010).   Representing the 
interests of the NWS, the P-5 is therefore of particular importance within the NPT with 
their involvement and consent key to any outcome agreement being approved.   
NPT RevCon Negotiation outcome Key issues under negotiation
1995 RevCon
Decision 1: Strengthening the review process
Decision 2: Principles and objectives for 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Decision 3: Extension of the NPT
Decision 4: Resolution on the Middle East
Negotiations intended to agree the extension of the 
NPT.  Focus also is upon strengthening the NPT 
review process, introducing a nuclear-weapon free 
zone in the Middle East, and for new benchmarks 
by which States Parties performance in meeting 
their NPT obligations could be measured.  The 
conference ended in success with the NPT 
indefinitely extended and with several other major 
decisions taken.
2000 RevCon
Final Document agreed reviewing the 
operation of the NPT and detailing the 
improved effectiveness of the strengthened 
review process.  Document includes the '13 
Practical Steps' towards nuclear 
disarmament
Negotiations focused in particular upon practical 
measures towards nuclear disarmament (with Indo-
Pakistani nuclear test explosions a critical subject) 
and regional issues, including the implementation of 
the Middle East Resolution.  Negotiations end with 
agreement on practical steps towards nuclear 
disarmament
2005 RevCon No agreement
Negotiations stalled over procedural issues with 
the US and others blocking progress on the 
adoption of a conference agenda due to mention of 
the objectives and principles detailed in 1995 and 
2000. Once negotiations start, focus is given 
particularly to DPRK withdrawal in 2003 and 
tackling issues of compliance.  No consensus is 
agreed and the RevCon ends in failure.
2010 RevCon
Final Document agreed reviewing the 
operation of the NPT and detailing conclusions 
and recommendations for follow-on actions.  
Document includes a 64-point Action Plan 
covering all three pillars of the NPT
Negotiations aimed at putting in place a forward-
looking, comprehensive and ambitious action plan 
to enable States Parties to fulfil their obligations 
under the Treaty.  Focus is particularly given to 
Iranian nuclear developments and other on-going 
nuclear concerns in the Middle East
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Standing in sharp contrast to the P-5, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is a major 
negotiation group within the NPT calling for immediate nuclear disarmament by the NWS.  
The NAM is a group of over 100 non-western, developing States Parties representing the 
interests of developing NNWS and with lead states including Egypt and South Africa, each 
of whom have strong pro-disarmament credentials.  Egypt in particular is widely regarded 
as a major player within the NPT (interview, Minister Counsellor to the UN, northern 
developed country, New York, 7
th
 March 2011, interview, First Counsellor, EU Member 
State A, New York, 9
th
 March 2011, interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the 
CD, EU Member State C, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011), not only for its leading role within the 
NAM, but also as a major power broker in the Middle East having influence with both Iran 
and Israel with whom it has close diplomatic relations.  Egypt is also prominent in the New 
Agenda Coalition (NAC) a group formed in 2000 with South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, 
Ireland and Sweden to act as a bridge between the west and the developing world in the 
proactive pursuit of nuclear disarmament.  Whilst the NAC is strongly pro-disarmament, it 
attempts to work with the P-5 to find practical measures for disarmament and is 
particularly active in the pursuit of the universal ratification of a Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) and a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT). 
 
In addition to the fundamental division between NWS and NNWS States Parties within the 
NPT negotiations, a further issue of contention is between developed and developing 
States Parties over the mechanisms by which states cooperate in the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy and in compliance and reporting of non-proliferation efforts.  For example, the US 
and Russia, along with the EU and Vienna Group of Ten are in favour of  initiatives such 
as introducing an Additional Protocol to IAEA verification standards, strengthening export 
controls on nuclear supplies, and pursuing multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.  
The NAM however has been strongly and consistently opposed to any initiatives that 
would hinder their development and has resisted these efforts on the grounds that they 
benefit the developed world only. 
 
For the EU therefore, the NPT presents an interesting challenge.  Since 1995 the EU has 
pursued the core objective to, “strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime”; to “contribute to the successful outcome of the review conference” (Council: 
1994, 2000a, 2005a, 2010a); and, to “build consensus on substantive issues” within the 
NPT (Council: 2000a, 2005a, 2010a).  Unlike other negotiation groups within the NPT 
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which comprise States Parties who congregate over specific issues of shared interests, the 
EU is a regional grouping
86
 representing the common objectives of a highly divergent 
group of Member States.  Its position therefore requires that it occupy the centre ground 
between NWS and NNWS positions.  An example of this may be seen in its position on 
nuclear disarmament.  Whilst supporting in principle the goal of nuclear disarmament, the 
EU common positions place much greater emphasis on principles of disarmament such as 
‘irreversibility’ and ‘transparency’ as well as strengthening other multilateral arms control 
treaties such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-
Off Treaty (FMCT) (Council: 2005a, 2010a).  In this way the EU’s stance on disarmament 
is relatively universal, appealing not only to all of its Member States (including its NWS) 
but also the broader NPT community. 
 
Such a position has both its benefits and drawbacks.  In terms of the EU’s objectives 
relative to the preference structures of key negotiation partners within the NPT, a more 
ambiguous and ‘universal’ common position – itself already a compromise by having gone 
through the process of internal EU negotiations - does enable the EU to find agreement 
with most, if not all, States Parties.  As reflected in Appendix IV, the EU is well positioned 
to achieve its key objective of “building consensus” in order to achieve a successful 
outcome due in part to these close symmetries with other key players.  However, the 
ambiguity of the EU’s common positions does also present the EU with a presentation 
problem within the NPT, particularly when compared to other negotiation groupings.  For 
example, the NAC stands out in the NPT negotiations for its proactive stance, since 2000, 
on nuclear disarmament issues (interview, senior analyst, Acronym Institute of 
Disarmament Diplomacy, London, 19
th
 April 2011).  The Vienna Group of Ten (G-10) has 
established itself as a prominent player on all ‘Vienna’ issues pursuing objectives such as 
strengthening the IAEA, export controls and nuclear safeguards.  The strategic interests of 
the P-5 meanwhile ensure that on all nuclear issues, not least the key issue of nuclear 
disarmament, these five states are of fundamental importance; whilst the NAM is high 
profile on all issues in representing the views of the developing world.  Comparatively the 
EU has no such raison d’être.  Instead the EU’s position, which has little in the way of 
uniquely ‘European’ positions or particular entrepreneurial solutions by which it could 
help steer negotiations, is in danger of being submerged by other more prominent, and 
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 Other regional groupings also exist within the NPT i.e. the Arab League, or the Pacific Island Group.  
There contributions tend to be irregular however and less formalised than the EU. The Arab League is also 
specific in dealing with single issues i.e. the Middle East Resolution, rather than providing a common 
position across all pillars. 
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ambitious, objectives, pursued more aggressively by groups who are dedicated to 
achieving specific results and who have very set views on what a ‘successful outcome’ 
should look like.  It is therefore to this position, and the EU’s performance in its pursuit 
and delivery, that we now turn.   
 
5.3. EU performance in the NPT review negotiations 
In this section the EU’s performance within each of the four NPT review negotiations 
between 1995 and 2010 - outlined in Table 5.1 above - is evaluated.  Evaluating 
performance using the analytical framework developed in Chapter Two, this analysis 
focuses upon the EU’s performance as a measure of both its negotiation behaviour and 
effectiveness.  In each NPT RevCon focus shall therefore be given first to the ambition of 
the EU’s common position, focusing therefore on its progressiveness relative to the 
preference structures of other negotiation groups.  EU performance is then assessed across 
four performance indicators focused upon the EU’s negotiation behaviour – including the 
level of EU unity, outreach, and significance – and its effectiveness with an overall 
assessment then made of the EU’s performance based on a scale of very good, good, fair, 
poor, or very poor.  In each of the following sub-sections the EU’s performance assessment 
is detailed within each of the section headers.   
 
The 1995 RevCon: A good performance on indefinite extension but lacking 
elsewhere 
The 1995 Review and Extension Conference commenced in New York on the 17th April 
1995.  A significant milestone for the NPT, the 1995 RevCon marked the end of the 
Treaty’s original fixed term period of 25 years.  Under article X(2) of the NPT (UNODA: 
1968) the 1995 RevCon was convened for States Parties to decide on whether the Treaty 
should continue in force indefinitely, or to be extended for a further fixed period(s).  
Entering the 1995 RevCon with its first Joint Action, agreed in July 1994, the EU’s 
position therefore detailed its principle objectives to act together to strengthen the NPT 
through the pursuit of the, “unconditional indefinite extension” of the Treaty and to 
promote its, “universal adherence” by all States (Council: 1994).  In attaining that goal the 
Joint Action further outlined a course of action that sought to build consensus through 
demarchés by the Presidency to third countries, both to encourage accession if not already 
a member and to promote the cause of unconditional indefinite extension (Council: 1994).    
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In calling for indefinite extension the EU’s negotiation position entering the 1995 Review 
and Extension Conference was moderately ambitious.  Joining forces with Canada and 
Japan (Fischer & Müller: 1995) who had also launched a campaign to build support in 
favour of indefinite extension, the EU’s objectives also met with the preference structures 
of the United States who was in favour of indefinite extension.  The US however was of 
the view that the decision on extension should be taken by a vote of 50%+1 in support of 
indefinite extension to secure its success. The EU however, was more ambitious than the 
US in this respect, calling instead for a unanimous decision in order to strengthen the 
legitimacy of the NPT’s extension (Fischer & Müller: 1995: 18, Van Dassen & Müller: 
1997).  Standing in contrast to the EU however, were a number of developing countries 
who opposed unconditional indefinite extension.  Mexico in particular was prominent in 
calling for extension plus (UNODA: 1995a) which sought the indefinite extension of the 
NPT but with additional measures including commitment by the nuclear-weapons states to 
cease all production of nuclear weapons and to reduce their arsenals directly.  A number of 
NAM countries, led by Iran, further opposed indefinite extension and called instead for 
rolling fixed term periods of 25 years and comprising several obligations that States Parties 
must meet, not least by the nuclear-weapons states (UNODA: 1995b)
87
.   
 
Within the existing literature, accounts of the EU’s performance in pursuit of the NPT’s 
indefinite extension have been highly positive, with the EU’s actions widely acknowledged 
as “crucial” to the campaigns success (Meier & Quille: 2005, Portela: 2003: 6, Van Dassen 
& Müller: 1997: 65).  Focus particularly has been given to the EU’s, “efficient and 
protracted diplomatic campaign” (Fischer & Müller: 1995: 42) judged to have been, “the 
best-known and celebrated example of EU action in non-proliferation” (Portela: 2003: 6) 
as well as a, “model for joint European action” (Meier & Quille: 2005).  Across other 
issues under negotiation during the 1995 RevCon however, the EU’s performance has also 
been criticised for having, “showed major shortcomings” (Fischer & Müller: 1995: 43) 
with the EU’s inability to agree a common EU position on the crux issue of nuclear 
disarmament especially highlighted as a notable flaw in its ability to make a difference 
across other major issues (Fischer & Müller: 1995: 43).  In fact, with the EU Joint Action 
focused solely on the objective of indefinite extension and strengthening the NPT through 
universality, it has not been possible to evaluate ‘EU’ performance on any other 
negotiating issues during the 1995 RevCon.  Efforts by the EU to attempt to develop a 
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 Co-sponsors of this proposal included the DPRK, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Thailand and Zimbabwe  
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common line on nuclear disarmament largely failed (Fischer & Müller: 1995: 43) and thus 
the ‘EU’ was an actor over the issue of indefinite extension only.  On this issue however, 
the EU was to give a good performance, demonstrating not only a moderate level of overall 
negotiation behaviour but also high effectiveness.    
 
On the indefinite extension decision, the EU was represented during the 1995 NPT 
RevCon by the then French Council Presidency with the EU position openly endorsed 
within the national statements and activities of each of the EU Member States (UNODA: 
1995c).  Speaking with many voices but maintaining cohesion over the issue of indefinite 
extension, EU unity on this issue was therefore moderate.  The EU’s outreach to its 
negotiation partners prior to and during the RevCon was also notably high.  Adopting a 
proactive negotiation strategy approaching the 1995 RevCon, the EU’s tactics included a 
tour des capitales of demarchés conducted by the Troika of past, present and future 
Council Presidencies and further reinforced, by diplomatic relations pursued with third 
countries by Member States individually (Fischer & Müller: 1995, Portela: 2003).  The EU 
specifically targeted those countries that continued to resist indefinite extension of the 
NPT, including, for example Egypt, Indonesia and Mexico (AgenceEurope: 1995).  The 
core aims of this tactic was to persuade States Parties to support indefinite extension of the 
NPT and to garner enough support in order to add weight to EU calls for the decision to be 
taken unanimously rather than by a vote.  This strategy was highly successful with a 
number of Latin American and African States Parties identified as having shifted their 
stance in favour of indefinite extension as a result of EU persuasion (Fischer & Müller: 
1995: 43).  The co-sponsored proposal in favour of indefinite extension further resulted in 
111 NPT States Parties formally aligning with the Draft Decision to indefinitely extend the 
NPT during the 1995 RevCon (UNODA: 1995d).   
 
Furthermore, with representation by the French Council Presidency – and with France 
attending not only as a NWS but also as a recently acceded NPT member – the EU was 
formally participant in the final week negotiations that took place between a small group of 
25 States Parties as ‘Friends of the President’. These negotations focused specifically upon 
the drafting of the final language to be included in the RevCon outcome document and on 
the crux negotiations centring on strengthening the NPT review process (Fischer & Müller: 
1995: 43).   It is noted however that, with the EU position so dominated upon the extension 
decision, France’s participation in this group was much more to do with its position as a P-
5 member and NWS, than to the high significance of the EU to the decision-making 
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process.  Subsequently, whilst the EU position on indefinite extension was pushed during 
these sessions, ‘EU’ participation beyond that was far more limited.  EU significance is 
therefore assessed as being moderate in the 1995 RevCon producing an overall moderate 
level of negotiation behaviour in the pursuit of the EU Joint Action. 
 
Adding to this moderate negotiation behaviour, the EU was also highly effective in 
achieving the objectives of its Joint Action in the 1995 RevCon.  Most importantly the EU 
attained its core objective to extend indefinitely the NPT.  In the decisions adopted in the 
negotiation conclusion, Decision Three detailed that, “as a majority exists among States 
party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, in accordance with article X, paragraph 2, 
the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely” (UNODA: 1995e (Decision 3)).  Further 
emphasising this success, the EU was also effective in achieving its objective through 
unanimity.  No vote was taken on the indefinite extension decision but was instead 
approved by consensus.  Whilst the extension decision was not wholly ‘unconditional’ as 
the EU Joint Action specifies, the conditions which came with it did nevertheless include 
several elements favoured, and openly supported, by the EU. Most notably the EU 
objective of promoting the universality of the NPT was included within the Final 
Document under Decision Two, with a call to all States not yet party to the Treaty to 
accede as soon as possible (UNODA: 1995e (Decision 2(1)).   
 
It should be noted however, that the indefinite extension decision was just one of a number 
of substantive developments to come out of the 1995 RevCon.   Also agreed were several 
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament (UNODA: 1995e 
(Decision 2)) aimed at reconfirming the obligations of both NWS and NNWS to their 
commitments under the NPT.  Stronger review processes were also negotiated, and 
subsequently implemented in 1995.  Critically the 1995 NPT RevCon also produced a 
Resolution on the Middle East – itself seen as a compromise to those States Parties 
reluctant to support indefinite extension (interview, EU diplomatic source, New York, 7
th
 
March 2011, interview, Minister Counsellor to the UN, northern developed country, New 
York, 9
th
 March 2011) – calling for all States within the Middle East to take practical steps 
towards, “the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons 
of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems”.  It 
further called upon all NPT States Parties and, “in particular the nuclear-weapon States” to 
extend their cooperation and exert effort to establish this nuclear weapon free zone in the 
region (UNODA: 1995e).  On these more substantive and politicised issues, the EU, with 
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no agreed common position beyond that of the indefinite extension decision, was virtually 
irrelevant to the negotiations; having little to offer beyond that of what its Members had 
been able to agree in July 1994 and subsequently of little or no influence.  Thus, whilst the 
EU’s good performance in delivering its objectives from the Joint Action was impressive, 
its impact elsewhere was lacking. 
 
The 2000 RevCon: A fair performance 
The next NPT Review Conference took place from 24
th
 April to 19
th
 May 2000.  
Particularly dominant on the agenda in 2000 was the issue of Indo-Pakistani nuclear test 
explosions two years previously which had, “sent shivers through the non-proliferation 
regime”(Johnson: 2000).  Efforts to push forward with the Principles and Objectives for 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed at the 1995 RevCon, as well as the 
implementation of a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone, had met with limited success; 
raising calls for the 2000 RevCon to produce practical and concrete steps forward for the 
regime.  For the EU the 2000 RevCon also reflected an important development in its 
negotiation position.  In a substantial development from the 1994 Council Decision, the 
EU’s 2000 Common Position (Council: 2000a) included the aim, in addition to its core 
objectives to, “strengthen the non-proliferation regime”; “promote a successful outcome” 
in the 2000 RevCon and; to “help build consensus”: twenty-one substantive issues, “for 
consideration” which ranged across all three pillars of the NPT.   
 
Amongst them, the EU set out objectives to pursue the early entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), to push for negotiations to commence on a 
Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) calling for provision for the reduction in non-
strategic nuclear weapons, and the establishment of a new working group under the 
Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament focused upon the cessation of the nuclear arms 
race and nuclear disarmament (Council: 2000a).  It further called for the development of 
nuclear weapon free zones, and to introduce an Additional Protocol under IAEA 
comprehensive safeguard agreements
88
 (Council: 2000a: Art 2).  However, despite its 
increased detail, the EU’s common position entering the 2000 RevCon was low in 
ambition.  Conservative in nature, the EU’s position gave no clear indication of what it 
sought for in the Final Document, and was principally premised on basic – universally 
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 The Additional Protocol is a legal document granting the IAEA complementary inspection authority to that 
provided in existing safeguard arrangements.  It enables the IAEA inspectorate to give assurance about both 
declared and possible undeclared nuclear activities.  
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acknowledged – principles such as encouraging the support of other multilateral arms 
control efforts and helping to “build consensus” towards a successful outcome (Council: 
2000a, emphasis added).  Subsequently, the EU’s position ensured that, whilst saying a 
great deal more than in 1995, it also found symmetries with the preference structures not 
only of its own and other NWS, but also the wider NNWS community as well.   
 
The EU has nevertheless been lauded within the existing literature for its role in achieving 
a Final Document in 2000 (Meier & Quille: 2005).  The RevCon outcome is seen to have 
been, “inspired by EU proposals” (Portela: 2003) and the EU has been judged to have 
played, “a notable role in the eventually successful Conference” (Portela: 2004: 6).  
Implicit in these assessments is that, because many of the EU’s substantive issues were 
included in the RevCon’s Final Document, the EU performed well in the 2000 RevCon.   
Closer analysis of the EU’s performance as a measure of both its negotiation behaviour and 
effectiveness however, shows that the EU’s performance was only fair in the 2000 
RevCon.  Whilst corroborating those claims that the EU had a high level of effectiveness in 
attaining what are the majority of its negotiation objectives in the Final Document, it also 
finds that this in fact coincided with a low level of negotiation behaviour.   It is thus argued 
that the success of the 2000 RevCon may have had less to do with the EU’s own 
negotiation position and subsequent behaviour, and much more to do with others with 
whom the EU was to share negotiation objectives. 
 
The EU’s official voice during the 2000 RevCon was provided by the Portuguese Council 
Presidency who gave statements on behalf of the EU in the plenary session, as well as in 
all three Main Committees (UNODA: 2000a).  Continuing to demonstrate moderate unity, 
the Council Presidency’s voice was again supplemented by the EU Member States with 
several Members also working alongside other negotiation groupings.  Sweden for 
example, in a statement to the general plenary endorsed both the EU statement and also 
that of the newly formed New Agenda Coalition (NAC) position (UNODA: 2000a: 36).   
Several other Member States including Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Ireland also 
worked alongside the G-10 to pursue shared objectives in Main Committee II and III.   
Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands (along with Norway) in fact stressed within 
the titles of their working papers submitted to the negotiations as the ‘NATO-5’ that their 
position was, “complementary to the European Union Common Position” (UNODA: 
2000b: xvi-xvii).  On the whole these activities were not contradictory to the EU common 
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position which, due to its ambiguity, enabled Member States some freedom to pursue 
stronger national interests without crossing any EU red-lines.   
 
The EU’s outreach during the 2000 RevCon was however, low.  Whilst demonstrating a 
marked improvement relative to 1995 through the submission of a number of formal EU 
working papers, including several to the negotiations on nuclear disarmament (UNODA: 
2000b: xvi-xvii), the EU’s negotiation strategy during the negotiations was reactive and the 
EU undertook no clear activity to persuade others of any specific EU objectives.  Relative 
to the impressive diplomatic campaign conducted by the EU in preparation for the NPT’s 
indefinite extension in 1995, its outreach in 2000 was underwhelming.  Similarly the EU’s 
significance was also to diminish following 1995.  Whilst participant in all of the open 
negotiation sessions, the Portuguese Council Presidency was then excluded from endgame 
bargaining.   Most notable in this regard was that whilst the EU’s official voice was 
excluded from the ‘Friends of the President’ negotiations, which were to again take place 
in 2000, these same negotiations were to include several EU Member States present in 
their own national capacity as members of the P-5 and NAC.  With disarmament proving 
to be the fundamental dividing issue between the P-5 and NAM it was therefore with 
members of the NAC, and not the EU, that the P-5 chose to negotiate in the final week in 
an effort to find agreement (Johnson: 2000, Hill: 2000).   
 
Despite this low outreach and significance, the EU was however, to achieve most of its 
objectives in the 2000 Final Document.  Negotiations concluded with the consensual 
adoption of a document for, “Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review 
process for the Treaty” (UNODA: 2000c) and which encompassed what are referred to as 
the “Thirteen Practical Steps” towards nuclear disarmament by the NWS.  Within that 
document the EU can claim the attainment of the majority of the 21 substantive issues 
raised in its common position.  Most notably flagged up within the existing literature are 
the references within the Final Document to the principles of irreversibility and 
transparency, and to the commitment to establish a nuclear disarmament working group 
within the Conference on Disarmament (Portela: 2003, 2004). Other goals were also 
attained however, including a call for all States to ratify the CTBT, to begin negotiations 
towards a FMCT, and to accede to several other multilateral arms control conventions 
including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Physical Protection Convention 
(UNODA: 2000c) as also detailed within the EU common position. 
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This particular case therefore presents an interesting dynamic.  The EU’s high 
effectiveness should suggest that it performed well.  Accounts within the existing literature 
of the EU’s proposals ‘inspiring’ and helping to achieve the 2000 Final Document would 
certainly imply this as well.  However, it is also clear that in the 2000 negotiations, the 
EU’s negotiation behaviour was low.  Whilst the EU did therefore attain most of its goals, 
it did so with a low outreach, moderate unity, and without being participant in endgame 
bargaining, suggesting that some other factors must have been at play in helping the EU to 
attain its goals.  Firstly, it is important to note that the EU’s goals in 2000 were low in 
ambition.  Subsequently its goal-attainment, whilst high, was premised on the 
acknowledgement of basic principles widely acknowledged, if not tacitly favoured, within 
the international community already.  Second, the EU was not the only negotiator to 
support those objectives outlined in the Final Document.  Importantly, the NAC position 
also reflected close symmetries with these principles.  For example, the NAC supported the 
pursuit of the CTBT and FMCT, sought the acknowledgement of the principles of 
irreversibility and transparency in NWS disarmament, and had also called for a working 
group to be established within the Conference on Disarmament to tackle practical 
disarmament (NAC: 2000).  Comparative to the EU moreover, the NAC did have high 
outreach in 2000 (Johnson: 2000) and was also highly significant, being participant in the 
last week negotiations along with the P-5.  Whilst the Final Document was a consensus 
decision, and therefore the EU can claim some credit for these goals being attained, its lack 
of involvement during key negotiation processes, coupled with its low outreach to other 
negotiation partners, would seem to suggest that EU effectiveness in this case was more a 
result of actions by the NAC than by the EU itself.  Its overall performance therefore is 
assessed as fair. 
 
The 2005 RevCon: Very poor performance and a missed opportunity 
The 2005 NPT RevCon took place in New York from 2
nd
 to 27
th
 May and has been widely 
acknowledged to have been a failed negotiation (Interview, Ambassador to the Political & 
Security Council, EU Member State F, Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011, interview, Ambassador to 
the UN, southern developing country, New York, 10
th
 March 2011, Kile: 2006, Johnson: 
2005, Müller: 2005: 34, Potter: 2005: 19).  During the five years since the 2000 RevCon 
several critical nuclear proliferation events had taken place in focusing the attention of 
delegates.  The terrorist attacks in the US on 11
th
 September 2001 and the resultant War 
Against Terror had significantly increased the threat of nuclear terrorism and emphasised 
the need for stringent nuclear non-proliferation measures.   The US had further targeted 
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several States in an ‘Axis of Evil’ – including NPT members Iran, Iraq and Syria - for 
allegedly harbouring terrorist cells and fostering a black market in nuclear materials.  
Adding further fuel to the fire, in 2003 the DPRK had announced its withdrawal from the 
NPT; further reinforcing concerns that the DPRK was attempting to develop a nuclear 
weapons programme.  States Parties entering the 2005 RevCon were thus faced with 
pressing challenges, not only in how to deal with an unprecedented case of withdrawal 
from the Treaty, but also ensuring the strict compliance by several of its own members 
with the principles it enshrined.   
 
For the EU, the 2005 RevCon provided an opportunity on several levels.  With the United 
States reverting to unilateralism in efforts to tackle threats to its security the EU was in a 
position to fill this “void in leadership” within the NPT community (Müller: 2005: 43).  In 
2003 the EU had moreover launched a Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) (Council: 2003d).  The strategy outlined, for the first time, the 
need for a coherent EU Action Plan to address the threat of nuclear proliferation.  In it, the 
strategy emphasised that ‘effective multilateralism’ was the cornerstone of EU efforts in 
combating the proliferation of WMD and that it would pursue the universalisation of 
multilateral treaties, including the NPT, putting particular emphasis on compliance with 
those treaties (Council: 2003d: 6).  It therefore presented an important document in 
emphasising EU continued commitment to ‘effective multilateralism’ at a time when US 
unilateralism was making many nervous.  In 2004 moreover, all EU Member States – 
including the recently acceded central and eastern European countries – had signed the 
Additional Protocol to IAEA comprehensive safeguard arrangements.  As a leading 
advocate of the Additional Protocol, this domestic action further created opportunity for 
the EU to ‘lead the way’ by setting an example that others could follow. 
 
The EU’s common position entering the 2005 RevCon was also more substantive than in  
2000.  Continuing to pursue its primary objectives: to “strengthen the international nuclear 
non-proliferation regime by promoting the successful outcome of the RevCon” and to 
“help build consensus” (Council: 2005a: 2(b)), the EU also outlined a total of forty-three 
‘essential issues’ that it would pursue in the 2005 RevCon.  Notable amongst these was a 
call for the adoption of measures to discourage withdrawal from the NPT, an emphasis on 
the “absolute necessity of full compliance with all provisions of the NPT” and further 
emphasising the need for an Additional Protocol as the new verification standard for the 
IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguard Arrangements.  The EU position also continued to 
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reiterate the need for urgent ratification of the CTBT as well as the need for negotiations to 
commence on a FMCT (which still had not progressed since 2000).  The position 
nevertheless continued to be weak on the issue of nuclear disarmament, mentioning simply 
that the NPT, “represents the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament” 
(Council: 2005a: 2(b)2)) but offering no concrete steps for tackling the issue.   
 
Whilst the EU common position in 2005 was judged to have been “promising” (Müller: 
2005: 43) and “well-defined” (Potter: 2005: 23), it is noted that the EU continued to utilise 
ambiguous, lowest common denominator language.  Whilst outlining several more 
substantive issues than it had in 2000, the 2005 position nevertheless remained ‘business as 
usual’ by failing to indicate how it would pursue those essential issues it had highlighted, 
or what it explicitly sought for the negotiation outcome.  Rather than offering clear 
direction the EU position remained conservative, continuing to offer broad appeal to both 
NWS and NNWS by remaining resolutely uncontroversial but offering little of the 
leadership that would enable the EU to “fill the void” that had been left by the US’s 
reticence. 
 
The EU’s performance during the 2005 RevCon has been broadly criticised within 
analytical commentary of the event. Müller (2005: 43), an analyst and official with the 
German delegation during the negotiations, has referred to the EU’s “dismal performance” 
during the RevCon; blaming divisions within the EU for its failure to offer leadership at a 
time when the United States was backing away from multilateral efforts and focusing on its 
unilateral policy (Interview, Minister Counsellor to the UN, northern developed country, 
New York, 9
th
 March 2011, interview, EU diplomatic source, New York, 7
th
 March 2011, 
Johnson: 2005).  Others have suggested that the EU failed due to its “unconvincing 
strategy” (Johnson: 2005) and because it was “hampered by internal divisions” (Kile: 
2006: 616).  Supporting these claims it is here found that the EU performed very poorly in 
the 2005 RevCon because it had both a low level of negotiation behaviour and, with the 
RevCon failing to produce any Final Document, a low effectiveness also, reflecting a worst 
case scenario for EU performance with low levels across all four performance indicators. 
 
 The EU’s unity in 2005 was to prove a particular set-back for the EU’s performance.  
Represented during the negotiations by the Luxembourg Council Presidency, Member 
States also continued to speak and negotiate in a national capacity.  Unlike the 1995 and 
2000 RevCons where their positions remained primarily complementary to the EU 
183 
 
common position, in 2005 several Members voiced opinions and objectives contradictory 
to the EU.  A particular point of contention early in the negotiations was the agenda to be 
adopted.  Holding up proceedings, the United States, supported by France, had objected to 
an agenda that included the agreements achieved in 1995 and 2000, particularly with 
regard to steps towards nuclear disarmament (Johnson: 2005: 1, interview, Minister 
Counsellor to the UN, northern developed country, New York, 9
th
 March 2011).  
Increasingly vocal in opposition to any mention of the ‘13 Practical Steps’ to nuclear 
disarmament, France’s actions were in direct contradiction to the EU common position 
which stated that any negotiations should be built, “on the basis of the framework 
established by the NPT in supporting the Decisions and Resolution adopted at the 1995 
Review and Extension Conference and the final document of the 2000 NPT Review 
Conference” (Council: 2005a: 2(b)).   
 
Within Main Committee negotiations the EU Member States were also seen to go “astray 
along national lines” (Müller: 2005: 43), failing to adequately reiterate EU positions 
(Potter: 2005: 24) and actively pursuing their own stronger national interests in Committee 
negotiations (see UNODA: 2005a).  The Netherlands, for example, was seen to work 
particularly actively, not only within the EU, but also within the G-10 and NATO-7, who it 
then spoke on behalf of in the main committees.  Whilst these positions were broadly 
complementary to the EU common position, that it spoke so regularly and was quite so 
‘hyperactive’ (Müller: 2005: 43) further emphasised the impression of EU division.  
 
EU outreach during the 2005 RevCon was also low.  Despite having more to say in its 
more detailed common position, the EU then failed to promote its position with negotiation 
partners (Johnson: 2005), spending more time attempting to reconcile differences within its 
own membership rather than negotiating with others.   Whilst the EU was found to increase 
the number of formal working papers submitted to the 2005 RevCon (UNODA: 2005b), 
including papers submitted to each of the Main Committees and with one aimed 
specifically at the issue of withdrawal, its negotiation strategy was reactive and, with 
divisions increasingly evident amongst its Members, the EU was then unable to actively 
promote them.  In addition, the EU had low significance with the Luxembourg Council 
Presidency excluded from the final week ‘Friends of the President’ negotiations held 
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between approximately twenty States Parties
89
 (interview, Ambassador to the UN, southern 
developing country, New York, 10
th
 March 2011). 
 
The overall failure of the 2005 RevCon to find agreement and produce a Final Document 
was moreover to result in the EU having low effectiveness.  With its priority objective of, 
“promoting the successful outcome of the 2005 Review Conference” (Council: 2005a: 1) 
the failure of the conference was an inevitable failure for the EU’s objectives also.  The 
2005 RevCon thus not only ended in failure for the NPT community, but for the EU as 
well.  With its very poor performance – sharply revealed in the limited ambition of its 
negotiation position and the divisions of its Member States – the EU missed its opportunity 
to make a difference to the negotiations and to take on a bigger role within the NPT itself.  
 
The 2010 RevCon: A transitional period and a good performance 
In sharp contrast to the negative atmospherics of the 2005 RevCon, the 2010 NPT RevCon, 
taking place from 3
rd
 to 28
th
 May in New York, was launched under a far more positive 
negotiation environment (interview, EU diplomatic source, EEAS, New York, 7
th
 March 
2011, Johnson: 2010).  Following the failure of 2005, officials from across the political 
divide were increasingly concerned about the implications that a second failed RevCon 
would have on the NPT (Interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, EU 
Member State C, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011, interview, Ambassador to the UN, southern 
developing country, New York, 10
th
 March 2011, interview, Minister Counsellor to the 
UN, northern developed country, New York, 9
th
 March 2011).   The 2010 negotiations 
were however to receive a significant boost in 2009 by the election in the US of the Obama 
Administration which was to re-energise the non-proliferation and disarmament debate by 
taking important steps to demonstrate a new multilateral approach to the issue.  These were 
to include a prominent speech given by President Obama in Prague in April 2009 (White 
House: 2009) which was lauded for the US’s re-commitment to a world free of nuclear 
weapons (BBC News: 2009, Interview, EU diplomatic source, New York, 7
th
 March 2011, 
interview, First Secretary, EU Member State E, New York, 11
th
 March 2011, interview, 
senior analyst, Acronym Institute of Disarmament Diplomacy, London, 19
th
 April 2011).  
Also in 2009 the US and Russia had begun renegotiations on a second Strategic Arms 
                                                   
89
 The final week negotiations took place at the Mexican mission in New York and were colloquially referred 
to as the ‘Smokers Group’ meetings due to the large number of delegates who smoked (interview, 
Ambassador to the UN, southern developing country, New York, 10
th
 March 2011).  The negotiations 
involved several EU Member States including members of the P-5 and NAC but Luxembourg was excluded 
in its role as EU representative. 
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Reduction Treaty (START-II), and in April 2010 the US hosted a Nuclear Security Summit 
coinciding also with the publication of its Nuclear Posture Review where it set out concrete 
steps to reduce the United States’ reliance on nuclear weapons for security and to move 
towards ‘global zero’ (US Department of Defence: 2010). Compared to 2005, with the 
US’s stance so altered, there was therefore real momentum towards a successful outcome 
for the NPT RevCon in 2010 (Anthony et al. 2010: 87) with the mood seen to be 
“cautiously optimistic” (Johnson: 2010, Müller: 2010: 5) 
 
The EU’s common position entering the 2010 negotiations again followed a similar trend 
to that seen in 2000 and 2005. Demonstrating an increased substance, the 2010 common 
position not only outlined its on-going core objective, “to strengthen the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime by promoting a substantive and balanced outcome to the 
2010 Review Conference” (Council: 2010a: Art. 1), but in fact specified that to attain that 
goal the EU would pursue “the adoption of a set of concrete, effective, pragmatic and 
consensual measures for stepping up international efforts against proliferation, pursuing 
disarmament and ensuring the responsible uses of nuclear energy” (Council: 2010a: Art. 
1).  In addition, in an improvement to the 2000 and 2005 positions, the EU common 
position in 2010 further specified seven priority areas that it sought to address in the 
negotiations backed up by a total of 56 ‘essential issues’ to promote.  These seven 
priorities included: a reaffirmation by all States Parties to their Treaty obligations, the 
adoption of concrete measures to enable States Parties to meet their obligations; ensuring 
the rapid entry into force of the CTBT and for negotiations to start on an FMCT; including 
the Additional Protocol as the new verification standard for the IAEA’s comprehensive 
safeguard arrangements; establishing a common understanding on how to resolutely and 
effectively respond to cases of non-compliance (with particular mention to the DPRK and 
Iran), and encouraging multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle (Council: 2010a: 
Art. 2(1-7)).  On top of this the common position was notable in calling for a moratorium 
on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons pending the entry into force of a 
FMCT (Council: 2010a: Art 3(17)), as well as for emphasising the need for, “immediate 
steps” towards the goal of nuclear disarmament and, “for an overall reduction in nuclear 
arsenals in the pursuit of gradual, systematic, nuclear disarmament” (Council: 2010a: Art 
3(7-8))
90
.   
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 It is also noted that the EU does also stress that “the special responsibility of the states that possess the 
largest arsenals” should be also be taken into account (Council: 2010a: Art 3(8))  
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Comparative to its own previous common positions, the EU’s stance entering the 2010 
RevCon was also more ambitious.  Most notably, unlike the 2000 and 2005 RevCons, the 
EU’s position in 2010 actually outlined specific goals that it sought for the 2010 
negotiation outcome – and not just broad principles that it favoured for the NPT regime as 
a whole.  Specifying the need for concrete measures and detailing seven priority areas for 
moving the negotiations forward gave the EU a more progressive position in 2010 and 
moved it beyond its traditional conservative basis.  This position was however only 
moderately ambitious.  Whilst it was progressive it nevertheless met in large part with the 
preference structures of its negotiation partners.  In calling for concrete and pragmatic 
measures to be agreed from the RevCon, the EU position was largely in keeping with a 
general consensus that had emerged following the 2009 NPT PrepCom that a balanced 
action plan across all three pillars would be required from the 2010 outcome (Interview, 
Counsellor, southern developing country, New York, 11
th
 March 2011, interview, 
Counsellor, EU Member State D, New York, 10
th
 March 2011, interview, Deputy 
Permanent Representative to the CD, EU Member State C, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011).  On 
the majority of issues within each pillar moreover the EU position was to show many 
symmetries with the position of the P-5 and G-10 (see also Appendix IV) – particularly 
evident on support for an Additional Protocol and promoting the multilateral fuel cycle.  
The EU could also claim some symmetry with the NAC and NAM over support for the 
CTBT and FMCT, including a call for a moratorium on the production of fissile material.  
In this way therefore the EU’s position in 2010 was to find areas of agreement with each of 
the main negotiation groupings within the NPT. 
 
The EU’s performance in the 2010 RevCon was then good.  Demonstrating both a 
moderate level of negotiation behaviour and a high degree of effectiveness the EU 
considerably improved upon its poor performance from 2005. This was further notable in 
light of changes that had taken place within the EU as a result of the Lisbon Treaty with 
the EU undergoing a ‘transitional period’ at the time of the 2010 RevCon (interview, EU 
diplomatic source, New York, 7
th
 March 2011).  The transitional aspect in particular 
affected the EU’s representation within the NPT, with a system of dual-representation 
including both the rotating Council Presidency – held by Spain and led predominantly by 
the then Spanish Disarmament Ambassador Miguel Aguirre de Carcer – and the EEAS, 
headed up initially by the newly appointed High Representative for the Union on Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy – Catherine Ashton – and latterly by the EEAS Director for 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs, Annalisa Giannella.  This odd state of affairs 
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resulted in the EU being represented by Catherine Ashton speaking in the general debate 
on the first day of the RevCon, and then by the Spanish Ambassador supported by Ms. 
Giannella for the remainder of the four weeks of negotiations. 
 
Despite this complexity over EU representation, and in a notable improvement to 2005, the 
EU’s unity in the 2010 RevCon was moderate.  With the Council Presidency speaking for 
the EU on the majority of issues, including in all plenary and committee discourses, EU 
Member States did then retain cohesion with the EU common position in their own 
statements and during committee sessions (UNODA: 2010a).   Comparison of the language 
between Catherine Ashton’s statement and those of the EU Member States for example 
reflects marked similarities, with Member States national statements also focusing on the 
Additional Protocol; calling for the ratification of the CTBT, emphasising concerns over 
non-compliance by Iran and the DPRK, and stressing the urgency of introducing the 
Middle East Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) to fulfil obligations from the 1995 
RevCon (UNODA: 2010a).  In sharp contrast to the 2005 RevCon where French efforts to 
block a negotiation agenda weakened the EU’s unity, in 2010 the EU managed to prevent 
internal disagreements from being openly aired but instead presented itself a united front.  
This has further been acknowledged by the EU’s negotiation partners, with one third 
country official claiming that the EU, “did not wash its dirty laundry in public” (Interview, 
Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, northern developed country, Geneva, 24
th
 
May 2011). 
 
A further point of note is that a number of Member States did also continue their tradition 
of working alongside other like-minded negotiation groupings including the New Agenda 
Coalition, the G-10 and the NATO-7 (see Figure 5.1 above).  Despite this, in interviews 
conducted by the author, many EU Member State officials involved in the 2010 NPT 
RevCon emphasised that whilst they sometimes went ‘further’ in their national positions 
by aligning with other groups (interview, First Counsellor, EU Member State A, New 
York, 9
th
 March 2011, interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, EU 
Member State B, New York, 9
th
 March 2011, interview, Deputy Permanent Representative 
to the CD, EU Member State C, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011, interview, Ambassador to the CD, 
EU Member State G, Geneva, 20
th
 May 2011) this was not considered contradictory to the 
EU position (Interview, Former Disarmament Ambassador Aguire de Carcer, Spanish 
Permanent Mission to the EU, Brussels, 5
th
 May 2011).  Others further emphasised that 
whilst Member States often aligned with other groups their loyalty remained to the EU and 
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to the common position with, “the level of alliance being much stronger within the EU” 
than to other groups (Interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, EU Member 
Sate C, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011, Interview, Ambassador to the CD, EU Member State G, 
Geneva, 20
th
 May 2011).   
 
In 2010 moreover, rather than undermining the EU’s performance, Member Sate cross-
alignment with other groups in fact provided an important avenue for the promotion of the 
EU’s common principles and to spread the EU position to a wider audience.  
Demonstrating a proactive negotiation strategy and with a high level of outreach, this 
cross-alignment of EU Member States working in other negotiation groups was a highly 
useful tactic; creating a multiple effect by utilising a network of diplomacies and 
communication through which the EU’s principles and objectives were promoted, issues 
debated and intentions between groups known.  Furthermore, this action was not 
detrimental to the EU’s performance but instead allowed different streams within the EU to 
better understand the positions of the other members of these groupings, and to feed this 
into the EU process.  EU coordination meetings thus became an opportunity where each 
Member State brought the outcome of its own bilateral relations to the table in order to 
fine-tune the EU’s own position and activity (interview, Former Disarmament Ambassador 
Aguire de Carcer, Spanish Permanent Mission to the EU, Brussels, 5
th
 May 2011).  With 
an EU position then agreed the Member States used whatever channels they had outside of 
the EU to promote the EU position.  Interestingly this was also something the Member 
States did, “as a matter of course” (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, 
EU Member State C, Geneva, 19
th
 May 2011) and which was moreover considered to be a 
great tool and an advantage for the EU, allowing it to have, “eyes and ears in many 
different bodies” (interview, Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, northern 
developed country, Geneva, 24
th
 May 2011). 
 
This diversity of activity within the EU group – building on the Member States’ own 
network of relationships and communication and through information sharing between 
these other negotiation groups – further allowed the EU to be even better informed of the 
movements at play in the negotiations and to consequently adapt its reactions to 
compensate.  In an environment where information matters, this ability of the EU to act as 
a hub for information coming in and going out ensured it was well-placed to be an actor 
that helped find the necessary consensus needed to produce a successful outcome.  This 
was most notable with regards to the language debated for inclusion in the RevCon’s Final 
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Document.  As one EU Member State official involved in the final week negotiations 
explained: 
 
“Quite a lot of the language from the EU is taken on in discussions with other groups 
– because the EU Member States are also in those other groups.  At the NPT, in the 
secret drafting exercise going on in parallel to the main negotiations, they were 
looking for language trying to build bridges.  The chair of that drafting committee 
could rely on EU language because it had already been tested in other fora and where 
states had found some agreement” (interview, Ambassador to the Political & 
Security Council, EU Member State F, Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011) 
 
As several interviewees suggested, the language put forward by the EU in the NPT was 
debated within the other negotiation groups of which the EU Member States also form 
part.  The close symmetry between the EU common position and the P-5 statement, as well 
as likenesses with the NAC and G-10 language, further provides some testimony of that. In 
this way acceptable language, already finely debated within the EU itself, was then aired in 
other negotiation groups and slight adaptations made which the EU could then put forward 
in the inner negotiations.  
 
This in term emphasises a further improvement for the EU’s significance in the 2010 
negotiations.  Unlike in 2000 and 2005, in 2010 the EU was to have a moderate level of 
significance, importantly being invited to, and participant in, the closed inner negotiations 
formed by the RevCon President, Ambassador Libran Cabactulan and hosted at the 
Egyptian Mission (Interview, Counsellor, southern developing country, New York, 11
th
 
March 2011, interview, Ambassador to the UN, New York, 10
th
 March 2011, interview, 
First Secretary, EU Member State E, New York, 11
th
 March 2011, interview, Former 
Disarmament Ambassador Aguirre de Carcer, Spanish Permanent Mission to the EU, 
Brussels, 5
th
 May 2011, Johnson: 2010).  Whilst the Spanish Council Presidency and 
EEAS were not involved in all sessions
91
, their participation within these crucial drafting 
negotiations ensured that the EU’s choice of language – finally debated both within the EU 
and with other negotiation groups – could be pushed forward.  The EU’s invitation to form 
part of this closed group of negotiators was also seen to be an important indicator that the 
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 The EU was not critical to the closed inner negotiations held by the RevCon Presidency and key players 
involved in the Middle East negotiations (interview, Ambassador to the UN, southern developing country, 
New York, 9
th
  March 2011) 
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EU was taken seriously within the NPT and that it was a voice that should be heard at the 
table (interview, First Counsellor, EU Member State E, New York, 11
th
 March 2011). 
 
The EU was then also to attain most of its goals in the 2010 RevCon Final Document.  
Returning to the EU’s common position, the EU’s main objective for the 2010 NPT 
RevCon was to strengthen the NPT regime and to promote a substantive and balanced 
outcome.  This was certainly achieved.  The 2010 RevCon was widely acclaimed a success 
by diplomats and analysts alike (all interviewees – see Appendix I for full list, Johnson: 
2010, Müller: 2010, Dhanapala: 2010). A Final Document was adopted by consensus and 
which included a forward-looking action plan that covered major points across all three 
pillars of the NPT.  In that respect therefore the EU’s primary objective was attained.   
 
Closer analysis of the Final Document further shows that the EU did attain most of its 
Seven Priorities as well as other aspects of its common position.  For example, the Final 
Document reiterates the obligations of all States Parties to their responsibilities under the 
NPT as well as emphasising the principles of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability 
in disarmament measures (UNODA: 2010b: Actions 1-2).  The Document moreover makes 
a direct call to States Parties to ratify the CTBT and start negotiations of an FMCT, with 
language analogous to that of the EUs (UNODA: 2010b: Actions 10-18), whilst also 
emphasising that discussions would continue regarding the development of multilateral 
approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle (UNODA: 2010b: Action 58).  The EU was however, 
unsuccessful in securing a firm commitment for the Additional Protocol to become the 
IAEA new verification standard, with the Final Document softening this language to 
“encourage” States to adopt the Protocol (UNODA: 2010b: Action 18) and calling for the 
IAEA Board of Governors to work towards recognition of the Protocol as a new 
verification standard.  However, the EU was successful in receiving some recognition of its 
efforts to encourage discussion between parties over the Middle East Resolution.  Whilst 
not included as an item on the EU’s original common position, an EU offer made during 
the RevCon to host a seminar in 2012 between the key stakeholders involved in the Middle 
East Resolution to establish a nuclear weapon free zone was welcomed and included in the 
Final Document (UNODA: 2010b: IV(5e)).  For many this was a critical development to 
come out of the 2010 negotiations (Interview, senior advisor, ICRC, New York, 10
th
 March 
2011, interview, EU diplomatic source, New York, 7
th
 March 2011, interview, Counsellor, 
southern developing country, New York, 11
th
 March 2011, interview, First Secretary, EU 
Member State E, New York, 11
th
 March 2011, Dhanapala: 2010: 11) and further 
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emphasised the EU’s high level of effectiveness.  Coupled with the EU’s improved 
negotiation behaviour, its performance as a whole in 2010 had therefore shown 
considerable improvement. 
 
Conclusion 
As this analysis has demonstrated, EU performance in the NPT review negotiations 
between 1995 and 2010 has been variable, with the EU giving performances assessed as 
poor, fair and good - reflected in Figure 5.2 below.  Starting off well in 1995, the EU 
achieved a good performance in fulfilling its Joint Action to pursue the indefinite extension 
of the NPT.  Its performance dropped however to fair in 2000 and then to very poor in the 
failed 2005 RevCon – in fact demonstrating a worst case scenario for EU performance with 
low measures across all four performance indicators.  EU performance has however, seen a 
marked improvement since 2005, with the EU achieving a good overall performance in the 
2010 NPT RevCon.  This good performance was moreover, in an improvement to its 
performance in 1995, evident across all aspects of the 2010 negotiations further suggesting 
an improved substance to the EU’s performance also.    
 
Figure 5.2: EU performance in the NPT review negotiations (1995-2010) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
These findings therefore offer some interesting results with regards to expectations of EU 
performance in this ‘hard’ test negotiation.  As highlighted at the start of this chapter, with 
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no EU competence, limited integration, and with the EU speaking with many voices in this 
forum, expectations of the EU’s performance in this negotiation environment are low.  
Despite this, it was only in the 2005 RevCon that the EU’s performance was in fact to fully 
meet these low expectations.  Further demonstrating the utility of a longitudinal 
perspective when assessing performance, this analysis has found that in 1995, 2000 and 
2010 the EU challenged these low expectations by giving fair to good overall 
performances.  This is interesting for several reasons.  Most notably, it has shown that the 
EU can perform well and exceed expectations in what are perceived to be ‘hard’ security 
negotiation environments despite the challenges it faces as an actor in this field.  This in 
turn would suggest the fallibility of relying on expectations based on the EU’s ‘capacity to 
act’ when seeking to understand how well the EU performs in such forum. 
 
Findings do further emphasise the importance of evaluating performance as a measure of 
both negotiation behaviour and effectiveness.  Reflected in Table 5.3 below are the results 
of the EU’s performances broken down by level of ambition, performance indicator, and 
overall performance assessment.  As these results show, the EU’s negotiation behaviour 
has been challenged within the NPT with difficulties over its unity, outreach and 
significance.   Whilst it has managed to overcome these challenges – most clearly seen in 
its ability to maintain its cohesion whilst its Member States continue to speak and negotiate 
in a national capacity – to judge the EU’s performance solely on these indicators would 
considerably under-estimate its overall performances which were, on the whole, creditable.  
Conversely, to address assessment only upon the EU’s effectiveness in this case would 
have significantly over-estimated EU performance.  As these findings suggest, with the 
exception of the 2005 RevCon, the EU was to attain most of the objectives outlined in its 
joint action, and later common positions, over this time period.  Taken on its own and the 
EU would be seen to have performed very well in this forum.  This on its own however, is 
insufficient in assessing the full extent of EU performance.  As these cases particularly 
emphasise, whilst the EU has achieved mostly high levels of effectiveness within the NPT, 
this has not corresponded to high levels of negotiation behaviour.  What the EU has 
therefore achieved has not always been a result of what the EU has said or done, but rather 
the often tacit consent by the EU to similar objectives pursued by other negotiation 
partners.  The fact that the EU has shared much symmetry in its objectives to the 
preference structures of its negotiation partners further stresses this point. 
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Table 5.2: Breakdown of EU performance in the NPT review negotiations (1995-
2010) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
More than this, as Table 5.2 reflects, on the whole the EU’s negotiation position within the 
NPT has been moderate to low; remaining uncontroversial, maintaining relative neutrality 
and universality on the more politicised challenges within the NPT negotiation, and 
seeking to gradually evolve its own voice across each of the three pillars rather than 
generate specific ‘EU’ objectives that it has then sought to attain. By focusing on 
supporting the NPT regime as whole, promoting consensus and a “successful outcome” 
and basing its objectives on universally acknowledged principles that would not only 
appease its negotiation partners but also its own Member States, the EU positions in this 
forum have been geared much more towards enhancing the EU’s overall presence within 
the NPT community rather than attaining specific ‘EU’ objectives.  The EU has therefore 
found itself fulfilling the role of a ‘NPT Champion’ and supporter of the system rather than 
a driver of it.  It was only in 1995 and 2010 that the EU’s voice was more explicitly geared 
towards achieving a specific outcome agreement from the negotiations, maintaining its 
supportive role but raising its level of ambition to subsequently achieve more moderate 
levels of negotiation behaviour as well as high effectiveness.  Thus it has been where its 
ambitions have been moderate that the EU has been able to outreach to its negotiation 
partners, demonstrate an improved negotiation behaviour and goal-attainment, and give a 
good overall performance.  
 
  
Negotiation Ambition Unity Outreach Significance Behaviour Effectiveness
Performance 
assessment
1995 RevCon Moderate Moderate High Moderate Moderate High Good
2000 RevCon Low Moderate Low Low Low High Fair
2005 RevCon Low Low Low Low Low Low Very poor
2010 RevCon Moderate Moderate High Moderate Moderate High Good
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Chapter Six: Explaining variation in EU performance in 
multilateral negotiations 
 
In the study thus far focus has been paid to the evaluation of EU performance in 
multilateral negotiations, with attention specifically on three case studies including the 
UNFCCC climate negotiations, the WTO multilateral trade negotiations, and the NPT 
review negotiations.  The purpose of these analyses has been to address the first of two 
research questions, namely: 
 
Research Questions 
(1) How well has the EU performed in multilateral negotiations over-time and across-
policy fields? 
 
(2) What explains variation in EU performance in multilateral negotiations? 
 
In addressing these questions an important factor has been to identify the dependent 
variable (DV), first by establishing how performance is conceptualised and measured 
(Chapter Two), and then evaluating how well the EU has performed within different 
negotiation contexts and over-time (Chapters Three-Five).  Within the study thus far a core 
finding has been the considerable variation in the DV, not only across negotiation 
environments, but also within them.  As reflected in Figure 6.1 below, variation has been 
evident across each of the three case studies with the EU demonstrating performances that 
have ranged between very poor, poor, fair, good and very good with numerous peaks and 
troughs occurring across the time-frame analysed between 1995 and 2011.  It is in 
endeavouring to explain that variation in EU performance – and thus addressing the second 
of the two research questions identified above – that is the purpose of this chapter.  
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Figure 6.1: EU performance in multilateral negotiations: A longitudinal overview 
(1995-2011) 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Taking as its starting point the explanatory variables identified from the existing literature 
detailed in Chapter One, this chapter considers how changes in the EU’s internal 
conditions and structural conditions within the negotiation environment may explain 
variation in how well the EU has performed.  Specifically this chapter addresses how 
variables such as the EU’s legal competence and institutional and policy developments, the 
presence or absence of opportunity within the international system, and more generally, 
how the ambition of the EU’s own negotiation position has been found to influence the 
EU’s performance across each of the case studies adopted in this study.  In so doing this 
chapter makes several important contributions to the existing literature.  First, by offering a 
systematic analysis of these variables it moves beyond a purely EU qua the EU focus to 
engage instead with how numerous variables – both from within the EU but also, 
importantly, from within the wider negotiation environment, can influence how well the 
EU performs in multilateral negotiations.  In so doing it contributes to what Jørgensen et 
al. (2011: 617) identify in the conclusions of their own performance study as the need, “to 
identify and systematically analyse (1) those (internal) factors that enable the EU to make 
the most of its own potentials and (2) those (external) factors that make EU goal 
achievement…(or other criteria) more or less difficult”.    
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Second, this analysis speaks directly to expectations of the EU’s actorness and behaviour 
within multilateral negotiations premised upon how ‘state-like’ the EU is (see Chapter 
One): in fact challenging expectations that the EU will perform at its best in multilateral 
negotiations purely on the basis of its exclusive legal competence and ability to ‘speak with 
one voice’.  Finally, this chapter considers not only what the EU says in multilateral 
negotiations but importantly, how that position actually shapes what the EU does, and what 
it achieves.  In this way this study moves beyond those studies which concentrate more 
specifically on how the EU’s negotiation position is formed and what shapes EU 
preferences, to engage instead with how the ambition of the EU’s negotiation position can 
explain how well the EU subsequently performs.  In so doing the main argument put 
forward in this study is that the EU’s level of ambition – itself shaped by several 
intersecting variables from both within the EU and the external environment – is of critical 
importance to the EU’s performance in multilateral negotiations.  Specifically it shows that 
the EU has performed at its best in those multilateral negotiations where it both pursues 
progressive objectives but also shares some zone of agreement with its negotiation 
partners.  Where the EU has however made ambitious demands that move far beyond the 
preference structures of its negotiation partners, its ability to persuade and to subsequently 
achieve its objectives is significantly limited.  Thus it is argued that it is not enough for the 
EU to simply make ambitious demands within a multilateral negotiation for it to perform 
well; what matters is how it balances those demands against what it can achieve in light of 
the preference structures of its negotiation partners.    
 
To make this case the chapter is broken down into four main sections.  In section one those 
variables identified as explaining EU performance in multilateral negotiations within the 
existing literature are briefly revisited.  These variables are then critically analysed in light 
of the findings from the previous case studies.  In section two explanations are offered as 
to how internal variables may have shaped the EU’s performance, with particular attention 
given to the EU’s competence and institutional and policy developments.  In section three 
focus is given to the EU’s performance relative to changes in the external environment, 
particularly focusing on the presence of other major powers within the international system 
and the condition of ‘opportunity’.  In the fourth and final section consideration then turns 
to explicitly addressing how the level of EU ambition entering multilateral negotiations 
shapes how well the EU then performs.  The chapter is then summarised in a concluding 
section. 
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It should be noted that, due to the small-n nature of this study, the conclusions here offered 
are first and foremost reflective of the findings from this empirical analysis which, without 
a larger sample of negotiations, does limit their inductiveness across other negotiation fora.   
It is also noted that findings do reflect an imbalance between the number of cases within 
the trade and climate change studies (each focusing upon eight separate negotiating events) 
relative to the NPT study (focusing upon four separate negotiating events).  Aggregated 
results may therefore be skewed in favour of ‘easy’ negotiations which, had it been 
possible to conduct analysis on a larger number of cases from the NPT negotiations, may 
have produced marginally less favourable results.  Where possible this is however 
recognised within the discussions.  A final point of note is that, with EU performance 
studies being at such a preliminary stage, it has been a necessary priority for this study to 
spend more time on conceptualising and then identifying the DV.  The balance of the 
studies’ focus has therefore been slanted in favour of evaluation (DV) over explanation 
(IVs), which does also require acknowledgement when considering the findings of this 
chapter.  The inferences made are however, intended to offer insights of how variation in 
the EU’s performance within those cases here analysed may be explained.  The hope is that 
these insights may help to move the research agenda towards further systematic analyses of 
how changes in EU performance over-time and across policies can be explained.   
 
6.1. Identifying explanatory variables: Explanation within the existing 
literature 
As detailed in Chapter One, explanation for variation in the EU’s ‘actorness’, ‘leadership’ 
and ‘effectiveness’ within multilateral negotiations has been largely premised within the 
existing literature upon three core factors.  These are (1) that the EU performs well where 
it is at its most ‘state-like’ and thus where it has exclusive legal competence and is at its 
most integrated (Wessel: 2011, Jørgensen & Wessel: 2011, Gebhard: 2011, Kissack: 2010, 
Gstöhl: 2009, Falkner: 2007: 509, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 107, Meunier: 2000, Allen 
& Smith: 1998: 46); (2) the EU demonstrates ‘improved’ leadership as well as a ‘high 
degree of actorness’ within multilateral negotiations where it has had the opportunity to act 
– thus where the position of other players – most notably the US – creates space for the EU 
to take on a greater international role (Vogler: 2011: 31-34, Vogler & Stephan: 2007, 
Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 24-27, Hovi et. al.: 2003:14). The rise of the emerging 
economies over the course of the 2000s has however limited that opportunity and created a 
more complex negotiating environment  in which the EU must perform (Van Schaik & 
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Schunz: 2012, Torney: 2011, Obethür: 2011a, A.R. Young: 2011, Roberts: 2010, Kilian & 
Elgström: 2010: 268); and (3) the EU makes ambitious demands within multilateral 
negotiations where its own domestic policy, and/or the policy preferences of its Member 
States, support progressive international policy initiatives (A.R Young: 2011, Vogler: 
2011: 31, Oberthür: 2011a: 673, Oberthür & Pallemaerts: 2010: 53, Van Schaik: 2010, 
Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36, M. Baldwin: 2006: 934, Falkner: 2007, 512, Groenleer 
& Van Schaik: 2007, Lamy: 2004, Meunier: 2000).   
 
Within the existing literature however, several areas of disagreement may also be 
identified which bring into question the explanatory power of these popularised arguments.  
Most prevalent as a source of explanation are the EU’s own capabilities to act and thus 
upon the EU’s legal competence and institutional development.  There is, however, some 
disagreement over the extent to which the EU’s competence matters when explaining its 
negotiation performance.  For example, whether the EU has legal competence or not is 
widely understood to influence the EU’s mode of representation within negotiations 
(Wessel: 2011, Pisani-Ferry: 2009, Lacasta et al.: 2007: 216, Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007: 
24-26, Falkner: 2007: 509, Damro: 2006: 175, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006: 107, Reiter: 
2005 Oberthür: 2000, Meunier & Nicolaïdis: 1999), and for being, “an enabling factor for 
[EU] unity” (Van Schaik: 2010: 252).  Wessel (2011: 622) particularly makes the case that 
legal competence matters as the legal rules and procedures surrounding a policy issue 
within the EU can shape the EU’s ‘potential’ within multilateral diplomacy and hence the 
role that the EU (and its Member States) can then play.  This is supported by others, who 
also identify competence as an important factor influencing EU performance (i.e. Elgström 
& Stromvik: 2005: 118-119, Jørgensen: 2009b: 194), particularly identifying its influence 
over EU ‘relevance’ to its Member States (Jørgensen et al. 2011: 611). 
  
Others however, have argued that competence can only explain so much of the EU’s 
negotiation performance, especially within those negotiation environments where 
competence is shared between the EC and Member States (Vogler: 2011: 23).  Reiter 
(2005: 162) for example suggests that competence can provide only a useful starting point 
in explaining the diversity of EU actorness within international organisations.  Of itself 
however, competence is a, “necessary but insufficient explanation” (Reiter: 2005: 162), 
requiring that attention also be paid to the external environment in explaining why EU 
performance thus varies.   
 
199 
 
There is moreover some dispute over the extent to which the EU’s own institutional 
development – most notably in the form of successive treaty reforms and particularly 
topical following changes from the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 – have shaped EU performance.  
The aim of successive treaty reforms have, broadly speaking, been intended to increase EU 
competences, streamline EU decision-making, improve EU coherence across external 
policy fields (see Commission: 2006), and subsequently enable the EU to better “punch 
above its weight” in international affairs (see also Thomas; 2012, Portela & Raube: 2012, 
Gebhard: 2011: 114, Carbone: 2011: 329-330, 339).  Notably, the 2007 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, or ‘Lisbon Treaty’, had been created to enhance the 
EU’s external coherence by removing the previous pillar structure and enabling the EU to 
act as the ‘EU’ (rather than as the European Community) within international institutions 
across all external policy fields.  The establishment of the High Representative of the 
Union on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, along with the EEAS, may particularly be 
identified for their potential to shape EU performance within multilateral negotiations; not 
only in terms of how the EU is represented but also its legal status within international 
organisations (Laatikainen: 2010: 476).   
 
Whilst the full implications of the Lisbon Treaty’s creation are yet to be fully realised, 
many questions nevertheless remain as to whether these institutional changes have in fact 
had the improving influence expected upon the EU’s negotiation performance (see also 
Jørgensen et al. 2011: 612).  Some, for example, argue that the EU’s treaty reforms have 
gradually improved the EU’s external coherence (Portela & Raube: 2012: 8, Gebhard: 
2011: 121).  Others however, suggest that such reforms have had only an ambivalent 
impact on EU negotiation performance (Jørgensen et al. 2011: 612, Meunier: 2000: 108).  
There is therefore some question over whether the EU having and developing ‘state-like’ 
qualities through ‘ever closer union’ does in fact influence its negotiation performance and 
thus whether such institutional changes can explain performance variation 
 
Another grey area within this discourse is with regards to structural conditions.  
Explanation has increasingly been paid within the literature to the EU’s place within a 
changing global balance of power (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012, Oberthür: 2011a: 677, 
Vogler: 2011: 30-31, Curtin: 2010: 7, Kilian & Elgström: 2010: 268), and to the rise of the 
emerging economies most especially, as reason for the EU’s diminishing effectiveness 
within multilateral negotiations (A.R. Young: 2011, Jørgensen et al.: 2011).  Far less clear 
from this discourse however is how, explicitly, changes to these structural conditions and 
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to the EU’s ‘opportunity’ to take on a more prominent position within a negotiation 
environment, explains variation in how well the EU performs.  Discourse on this issue 
tends instead to be implicit in associating EU (in)effectiveness with the (in)significance or 
(in)activity of other major powers in the international system.  Thus the EU is believed to 
perform well if it is prominent within a negotiation where other major powers are less so 
(i.e. following US abdication from the Kyoto Protocol, see Vogler: 2011, 2005, Oberthür: 
2011a, Bretherton & Vogler: 2006), or to perform poorly where it has then been “side-
lined” by them (i.e. as was the case in the UNFCCC Copenhagen Summit, see Van Schaik 
& Schunz: 2012: 182, Oberthür: 2011a: 670, Spencer et al. 2010).   The opportunity 
enabling, or competition preventing, the EU from taking on a prominent role within 
multilateral negotiations is thus taken as a critical point of explanation for its performance 
but with very little attention then given to what the EU wanted relative to the preferences 
of those other major players or what it actually did to achieve them.  This is however, an 
important point to take into account as it cannot be assumed that just because the EU has 
the opportunity to take on a prominent role in a negotiation that it will necessarily perform 
well, nor that the presence and active participation of rising new powers within a 
negotiation environment will necessarily hinder the EU’s performance.  In order to explain 
variation in the EU’s performance consideration must therefore be given not only to 
changes in structural conditions, but importantly, to how the EU responds to them in terms 
of its own negotiation position. 
 
Another, related point of uncertainty however, is how the EU’s negotiation position can 
itself help to explain variation in EU negotiation performance.  The trade policy literature, 
for example, has concentrated particular efforts upon explaining why the EU says what it 
says in multilateral trade negotiations – with focus especially upon the dynamics between 
the Commission and the Council (i.e. Da Conceição: 2010, Delreux & Kerremans: 2010, 
Kerremans: 2004, Meunier & Nicolaidis: 1999), and the preference structures of the 
Member States themselves (Dür: 2008, M. Baldwin: 2006, Meunier: 2000), as shaping the 
EU’s negotiation mandate.  A similar tendency is evident also within the environmental 
literature where focus is aimed at explaining why the EU’s negotiation position is 
ambitious in multilateral climate negotiations (Parker & Karlsson: 2010, Schreurs & 
Tiberghien: 2007, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007, Zito: 2005).  Furthermore, claims follow 
that it is these ambitions, marking out the EU as a ‘green’ and ‘normative’ leader, that has 
aided the EU’s ‘improved’ leadership in global environmental governance (Parker & 
Karlsson: 2010, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 44, Falkner: 2007).  Thus where the EU is 
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making ambitious demands within a multilateral negotiation this can often be taken as a 
success in itself: reiterating the EU’s normative identify, pursuing its objective of 
‘effective multilateralism’ (Vogler: 2011), demonstrating that the EU can take on, 
“responsibility for building a better world” (Council: 2003c), and showcasing the EU’s 
distinctiveness as a global ‘leader’ that others can follow (Skodvin & Andresen: 2006: 21, 
Andresen & Agrawala: 2002: 49).  Conversely, where the EU has a ‘lowest common 
denominator’ position this is often seen to be something of a performance failing (Müller: 
2010, Elgström & Stromvik: 2005: 117, House of Lords: 2004: 56), with only implicit 
mention then given to how that position impacts on, for example, the EU’s unity (Müller: 
2010: 11) or outreach (Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 286).  Far less clear is how the EU’s 
negotiation mandate – taking into account both what the EU wants and how this relates to 
the preference structures of its negotiation partners - explicitly shapes EU performance 
within a negotiation environment
92
.  It is therefore in addressing these issues of contention 
and uncertainty within the existing literature that the following sections are aimed.   
 
6.2. Internal conditions and EU performance 
In this section the internal conditions recognised to explain variation in EU performance in 
multilateral negotiations – including its level of competence and institutional and policy 
development over the period from 1995 to 2011 – are critically analysed in light of 
findings from the previous case studies.   
Competence matters – but only to an extent 
As detailed in Chapter One, expectations of the EU’s international role, of its ‘actorness’ or 
performance more broadly, have typically been premised upon understandings of how 
‘state-like’ the EU can be and its variable capabilities as a global actor.  Expectations of 
the EU performing as an ‘economic giant, political dwarf, and military worm’ have thus 
regularly been translated into expectations of the EU performing at its best in negotiations 
where the EU acts supranationally, but with greater challenges in areas of 
intergovernmentalism where it is less integrated, does not have exclusive competence, and 
where, due to the continued prominence and authority of its Member States, it cannot 
always ‘speak with one voice’.  Within this study cases were therefore analysed which 
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 Exception to this may be found in A.R. Young (2011) who suggests that the rise and diminution of EU 
performance in the WTO over the 1990s and 2000s may be explained by the EU’s ambitions which are raised 
by EU policy developments but subsequently lowered by the need to meet with the preferences of the EU’s 
negotiation partners.  Another exception is also found in Afionis (2011) who suggests that the EU’s 
performance in the UNFCCC negotiations has been weakened where it has over-estimated the preference 
structures of the US and other major players in wanting to support the EU’s own, often more ambitious, 
objectives.   
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covered both ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ tests for the EU in terms of its level of integration and 
competence.  In the case of the WTO multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), the EU’s high 
degree of integration and exclusive competence - reflecting one of the EU’s most 
supranational of external policies - provided what might be understood as an ‘easy’ test 
with correspondingly high expectations for the EU’s performance.   Conversely, with 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament issues falling under the CFSP; and, as an 
intergovernmental policy where there is no EU legal competence, the NPT case provided 
the EU’s ‘hard’ test with expectations for the EU’s performance significantly lower.   In 
the UNFCCC negotiations the EU’s shared competence with its Member States was also 
expected to provide some performance challenges for the EU, however, due to the EU’s 
ambitions to lead in this forum, and with wide recognition that the EU has performed the 
role of a ‘leader’ since the late 1990s, expectations of the EU performing well in this forum 
were also high.  
 
As the findings from the previous case studies suggest, such expectations are correct to 
some extent.  Findings indicate that the EU’s negotiation behaviour is at its best within the 
WTO’s MTN with the EU demonstrating consistently high levels of negotiation behaviour 
over the period from 1995 to 2011.  The EU’s negotiation behaviour within the UNFCCC 
and NPT has however been much more variable, with the EU demonstrating more 
moderate to low levels of negotiation behaviour (see also Figure 6.1 above and Appendix 
V for breakdown of findings in full).  The EU’s negotiation behaviour has therefore 
followed the expected pattern of being at its best in supranational policy-fields where the 
EU has exclusive competence but less well in intergovernmental policy-fields of shared or 
no legal competence.  However, the same cannot be said of the EU’s performance overall.  
Instead, as Figure 6.1 above reflects, findings from the previous case studies show that the 
EU’s overall performances have varied between very poor, poor, fair, good and very good 
not only across each case study but also within them.  Thus whilst the EU’s negotiation 
behaviour has demonstrated some evidence of meeting the expectations associated with its 
level of competence, no similar relationship can be drawn between the EU’s level of 
competence and its subsequent effectiveness.  For example, within both the WTO and 
UNFCCC, EU effectiveness has in fact been highly variable; fluctuating between low, 
moderate and high over the time-period from 1995 to 2011.  Within the NPT moreover, 
EU effectiveness has, counter-intuitively considering its lack of competence in this field, 
been mostly high; with some variation in 2005 where it dropped to low levels.  These 
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findings thus raise interesting implications for the often assumed link between the EU’s 
ability to ‘speak with one voice’ and its performance in multilateral negotiations.  
 
Endeavouring to address this issue, in each of the negotiations analysed, the EU’s unity 
was measured on a scale of low, moderate or high.  High unity was assessed where the EU 
was represented by an EU representative or figurehead and ‘spoke with one voice’.  
Moderate unity was assessed where the EU was represented by an EU representative or 
figurehead but where its Member States also participated and spoke during negotiations in 
a way that was complementary to the EU position.  Low unity was then assessed where the 
EU was represented by an EU representative or figurehead but where its Member States 
also participated and spoke during negotiations in a way that was contradictory to the EU 
position.       
 
As might be expected in light of its integration and exclusive competence, within the WTO 
MTN the EU maintained a consistently high level of unity and ‘spoke with one voice’ 
throughout the Ministerial Conferences and General Council meetings assessed from 1996 
to 2011 (see Appendix V).  Notably, this was in spite of the fact that internal disagreements 
and in-fighting over the Commission’s negotiation mandate were believed to have 
threatened EU unity at times.  Conversely, within the UNFCCC the EU’s level of unity 
was mostly moderate, first in the late 1990s as Member States continued to negotiate in 
their national capacity alongside the Council Presidency, and then after 2004 where the 
EU’s reformed system of ‘lead’ negotiators enabled the EU to speak with several voices, as 
coordinated by the Council Presidency.  The EU has thus demonstrated an ability to 
maintain its cohesion in this forum despite speaking with several voices.  Within the NPT 
moreover, EU unity has been, as may also be expected, variable between moderate and low 
levels, with the EU and its Member States frequently speaking within negotiations.   
Interestingly however, the EU’s unity was, with the exception of the 2005 RevCon, mostly 
moderate rather than low during the period from 1995 to 2010.  Thus, whilst the EU does 
speak with many voices within this negotiation, and often with Member States working 
alongside other negotiation groupings, this has not been found to be contradictory but 
rather, complementary to the EU common position.   
 
As Table 6.1 below further demonstrates, of the twenty individual negotiations in which 
EU performance was evaluated in this study, the EU formally ‘spoke with one voice’ – 
reflected in the figure for total cases of high unity - on nine occasions, with moderate unity 
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on eight occasions, and with low unity on three occasions.  Closer analysis of these cases 
relative to overall performance evaluations reflects that, as would be expected, in those 
three cases of low unity the EU did perform poorly (as in the case of the UNFCCC’s 
Hague summit in 2000 and Copenhagen summit in 2009) or very poorly (as in the 2005 
NPT RevCon).   However, where the EU has demonstrated high or moderate unity it has 
had no poor performances within those negotiations analysed.  What is more interesting is 
that the EU’s ability to ‘speak with one voice’ has not, as might be expected, shown 
specific causality to the EU performing well.  What the findings in Table 6.1 instead 
suggest is that the EU has had good or very good performances where it has demonstrated 
either moderate or high levels of unity. The EU has thus been able to perform well not 
only where it speaks with ‘one voice’ but also where it speaks with ‘many’.  Much more 
significant to the EU performing well therefore is its ability to maintain cohesion rather 
than how many voices it has speaking for it. 
Table 6.1. EU unity relative to overall performance assessments  
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
What these findings would appear to suggest therefore is that whilst the EU’s competence 
within any given policy field does matter in terms of shaping EU unity and its negotiation 
behaviour more broadly, it has more limited utility in explaining variation in the EU’s 
performance overall.  Further challenging expectations, these findings would appear to 
corroborate those who have started to question conventional wisdom that is only by 
speaking with ‘one voice’ that the EU may best attain its goals within multilateral 
negotiations (see Dee: 2012a, Koops & Macaj: 2012, Smith: 2006); suggesting instead that 
the EU may perform well, not always by speaking with one voice, but with many.   
 
The variable impact of ever closer union  
Another area where the EU’s ‘state-like’ qualities are often judged to have impact – or 
potential impact – upon the EU’s performance within multilateral negotiations are in 
regard to the EU’s on-going integration efforts towards ‘ever closer union’ (Treaty of 
Rome: 1957).  Notably this includes two particular facets of EU integration: (i) EU 
Total Very Poor Poor Fair Good Very good
High 9 0 0 4 4 1
Moderate 8 0 0 2 4 2
Low 3 1 2 0 0 0
Total 20 1 2 6 8 3
Overall PerformanceUnity
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domestic policy initiatives often cited as explanatory variables shaping the EU’s 
negotiation position and the demands it makes within multilateral negotiations, and (ii) 
successive treaty reforms intended to strengthen EU external coherence, stream-line 
decision-making and enhance its modes of external representation.  Focusing first on the 
EU’s domestic policy developments, findings here corroborate the argument that changes 
in the EU’s domestic policies have shaped its negotiation position.  More specifically it is 
argued that, in certain cases, initiatives towards improving the EU’s domestic policy – as 
seen in the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the introduction of the 
European Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the EU’s climate and energy package – or 
20-20-20 initiative – have significantly bolstered the EU’s demands within multilateral 
negotiations.   
 
This is perhaps most clearly evident in the WTO’s MTN where the EU’s negotiation 
position entering the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference was notably high in ambition 
thanks to the EU’s 2003 CAP reform (see also A.R. Young: forthcoming, 2011, M. 
Baldwin: 2006).  Similarly with climate change, the agreement on EU ‘burden-sharing’ 
emissions reductions between the Member States in 1997 particularly enabled the EU to 
propose the highest emission reductions of all the UNFCCC parties for the Kyoto Protocol 
(see Table 3.2 in Chapter Three, also Oberthür & Pallamaerts; 2010: 33, Vogler: 2005: 
848).  In addition, it has been the EU’s own unilateral domestic policy initiatives including 
the ETS and its climate and energy package that have been most cited as providing the 
EU’s ‘directional leadership’ of the UNFCCC; not only by setting the example for others 
to follow, but enabling the EU to itself propose ambitious targets for the international 
community as a whole (Oberthür: 2011a, Parker & Karlsson: 2010, Keleman & Vogel: 
2009, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36).  Notable from the previous case studies findings 
however is that, despite developments in the EU’s domestic climate policy and its own 
unilateral efforts to ‘lead the way’, the EU has demonstrated no clear evidence of 
improvement over time in its negotiation performance within the UNFCCC.  Instead, the 
EU’s performance within the UNFCCC varied throughout the late 1990s and 2000s and 
demonstrated no obvious sign of enhanced negotiation behaviour or effectiveness in 
response to its ETS or the climate and energy package.   
 
Interestingly, policy developments in the EU’s nuclear non-proliferation policy have also 
demonstrated no clear effect either on the EU’s negotiation position or its performance 
within the NPT RevCons.  For example, the EU’s Strategy Against the Proliferation of 
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WMD adopted in 2003, whilst creating the opportunity for the EU to pursue a more 
ambitious non-proliferation policy in the 2005 NPT RevCon, was in fact to have no 
discernible impact upon the EU’s ambitions (which remained low) or its performance 
(which was very poor).  Whilst improvements in the EU’s NPT performance in 2010 may 
be attributed to the WMD Strategy (which was reviewed in 2008), there are no clear 
findings to suggest that this policy development was an explicit cause (see also Dee: 
2012b, Portela: 2004).  However, whilst the EU’s internal nuclear policies have had limited 
effect on its NPT performance, the EU’s institutional developments through its treaty 
reforms may be found to have made a difference.  In particular, the 1992 Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) can be especially highlighted as creating the formal mechanisms 
by which EU performance in the NPT could in fact be assessed at all.  With the 
establishment of the CFSP the EU could not only work in concert through their first Joint 
Action entering the 1995 NPT Review Conference, but could do so with French accession 
to the Treaty, ensuring that all EU Member States could work together.   
 
Findings do not however, indicate any discernible trends in EU performance after 1997 and 
2001 with changes proceeding from the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising in these cases as the reforms of the TEU were intended primarily to improve 
EU decision-making by extending the use of qualified majority voting in the Council.  As 
most decisions in trade, climate change, and NPT are taken by consensus within the 
Council, these changes would not be expected to make any dramatic difference to the EU’s 
negotiation position or subsequent performance. The 2007 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, or ‘Lisbon Treaty’ does, however, deserve closer analysis.  Changes from 
the Lisbon Treaty, through the creation of the EEAS and subsequent efforts towards the 
improvement of EU external ‘coherence’, may particularly be expected to have improved 
EU performance in multilateral negotiations since the Treaty entered into force in 2009. 
 
Findings however, suggest that the Lisbon Treaty has had limited impact on the EU’s 
negotiation performance since 2009.  In the field of trade, the Lisbon Treaty has only really 
affected EU performance within the WTO by giving Commission negotiators – now 
needing to consider the input of the European Parliament - an extra hoop to jump through 
when it comes to ratification of any Doha outcome agreement.  Nevertheless, in interviews 
with the author, several Commission trade officials have suggested that the new role of the 
European Parliament in the EU’s trade policy-making is unlikely to influence their 
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negotiation directives or affect the ratification of any Doha Round deal
93
 (interview, Senior 
official, Cabinet to the EU Trade Commissioner, Brussels, 11
th
 May 2011, interview, 
Senior official, WTO Unit, DG Trade, Brussels, 12
th
 May 2011, interview, Senior official, 
DG Trade, Brussels, 16
th
 May 2011).  One area of potential discord from the Lisbon Treaty 
however, can be found in increased internal friction between the European Parliament – 
keen to exercise its new oversight capability – and the Council.  This is evident particularly 
between the Council’s Trade Policy Committee (TPC) and the new Parliamentary 
International Trade Committee (INTA).  Officials on the TPC have voiced concerns both 
over INTA requests to sit in on all Commission negotiations within the WTO, as well as 
requests for Parliament officials to oversee the work of the TPC, with many Member States 
seeing the Parliament’s request as going beyond their competence (interview, senior trade 
official, EU Member State E, Brussels 17
th
 May 2011).  Whilst creating potential discord 
in the EU’s trade-policy making, which may create challenges in deriving the EU’s 
negotiation mandate within the WTO, this discord may nevertheless not be expected to 
directly influence the EU’s performance within MTNs. 
 
In the UNFCCC moreover, changes from the Lisbon Treaty have, as yet, had limited 
bearing on the EU’s performance.  Whilst formally recognising environmental policy as an 
area generally covered by EU competence following the Lisbon Treaty’s creation, the 
EU’s distribution of competences in climate change policy have remained unchanged 
(Vogler: 2011: 31) and the Council Presidency continues to represent EU common 
interests within the UNFCCC (see Oberthür: 2011a, 2011b).  The EU has thus continued to 
operate as ‘business as usual’ since the Lisbon Treaty was ratified.  It should be noted 
however, that, at the Durban CoP-17 in December 2011, the Polish Council Presidency did 
also share representation with the newly established DG CLIMA.  The creation of this new 
directorate-general was not part of the Lisbon Treaty however it does create the potential 
for the Commission to take on a more prominent role within the UNFCCC.  With regards 
to the scope of this study however, the changes from the Lisbon Treaty between 2009 and 
2011 demonstrated no clear causality to changes in the EU’s UNFCCC performance.  
Further research would therefore be recommended in addressing how changes resulting 
from the creation of DG CLIMA may shape the EU’s performance in negotiations to come. 
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 Although it is noted that these trade officials did suggest that Parliament was expected to have a greater say 
over the EU’s Free Trade Agreements, suggesting a greater influence over the EU’s bilateral if not 
multilateral trade negotiations.  In the case of the Doha Round moreover, the sheer scale, time and 
complexity of the now decade-long negotiations makes it extremely unlikely that the Parliament would 
refuse or delay ratification where the Commission and Council have already approved an outcome agreement 
(interview, senior official, WTO Unit, DG Trade, Brussels, 12
th
  May 2011) 
208 
 
 
Within the NPT review negotiations changes from the Lisbon Treaty were however found 
to create a ‘transitional period’ for the EU’s representation during the 2010 RevCon, with 
the rotating Council Presidency sharing representation alongside the EEAS Head of Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs.  This transitional period will moreover be phased 
out in preparation for the 2015 NPT RevCon; where the EU’s representation will 
subsequently move away from the Council to the EEAS.  During the 2010 RevCon this 
odd system of dual-representation involving input from the newly formed EEAS, may 
provide some explanation for the EU’s improved performance.  One particular area of 
improvement in 2010 was found in its negotiation behaviour as a whole, with the EU 
demonstrating enhanced unity, outreach and significance, and which may therefore be 
attributed to the presence of the EEAS.  What will however, prove an interesting dynamic 
for EU performance in the next 2015 NPT RevCon is how the EEAS deals with Member 
States’ tradition of cross-alignment with other negotiation groups within this forum.  If its 
performance from the 2010 RevCon is anything to go by, the EEAS would be advised not 
to fight this practice, but to allow its continuation as a method of enhancing EU outreach 
with negotiation partners.  
 
In summary however, what this discussion does also suggest, is that the EU’s treaty 
reforms and policy developments may explain only some of the changes in EU 
performance within the multilateral negotiations assessed in this study.  Whilst the EU’s 
domestic policies and institutional reforms can therefore be found to offer some 
explanation for changes in the EU’s negotiation position – not least in terms of raising the 
EU’s ambitions - and in shaping aspects of the EU’s negotiation behaviour, focus must 
also be turned to other variables at play if we are to understand the true extent of 
conditions shaping EU performance. 
 
6.3. Structural conditions and EU performance 
Another important aspect of consideration when explaining variation in how well the EU 
has performed in multilateral negotiations are the structural conditions at play within that 
negotiation environment (Hill & Smith: 2011b: 477).   As detailed earlier, of prominence 
within the existing literature has been the argument that structural ‘opportunity’ has been 
necessary for the EU to take on a leadership role within multilateral climate and trade 
negotiations, whilst the rise of the emerging economies within the international system has 
eroded the EU’s ability to influence negotiation outcomes and achieve its objectives.  In 
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this section the structural context will be critically analysed in light of the performance 
findings from the previous case studies.  In particular it considers how the activity and 
preferences of other major powers within the negotiation environment have explicitly 
shaped EU performance and can thus contribute to explanation for its variation.   
 
The structural conditions affecting multilateral negotiations during the period from 1995 to 
2011 are of particular interest for this study as the international system has experienced a 
major global redistribution of power during this period (A.R. Young: 2010).  In the 1990s 
it was notably the US, alongside the EU who were the two major powers of the multilateral 
trading system.  As the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG) the EU and US 
were also the most prominent players within the UNFCCC’s climate negotiations.  Since 
the early 2000s however, a global re-distribution of power away from the industrialised 
North and towards the developing South has considerably altered the power dynamics of 
multilateral negotiations, leading many to claim that the 2000s have witnessed the 
emergence of a ‘multipolar’ world order in which India, China and Brazil are increasingly 
exerting their influence (see A.R. Young: 2010: 3, Roberts: 2010).  This has been evident 
particularly within the WTO where India and Brazil – and later followed by China - 
replaced Japan and Canada in the 2000s as the major trading powers involved in the core 
group of negotiators alongside the US and EU.  Within the UNFCCC India, Brazil, China 
and South Africa (BASIC) have also grown in prominence as their rapid growth has 
resulted in a major shift in the global share of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions away from 
the EU (whose share has diminished) and the US (who has stayed broadly the same) 
towards the emerging South, and China in particular, who is now the world’s largest 
emitter.   
 
More than this, the emerging economies have, over the course of the 2000s, increasingly 
exerted their influence within multilateral negotiations (A.R. Young: 2010: 3). In the WTO 
the emergence of the new G20 group - led by India, Brazil and China – not only blocked 
the adoption of agricultural modalities for negotiations at the 2003 Cancún Ministerial, 
resulted in the ‘Singapore issues’ being dropped from the Doha Round agenda, but which 
was also seen to bring about an end of, “bilateral co-hegemony” between the EU and US, 
and creating a, “new topography in global trade politics” (Mortensen: 2009: 86).  
Similarly, in the UNFCCC the rise of the BASIC group at the Copenhagen Summit in 
2009 has been seen to have demonstrated a, “shift in tectonics of international climate 
policy” (Oberthür: 2011a: 677) and the emergence of a “new world (dis)order” (Roberts: 
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2010).   Such structural changes have moreover been cited, first for aiding EU performance 
within multilateral climate negotiations over the late 1990s and early 2000s where the EU 
and US were the major powers involved in negotiations, and then for impeding it as the 
emerging economies rose over the course of the 2000s, creating competition for the EU 
(Oberthür: 2011a, Vogler: 2011).  Within the WTO a similar conclusion is also found with 
the EU found to have exerted considerable influence as a leading power within the MTS 
over the late-1990s, only for its performance to diminish over the 2000s due to the ‘hostile’ 
preferences of the emerging economies towards the EU’s trade agenda (A.R. Young: 2011, 
M. Baldwin: 2006). 
 
Following this line of argument it may therefore be expected that the EU would show signs 
of performing well during the late 1990s and early 2000s, but to show a decline over the 
course of the 2000s and early 2010s.  However, as Figure 6.1 above reflects, the EU’s 
performance within the multilateral negotiations analysed from 1995 to 2011 has 
experienced considerable variation, not only across policy fields, but also over-time.  No 
clear trends can therefore be identified within any of the three case studies to suggest that 
the EU’s performance improved over the late 1990s and early 2000s to then diminish over 
the course of the 2000s.  Within the WTO the EU’s performance has at times been notably 
challenged by the activity of the emerging economies.  In the 1999 Seattle Ministerial it 
was India and other developing countries that were to block EU efforts to launch a new 
trade round.  In the 2003 Cancún Ministerial the creation of the G20 coalition resulted in a 
failed effort to launch agricultural modalities, despite the EU making concessions 
following its CAP reform, and where Indian resistance to the ‘Singapore issues’ resulted in 
their being dropped from the Doha agenda in 2004.  In 2008 moreover it was Indian and 
Chinese resistance to the NAMA negotiations, as well as blocking by India over the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) which resulted in a failure to conclude the Round.  
Since 2008 Indian, Chinese and US reticence towards the NAMA negotiations has also 
increasingly frustrated EU efforts to conclude the Doha Round.  Despite these cases, there 
is no evidence to suggest any downward trend for EU performance within the WTO.  In 
2004 for example, the EU gave a very good performance and helped bring about a new 
impetus to the Doha Round.  In 2011 moreover the EU gave a good performance during 
the Geneva Ministerial.   In both of these cases the emerging economies were still 
significant players and yet, in these examples the EU’s performance was not diminished. 
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Within the UNFCCC a similar scenario is revealed.  For example, findings do corroborate 
claims that the EU’s performance improved after the abdication of the US from the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2001 – most evident in the shift from a poor performance at The Hague 
Summit in 2000, to a good performance in the Bonn and Marrakesh Summits in 2001 with 
the EU managing to subsequently ‘save the day’ and push forward with the ratification of 
the Kyoto Protocol.  The EU’s performance was certainly hindered moreover, by the more 
active role of the US, along with the rise of the BASIC group, in Copenhagen in 2009 
where the EU failed not only to maintain its unity under pressure, but failed to sufficiently 
outreach to these players or attain the majority of its objectives.  However, these structural 
changes do not explain why EU performance varied prior to the withdrawal of the US from 
the Kyoto Protocol, or why the EU was then able to give a good overall performance after 
Copenhagen during the Durban Summit in 2011 at which point the US had re-engaged in 
the climate negotiations under the Obama Administration.   
 
A further area of interest is within the NPT review negotiations where economic power 
often comes secondary to the nuclear balance of power.  Within this negotiation the P-5 
nuclear-weapon states have consistently maintained their preponderance within 
negotiations.  The rise of the emerging economies has thus had less of an impact in this 
environment as it has in the UNFCCC or WTO
94
.  Structural conditions have however 
shifted within this environment to some extent due to changes in the foreign policy of the 
P-5.  This has been most clearly evident in shifts in the US stance and its engagement with 
the NPT review negotiations.  Following the September 11
th
 2001 terrorist attacks in New 
York and Washington the US’s foreign policy took a notable shift towards unilateralism 
(White House: 2002).  The War in Iraq in 2003 further distanced the US from multilateral 
efforts and, in the 2005 NPT RevCon the US was widely criticised for its reticence towards 
the NPT and for blocking efforts towards the agreement of an outcome document 
(Johnson: 2005, Müller: 2005, Potter: 2005).  The inauguration of the Obama 
Administration in 2008 however brought about a re-engagement of the US within the NPT 
(Johnson: 2010), and the shift in US foreign policy in favour of ‘Global Zero’ was widely 
lauded within the NPT community as providing the necessary leadership to reenergise the 
2010 review negotiations (interview, EU diplomatic source, EEAS, New York, 7
th
 March 
2011, interview, Minister Counsellor to the UN, northern developed country, New York, 
                                                   
94
 Within the NPT China is already recognised as a nuclear weapon state and a member of the P-5.  Brazil is 
a prominent member but only as a member of the New Agenda Coalition and Non-Aligned Movement.  India 
is a nuclear weapon state but is not recognised by the UN and is not therefore a member of the NPT. Were 
India to accede to the NPT it would be expected to wield the same sort of influence as Brazil because it can 
only accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. 
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7
th
 March 2011).  Following the line of argument that opportunity is required for the EU to 
perform well, the 2005 NPT RevCon was believed to offer the “potential” for the EU to 
take on a “leadership role” (Müller: 2005: 43).  The US’s reticence towards the 
negotiations and the EU’s own preferences in support of a “successful outcome” (Council: 
2010a) for the RevCon – much boosted by the EU’s own domestic steps towards tackling 
global proliferation through its 2003 Strategy Against the Proliferation of WMD – meant 
that the EU was well placed to play a more prominent role and improve its NPT 
performance.  However, in the 2005 NPT RevCon the EU performed very poorly – 
reflecting low levels across all performance indicators.  Instead, it was not until after the 
US re-engaged in the multilateral process and itself took on a more prominent ‘leading’ 
role entering the 2010 RevCon that the EU’s performance was in fact to improve within 
the NPT negotiations.   
 
What this analysis therefore suggests is that whilst the lack of competition has, at times, 
created the political opportunity for the EU to increase its ambitions and take on a greater 
role within multilateral negotiations, this has not always resulted in the EU actually 
improving its negotiation performance.  More than this, the EU has also demonstrated that 
it can perform well where competition is nevertheless present.  In the UNFCCC, WTO and 
NPT the EU has thus demonstrated that it can give good performances despite the lack of 
opportunity for it to always play a ‘leading’ role.  As such, the condition of opportunity 
may not of itself be sufficient to explain why EU performance varies.  A more nuanced 
approach to explanation is therefore required which takes as its starting point who the 
major players active within the negotiation environment are, but which also focuses upon 
the preference structures of other major players, how the EU has subsequently managed 
that complexity by building upon a zone of agreement, and how well it has thus outreached 
to its negotiation partners in building consensus.  It is to these issues that we now turn. 
 
6.4. Ambition and EU performance 
It is a key argument from this study that the EU’s negotiation performance is highly 
dependent upon the ambition of its negotiation position.   As previously discussed, the 
EU’s negotiation position has been a topic of some interest already within the existing 
literature with focus particularly given to why the EU says what it says in multilateral 
negotiations.  Attention within the existing literature has therefore especially been paid to 
institutional dynamics shaping how the EU’s negotiation mandate is forged (Da 
Conceição: 2010, Delreux & Kerremans: 2010, Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007, Delreux: 
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2006, Meunier: 2000), the influence of interests and EU domestic policy (A.R. Young: 
forthcoming, 2011, Van Schaik: 2010, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007, Dür: 2008, M. 
Baldwin: 2006), and how the EU’s normative or strategic preferences shape its negotiation 
objectives (Keleman: 2010, Keleman & Vogel: 2009, Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012, 
Falkner: 2007, Groenleer & Van Schaik: 2007).  The ambition of that negotiation position 
has also increasingly been identified as a variable to be taken into consideration in 
explaining the EU’s leadership, actorness or effectiveness within multilateral negotiations.  
A.R. Young (2011) for example, identifies the EU’s level of ambition – shaped by both its 
internal policy developments and wider structural conditions – as explanation for the rise 
and fall of the EU’s external effectiveness in the multilateral trading system.  Others make 
the case that the EU’s ambition to take on a greater international role and to strategically 
orient itself as a ‘leader’ was a major factor behind improvements in EU leadership within 
the international climate regime (Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 44), as well as in 
multilateral trade negotiations (Ahnild: 2005: 137).  Some have suggested that where the 
EU’s ambition approaching a negotiation has been too high its performance has been low 
due to an inability by the EU to achieve its ambitious objectives (Afionis: 2011: 
355,Oberthür: 2011a: 670, Lacasta et al.: 2007, Hovi et al.: 2003); whilst others associate 
the EU’s ‘lowest common denominator’ position – implicit of low ambition – to its 
subsequent performance failures, particularly in terms of its unity (Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 
286) and outreach (Müller: 2010: 11).   
 
In this study the ambition of the EU’s negotiation position was explicitly addressed within 
the analytical framework.  Focusing not only on how progressive – or change-seeking - the 
EU’s negotiation objectives are; ambition was also assessed in light of the preference 
structures of the EU’s negotiation partners.  A high ambition negotiation position was 
therefore assessed where the EU had progressive negotiation objectives but where it also 
acted as a preference outlier by going much further than the preference structures of its 
negotiation partners.  A moderate ambition position was assessed where the EU had 
progressive negotiation objectives but where it shared some zone of agreement with the 
preference structures of its negotiation partners.  A low ambition position was then 
assessed where the EU had conservative negotiation objectives and/or where its position 
was ambiguous and stated no clear objectives.  In this way the EU’s negotiation position – 
shaped not only by its internal conditions but also by the preference structures of other 
major players within the negotiation environment – provided a blueprint against which its 
negotiation behaviour and effectiveness could be compared.   
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As Table 6.2 below reflects, of the twenty individual negotiation positions assessed in this 
study, seven were high in ambition (four including positions entering UNFCCC 
negotiations, and three entering WTO negotiations), nine were moderate ambition 
(including four positions from the WTO, three positions from the UNFCCC and two 
positions from the NPT), and four were low ambition positions (two including positions 
entering the NPT review negotiations, one from the UNFCCC (Montreal CoP-11) and one 
from the WTO (Geneva Ministerial 2011).   As this reflects the EU has therefore entered 
the majority of negotiations in this study with progressive – or change seeking – 
negotiation objectives.  
 
Table 6.2. EU ambition relative to overall performance assessments 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Further reflected in Table 6.2 was that, of the seven negotiations in which the EU’s 
negotiation position was one of high ambition, this has corresponded to only one good 
performance (CoP-6bis/CoP-7 in the UNFCCC), one very good performance (CoP-1 in the 
UNFCCC), but with the majority demonstrating fair (including at Seattle, Cancún and 
Geneva 2008 in the WTO) and poor performances (including CoP-6 and CoP-15 in the 
UNFCCC).  What this would suggest is that the EU has not performed well where it has 
been positioned as a preference outlier and does not therefore share a zone of agreement 
with its (more conservative) negotiation partners.   Its performances at The Hague in 2000 
and in Copenhagen in 2009 in the UNFCCC negotiations particularly exemplify this point 
regarding the EU’s objectives; first for maintaining the environmental integrity of the 
Kyoto Protocol, and then for the completion of a more ambitious post-2012 successor 
agreement, positioning the EU far beyond the preference structures of the majority of other 
parties within the negotiations, not least the US and later, the emerging economies.   
 
On the other side of the spectrum however the EU was also found to perform very poorly 
where it had a low ambition negotiation position.  In the 2005 NPT RevCon the EU’s 
Total Very poor Poor Fair Good Very good
High 7 0 2 3 1 1
Moderate 9 0 0 2 5 2
Low 4 1 0 1 2 0
Total 20 1 2 6 8 3
Overall PerformanceAmbition
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negotiation position was notably ambiguous in its language approaching the review 
negotiations; neither indicating how it would pursue the issues it highlighted nor what it 
explicitly sought for the negotiation outcome.  Rather than offering clear direction the EU 
position was thus not only a lowest common denominator position but also conservative in 
preserving the status quo.  In this case the EU was subsequently assessed as having low 
values across all performance indicators, achieving an overall very poor performance 
evaluation.   
 
However, of those negotiations in which the EU had a moderate ambition negotiating 
position, the EU did, in the majority of cases, perform well; demonstrating no poor 
performances but rather a majority of good (five cases), very good (two cases) and fair 
(two cases) performances.  Thus, where the EU’s negotiation position was both progressive 
and where it shared some zone of agreement with its negotiation partners the EU 
performed well.  What is clear therefore is that the EU has performed well in the 
UNFCCC, WTO and NPT where its negotiation objectives and preferences have found 
some zone of agreement with negotiation partners, but poorly where the EU has been a 
preference outlier.  The presence of some zone of agreement between the EU’s preferences 
and the preference structures of its negotiation partners is therefore critical to how well the 
EU performs in multilateral negotiations.  Breaking these findings down further, how has 
the EU’s performance explicitly been shaped by its level of ambition and why does a zone 
of agreement matter? 
 
Focusing firstly on the EU’s negotiation behaviour in relation to its negotiation partners, 
findings from the previous case studies suggest that, where the EU has had a high 
outreach; adopting a proactive strategy and successfully employing tactics such as 
coalition-building, issue-linkage, or a willingness to make concessions, the EU has 
demonstrated mostly good and very good overall performances - as reflected in Table 
6.3 below.  Particular example of this can be found on several occasions within the 
UNFCCC negotiations where the EU successfully employed coalition-building tactics with 
the G77 to generate enough support to push forward with negotiations for the Kyoto 
Protocol, as well as a post-2012 international climate agreement.  
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Table 6.3. EU outreach relative to overall performance assessments 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Conversely, where the EU has tried yet failed in the employment of negotiations tactics – 
evident in the eight cases of moderate outreach reflected in Table 6.3 above – its 
performance has been much poorer with a majority of poor to fair performances.   In 
these cases the EU’s ability to persuade its negotiation partners to support its objectives 
failed.   Notable examples of this can be found in the WTO during the failed Seattle and 
Cancún Ministerial Conferences in 1999 and 2003 and at the Geneva General Council in 
2008.  In each of these negotiations, the EU made ambitious demands but sought to 
outreach to its negotiation partners – especially India and other members of the G20 – by 
demonstrating flexibility over the critical agriculture negotiations and offering concessions 
on agricultural market access and domestic support.  These tactics failed however to garner 
their support and to build the necessary zone of agreement, and the EU could subsequently 
attain few of its negotiation objectives.   
 
The EU’s ‘power of persuasion’95 (see also A.R Young: 2011: 724) over other players 
within the negotiation environment can thus be identified as an important source of 
influence over the EU’s performance.   Where the EU is able to successfully utilise 
negotiation tactics in persuading others to support its objectives, it has been far more 
capable of performing well within multilateral negotiations.  Where however, the EU has 
failed to persuade others – most especially in the case of the increasingly prominent 
emerging economies – its ability to then translate its ambitious objectives into goal-
attainment is far more limited.    
 
In addition, findings from the previous case studies further reveal that, where the EU’s 
ambitions have been high – reflecting its position as a preference outlier relative to its 
more conservative negotiation partners – its outreach is moderate and its effectiveness 
low – detailed in Table 6.4 below.   
                                                   
95
 See also  Risse (2000) for further discussion of persuasion in social interactions, particularly in terms of the 
‘power of the better argument’ 
Total Very Poor Poor Fair Good Very good
High 9 0 0 0 6 3
Moderate 8 0 2 5 1 0
Low 3 1 0 1 1 0
Total 20 1 2 6 8 3
Overall PerformanceOutreach
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Table 6.4. EU ambition relative to individual performance indicator assessments 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Thus, where the EU is a preference outlier it has not only been unsuccessful in persuading 
its negotiation partners to support its goals, but has then been unable to translate those 
ambitious objectives into substantive goal-attainment.  The EU’s ‘power of persuasion’ in 
such cases is therefore severely limited, and its effectiveness impeded.  This was evident in 
the case of the WTO’s Cancún Ministerial in 2003.  Approaching the negotiations with a 
high ambition negotiation position, the EU sought the agreement of agricultural modalities 
and the launch of negotiations on the ‘Singapore issues’. Its negotiation partners – most 
prominently India and other developing countries – were however markedly hostile to the 
Singapore Issues, and the emerging economies believed that the EU’s position on 
agriculture did not go far enough (see Chapter Four).  The EU’s outreach during the 
Cancún Ministerial was subsequently moderate; with the EU endeavouring to make 
concessions over agriculture and the Singapore issues but which resulted in the EU failing 
to garner the necessary support from the developing countries to bring about consensus for 
modalities to be agreed.  EU effectiveness at Cancún was then low and its overall 
performance only fair.  It was only after the EU had moderated its ambitions entering the 
2004 Geneva General Council and began building upon a zone of agreement with its 
negotiation partners over the Singapore issues and agriculture that its performance 
improved. 
 
However, as also reflected in Table 6.4, where the EU had moderate ambition entering 
negotiations, this corresponded to it having mostly high levels of outreach (in seven out of 
nine cases), and mostly moderate or high effectiveness (four cases of moderate 
effectiveness, and four cases of high effectiveness out of a total nine cases of moderate 
ambition).  The EU has therefore been better able to achieve some or most of its 
negotiation objectives where those objectives have met in part with the preference 
structures of its negotiation partners.  For example, in the UNFCCC Durban Summit in 
December 2011 the EU’s negotiation position was moderate in ambition.  Thus whilst the 
EU continued to pursue progressive objectives for a successor agreement to the Kyoto 
Total High Moderate Low High Moderate Low High Moderate Low High Moderate LowCount of Negotiation
Total High Moderate Low High Moderate Low High Moderate Low High Moderate Low
High 7 4 1 2 2 5 0 6 1 0 1 1 5
Moderate 9 4 5 0 7 2 0 6 3 0 4 4 1
Low 4 1 2 1 0 1 3 2 0 2 2 1 1
Total 20 9 8 3 9 8 3 14 4 2 7 6 7
Ambition Unity Outreach Significance Effectiveness
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Protocol it nevertheless shared some zone of agreement with its negotiation partners by 
accepting that a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol may also be required.  
The EU’s outreach during Durban was also high; pursuing a proactive negotiation strategy 
with negotiation partners and successfully coalition-building with other ambitious groups 
including AOSIS and the LDC group (see also Chapter Three).  The EU subsequently 
managed to negotiate with the emerging economies a consensus agreement which met the 
EU’s goals of ensuring an ambitious successor agreement would be negotiated, but which 
also put in place a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol.  As this example 
thus demonstrates, where the EU has had some zone of agreement to build upon in 
negotiating with others, it has been much more capable of persuading its negotiation 
partners to support its own (more) progressive objectives, achieve its objectives, and 
subsequently perform well.   
 
Conversely, Table 6.4 also reflects that, where the EU has had a low ambition negotiation 
position – reflective of conservative or particularly ambiguous lowest common 
denominator objectives - its outreach to negotiation partners has been mostly low (in three 
out of four cases) and yet its effectiveness also high (in two out of four cases).  This was, 
for example, seen in the NPT during the 2000 RevCon where the EU’s low ambition 
negotiation position – detailing principles of support but specifying no clear objectives for 
the outcome itself – in fact resulted in the EU having a low level of outreach, with a 
reactive strategy and little evidence of tactics being employed to generate support for its 
position.  Despite this, the EU did achieve a high level of effectiveness in this negotiation 
with many of its favoured principles evident within the outcome document.  In such cases 
the EU’s high effectiveness cannot however be attested to it performing well in terms of its 
negotiation behaviour – and in fact the EU’s performance overall was fair at best - but 
much more to the fact that its objectives were ambiguous and low ambition to begin with.   
 
What this reveals therefore is that the level of EU ambition approaching multilateral 
negotiations does explain changes in its negotiation behaviour with regards to its outreach 
to negotiation partners, and its subsequent effectiveness.  More than this, in much the same 
way as the EU’s negotiation performance has demonstrated considerable variation over-
time and across negotiation environments analysed in this study, so too has the EU’s level 
of ambition been seen to fluctuate over the period from 1995 to 2011 (see Appendix VI for 
overview).  What is particularly interesting from a chronological perspective of changes in 
the EU’s level of ambition is that there is evidence of EU ambitions shifting following 
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negotiations which have failed or where the EU performed poorly due to high ambition.  
This may be found in the case of the WTO where, following the EU’s high ambition 
positions entering the failed Seattle 1999, Cancún 2003 and Geneva 2008 General Council 
meetings, its subsequent negotiation positions reflected more moderate ambitions, 
reflective of a closer zone of agreement with its negotiation partners, and which resulted in 
improved performances (see findings for Doha 2001, Geneva 2004, and Geneva 2011 in 
Appendix VII).   Similarly, following the UNFCCC’s 2009 Copenhagen Summit the EU 
was found to have moderated its ambition approaching both the Cancún and Durban 
Summits in order to find some zone of agreement between its progressive objectives and 
the more conservative interests of the BASIC group and US.  At Durban moreover the EU 
significantly improved its performance following its failures at Copenhagen.   
 
In these cases the EU was to maintain its progressive objectives but moderated its ambition 
to find some zone of agreement with negotiation partners.  What these findings suggest 
therefore is that, whilst the rise of the emerging economies cannot of itself explain 
variation in the EU’s performances, their preference structures do explain changes in the 
EU’s level of ambition.  Within both the UNFCCC and WTO it has been the more 
conservative preferences of the emerging economies as well as, at times, the US, which 
have caused the EU to moderate its ambitions in order to build a zone of agreement.  
Noteworthy therefore is that the emerging economies have not raised their ambition to 
meet with the preference structures of the EU as may be expected of claims to EU 
‘leadership’ within multilateral negotiations (see Torney: 2011), but vice versa.  There is 
moreover evidence to suggest that the EU’s past performances do influence its level of 
ambition approaching negotiations.  For example, within the NPT, following the EU’s low 
ambition position and very poor performance within the 2005 RevCon the EU raised its 
level of ambition to moderate approaching the 2010 RevCon and subsequently gave a good 
performance.   
 
In this way it is argued that a degree of pragmatism may be identified in the formation of 
the EU’s negotiation objectives approaching multilateral negotiations.  Shaped not only by 
its own interests and institutional capabilities, the EU’s negotiation position has also been 
adjusted to account for past performances and the preference structures of its often more 
conservative negotiation partners.  Where the EU has subsequently performed well it has 
been because it has moderated its ambitions to better account for the preference structures 
of others; building consensus towards an outcome that is in keeping with a broader zone of 
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agreement.  What this would therefore suggest is that, despite claims particularly found 
within the EU leadership discourse associating the EU’s high ambitions with its 
‘improved’ performance, in fact the EU has had a limited ability to persuade others to 
follow or raise their ambitions to meet with its preference structures.  It has thus been 
where the EU finds areas of commonality that the EU has performed well, not where it has 
set itself apart as a distinctive demandeur.    
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to address the question of why EU performance 
varies in multilateral negotiations.  Focusing on findings from the previous three empirical 
chapters and drawing on explanatory variables identified from within the existing 
literature, it has sought to critically analyse a number of prominent explanations typically 
offered for changes in the EU’s actorness, leadership, effectiveness and performance in 
multilateral negotiations.  In so doing, it has argued that explanation for the variation in 
how well the EU performs in multilateral negotiations may be found not in any single 
variable or group of variables, but rather in looking at how the internal and external 
conditions at play intersect and shape the EU’s ambitions and subsequent performance.   
 
Critically analysing explanatory variables identified from within the existing literature 
relative to the performance findings from each of the previous three case studies; it 
addressed how internal and structural conditions have shaped the EU’s performances, as 
well as its ambition approaching each negotiation.  It found that variables believed to 
enhance the EU’s capacity to act, such as its level of competence and institutional and 
policy development, can offer only some explanatory power in the changes that have been 
found in the EU’s performances.  It has been argued that whilst the EU’s capabilities, 
including its competence and level of integration, do matter in terms of shaping EU 
negotiation behaviour – most evident in terms of its unity and ability to ‘speak with one 
voice’ – these capabilities have less utility in explaining changes in the EU’s effectiveness 
or performance overall.  How ‘state-like’ the EU is within a multilateral negotiation has 
not therefore had any clear bearing on its ability to perform well in the negotiations 
analysed.  Efforts towards ‘ever closer union’ through successive EU treaty reforms – most 
recently in the 2007 Lisbon Treaty – have moreover shown no clear improving effect on 
how well the EU performs within those negotiations analysed.   
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Analysis of the influence that structural conditions have had upon the EU’s negotiation 
performance moreover reveals interesting insights.  Findings particularly have shown that 
whilst changes within the international system through the rise of the emerging economies 
have had an impact in moderating the EU’s ambitions entering the WTO and UNFCCC 
negotiations specifically, this has not translated into any clear trend of diminishing 
performance by the EU in either of these fora.  It is argued therefore, that the presence or 
absence of competition is not of itself sufficient to explaining variation in the EU’s 
performance, but whether the EU’s preferences can find some zone of agreement with the 
preference structures of those major powers.   This in turn highlights the importance that 
the level of EU ambition approaching multilateral negotiations has in explaining its 
subsequent performances.  Influenced by both its internal conditions, as well as the 
preference structures of other major powers, it has been argued that where the EU has high 
ambition this has resulted in the EU having poor or fair performances due to the limitations 
of the EU’s outreach and its ‘power of persuasion’ over negotiation partners.  Rather, it has 
been where the EU has moderated its ambitions to find some zone of agreement with its 
negotiation partners that it has performed well in multilateral negotiations.  Within 
consensus-based environments such as multilateral negotiations, it has thus been the EU’s 
ability to pursue progressive objectives but maintain some commonality with the 
preference structures of its negotiation partners that has enabled it to perform well and 
attain its goals.  It is with these findings in mind that we now turn to this study’s 
concluding chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
 
“Certain subjects seem quite clear as long as we leave them alone.  The answers look 
obvious until we ask questions, the concepts appear to be well understood until we wish to 
define them, causes and effects are easily recognised until we seek to explain them, and all 
the rules pass for valid until we try to prove them.”  
(Iklé: 1964: 1) 
 
The concept of performance, along with judgements on how well an actor performs is a 
subject which, as Iklé would support, seems quite clear and obvious until we start to ask 
questions.  Performance is after all a term commonly used, easily recognised and widely 
understood – that is, until we start to ask what it means, how it differs from other concepts 
of analysis, and why it then matters.  In a similar way, so too may we start to understand 
how EU performance in multilateral negotiations has, as a subject, been addressed within 
EU studies thus far.  Commonly discussed within the literature, the concept of performance 
has nevertheless rarely been defined or explicitly evaluated.  Often premised instead on 
expectations surrounding the EU’s capabilities as a global actor, the EU’s performance in 
the context of multilateral negotiations has typically been judged, less upon explicit 
conceptualisations relating to how well the EU actually performs, and much more upon 
perceptions of how the EU ought to perform.   
 
Expectations have subsequently grown or diminished relative to the EU’s capacity to act in 
different policy areas.  Expectations are, as such, at their highest where the EU is at its 
most ‘state-like’, as is commonly argued in the case of multilateral trade negotiations; and 
lower where the EU is less well integrated and where its ability to impact upon 
negotiations is seen to be hindered by the often more dominant role played by its own 
Member States.  A further expectation may also be found in relation to policy fields such 
as environmental policy where, due to the EU’s own high ambitions in this sector, 
expectations of the EU taking on a ‘leading’ role have become increasingly prominent.   
More confusingly still, increasingly disparate accounts of the EU’s performance are found 
within the literature dependent upon the concept used to assess it; with the EU lauded for 
its sustained and improving ‘leadership’ record on the one hand, and lamented for its lack 
of influence and ineffectiveness on the other.  Yet, understanding how well the EU 
performs in multilateral negotiations is never more important.  In an international system in 
which the performance of all actors is increasingly under scrutiny and the yard-stick by 
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which the actions of the major powers are measured gets ever longer; now is the time to 
ask the questions, define the problem, and seek explanation for how well the EU does 
perform in multilateral negotiations.   
 
It has been in addressing these issues that this study has been aimed.  Concerned with the 
conceptualisation and evaluation of EU performance in multilateral negotiations spanning 
time and policy-fields, it has sought to test those divergent expectations and, in so doing, 
generate a fuller picture of how well the EU performs.  Specifically, this study has sought 
to address two principle research questions.  First, how well has the EU performed in 
multilateral negotiations over-time and across policy fields?  And second, what explains 
variation in the EU’s performance in multilateral negotiations? In drawing this study to its 
conclusion, the purpose of this chapter is to offer a response to these questions and to 
address how its main findings relate to the wider discourse on the EU as a global actor.  To 
present itself the chapter is broken down into three main sections.  In section one findings 
from the previous case studies are drawn together in order to address the study’s principle 
research questions.  Developing on these responses, in section two, aspects of the EU’s 
performance that have challenged expectations are highlighted, along with their 
implications for understanding the EU as a global actor.  The third and final section further 
outlines some possible avenues for the development of the performance research agenda. 
 
7.1. Addressing the research questions 
In approaching this study’s principle research questions, three stages have been followed.  
First, in order to evaluate how well the EU performed in multilateral negotiations – and to 
subsequently enable explanation of any changes within it – performance was 
conceptualised in order to identify how well the EU performs as a dependent variable.  
Detailed in Chapter Two, an analytical framework was developed for the evaluation of 
performance based on analysis of the EU’s negotiation behaviour and effectiveness; and 
which included performance indicators which drew upon process- and outcome-oriented 
concepts focused upon the EU’s level of unity, outreach, significance, and effectiveness.  
These indicators were assessed on a scale of low, moderate and high which, when 
aggregated, related to an overall performance value ranging from very poor, poor, fair, 
good to very good.  The second stage of the study was a detailed empirical analysis in 
which the EU’s performance was evaluated over the time-period from 1995 to 2011 across 
negotiation environments in which expectations of the EU’s performance were highly 
divergent and in order to capture variation in several key factors believed to shape EU 
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performance.  Cases thus included negotiations covering three different policy fields, 
including: in environment, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
negotiations (Chapter Three), in trade, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) multilateral 
trade negotiations (Chapter Four), and in security, the Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) review negotiations (Chapter Five).  The final stage was then addressed in Chapter 
Six where critical analysis of a number of explanatory variables – as identified from the 
existing literature – was conducted in seeking to test and draw any causal inferences 
between changes in how well the EU performed and changes in its internal and structural 
conditions, as well, interrelated to these conditions, upon changes in the EU’s level of 
ambition.  The principle findings from this analysis are summarised as follows: 
 
Q1: How well does the EU perform in multilateral negotiations over-time and 
across policies? 
In broad terms, findings from this analysis have shown that the EU does perform well in 
multilateral negotiations.  Out of a total twenty individual negotiations in which the EU’s 
performance was analysed, the EU gave a very good performance in three cases, a good 
performance in eight cases, a fair performance in six cases, a poor performance in two 
cases and a very poor performance in one case; showing that the EU has had a good or 
very good performance in the majority of negotiations analysed.  Closer analysis does 
however reveal a more variable picture which challenges expectations of how well the EU 
is thought to perform in multilateral negotiations.  As detailed in Figure 6.1 in the previous 
chapter, a chronological overview of the EU’s performances in all negotiations analysed 
from 1995 to 2011 has been found to range between very poor, poor, fair, good and very 
good across this time-period but with no clear trends indicating an overall improvement or 
diminution in its performances.  Thus, whilst the EU has performed relatively well within 
the majority of negotiations here assessed, this has not been found to have translated into 
consistency in its performances, but has instead been subject to considerable variability. 
 
EU performance within each negotiation environment further reflects this variation.  
Within the UNFCCC negotiations expectations have particularly been challenged with the 
EU’s performance found to have fluctuated between poor, fair, good and very good with 
no clear improving trend in the EU’s performance identified.  Whilst the EU has 
demonstrated that it can perform well in this forum, and has at times given several very 
good performances (particularly found in Berlin in 1995 and in Bali in 2007), this has by 
no means been consistent.  For example, whilst the EU’s negotiation behaviour was found 
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to vary between mostly moderate and high levels within the UNFCCC, its effectiveness 
fluctuated between low, moderate and high levels (see Table 3.3).  Findings therefore 
challenge expectations – particularly those associated with the EU’s ‘leadership’ within 
this environment – which suggest that EU performance has significantly improved over 
this time period. They further challenge expectations that the EU’s performance has 
diminished since the failure at Copenhagen in 2009, suggesting instead that the EU’s 
performance bounced-back with the EU giving a good performance at Durban in 
December 2011.    
 
Within the WTO multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) the EU’s performance was also 
found to have varied between fair, good and very good levels.  These findings also 
challenge expectations however, because whilst the EU was found not to perform poorly in 
this forum, neither has it had the extent of good or very good performances typically 
associated with an actor of the EU’s size or importance in the MTS.   In fact this study 
finds that of the negotiations analysed between 1996 and 2011, on only one occasion has 
the EU’s performance been found to be very good (in Geneva 2004) in this forum (see 
Figure 4.2). More than this, no clear trends have been identified in these findings to 
suggest any overall improvement or diminution in EU performance within the WTO over 
this period.  Instead, whilst the EU has shown itself to have a consistently high negotiation 
behaviour within the WTO, this has not always translated into higher goal-attainment and 
the EU’s effectiveness has mostly been moderate to low.  Its performances within the 
multilateral trade negotiations have subsequently varied between predominantly fair and 
good.   These findings thus challenge expectations that the EU performs at its best in the 
WTO due to its high capabilities and ‘state-like’ qualities. 
 
Variation is also found within the NPT negotiations where the EU’s performance was 
found to vary between very poor, fair and good; although with some indication of an 
improvement in the EU’s performance over more recent negotiations with a marked 
increase from very poor to good performance between the 2005 and 2010 NPT review 
negotiations.   Findings do further suggest that the EU has in fact exceeded expectations by 
performing well in several review negotiations (particularly found in the 1995 and 2010 
RevCons), despite the challenges it has faced due to its limited capacity to act in this field.   
Thus whilst the EU’s negotiation behaviour was found to vary between mostly low and 
moderate levels, its effectiveness has, interestingly, been predominantly high; with the EU 
attaining most of the goals set out in its common positions in this forum.    
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Q2: What explains variation in EU performance in multilateral negotiations? 
Explanation for variation in the EU’s performance within the multilateral negotiations 
assessed in this study was found across several factors shaping both the EU’s negotiation 
behaviour and effectiveness.  It has argued that understanding changes in the EU’s 
performance should take into account the internal conditions shaping the EU’s capacity to 
act, the external conditions shaping the EU’s ability to attain its goals, and also, how these 
factors intersect and shape the EU’s ambition and the objectives it seeks within multilateral 
negotiations. Thus, variation in EU performance in multilateral negotiations cannot be 
explained by any single variable or group of variables, but rather by several intersecting, 
mutually reinforcing factors each shaping the EU’s negotiation position and its fulfilment 
within the negotiation environment.  
 
Where this approach has added value to understanding the variation of EU performances in 
multilateral negotiations has been with particular regard to the relationship between the 
EU’s performance and its level of ambition as detailed in its own negotiation position.  It is 
argued that the EU has attained good or very good performances within the WTO, 
UNFCCC and NPT negotiations where its negotiation position has reflected a moderate 
level of ambition.  The EU has therefore been better able to outreach to its negotiation 
partners and ultimately attain its goals, where its negotiation objectives have been 
progressive but reflective of some symmetry with the preference structures of its 
negotiation partners.  Where the EU’s negotiation objectives have however, been high in 
ambition – positioning the EU as a progressive preference outlier in a negotiation 
environment dominated by more conservative interests – the EU’s performance has been 
far less impressive with notably lower levels of outreach and effectiveness.  Conversely, 
where the EU’s negotiation objectives have been low in ambition – positioning the EU as a 
conservative player with ambiguous language and lowest common denominator 
preferences – this has often translated into high effectiveness but low negotiation 
behaviour. 
 
In terms of understanding the EU as an international negotiator therefore, what this 
suggests is that the EU negotiates well not because it has set itself apart as a distinctively 
normative and highly ambitious player or because it has set ambiguous objectives which 
others cannot fail to agree with, but because it has set itself progressive objectives which 
also share some zone of agreement with negotiation partners.  It is thus where the EU can 
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build upon a zone of agreement that it has been better capable of outreaching to negotiation 
partners, successfully employing negotiation tactics, and has been able to achieve moderate 
to high levels of effectiveness. 
 
Focus was also given to how the EU’s internal conditions – most especially in terms of the 
EU’s level of integration and competence within each policy-field analysed – and the 
structural conditions facing each negotiation environment had shaped the EU’s negotiation 
position and its subsequent performance.  It was found that the level of EU competence did 
influence the EU’s negotiation behaviour within multilateral negotiations; most notably 
boosting EU unity where it has exclusive competence, as was found in the WTO; but 
providing a challenge to EU unity where competence is lacking, as was found in the NPT.  
It was argued however, that competence, whilst important, is insufficient in itself to 
explain variation in the EU’s effectiveness or to changes in the EU’s overall performance.  
The EU’s domestic policy was also found at times to influence EU performance; with 
policies such as the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, or its ‘burden 
sharing’ agreement over cuts in greenhouse gases, raising the EU’s ambition within the 
UNFCCC and WTO negotiations.  EU institutional changes were also found to have some 
impact upon EU negotiation behaviour, although this was not to the extent that might be 
expected.  On-going treaty reforms were in fact found to have made little direct influence 
on the EU’s performances; although changes from the 2007 Lisbon Treaty may be 
expected to bring about further changes to the EU’s representation within the NPT, if not 
in the UNFCCC and WTO.   
 
Changes in structural conditions, particularly due to changes in the global distribution of 
power and the rise of the emerging economies, were also found to influence EU 
performance in multilateral negotiations.  Notably, it was found that the rise of the 
emerging economies since the early 2000s has not resulted in the overall diminution of EU 
performance in multilateral negotiations often suggested within the existing literature (see 
A.R. Young: 2011, Oberthür: 2011a, Roberts: 2010, Afionis: 2009).   However, these shifts 
in structural conditions have influenced the EU’s level of ambition within negotiations 
over the period 1995 to 2011, with the EU often moderating its ambition in order to find 
accommodation with the more conservative preference structures of other major powers.  It 
has been argued therefore that the presence or absence of competition within the 
international system cannot of itself explain variation in the EU’s negotiation performance, 
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but rather how the EU manages that complexity to find some zone of agreement with the 
preference structures of its negotiation partners.  
 
7.2. Challenging expectations and its implications 
The findings from this study would thus appear to challenge expectations of the EU’s 
performance; and its explanation, in several ways.  At its most fundamental, expectations 
of how well the EU should perform in multilateral negotiations as premised upon how 
‘state-like’ an actor it is have been particularly challenged in the findings from this study.  
As was outlined in the previous section, whilst EU negotiation behaviour has been at its 
best in the WTO where it has exclusive competence, a high level of integration and an 
ability to ‘speak with one voice’, this has not always been translated into a high level of 
effectiveness nor therefore an overall good performance in this forum.  Equally, within the 
NPT negotiations expectations of EU performance have been low due the EU’s limited 
integration in this field and the challenges faced of maintaining unity amongst highly 
divided Member States.  However, the EU’s performance in this forum was found to 
exceed expectations with the EU giving good performances on several occasions.  
 
Expectations have also been challenged however within the existing literature; and 
particularly in terms of how other concepts of analysis including EU leadership, actorness 
and effectiveness have been evaluated within these negotiations.  A critical aim of this 
study has been to move beyond challenges identified within this discourse by testing the 
highly divergent expectations that these concepts have generated over the EU’s 
performance in multilateral negotiations.  By focusing explicitly on EU performance as a 
measure of both its negotiation behaviour and effectiveness, it has sought to narrow the 
gap between predominantly process- and outcome-oriented concepts which have tended to 
considerably over- or under-estimate EU performance.  Most notably these findings have 
challenged expectations by suggesting that the EU has neither performed as well as the EU 
leadership and actorness literature has argued, nor as poorly as the effectiveness literature 
would imply.   
 
Focusing first on the leadership and actorness literatures, as was demonstrated in Chapter 
One, this literature - dominated particularly by case studies on multilateral trade and 
climate negotiations – have been seen to follow a, “decadal variation” (Oberthür: 2011a) in 
arguing that the EU’s capacity to act, and to ‘lead’ within these negotiations has broadly 
improved since the 1990s, only to be challenged during the later 2000s as the rise of the 
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emerging economies has impacted upon the EU’s effectiveness (see also A.R Young: 
2011).  Expectations of an EU who “traded places” (Keleman & Vogel: 2010) with the US 
as the leading actor of the UNFCCC and who was the principle demandeur in launching 
the Doha Round within the WTO in the early 2000s, have thus increasingly been replaced 
in the late 2000s and early 2010s by concerns of the EU “abdicating its leadership role” 
(Santarius et al.: 2009), and of a dawning new multipolar world order dominated by the US 
and emerging economies (Kilian & Elgström: 2010: 268).  Findings from this study 
however, indicate no such improving or diminishing trends in the EU’s performance.  
Instead it has shown that the EU’s performances within the UNFCCC and WTO have 
continued to demonstrate the same variability found during the late 1990s, as had been the 
case over the 2000s and early 2010s.  Concerns voiced following negotiation set-backs in 
Geneva in 2008 (WTO) and Copenhagen in 2009 (UNFCCC) have also been found to be 
premature, with the EU then bouncing back to give good performances during both the 
UNFCCC’s Durban summit and the WTO’s Geneva Ministerial Conference held in 
December 2011.   
 
Equally, expectations stemming from more cautious critiques of the EU’s “limited 
influence” (Van Schaik & Schunz: 2012, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36) and 
effectiveness in multilateral negotiations have also been challenged in these findings.  As 
was discussed in Chapter One, the existing literature on EU effectiveness within 
multilateral negotiations has highlighted the considerable variability in the EU’s ability to 
shape outcome and attain its goals (i.e. Jørgensen et al. 2011, Laatikainen & Smith: 2006), 
with particular attention paid to the EU’s “punching below its weight” (Laatikainen & 
Smith: 2006: 20).  Whilst these findings do corroborate the argument that EU effectiveness 
is highly variable within multilateral negotiations, they nevertheless challenge the 
understanding that the EU often “punches below its weight”.   Whilst recognising that the 
EU’s level of ambition has influenced the EU’s subsequent goal-attainment, it has been 
found that, in the majority of individual negotiations assessed in this study, the EU did 
attain some or most of its goals (see also Appendix V).  This is particularly exemplified in 
the NPT review negotiations where the EU has in fact demonstrated a predominantly high 
level of effectiveness.  Within the UNFCCC moreover, whilst it has been argued that the 
EU’s performance has been at its best during CoPs aimed at initiating negotiations rather 
than in their finalisation, it has also shown that the EU has attained mostly moderate to 
high levels of goal-attainment overall in this forum.  The concept of punching above or 
below its weight would also appear to have only limited utility in the context of the WTO’s 
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multilateral trade negotiations where the EU’s effectiveness has, despite its considerable 
‘weight’ as a global trading superpower, varied between predominantly low to moderate 
levels.  What this analysis would thus suggest is that expectations of an ‘improving’ EU 
leadership as well as concerns over its ‘limited influence’ within multilateral negotiations 
may, in fact, require some careful re-evaluation.    
 
Moderating ambitions aids EU performance 
One approach for re-evaluating expectations and more accurately evaluating the EU’s 
performance in multilateral negotiations may be found by moving beyond attempts to 
conceptualise the EU’s weight and presence in international relations, to engage instead 
with what the EU is actually trying to achieve and how its position relates to the preference 
structures of its negotiation partners.  As was highlighted in Chapter One, the ambition of 
the EU’s negotiation position within multilateral negotiations, and particularly within 
environmental negotiations, has commonly been cited as a condition of its leadership in 
such fora (Parker & Karlsson: 2010: 930, Gowan & Brantner: 2008: 45, Oberthür & Roche 
Kelly: 2008: 36, Schreurs & Tiberghien: 2007: 19, Gupta & Ringius: 2001: 288).  The 
EU’s own ambitions of playing a ‘leading role’ within international institutions and to, 
“take on responsibility for building a better world” (Council: 2003c), also emphasise this 
fact; with the EU’s willingness to lead often given greater focus than its ability to then 
persuade followers.   
 
Yet, what this study has reflected is that, where the EU’s position entering negotiations is 
high in ambition the EU’s ability to persuade negotiations partners to support its goals has 
been severely limited and its effectiveness low.  Instead, it has found that it is where the 
EU’s negotiation position has moderated its ambition that the EU has achieved good or 
very good performances in multilateral negotiations.   In those cases, it has been where the 
EU’s position has been progressive; yet reflecting some zone of agreement with its 
negotiation partners, that it has been best capable of performing well and attaining its 
goals.  The EU thus performs well in multilateral negotiations not because it has set itself 
apart as a distinctive ‘leader’ or demandeur, but because it has set progressive objectives 
which relate to the preference structures of its negotiation partners.  It has thus been by 
building on areas of commonality with its negotiation partners, rather than endeavouring to 
demonstrate its distinctiveness as a ‘leading’ actor, that the EU has managed to 
successfully outreach to others, and subsequently achieve its goals.   
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What this therefore suggests is the need, not for high, but moderate ambitions in order to 
aid EU performance.  Whilst high ambitions are to be applauded in terms of raising the 
level of debate, highlighting the need for greater ambitions by others; and, as was found in 
Chapter Three with the EU’s ambitions approaching the first UNFCCC COP in Berlin, 
may also have some utility in helping to set the agenda for negotiations; moderated 
ambitions, which also take into consideration the reality of the negotiation context are 
more likely to aid performance.  More than this, where the EU’s negotiation position is 
both progressive and realistic, it has been shown to not only have resulted in a good 
performance for the EU but also exhibited an outcome agreement supported by all 
negotiation partners.  Moderating the EU’s ambitions to accept the reality of the 
negotiation context within which it must perform can therefore be found to help not only 
its own performance but also contribute to the success of the negotiation itself.  
  
‘Follower’ the leader: Readdressing the balance between ‘leadership’ and 
outreach 
This in turn raises a further implication in terms of analysis of EU ‘leadership’ within 
multilateral negotiations.  It is argued that a necessary means of re-evaluating expectations 
of EU performance in multilateral negotiations is to look beyond the EU’s high ambitions 
and its potential to lead, to engage instead with the EU’s negotiation performance and its 
outreach to potential ‘followers’.  A major challenge facing the EU leadership discourse 
however has been that it has tended to neglect the relationship between leader and 
followers (see Underdal: 1994).  As this study has shown, the EU’s success in its 
performance outreach to negotiation partners has been of critical importance to its 
subsequent goal-attainment.  This begins with the moderation of its ambitions to find some 
zone of agreement with its negotiation partners, but it continues on into the negotiations 
themselves through the EU’s negotiation strategy and the tactics it employs in persuading 
others to support its preferences.    
 
What this study has especially identified is that the EU’s negotiation strategy during the 
majority of negotiations here analysed has been predominantly proactive.  This may be 
expected in these cases where the EU’s negotiation position entering the UNFCCC, WTO 
and, to a certain extent, the NPT, has been principally progressive rather than conservative.  
The EU has however, also been identified to have employed several negotiation tactics 
within the negotiations here analysed.  Coalition-building specifically was found to be 
successful in the UNFCCC negotiations with the EU building support with the G77 at 
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numerous stages throughout the Kyoto and post-Kyoto agreement negotiations.  In Durban 
in 2011 this was also seen in the EU building support for progress towards a post-Kyoto 
agreement amongst other ‘high ambition’ negotiation groups including AOSIS and the 
LDCs (see Chapter Three).  The tradition of EU Member States working within other 
negotiation groups within the NPT may also be found to fall into this category and which, 
in 1995 and 2010, was found to be highly useful for the EU spreading its voice and 
pushing its common objectives with negotiation partners.   The EU has also been shown to 
use argumentation; strengthening its case with negotiation partners by, for example, basing 
arguments on scientific evidence (UNFCCC), and focusing on the technical details in 
dealing with more politically-sensitive issues.   
 
The EU’s propensity to concentrate on more technical issues under negotiation in order to 
build agreement has in fact been evident across all three negotiation environments.  Within 
the NPT the EU has placed far greater emphasis on technical issues, such as the Additional 
Protocol for IAEA comprehensive safeguard arrangements; where its Members’ interests 
are also far more convergent, than in issues relating to the more politicised and 
controversial issue of nuclear disarmament, where its position has been more ambiguous.  
Within the WTO, the EU’s penchant for pursuing technical objectives has also been found 
in negotiations over industrialised goods (NAMA) especially where, in its efforts to break 
the impasse over NAMA-sectorals, the EU conducted negotiations amongst technical 
experts during the critical 2008 negotiations, and in 2011 submitted a further compromise 
proposal outlining technical details for a formula for NAMA-sectorals (Chapter Four).    
 
The EU has also been found to use concessions as a negotiation tactic; particularly evident 
in the WTO where the EU’s market size gives it considerable bargaining power and makes 
its concessions a critical incentive for negotiation partners to support the EU’s more 
offensive preferences.  Within the WTO and UNFCCC the EU also employs issue-linkage 
which has been most commonly used in pursuing offensive interests that build support 
with the developing world.  Coalition-building within the UNFCCC has, for example, 
typically gone hand in hand with issue-linkage with the EU linking its support for 
development issues and offering financial incentive through the Green Fund to persuade 
the G77 to support its objectives for a post-Kyoto successor climate agreement.  Findings 
also indicate that the EU has made good use of demarchés prior to negotiations in 
persuading negotiation partners of its objectives.  Several of its diplomatic campaigns – 
most especially the 1995 indefinite extension decision in the NPT; the campaign to attract 
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support for the launching of a new trade round in the WTO; and the campaign to persuade 
the ‘Gang of Four’ to ratify the Kyoto Protocol – have all been highly successful and 
demonstrate the significant difference that the EU can make when it utilises all of its 
diplomatic tools (including those of its Member States) in its efforts to persuade 
negotiation partners.   
 
Findings have further shown that, where those tactics have been successful, the EU’s 
effectiveness is higher.   It is noted however, that the EU’s ability to successfully utilise 
these tactics has been highly variable and the EU’s ‘power of persuasion’ has, at times, 
been limited.  Thus, whilst the EU may often unilaterally set an example, specify ambitious 
objectives in its efforts to ‘lead’, and attempt to persuade its negotiation partners, this does 
not always translate into others then ‘following’  (see also Chaban et al. 2006, Torney: 
2011).  Instead, what this study finds is that rather than others raising their level of 
ambition to meet with the preference structures of the EU, it has been the EU that has 
moderated its ambitions to better account for the more conservative interests of its 
negotiation partners.  What this would therefore suggest is the need to readdress the 
balance between understandings of the EU’s leadership within multilateral negotiations, 
and its actual outreach as an indication of its negotiation behaviour and overall 
performance.  More specifically, it suggests that focus move beyond the EU’s leadership 
rhetoric to engage much more deliberately with what the EU wants in multilateral 
negotiations – relative to its negotiation partners; what strategy and tactics it subsequently 
employs, and how it can build upon any zone of agreement to subsequently achieve its 
goals. 
 
Normative or Pragmatic Power Europe? 
Further relating to the EU’s leadership rhetoric is the discourse on the EU as a particular 
‘type’ of power.  As reflected upon in Chapter One, a popular focus within the EUGA 
literature has been towards assessment of the EU as a distinctive ‘type’ of power; one who 
chose to act multilaterally, pursued distinctive and ‘normative’ preferences, and who 
sought to be a ‘force for good’ in international affairs (see Börzel & Risse: 2009, 
Aggestam: 2009, Manners: 2002, 2006).  Prominent in the Normative Power Europe 
(NPE) discourse particularly has been a prevailing argument that the EU not only forges its 
international identity by being a ‘normative’ actor, but moreover exercises influence and 
power in its international relations through the pursuit of a distinctly normative agenda in 
which the EU sets itself apart as being ‘different’ from other major players (see Manners & 
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Whitman: 2003, Manners: 2006, 2002).  An expectation therefore is that the EU is most 
influential – and thus most likely to achieve its goals - where it pursues a distinctive 
agenda in which it is not only ‘progressive’ but also ‘different’ to others (Schiepers & 
Sicurelli: 2007: 451-452).  Relating also to the leadership debate, claims of the EU 
performing the role of a ‘directional leader’ by pursuing the most ambitious domestic 
policies to tackle climate change, of going first and of setting the example which others can 
follow, also stress the importance of the EU’s high ambition and normative distinctiveness 
to its performance within multilateral negotiations (Andresen & Agrawala: 2002: 49, 
Skodvin & Andresen: 2006: 21, Oberthür & Roche Kelly: 2008: 36). 
 
However, in challenging those expectations, this study has found that where the EU has 
entered negotiations with a high ambition negotiation position – positioned therefore as a 
distinctive and normative preference outlier - its ability to outreach to its negotiation 
partners has been significantly limited.  Prime example of this was seen at the UNFCCC’s 
Copenhagen Summit in 2009 where the EU’s pursuit of a distinctively normative 
negotiation agenda, pursuing a progressive international agreement for legally binding 
reduction targets for the emission of greenhouse gases by both the developed world and 
emerging economies, failed to garner any of the necessary support from what were the far 
more conservative preferences of the US, India, China and Brazil, and which resulted in a 
poor performance for the EU overall. More than this, in all cases where the EU was found 
to enter negotiations with a high ambition negotiation position, the EU’s outreach to third 
countries was not only mostly moderate but its effectiveness also low (see also Figure 6.4 
in Chapter Six). What this therefore suggests is that where the EU has attempted to act 
normatively, and ‘differently’, within multilateral negotiations, its ability to successfully 
utilise tactics to persuade third countries to support its goals, and to subsequently influence 
the outcome of the negotiation in favour of those objectives, has failed.   
 
Instead, what this study has revealed is that it is where the EU has pursued both a 
progressive negotiation agenda, but one which in fact builds upon common preferences 
with its negotiation partners, that it has performed at its best in multilateral negotiations.  
More than this, it has been where the EU has lowered its high ambitions following 
negotiations in which its performance was consequently poor that it has demonstrated 
improvement in its negotiation performance.  This was evident particularly within the 
UNFCCC and WTO negotiations where, following negotiations in which the EU’s 
negotiation position was high in ambition and its performance poor or fair, the EU 
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subsequently lowered its ambition to a moderate level approaching the next negotiation 
and, in so doing, improved its overall performance. 
 
It is thus argued that a degree of pragmatism can be identified in the formation of the EU’s 
negotiation objectives approaching multilateral negotiations.  Shaped not only by its own 
norms, interests and institutional capabilities, the EU’s negotiation position has also been 
adjusted to account for past performances and the preference structures of its often more 
conservative negotiation partners.  It has thus been where the EU finds areas of 
commonality that the EU has performed well, not where it has set itself apart as a 
‘different’ sort of actor and preference outlier.  What this would thus imply is that the EU’s 
influence courtesy of ‘what it is’ as an international actor has had limited impact upon its 
performance within those multilateral negotiation here analysed.  In an environment in 
which the preference structures of hundreds of other actors must be taken into 
consideration, and in which the EU’s ability to persuade more conservative negotiation 
partners has been remarkably limited, it has in fact been the EU’s pragmatism in 
moderating its ambitions to take into consideration the preference structures of others, and 
thus take into account the reality of the negotiation context, that has enabled it to perform 
well.  What this would therefore suggest is that EU influence is less a consequence of its 
distinctiveness as a Normative Power, and much more a result of its pragmatism as a 
negotiator in better navigating the preference structures of its negotiation partners.  This in 
turn would imply that efforts to identify the EU as a particular ‘type’ of power may require 
some refinement in order to take into consideration the EU’s preferences relative to its 
negotiation partners and its actual rather than potential influence in shaping the objectives  
of others. 
  
Speaking with ‘one voice’ – or with many? 
Another important implication challenging expectations in this study is that the EU has 
been able to attain its goals within multilateral negotiation, not by always speaking with 
one voice, but with many.  Reflected upon in Chapter One, whilst there is an assumed link 
between the EUs’ unity and its overall effectiveness within multilateral negotiations (i.e. 
Gebhard: 2011: 110, Van Schaik: 2010: 255), this link has rarely been explicitly tested (see 
Thomas: 2012).  Developing upon this, in this study EU unity and effectiveness were 
evaluated as two of the four performance indicators used to make an overall performance 
assessment.  Challenging expectations, it has found that the EU has been able to attain 
most of its objectives; achieving high levels of effectiveness, in those negotiations where it 
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has also had moderate unity (see Appendix V).  As shown in Chapters Three and Five 
evaluating the EU’s performance within the UNFCCC and NPT negotiations, it was found 
that whilst the level of EU unity in these fora has at times been challenged by its Member 
States speaking in their own national capacity, the EU has also been at its most effective 
where it has demonstrated cohesion amongst its constituent part, and spread its voice 
across several ‘lead’ negotiators and Member States.  These findings do also have 
important implications not only for how the EU’s unity within multilateral negotiations is 
to be understood, but also upon the expectation that it is by ‘speaking with one voice’ that 
the EU may best attain its goals.  Firstly, it is noted that these findings would appear to 
corroborate those who have started to challenge conventional wisdom in suggesting that 
speaking with one voice may not always be to the EU’s advantage (see Dee: 2012a, Koops 
& Macaj: 2012, Smith: 2006).   
 
Secondly, whilst the EU’s unity is a necessary consideration in assessing its performance 
in multilateral negotiations, these findings would suggest some attention be given to how 
EU performance can be aided by the EU speaking with more than one voice.  The EU’s 
ability to ‘speak with one voice’ within the WTO – a negotiation environment in which the 
EU’s capacity to act is widely acknowledged to be at its most ‘state-like’; and thus where it 
is expected to negotiate through the official voice of the European Commission – has been 
a considerable strength and has enabled the EU to maintain a high level of negotiation 
behaviour even where it has been internally divided.  However, within negotiations where 
its competence is less established, the EU’s ability to speak with more than one voice has 
not been the disadvantage that many have feared
96
.  Of importance for the EU’s 
negotiation performance therefore, have been less how many voices the EU speaks with, 
and much more how cohesive the EU’s voices are.  Where the EU and its Member States 
have maintained cohesion, with Members reinforcing and supporting EU positions in their 
own activities, the EU’s effectiveness has been moderate to high.  Where the EU Member 
States have been divided, contradicting EU common positions through the pursuit of their 
own stronger national interests, the EU’s performance has been adversely affected.  
 
There is therefore, some argument to be made in suggesting that where the EU can 
maintain its cohesion it is well placed to utilise the diplomatic relationships of its Member 
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 In responding to a question on the impact of Member State cross-alignment with other negotiation groups 
within the NPT upon the EU, one EU diplomatic source responded: “It doesn’t help the visibility of the 
EU...It is to our discredit.” (Interview, New York, 7th March 2011). Another senior official further claimed 
that cross-alignment could be seen to damage EU credibility (interview, senior official, Department of Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs, EEAS, 10
th
 May 2011) 
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States in furthering its common objectives within the context of multilateral negotiations.   
In an environment in which consensus-building is the order of the day and where 
negotiators must work closely with others in order to manage complexity and reduce the 
number of divergent perspectives and proposals into core interests with which to negotiate, 
the EU’s ability to have eyes and ears in several places is a notable advantage.  Where the 
EU can itself then maintain its own cohesion to utilise this advantage rather than allow its 
own internal divisions to weaken its position, its performance is significantly enhanced.  
This may particularly be found to be a comparative advantage in those multilateral 
negotiations where the EU does not have exclusive legal competence but where the 
Member States do coordinate under a common position.  Within the United Nations 
especially there is certainly some argument to be made for the EU pursuing a strategic 
approach that takes full advantage of its Member States diplomatic connections
97
.  
 
‘Ever closer union’ but to what end? 
A final related implication challenging expectations in this study relates specifically to the 
EU’s competence and its ongoing efforts for institutional development and ‘ever closer 
union’.  Debate not only within the scholarly community (i.e. Thomas: 2012, Gebhard: 
2011) but also within EU policy-making circles (i.e. Commission: 2006), has particularly 
stressed the expected improving nature of EU integration efforts upon EU external 
coherence and effectiveness.  Findings from this study have however challenged this 
conventional argument in several ways.  First, findings have suggested that EU 
performance in multilateral negotiations has not followed any notable improving trend 
following successive treaty reforms but has instead continued to vary considerably over-
time across all policy fields.  As Figure 6.1 in the previous Chapter revealed, how well the 
EU has performed in multilateral negotiations spanning time from 1995 to 2011 continued 
to vary between very good, good, fair, poor and very poor levels despite several treaty 
reforms over this time-period.  In particular, no pertinent trends were identified to suggest 
improvement in the EU’s negotiation performance within any of the cases analysed 
following the Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001), or Lisbon (2007) Treaties; despite the 
intention that such treaty reforms would build ‘Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and 
Visibility’ for the EU in its external relations (Commission: 2006).  Whilst the full extent 
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 See also Laatikainen  (2010: 488) who argues that in pursuing an entrepreneurial style of leadership at the 
UN post-Lisbon Treaty – whereby the EU takes on a much more bridge-building type role - the EU’s 
external representation would in fact be best served by the EU-27 permanent missions being the, “visible face 
of the EU in UN diplomacy...which in their interactions with third parties would have freedom to interact, but 
in line with EU positions” 
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of the Lisbon Treaty’s impact upon EU negotiation performance has yet to be fully 
realised, early indications from 2009 to 2011 moreover suggest no obvious improvement 
for the EU in its performance within the UNFCCC or WTO particularly
98
.     
 
Secondly, findings further suggest that EU performance in multilateral negotiations has not 
followed any obvious trend of being at its best in the WTO trade negotiations, and at its 
worst in the NPT negotiations, but has instead varied considerably within each policy field 
(see also Appendix V).  Whilst findings from this study do support the argument that 
greater integration and exclusive competence can benefit the EU’s negotiation behaviour – 
most notably evident in the consistently high level of negotiation behaviour exhibited by 
the EU within the WTO multilateral trade negotiations - what has also been clear from this 
study is that how ‘state-like’ the EU is has had only limited bearing upon its effectiveness 
within multilateral negotiations.  EU effectiveness has instead varied between low, 
moderate and high across each case study including in the WTO, the UNFCCC and the 
NPT negotiations, suggesting that the extent of EU integration and its level of competence 
in any given policy field has had limited influence upon its ability to ‘punch above its 
weight’ and attain its goals.   
 
This would therefore appear to raise important questions of to what end EU efforts towards 
‘ever closer union’ over the past two decades have been geared.  When it comes to 
influencing – and subsequently explaining – how well the EU performs within multilateral 
negotiations, what this study has shown is that there have been no obvious trends of 
improved effectiveness for the EU as a result of its ‘state-like’ qualities or on-going efforts 
towards improved integration.  Whilst there may be some counterfactual argument to 
suppose that the EU’s performance could have been worse had it not been for the EU’s 
treaty reforms and institutional development, what this study would nevertheless iterate is 
that the EU’s competence and institutional development have been less a determinant of 
improvements in the EU’s performance as conventional wisdom has supposed.  
 
In making this point, it is not to say that the EU should thus stop its quest for ‘ever closer 
union’.  Rather, this study’s findings reinforce the argument that the EU’s exclusive 
competence and closer integration can boost EU behaviour within negotiations and which 
does therefore warrant further consideration and on-going effort.  Instead, what is argued is 
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 Exception may be seen in the NPT where the introduction of the EEAS was seen to have some improving 
effect on its performance in the 2010 RevCon. 
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that scholars and policy-makers may find greater merit in moving beyond a purely EU qua 
the EU focus in looking to how the EU can improve its ‘state-like’ qualities in multilateral 
negotiations, to engage instead with questions of what the EU is actually doing relative to 
its negotiation partners and how well it then performs.  For EU policy-makers particularly 
what this would suggest is the need to re-focus attentions from what has been a 
predominantly coherence = effectiveness mind-set to a more nuanced approach which 
looks not only to EU coherence and its capacity to act, but to how the EU positions itself 
and outreaches to third countries, how it fine-tunes its negotiation style and the tactics it 
employs in engaging with negotiation partners, and how this can in turn bolster EU 
effectiveness on the world stage.   
 
7.3. Furthering the performance research agenda 
As this study has aspired to show, performance studies have a great deal to offer in 
contributing to understanding of the EU as a global actor, power and leader.  One aim of 
this study has been to contribute to the small, yet growing, body of debate which has, since 
the turn of the 2010s, begun to focus explicitly on EU performance as a distinctive research 
agenda.  By offering these findings it hopes to have added to those preliminary studies 
through the further conceptualisation of performance and, importantly, through the 
generation of new empirical data.  This contribution is nevertheless one step on the path 
towards a much broader research agenda which, as Jørgensen et al. (2011: 600) state, “may 
be about to hit a new high watermark”.  As this study has endeavoured to show, 
performance studies have considerable utility in addressing not only how the EU acts and 
behaves internationally, but also how effective those actions are.  As a concept of analysis 
it can therefore, contribute a great deal to bridging the gap within EU studies between other 
more process- and outcome-oriented concepts which have had a tendency to focus either 
on what the  EU is, says, and does but with limited recourse to the connectivity between 
them (see also Damro: 2012:  697).  
 
In furthering that research agenda several recommendations may however, still be made.  
First and most fundamentally, building up a wider empirical base is an important step 
forward.  Whilst this study has endeavoured to generate a fuller picture of how well the EU 
performs in multilateral negotiations spanning time and policy fields, it has nevertheless 
been a small n-study.  A larger data set ranging across a greater number of negotiation 
environments would invariably strengthen the findings here indicated.  Broadening the 
focus to include new negotiation environments would be particularly useful in generating a 
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much wider picture of the EU’s performance in multilateral negotiations across different 
issue areas as well as how other independent variables may shape that performance.   In 
this study multilateral negotiations were selected which broadly reflected examples of 
‘global conference diplomacy’ (Rittberger: 1983).  Time and space constraints have 
however prevented detailed discussion of the diverse nature of those negotiation 
environments and the potential impact that different negotiation processes may have had 
upon the EU’s performance.  Particularly worthy of further research in this regard is the 
impact that iterative compared to non-iterative negotiation environments might have upon 
EU performance, particularly in terms of how enhanced socialisation practices amongst 
negotiators involved in iterative contexts may help to shape EU negotiation behaviour and 
likely outcomes.  Broadening the empirical focus to therefore explicitly address different 
negotiation contexts would again enable a fuller picture of how well the EU performs to be 
manifested and explanation for its variation to be developed. 
 
A further recommendation could be to further fine-tune conceptualisations of performance 
to suit other fora.  In this study the performance indicators selected have been chosen to 
suit the context of a multilateral negotiation where consensus-building and the 
requirements of multilateral diplomacy require certain actions from an actor’s 
performance.  These indicators are not static however but could be adapted to other forum. 
This might be useful in relation to bilateral or plurilateral negotiations where indicators 
could, for example, focus more upon the EU’s explicit bargaining behaviour and the power 
symmetry of the negotiation environment.  Another point of potential development is to 
adopt a comparative approach that evaluates EU performance relative to the performances 
of other major players within multilateral negotiations.  This study has endeavoured to 
move beyond purely EU qua the EU approaches by relating analysis of the EU’s ambition 
and its outreach within negotiations to the preferences and activities of its negotiation 
partners, however, this could be further built upon to also conduct explicit performance 
analyses of other players.  Such a comparative approach would moreover, considerably 
facilitate performance studies in reference to the competitiveness debate; enabling how 
well the EU performs to be assessed comparative to the performance of others.  Whilst this 
approach would generate challenges over how EU performance should be evaluated in a 
way that allows a fair comparison to the performance of State actors, it would nevertheless 
enable a far wider understanding to be garnered of the EU as an international actor and 
negotiator relative to other actors within the international system. 
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A further avenue for furthering the performance research agenda is through the 
development of systematic approaches to explanation of why the EU performs as it does.   
Due to this study’s necessary prioritisation of evaluation of performance over its 
explanation, it has not been possible to offer a more rigorous and systematic approach to 
the explication of variation in EU performance in multilateral negotiations.  Whilst 
offering what is hoped to be a more holistic approach to understanding those variables 
which shape the EU’s negotiation performance, it would nevertheless be recommended 
that much greater focus be given to this specific aspect of performance in future research.  
One possible approach for furthering this aspect of the research agenda could be to move 
beyond more inference based, process-tracing approaches to instead develop a more 
comparative, index-oriented approach (see also O. Young: 2001).  Inference, process-
tracing approaches – as were utilised in this study – are useful in endeavouring to identify 
pertinent trends between changes in the dependent variable relative to independent 
variables in an effort to prove or disprove any causal relationship between the two (see also 
Bennett: 2008). They are however, limited in being able to offer systematically tested 
explanation and rely in most part upon the identification of possible explanatory variables 
rather than testing how much those variables actually shape the dependent variable. 
 
Another approach could be to utilise methods such as the Qualitative Comparative 
Approach (QCA) which places emphasise on identifying combinations of conditions which 
shape the dependent variable.  QCA is a research method developed specifically for the 
analysis of small-n data sets and is typical in comparative studies (Rihoux: 2008: 724); it 
does therefore have some utility in cases such as these.  As a research method, QCA seeks 
to establish “specific connections” (Rihoux: 2008: 724) by analysing a selection of cases 
chosen either based on a common outcome in order to identify shared conditions, or based 
on cases that share common conditions in order to assess whether or not they then exhibit 
the same outcome.  Using a truth table, co-variance between the value of the dependent 
variable and variations in values of identified conditions is then easily and logically 
identified and those combinations of conditions most likely to influence the dependent 
variable revealed.  Such an approach could therefore enable the identification of, “decisive 
recipes … [to] unravel causal complexity” (Rihoux: 2008: 726) and which could therefore 
greatly contribute to explanation of variability of the EU’s negotiation performances.   
 
Such an approach does however, have its challenges.  In particular, whilst offering a clear 
and systematic method of identifying connections between changes in the EU’s 
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performance and changes in internal and external conditions, it does then place 
considerable stress onto how those conditions are themselves indexed into values that can 
be input into a truth-table.  The question that must therefore be addressed is how 
conditions, for example, changes to the negotiation environment, or the degree of 
convergence amongst EU Member States interests, can themselves be indexed into 
quantifiable values.  Another challenge is that QCA has been relatively under-utilised 
within EU studies.  Hence, developing this approach to utilise in performance studies 
would be setting a precedent.  It may however provide an interesting avenue for furthering 
the research agenda upon explanation of consistency and change in EU performance.   
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been to offer a fuller understanding of how well the EU 
performs in multilateral negotiations.  It has dealt with questions of the EU’s unity and 
significance; the EU’s outreach to negotiation partners and its ability to attain its goals; and 
it has sought to make some contribution to understanding the EU as a global actor by 
demonstrating how conceptualisations of performance can enable the evaluation of both 
EU behaviour and effectiveness.  In its modest contribution it has attempted to offer added 
value to the existing discourse by challenging those expectations of how the EU ‘ought’ to 
perform in the context of multilateral negotiations, to engage instead with how well the EU 
has performed.  In so doing it has challenged expectations in several ways.  At its most 
fundamental it has found that the EU’s performance in multilateral negotiations does not 
follow a pattern of being good in those fora where it is itself most ‘state-like’ and poor in 
those forum where it is least integrated.  Rather it has shown that EU performance in 
multilateral negotiations is highly variable, not only between negotiation environments, but 
also within them.  Expectations have further been challenged in the way that the EU’s 
performance has been conceptualised.  Challenging the over-estimation of EU ‘leadership’ 
and actorness discourses, as well as the under-estimation of the external effectiveness 
literature; it has shown that the EU has performed neither as well as the leadership 
literature has suggested, nor as poorly as the effectiveness literature has implied.   
 
Explanation for this variation may moreover be found, less in the EU’s own capacity to act 
– although this is an essential consideration – and more in how the EU’s institutional 
conditions and the conditions of the external environment shape the EU’s ambition 
approaching negotiations.  Where the EU maintains a moderate level of ambition reflecting 
progressiveness in its negotiation objectives, but where it also finds some zone of 
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agreement with negotiation partners, it is far more likely to perform well; building on its 
extensive diplomatic capabilities to persuade partners of its objectives and to ultimately 
attain its goals.  What this study thus argues is that understanding how well the EU 
performs in multilateral negotiations cannot simply be a question of understanding how 
well the EU can perform, but of understanding how it actually navigates the negotiation 
environment.  It is hoped that this study has made some contribution in enabling that 
understanding to be developed further. 
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Appendix I: List of Interviewees 
 
Interviewee Reference Location Date
Senior official, DG Trade Brussels 11th May 2011
Senior official, WTO Unit, DG Trade Brussels 12th May 2011
Senior official, DG Trade Brussels 16th May 2011
Senior official, EU Delegation to the WTO Geneva 20th May 2011
Lord Brittan of Spennithorne, former EU Trade Commissioner London 19th April 2011
Mr Hugo Paeman, former EU lead negotiator, DG Trade Brussels 16th May 2011
Senior trade official, EU Member State A Brussels 18th May 2011
Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State B Geneva 20th May 2011
Senior trade official, EU Member State C Brussels 16th May 2011
Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State C Geneva 23rd  May 2011
Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, EU Member State D Geneva 20th May 2011
Senior trade official, EU Member State E Brussels 17th May 2011
WTO spokesperson Geneva 19th May 2011
Ambassador to the WTO, northern developed country Geneva 19th May 2011
First Secretary to the WTO, southern developing country Geneva 19th May 2011
Deputy Permanent Representative to the WTO, southern developing country Geneva 19th May 2011
Commercial Secretary, southern developing country Geneva 19th May 2011
First Secretary to the WTO, northern developed country Geneva 23rd May 2011
Second Secretary to the WTO, northern developed country Geneva 24th May 2011
EU diplomatic source, EEAS New York 7th March 2011
Senior official, Department of Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Affairs, 
EEAS Brussels 10th May 2011
Former Disarmament Ambassador Miguel Aguirre de Carcer, Spanish 
Permanent Mission to the EU Brussels 5th May 2011
First Counsellor, EU Member State A New York 9th March 2011
Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, EU Member State B New York 9th March 2011
Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, EU Member State C New York 10th March 2011
Counsellor, EU Member State D New York 10th March 2011
First Secretary, EU Member State E New York 11th March 2011
Ambassador to the Political & Security Council, EU Member State F Brussels 16th May 2011
Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, EU Member State C Geneva 19th May 2011
Ambassador to the CD, EU Member State G Geneva 20th May 2011
Minister Counsellor to the UN, northern developed country New York 7th March 2011
Ambassador to the UN, southern developing country New York 10th March 2011
Counsellor, southern developing country New York 11th March 2011
First Secretary to the CD, northern developed country Geneva 23rd May 2011
Deputy Permanent Representative to the CD, northern developed country Geneva 24th May 2011
Ambassador, southern developed country By Email 6th April 2011
Senior official, UNODA New York 10th March 2011
James Wurst, Program Director, Middle Power Initiative New York 7th March 2011
Ray Acheson, Director, Reaching Critical Will New York 10th March 2011
Senior Advisor, ICRC New York 10th March 2011
Senior Analyst, Acronym Institute of Disarmament Diplomacy London 19th April 2011
Trade
NPT
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Appendix II: UNFCCC Negotiation Groups and their key issues 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation.  For these and other group positions during UNFCCC negotiations see 
http://unfccc.int  
Negotiation 
Group
Period of 
Activity
Members Key Issues
Legally binding emission reduction targets and timetables 
to prevent a rise in global temperature above 2 degrees 
Celsius
Developed world to take the lead in committing the most 
to emissions reductions but with recognition that the 
most advanced developing countries must also make 
commitments
Proponent of domestic action to reduce emissions and, 
since 1997, open to flexible mechanisms to achieve 
reduction targets (CDM, JI, emissions trading) but with 
limits to ensure environmental integrity 
Emissions reductions through flexible mechanisms 
(emissions trading, JI and CDM, use of sinks) with no 
limits
Binding commitments to be made by developing countries 
also, particularly the most advanced developing countries
Emissions reductions through flexible mechanisms 
(emissions trading, JI and CDM, use of sinks) with no 
limits
Binding commitments to be made by developing countries 
also, particularly the most advanced developing countries
Developed country to take the lead and cut emissions due 
to historic responsibility
Prior to 2005, no binding commitments on developing 
countries, since 2005 some openness to consider new 
commitments at levels suitable to development status 
under a post-Kyoto agreement
Better and more efficient funding and technology transfer 
from developed nations
No limits to be placed on economic growth
Some openness to making commitments to reduce 
emissions but not in the short term
Support a post-2012 agreement to which they will commit 
to targets but with historic responsibility to do the most 
still resting with the developed world
Need for more and better financial support to DCs 
especially with prioritisation of adaptation
Focus also on issues of equity, trade and intellectual 
property rights
Urgent need to tackle climate change to prevent further 
rises in sea-levels.  Most ambitious in calls for higher and 
quicker reduction targets by the developed world
Scaling up and quicker provision of Adaptation funding, 
technology transfer and financial support for mitigation in 
developing countries
Environmental 
Integrity Group 
(EIG)
2000-2011 Switzerland, Mexico & 
Korea
More ambitious emissions reduction targets and the 
maintenance of the environmental integrity of the Kyoto 
Protocol and any post-Kyoto agreement
OPEC 
(Organisation of 
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Countries)
1992-2011 12 States with petroleum 
exporting interests, also 
members of the G77.
Compensation from developed countries for undertaking 
new green measures and thus for buying less petroleum
LDCs (Least 
Developed 
Countries)
1992-2011 The 50 UN-recognised 
LDCs, also members of the 
G77
Easy and direct access to financial support
BASIC 2009-2011 Brazil, South Africa, India 
and China, fully associated 
with the G77
AOSIS (Alliance 
of Small Island 
States)
1992-2011 43 low-lying and small island 
countries, most of which are 
members of the G-77
Umbrella Group 1998-2011 Australia, Canada, Iceland, 
Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Russia, Ukraine 
and the US
G77 1992-2011 Approximately 130 
developing countries plus 
China
EU 1992-2011 EU-27 plus the EC
JUSSCANNZ 1992-1997 Japan, US, Switzerland, 
Canada, Australia, Norway, 
New Zealand
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Appendix III: WTO negotiation objectives by key player 
 
Actor Negotiation objectives
EU Defensive stance with preference for the maintenance of the status quo (and the protection of CAP).  
Willing to make some concessions in lowering or reducing tariffs/subsidies but with balance across the 
three pillars and with attention paid to the 'non-trade concerns' and 'multifunctionality' of the agricutlural 
sector.  Any or all concessions made conditional on agreement being reached in other sectors notably 
industrial goods, services, rules on anti-dumping, and development assistance.  Wants the US particularly 
to signficantly reduce its trade-distorting subsidies to farmers
US Offensive stance calling for the elimination of all export subsidies, cuts of the highest tariffs and some 
concessions of cuts in domestic support (amber box) but with green box maintained.  
G20 Broadly offensive positioning calling for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies, significant cuts in 
domestic support - particularly by the EU - and cuts in developed country tariffs.
EU Offensive objectives aimed at securing real improvements for access of its industrial goods to other 
countries.  A core objective is tackling the 'water' between current bound tariff rates and the applied rates 
of many developing countries as well as in new industrial sectors.  Favours the Swiss Formula approach 
in modalities for tariff reduction.  Part of the NAMA 'Friends of Ambition' negotiating group seeking to 
maximize tariff reductions and achieve real market access in NAMA
US Offensive interests that favours a sectoral approach with the reduction of tariffs and tariff peaks across 
key sectors of industrial products.  Favours a Swiss Formula approach to the reduction of tariffs 
particularly targeting the emerging economies. Part of the NAMA 'Friends of Ambition' negotiating group 
seeking to maximize tariff reductions and achieve real market access in NAMA
India Defensive interests on NAMA particularly on the formula for tariff reduction, opposing the Swiss 
Formula due to its emphasis on making higher cuts on high tariffs than on low tariffs – notably due to 
most DCs having defensively high tariffs.  India’s position is that the Swiss Formula goes against the 
principle of less than full reciprocity for DCs.  A member of the NAMA-11 calling for flexibilities to limit 
market opening in industrial goods trade
Brazil Offensive interests in reducing tariff peaks and escalation but opposes a Swiss Formula approach.  
Supports India (and Argentina) in proposing a Swiss-type formula to be applied line-by-line to bound 
tariffs but for unbound tariffs to be reduced from base values on the average tariffs.   A member of the 
NAMA-11 calling for flexibilities to limit market opening in industrial goods trade
China Defensive interests with core objectives to maintain special and differential treatment for DCs in NAMA 
negotiations.  Has supported the Swiss Formula with dual coefficients as long as the coefficients take 
DCs into account.  Member of the 'Paragraph Six' Group of countries with less than 35% of non-
agricultural products covered by legally bound tariff ceilings. They have agreed to increase their binding 
coverage substantially, but want to exempt some products
EU Offensive interests aimed at securing real improvements in European services access to other countries.  
Core objective is to tackle tariff peaks and thus to raising others level of ambition in making offers on 
bound tariffs that go further than current applied levels.  Further objective is the overall widening of 
services liberalisation.  Would prefer full modalities for tackling this issue within the DDA rather than the 
current request-offer basis. 
US Relatively offensive interests and a promoter of the more voluntary method of request and offer (rather 
than full modalities).  Has made calls for others to offer more in opening up their markets to foreign 
competition.
India Offensive interests on services and particularly on Mode-1 (cross-border supply i.e. international 
telephone calls) and Mode-4 (presence of natural persons).  India has also been vocal in stressing the 
equal importance of services to NAMA and agriculture.
Brazil Some offensive interests on sectors such as computers and IT but with concerns over possible constraints 
being imposed on national regulation 
China Has called for special interest to be given to sectors of particular concern or export interest for DCs
Agriculture
Industrial Goods (NAMA)
Services
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Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
 
 
 
EU Offensive interests in all four Singapore Issues, environmental & core labour standards, as well as in 
further trade liberalisation in TRIPs and TRIMs.  
US Offensive interests in pursuing the Singapore Issues, particularly pushing for government procurement and 
trade facilitation to be kept on the negotiating agenda.  Also a major advocate in the late 1990s for new 
round trade negotiations to focus upon core labour standards.  
India A consistently vocal opponent to the inclusion of new trade issues in early 1990s and early 2000s, 
particularly blocking core labour standards at Seattle, and the Singapore Issues at Cancun.  Supported by 
much of the developing world 
Brazil Remained mostly silent on the Singapore Issues during the early 2000s, allowing India to take the lead in 
opposing their inclusion on the DDA agenda. 
 'New' Issues
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Appendix VI: Levels of EU ambition over-time and across policies: Graphic 
interpretation of all findings 
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Appendix VII: EU performance relative to ambition: Graphic Interpretation of 
all findings 
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